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Abstract:
Within the past decade, there has been considerable debate amongst 
lawyers in most European and North American ju r isd ic t io n s  on standardized 
contracts. The rea lisa tion  tha t these contracts did not f i t  in to  the 
framework o f the law o f contract elaborated by nineteenth-centry theo rists , 
induced judges and academic a lik e  to fashion concepts and mechanisms in 
order to tackle the undoubted in ju s t ice s  which were concomitant with the 
use o f standardized contracts. These well meaning attemtps, while affording 
some protection to weaker contracting pa rtie s , were nevertheless productive 
o f uncertainty and inconsistency. Hence, there has been in recent years a 
spate of le g is la t io n  designed to deal with standardized contracts d ire c t ly  
or in d ire c t ly .
The adoption of modern economic in s t itu t io n s  and also of Western legal 
systemsin Cameroon has brought about s ig n if ic a n t problems in the realm of 
contract. The widespread i l l i t e r a c y  in  Cameroon, the lack o f commercial 
soph istication  o f the bulk o f the populace, and the use of standardized 
contracts, have created problems of a much wider dimension than those to 
be found in the developed countries.
This thesis involves a study in comparative law. I t  charts the ways 
in which the English and French courts have addressed the problems of 
standardized contracts. I t  a lso  delves in to how the Cameroonian courts 
have dealt with them, revealing the incongru ities inherent in the 
app lication o f concepts which have been evolved in a d iffe ren t country with 
d is t in c t  motives, in another country with en tire ly  d iffe ren t soc ia l re a lit ie s .
F in a lly , th is thesis looks at the le g is la t iv e  innovation; brought to th is 
area o f the law by four European countries and discerns what lessons can be 
learned from them by Cameroonian leg is la to rs  in dealing with the problems 
of standardized contracts in Cameroon.
A ll th is is  achieved by pu llin g  together legal analysis and comments by 
Anglo-Americans and European scho lars, and by weaving into the text nearly 
a ll important English, French, Cameroonian and indeed American cases on th is 
subject.
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INTRODUCTION.
The law o f contract in both England and France, and indeed 
in  most o f the Western c a p ita lis t  countries, was essen tia lly  shaped in 
the nineteenth century. The premises of the law of contract were the 
la is s e z - fa ire  theories o f Adam Smith and others, and it s  mainstay was the 
p rin c ip le  o f freedom o f contract and the co ro lla ry , the sanctity  o f contract 
Each contracting party was deemed to be acting through h is fre e -w ill and 
the function of the law o f contract was predominantly to define the 
necessary formal conditions for the v a lid ity  o f a contract. Once those 
conditions were obtained, the contracts had to be respected by both parties 
and by the courts as w e ll.
The beginning of the twentieth century saw radical transformations of 
socia l and economic r e a l it ie s ,  inasmuch as the growth of large scale 
production, with the attendant growth of monopolies and the use of 
standardized contracts, began creating a fundamental d isequ ilib rium  or 
even an antagonism between the large powerful businesses on the one 
hand, and smaller businesses and consumers on the other. The cornerstone 
of the c la s s ic a l paradigm of contract law, i .e .  freedom o f contracimproved 
il lu so ry  because the facu lty  to negotiate contractual terms was no longer 
rea lizab le . In the face of these changes, the mechanist fo r the protection 
of weaker parties which were incorporated in the c la ss ica l law o f contract 
such as duress, m isrepresentation and undue Influence, could only afford 
formal protection.
This c la s s ic a l paradigm of contract, with a l l i t s  appurtenances was 
transplanted into Cameroon, via co lon ia lism . Because of local facto rs,
greater d is to rt ion s  have become apparent in  th is  c la ss ic a l model o f 
contract. While English and French courts and leg is la tu res  devised means 
of m itigating the unfairness o f standardized contracts, th e ir Cameroonian 
counterparts have not followed s u it .
By introducing sweeping le g is la t io n  in th is  area of the law, the 
English and French ju r isd ic t io n s  have ta c it ly  acknowledged that ju d ic ia l 
control o f standardized contracts is  in su ff ic ie n t . I t  w il l be submitted 
that th is  must a fo r t io r i be the case in Cameroon.
This thesis is  divided in to seven chapters. The f i r s t  four chapters 
culminate in  an exposition o f the current approach o f the Cameroonian 
courts to the issues raised by standardized contracts. That exposition is  
reached by way of a description of the legal and economic context in 
Cameroon (Chapter One); a h isto ry  o f the evolution of the c la ss ic a l law 
of contract (Chapter Two); and an analysis of the law and the approach 
of the courts of France and England to standardized contracts (Chapter 
Three). Because the law of contract in Cameroon is  based upon the law 
of these countries, these chapters provide the material fo r the eventual 
understanding of the current Cameroonian approach.
The study then considers the nature and value o f the concept of 
"Unconscionability" in  dealing with standardized contracts (Chapter Five) 
and the modern le g is la t iv e  attempts o f four countries, v iz , England, 
France, Germany and Sweden - to deal with the issues, before f in a l ly  
focussing upon a proposed strategy fo r Cameroon, drawing upon the 
experiences of the countries already mentioned, and where app licab le , 
those of the African countries (Chapter Seven).
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE SOCIO-CONOMIC AND LEGAL STRUCTURE OF CAMEROON
It would be both r id icu lou s , and fu t i le  to attempt to carry out an 
elaborate study of the socio-economic and legal structure o f Cameroon in 
a thesis of th is  kind. However, an ou tline o f that structure is  ce rta in ly  
not out o f place here fo r i t  provides an overview of the context w ithin 
which contracts are made and disputes a ris in g  therefrom are settled .
Without such an overview, i t  w i l l  be d i f f ic u l t  i f  not impossible to 
appreciate the extent o f the problems to be raised subsequently and the 
conclusions reached by the researcher.
Section I: Cameroon's Legal System:
A: H is to rica l Background.
There are three facts which w i l l  in ev itab ly  meet the eye of any 
legal scholar in  Cameroon. The f i r s t  which is  obviously very t r i t e ,  is  
th a t ,1 ike a ll African countries, the legal system is  based on European 
models. The second is  that Cameroon has inherited  from it s  co lon ia l past 
a h igh ly complex legal system, consisting o f at least three bodies of 
laws:- French law, English law, and Customary law (including Islamic la w ) .^  
I t  therefore o ffe rs the fasc inating example o f a country attempting to create 
a legal system not only from the C iv il  and Customary law, but from the 
Common law as w e ll. The th ird  conclusion which is  equally conspicuous is  
the appalling lack of awareness on the part o f the community at large of
1. The terms "English" and "French" law are used here in a rather 
re s tr ic t iv e  sense to denote that part o f English and French law 
which through colonialism  were extended to Cameroon.
-4-
the workings of the legal system, espec ia lly  with respect to c iv i l  
matters.
Cameroon, which occupies an area o f about one hundred and eighty 
three square m iles, with a population o f about eight m illio n , has a 
legal system which has been squarely determined by it s  co lonial past.
I t  is  therefore impossible to understand i t  without some knowledge of that 
past. In 1884, a fte r a period o f intense r iv a lry  between the B r it ish  and 
the Germans, Germany outwitted B r ita in  and annexed Cameroon.^ Their 
goal in doing so was to e xp lo it in tens ive ly  the te r r ito ry 's  natural 
resources in order to feed the emerging industries in G e r m a n y . T h u s ,  
i t  did not take long for th e ir  influence on the te r r ito ry  to disappear a fte r 
th e ir  rule was brought to an end during the F ir s t  World War by the combined 
forces of B r ita in  and France.
On the 4th o f March 1916, B r ita in  and France formally partitioned 
Cameroon a fte r a series o f diplomatic agreements. Under the Treaty of 
Ve rsa ille s  in 1919, Germany renounced a l l  righ ts to it s  former colonies in 
favour of the a ll ie d  and associated powers. B rita in  and France then 
presented the League of Nations with a ' f a i t  accompli'. However, by the Acts 
o f Ju ly 20th of the League of Nations, they undertook to administer the 
te r r ito ry  w ithin the s p ir i t  of A r t .22 o f the League of Nations Covenant. 
A r t ic le  9 of the Acts of 1922 granted B r ita in  and France " fu ll powers of 
adm inistration and le g is la t io n "  over the Cameroons, and went further to 
provide that they were to be "administered according to the leg is la tion  o f 
the Mandatory power as an integral part o f i t s  te rr ito ry " . It  further
2. Ardner, Eye-Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon. (Buea,
Government Press, 1968] pp. 19-26.
3. E. Lewin, The Germans and A fr ic a . (Cassel & Co. L td ., 1915)
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stipu lated  that "The Mandatory Power is  consequently authorised to apply 
to the regions subject to mandate it s  leg is la t ion  with such modifications 
as are required by loca l conditions".
With these powers given her, France immediately took steps to extend 
her municipal law to what then became known as French Cameroons. She did 
th is  by the employment o f reception statutes. The decree of May 22nd 1924 
"rendered executory in the te r r ito ry  o f the Cameroons placed under the 
Mandate o f France the laws and decrees in French Equatoria l A frica  p rio r 
to January 1st 1924" B rita in ,on  her part, proceeded to administer her own 
part of the te r r ito ry  - B r it is h  Cameroons - as part o f i t s  adjacent colony 
of N igeria. By an Order-in-Counci1 No. 1621 of June 1923, laws in force in 
N igeria were extended to B r it is h  Cameroons.
At the end of the Second World War, the status o f the Cameroons was 
changed from a mandatory te r r ito ry  under the League of Nations, to a Trust 
Territo ry  under the United Nations. This development however, had no 
impact on the legal development of the te rr ito ry  since l ik e  the League of 
Nations before i t ,  the United Nations gave B r ita in  and France " fu l l powers 
o f le g is la t io n " .^  Hence, English and French law came to ex is t in Cameroon 
fo r no other reason than th is: th e ir imposition by the co lon ia l powers.
Although foreign law became imposed on the te r r ito ry , there were 
certa in areas where i t  was absolutely necessary to maintain customary law. 
Family law and the law o f succession obviously stand out in th is respect. 
B r it is h  co lon ia l p o licy , the cornerstones of which were in d ire c t rule and 
trade, had to accommodate customary law as a matter o f strategy. Furthermore, 
there is  some weight fo r the proposition that customary law had to be
4. Cameroons (1946) United Nations Document A/155/Rev. 2 a rt 64.
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maintained in order to "keep the natives n a t i v e " . A s  fa r as France 
is  concerned, i t  has time a fte r time been stated that her po licy  was one 
of ass im ila tion . This would imply that she wanted to do away with customary 
law and it s  in s t itu t io n s . I t  is  now evident however that th is po licy  was 
simply aimed at se tting  apart an e l i t e  group among the indigenous people 
who would serve as her a l l ie s  so to speak. They were given the status of 
"citoyen" when they abandoned th e ir customary law and adopted the personal 
law of the c iv i l  code. The extension o f French Law to the entire  population, 
g iving them c iv i l  and p o lit ic a l r igh ts  was not only o f no in te rest to the 
French, but was indeed in im ica l to th e ir  designs. France a lso , thus, 
maintained indigenous African in s t itu t io n s  and law. The system they 
established to th is  e ffe c t was the "indigdnat" which regulated the c iv i l  
rights and ob ligations o f the "su je ts". There was therefore qua lif ied  
recognition and enforcement o f customary law in the en tire  te r r ito ry .
B: Cameroon's Legal System Since Independence.
( i)  Before 1972:
A chapter the scope of which is  merely to give an in s igh t into 
the legal system in Cameroon can hardly be the place to delve into it s  
legal h is to ry . The emerging co lon ia l system outlined above became con­
so lidated in the B r it is h  Cameroons in 1954. Because of constitu tiona l 
changes in Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Nigerian (Constitution) Order-in- 
Council 1954 reorganising the court system was issued. Southern Cameroons 
(the new name given to Cameroon under B r it is h  ru le ), had it s  own High Court 
and Magistrate Courts by v irtue of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law,
1955 and the Magistrate Courts (Southern Cameroons) Law. Customary law
5. Gaertz, The Relig ion o f Java (New York, 1960), p. 363.
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Courts, then known as Native Authority Courts, were maintained. Appellate 
ju r isd ic t io n  rested with the Federal Court o f Justice in Lagos. Cameroonian 
law was thus tied to Nigerian Law.
Meanwhile, in the French Cameroons, the Jud ic ia l Organisation Ordinance 
No. 59/86 of 17th December 1959 created an array of courts. Five courts 
with orig ina l ju r is d ic t io n  were in s titu ted : The F ir s t  Instance Tribunal, 
the "Justice de Paix" Tribunal; Customary Tribunal and Grade I Tribunal, 
both of which were trad it ion a l law courts; D iv is iona l Criminal Courts and 
Special Criminal Tribunals. There was also an Appeal Court.
On the 1st of January 1960, the Trust Te rrito ry  of French Cameroons 
attained independence and became "La Republique du Cameroon." On October 1st 
1961, following a p le b is c ite , the then Southern Cameroons decided to unite 
with the new"Republique du Cameroon"and the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
was thus formed. With respect to legal matters, the leg is la t ion  in force 
in each of the Federated States p r io r to the 1st o f October 1961 was maintained 
insofar as i t  was not against the 1961 C o n s t itu t io n .^  But fo r the creation 
of a few new Federal Courts, which were courts o f special ju r is d ic t io n , 
dealing essentia lly  w ith constitu tiona l and labour matters, the two d is t in c t 
legal systems remained as they were in pre-independence days. The new courts 
in stitu ted  were: the Federal Court o f Justice which dealt with constitu tional 
issues and matters a r is in g  from co n flic ts  o f ju r isd ic t io n  between the courts 
of East and West Cameroon as the French and B r it ish  Cameroons became hence­
forth known respective ly; the Federal High Court o f Justice was to try  the 
President and M in isters of State for treason - a task which i t  was never
6. Law No. B1-24 o f ls t  September 1961, a r t ic le  46 in Journal O ff ic ie l 
de la République du Cameroun, September 30th 1961.
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once ca lled  to undertake throughout it s  l i f e .  Labour Courts were also 
established throughout the Federal R ep u b lic .^  Each Federated State 
maintained a separate appellate system:- The Cour Supreme in East 
Cameroon and the West Cameroon Court o f Appeal in West Cameroon. The 
decision of any court in  e ithe r Federated State was however enforceable 
throughout the Republic.
This state of a f fa irs  continued u n til 1972. On the 20th o f May 1972, 
the Cameroonian people, by a referendum, accepted President Ah id jo 's 
proposal to transform the federal system into a un itary one. The country 
henceforth became the United Republic o f Cameroon, composed of seven 
provinces, two of which are anglophonic, i.e .  the former West Cameroon.
A legal revolution thus took place and the new constitu tion which came in 
force on the 2nd o f June 1972 provided fo r the establishment of a sing le  
system of courts w ithin the whole country
( i i )  Post 1972:
A rt ic le  42 o f the 1972 Constitution gave the President o f the 
United Republic of Cameroon powers to set up new ju d ic ia l in s titu t io n s  
w ith in  a lim ited  period o f one year. He did th is  by Ordinance No. 72/4 
o f 26th August 1972 on Jud ic ia l Organisation. The underlying reasons for 
the new decree were twofold: f i r s t  o f a l l ,  the passage from a Federated 
to a United Republic meant that a uniform system had to be set up.
Secondly, the pre-1972 system was very complicated and inconvenient. The 
new Ordinance did away with the maze of courts which existed in the country 
and established a much simpler system of courts. Four courts with ordinary
7. M. Riou - 'L 'O rg an isa t io n  J u d ic ia i r e  du Cameroon.'1 Penant , vo l.  79
No. 723, 1969, pages 33-86.
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ju r isd ic t io n  were created: Courts o f F ir s t  Instance, High Courts,
Courts o f Appeal and M ilita ry  Courts. Three Courts with special 
ju r isd ic t io n s  were also in s titu ted : The Supreme Court, the Court of 
Impeachment and the Higher J u s t ic ia l Council.
Customary ju r is d ic t io n  ex is ts  only "fo r the time b e in g "J8 910) The 
new ju s t ic ia l organisation aims at the eventual abo lit ion  o f customary 
courts. These courts however continue to e x is t . In the Anglophonic 
provinces of the country, they are simply ca lled  Customary Courts while 
in the Francophonic provinces they are ca lled  "Justices de Paix".
F ir s t  Instance^  Courts have replaced the Magistrate Courts in the 
Anglophonic Provinces. They consist o f a President, one or more 
(professional) judges, a State Counsel with one or more deputies, a Chief 
Registrar with one o r more reg is tra rs . Only one judge s its  at a time.
The Ordinance stipu lated  that there be one court o f F ir s t  Instance in every 
d is t r ic t  in the country. This objective is  fa r from being achieved 
however because of the lack of personnel and finance. Hence, one Court 
o f F ir s t  Instance may serve two or more d is t r ic t .  Their substantive 
ju r is d ic t io n  covers both crim inal and c iv i l  matters. In crim inal matters, 
they have ju r is d ic t io n  over misdemeanours and simple o f f e n c e s , w h i l e  
in c iv i l  matters, they can try  any action where the amount of the claim 
does not exceed 500,000 frs C .F.A ., 1.e. about £1,000.
8. S.26 o f Ordinance No. 72/4 o f 26th August 1972.
9. This nomenclature appears confusing as High Courts are also f i r s t  
instance courts. Even the Supreme Court in Cameroon is  a f i r s t  instance 
court, i .e.  w ith respect to adm inistrative matters.
10. The Cameroon Penal Code c la s s if ie s  offences according to the maximum 
punishment attributed to that offence. Thus, a misdemeanour is  any 
offence the maximum punishment o f which is  5 years imprisonment.
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High Courts are composed of a President, who must be a ju d ic ia l 
o f f ic e r  and member o f the Court o f Appeal, one o r more judges, also 
members o f the Court o f Appeal, a Chief Reg istrar and one or more 
re g is tra rs , a State Counsel and one or more deputies. Like the F ir s t  
Instance Courts, they s i t  with only one judge, except in labour matters 
where there must be two assessors. They also have ju r isd ic t io n  over pro­
ceedings a ffecting  a person's status - d ivorce, a f f i l ia t io n ,  adoption etc.
They can also issue prerogative orders such as 'c e r t io r a r i ' ,  'mandamus' 
and 'p ro h ib it io n ' and the 'w r it  o f habeas corpus'. The ordinance of 1972 
provided fo r the establishment of one High Court in every d iv is ion  o f the 
country. Here again, i t  is  the same old ta le  - lack o f qua lif ied  personnel 
and su ff ic ie n t  funds do not permit th is .
There is  one Court o f Appeal fo r each of the Provinces. They are 
composed of a President, one or more V ice-Presidents, one or more judges, 
a Procureur General, an Advocate General, legal a ss is tan ts , a Chief 
Registrar and one or more reg istra rs . Appeals come from Customary Courts, 
F ir s t  Instance Courts, and the High Courts w ith in any given Province and 
are tr ie d  by three judges.
The Supreme Court is  an appellate court with special ju r isd ic t io n . There 
is  one for the en tire  country and it s  seat is  in Yaounde, the cap ita l. It 
functions lik e  the”Cour de Cassatiorf' in France. I t  hears applications 
a lleg ing  an erro r o f law in a judgement of the court below, i . e.  the 
Court o f Appearand decides only on questionsof law, not of fact. Its 
primary ro le is  to harmonize the in terpretation o f the rules of law by
- l i ­
the lower c o u r t s . D e c i s i o n s  from any o f the seven Courts o f Appeal 
can be attacked by "pourvoi" to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has unfortunately, however, had only a s lig h t impact 
on the harmonization o f the in terp re ta tion  of the ru les o f law. This 
fa ilu re  is  due mainly to the fact that there is  no real basis from which 
such harmonization can properly be done. The judges o f the Supreme Court 
have been brought up in contrasting legal trad ition s. Thus, i t  is  no surprise 
that the Supreme Court has ended up entrusting the hearing o f  appeals (pourvoi) 
from the Courts of Appeal in the Anglophonic provinces only to Anglophonic 
judges and vice-versa.
I f  the Supreme Court, which s it s  with five  judges, find s that a 
Court o f Appeal has made an e rro r o f law, i t  n u ll i f ie s  the judgement and 
remits the case to a d iffe re n t ly  constituted Court of Appeal (or that o f 
another province). I f  however any pa rt icu la r matter comes to the Supreme 
Court for a second time, the Supreme Court may then give a f in a l judgement.
The Supreme Court is  a lso , oddly, a court of f i r s t  instance with 
respect to adm in istrative matters. Its adm inistrative bench tr ie s  a ll 
adm in istrative and constitu tiona l matters. Appeals from the adm inistrative 
bench may be brought to the f u l l  court. 1
11. This was thought to be necessary because the p rin c ip le  o f  the binding 
force o f precedent does not e x is t  generally. I t  is  to be found in a 
lim ited  way in the Anglophonic Courts. Unlike other common law ju r is ­
d ictions the Anglophonic Courts do not apply the p r in c ip le  r ig id ly  for 
two reason: (1) The absence of law reporting makes i t  unsafe to re ly  on 
precedent; (2) There are two Courts o f Appeal in the Anglophonic Provinces 
and th e ir  decisions may not always be the same on any given point o f law.
Although there is  no rule as to the binding force of precedent in the 
Francophonic Courts, i t  must be observed however that in  lin e  with the 
French trad it io n , in practice i f  not in theory, a se tt led  line  of 
decisions - "jurisprudence constante" - constitutes strong authority 
and is  generally followed. This is  p a rt icu la r ly  so in adm in istrative 
law where because of the absence of a code, case law Is an actual source 
of law. "Les grands a r r fts "  are frequently cited as authority  fo r 
proposi t io n s .
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( i i i )  Content of the Law Administered:
In Crim inal and Labour matters, the laws applicable are uniform 
in a l l  the seven provinces. Here, the Leg islature has made great strides 
in enacting loca l le g is la t io n . On October 1st 1966, Law No. 65-LF-24 of 
12th November 1965 came into force, de lineating the fundamental rules 
governing the whole of crim inal law. On October 1st 1967, Law No. 67 - 1 
of June 12th 1967, defining pa rticu la r offences also came into e ffe c t.
The two laws make up the Cameroon Penal Code. In 1967, the Cameroon 
Labour Code was also enacted.
In c iv i l  matters, excepting ce rta in  aspects of fam ily law, v iz . ,  status, 
and some areas o f commercial law such as banking and insurance, there is  a 
dearth of loca l le g is la t io n . In the Anglophonic provinces, the 
applicable law comprises:- (a) the comnon law; (b) the doctrines of 
equity and (c) the statutes of general app lica tion  which were in  force in 
England before January 1st 1900. ^  Laws which were enacted a fte r 1900 
and before independence under the co lon ia l adm inistration are also s t i l l  
applicable in so fa r  as they do not go contrary to any new le g is la t io n .
Pre-independence le g is la t io n , which as has already been remarked, was tied  
to Nigerian le g is la t io n , is  found 1n statu te books known as the Revised 
Editions o f the Laws of the Federation o f N igeria. They continue to be 
the mainstay o f c iv i l  le g is la t io n  in  Anglophonic Cameroon. In the law 
of contract therefore, i t  is  e ssen tia lly  the cornnon law princ ip les and pre-1900 
English le g is la t io n  that apply. This is  in  contrast to the legal develop­
ment in Nigeria where English law, although s t i l l  a large part of Nigerian 123
12. See Ordinance No. 73-14 of 10th May 1973 regulating Insurance Companies; 
Ordinance No. 73-27 of 30th August 1973 regulating Banking A c t iv it ie s .
13. S.15 of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955.
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law, has considerably diminished in  importance since independence as 
a resu lt of the growing weight and importance given to loca l le g is la t io n .(14 15)
The precise scope o f app lica tion  of the common law, the doctrine of
equity and statutes of general app lication has never been determined.
It is  not the in tention  to explore the precise app lica tion  of the above.
It must be observed however that the Anglophonic Courts in  Cameroon have 
continued to c ite  and fo llow  English cases, p a rt icu la r ly  those of the 
Privy Council, the House of Lords and the Court o f Appeal, except where 
the decision of the court is  e n tire ly  based on a piece of post 1900 
le g is la t io n .
Furthermore, customary law which is  neither repugnant to ju s tic e , 
equity and good conscience, nor incompatible with any law in  force is  
app licab le . S.27(3) o f the Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955 
however states that "no party shall be en tit led  to claim the benefit o f 
any native law and custom i f  i t  sha ll appear e ith e r from express contract 
or from the nature of the transaction out o f which any s u it  or question 
may have arisen that such party agreed that h is ob ligations in connection 
with such transactions sh a ll be regulated exc lu s ive ly  by English law or 
that such transactions are transactions unknown to native law and custom."
Sub-section 4 provides that: "In cases where no express rule is  
applicable to a matter in  controversy, the court sha ll be governed by 
the p rin c ip les of ju s t ic e , equity and good conscience."
In the Francophonic Provinces, the same picture can be seen. Unlike
14. D.E. Obilade,"The Legal System Since Independence," in  T.O. E lia s , Law 
and Social Change in  N igeria ,(Evans B ros.Ltd., 1972), pages 23-33.
15. Because there are very few areas in the c iv i l  law of England which have 
not been subject to le g is la t io n  i t  is  now d i f f ic u l t  to find any decision 
which is  not re lated to some statutory provision. In family law, English 
le g is la t io n  is  s t i l l  applicable in  Anglophonic Cameroon.
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Senegal and Ivory Coast which have elaborated C iv il  Codes of th e ir  own,
Cameroon s t i l l  re lie s  heavily on received French le g is la t io n : Codes and
numerous other statutes which were applicable in  French Equatorial A frica .
In add ition  a lo t  o f le g is la t io n  was passed during the co lon ia l period.
The law of contracts is  however nearly en tire ly  based on the French C iv il
Code^16 178^ which has been supplemented by "doctrine" and "principes gdndraux" 
put forward by eminent French legal scholars.
C: Law Reform and the Legal Profession:
On the 9th o f February 1973, President Ahidjo, ta lk ing  about law 
reform during a Press Conference, said: "This is  both an urgent and 
de lica te  task. Urgent because i t  is  obvious that sets of laws which 
correspond to d iffe ren t p rin c ip le s  cannot co -ex ist fo r long w ith in  a 
un ita ry  state: de lica te  because i t  a ffects the trad ition s and values of 
men.,,(18)
This view encapsulates the problems facing the Cameroonian law 
reformer. On the one hand, the 1972, June 2nd Constitution which created 
a un ita ry sta te  was patterned on the 1958 French Constitution. I t  created 
a h igh ly  cen tra lised  government, g iving the President "imperial" powers.
16. In France, other laws have been passed to modify certain provisions of 
the c iv i l  code, fo r example, Law No.78-23 of 10th January 1978 on 
"Contra ts d' adhesion". Such laws are not applicable in  Cameroon.
17. Legal scholars have always wielded considerable influence on the 
development of the law in France. The C iv il Code drew very large ly  on 
Domat's "Les lo ix  c iv i le s  dans leu r ordre nature l", 1689-94 and from 
Po th ie r 's  T ra ité  des O b liga tions. 1761. Their ro le is  not merely to 
expose de lege lata, but a lso de lege ferenda. Outside the leg is la tu re , 
they are the mosTTpotent force in  i-rench legal development. Pre-eminent 
among these ju r is t s ,  in the realm of contract, today, are: Marty G, 
Renaud P, Henrf, Léon and Jean Mazeaud, Jean Carbonnier, Boris Starck, 
Savatie r, R ipert P lan io l.
18. ACAP Da ily  News B u lle t in , 10th February, 1973.
This cen tra lisa tion  pervades not only the country's p o lit ic s  but as w il l  be 
seen la te r , the country's economic structures. The seven provinces of the 
country have since 1972, become very in t r ic a te ly  knitted together. On 
the other hand, the substantive as well as the procedural laws in two of 
the seven provinces are d iffe ren t (very ra d ic a lly  d iffe ren t in certa in  
aspects) from the laws preva iling in the other f iv e  provinces. This 
s itua tion  is  exacerbated by the existence o f customary law (which d if fe rs  
from one tr ibe  to another) and also o f Islamic law. While conceding in 
p r in c ip le  that legal p luralism  may be better su ited to achieve the ends of 
ju s tice  in the p lu ra l is t ic  society that Cameroon is ,  the costs incurred in 
terms o f the inconvenience and uncertainty resu lting  from th is  state of 
a ffa irs  are too heavy. I t  is  surely contrary to the in terests of both 
foreign and loca l investors, of lawyers who wish to practice in both the 
anglophonic and francophonic provinces, of business concerns, and not 
lea st, o f law students who would undoubtedly find  i t  easier to grapple 
with a legal system based on fa ir ly  uniform p rin c ip le s , than one which 
comprises common law, c i v i l  law and customary law p rin c ip les .
In very decentralised countries, for example the United States of 
America, a lo t  o f in te lle c tu a l and material e f fo r t  has been spent in try ing 
to evolve f a ir ly  uniform p rin c ip les fo r the en tire  community; hence, the 
elaboration of the American Restatements of the law of contract , 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Such e ffo rts  should 'a fo rt io r i ' be made 
in a centra lised  country such as Cameroon where there is  an evident need 
for uniform ity of law. Helas, th is has not been the case. The most 
important single hurdle standing in the way of uniform ity is  that of 
bridging the gu lf that e x is ts  between c i v i l  law and common law trad it ion s .
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The problems involved in  harmonising the battery o f loca l customs that 
e x is t are also considerable.
In connection with law reform, Cameroon, in  the footsteps of France, 
has opted for co d ifica tion . In 1964, four years a fte r independence, two 
Federal Law Reform Commissions were formed and were given the hard task 
o f preparing a Code o f C iv il and Commeici al Obligations and also a Code 
o f C iv il Procedure. The Commissions, oddly enough, were made up 
exc lu s ive ly  o f judges, advocates, trad it ion a l Chiefs and re lig ious leaders. 
They did not include any un ive rs ity  law teacher, anthropologist or 
so c io lo g is t. This may explain why none of these codes saw the lig h t of 
day.
The only major works of cod ifica tion  so fa r are the Cameroon Penal 
Code, and the Labour Code. They did not however re su lt from a real process 
o f law reform. Rather, they were the consequence o f a purported exercise 
o f harmonising the laws that prevailed in both East and West Cameroon as 
they then were. In th is  process, the rule o f the majority won the day.
The Labour Code for example was nearly a complete rep lica  of the French 
"Code du Travail d'Outre Mer" o f 1952. The only p r in c ip le  borrowed from 
the labour leg is la t io n  in the then West Cameroon were those re la ting  to 
union organisation and labour inspectors. There was very l i t t l e ,  i f  any, 
fresh th inking on the subject. I t  did not however take long for the 
leg is la tu re  to come to the rea lisa tio n  that the code did not take local 
factors in to consideration and had become v ir tu a lly  in e ffe c t iv e . In 1974, 
i t  was completely withdrawn and a new one with s ig n if ic a n t differences was 
promulgated.
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A ll too often, law reformers in  Cameroon have had "the tendency to 
look at law reform . . .  as a struggle between the common law and the c iv i l  
law as to which system would emerge v ic t o r io u s . . . " .^ )  It is  submitted 
that th is  tendency is  parochial and regrettable because i t  does not enable 
the law reformers to approach th e ir  subject in  a dispassionate and orig ina l 
manner which they ce rta in ly  must do i f  they have to bring forth recommend­
ations relevant to the s o c io -p o lit ic a l and economic context o f Cameroon.
The nature o f the bar and the ju d ic ia ry  (magistrature as commonly referred 
to in Cameroon) has not in any way helped the p ligh t of law reform in 
Cameroon. While observers such as academics, jo u rn a lis tse tc ., are useful 
forces in the law reform process, the jud ic ia ry  and the bar who are amongst 
the primary partic ipants o f the adm inistration o f ju stice  ought to be very 
involved. This had not however been the case fo r a number of reasons. 
Foremost among them is  the fact that the legal establishment, i . e .  the 
h ighly successful p ractis ing  lawyers^19 201) received the ir legal tra in ing
19. Anyangwe, Carlson, The Adm in istra tion of  Justice in a B i-Ju ral Country - 
The United Republic o f Cameroon. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University o f 
London, 1979, page 1270.
20. While interview ing one of the legal scholars in Cameroon, Professor 
S tan islas Melone, on th is subject, 1 rea lised that th is tendency is  
not only ingrained in judges, but also (sadly) in some academics. His 
view is  that what is  required in  so far as law reform in Cameroon is  
concerned, is  to take the French law as a basis and then to proceed to 
make good any flaw that is  apparent by borrowing from English law. It 
is  submitted that th is manner o f proceeding with law reform by forging 
what amounts to an uncomfortable compromise between two a lie n  systems 
of law is  not only misguided, but i t  is  also productive of laws which 
do not m irror forth the p a rt icu la r circumstances and the changing 
re a lit ie s  of Cameroon.
21. Like many other African countries, there is  not spec ia liza tion  into 
s o lic ito r s  or advocates among p ractis ing  lawyers 1n Cameroon. Public 
Notaries however constitute a d is t in c t  and separate group o f legal 
p rac titione rs . Their ro le is  e ssen tia lly  to authenticate legal 
documents and instruments such as contracts, leases, conveyances etc. 
They are appointed by the M in is te r of Justice from among leading 
practitioners in good standing. They do not,however, represent the 
State.
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e ith e r in France or in England and have been imbued exclu s ive ly  with 
e ith e r the French or the English law tra d it io n s . They have no pa rticu la r 
desire to modify the laws, which might thus introduce them to something 
outside the ir lega l cu ltu re.
Secondly, u n t il very recently, they have been very small in  number, 
thus enjoying exclusive status with a l l that goes with i t .  I t  is  therefore 
in th e ir in te re st that the status quo should not be disturbed. Their 
c lie n te le  consist e ssen tia lly  o f the business community - middle-men, 
traders, property developers e tc ., and the growing professional middle 
c lass who more than any other group, benefit from the ex isting  laws 
(espec ia lly  in connection with commerical matters). This makes the lawyers 
obsequious to these classes, thereby s t i f l in g  any desire on th e ir  part to 
lobby for any changes in the law.
S im ila r ly , the jud ic ia ry  is  not very well suited to actuate law reform. 
Following the French trad it io n , judges in Cameroon have a status akin to 
that o f c iv i l  s e r v a n t s . C o n t r a r y  to the English trad it ion  of 
appointing judges from leading memebrs o f the bar, in Cameroon, judges 
are trained. Any person wishing to become a judge must possess a law 
degree equivalent to the licknce-en-D ro it or LI.B. and undergo a two year 
course at the National School o f Adm inistration and Magistrature, subject, 
o f course, to an entry examination.
The notion that the introduction of new laws is  s t r ic t ly  w ithin the 2
22. The only s ig n if ic a n t difference between judges and the rest of c iv i l  
servants 1s that they are protected from a rb itra ry  dism issals and 
santions. In th is  respect, the Higher Jud ic ia l Council which is  made 
up of senior judges and president over by the Head of State, is  the 
only body which has the power to sandtion or dismiss any judge fo r gross 
misconduct.
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compass of the leg is la tu re  and the executive is  deeply implanted in  themJ23) 
The judges therefore do not possess the sense of independence nor the 
necessary v o lit io n  which i t  takes to make any proposals fo r law reform 
e ith e r in th e ir judgements, or outside the courts.
Another problem facing the ju d ic ia ry  is  the paucity of personnel.
The 1972 ju d ic ia l organisation decree attempted to tackle th is problem 
by reducing the number o f ju r is d ic t io n s . The problem pe rs is ts , none-the- 
le s s . ( 24>
There is  however a glimmer o f hope. In the few years past, graduates 
from the Faculty o f Law and Economics in the University o f Yaounde, 
who have been s u f f ic ie n t ly  grounded in both French and English law have 
been admitted into the ju d ic ia ry . Because they have received a more or less
23. Some Anglophonic judges, p a rt icu la r ly  those who began the ir careers 
in the co lon ia l era and immediately afterwards, have nevertheless 
vigorously spoken out in favour reforming the law. Their number is  
however dwindling. Foremost among them is  the former Chief Justice 
of West Cameroon, now President o f the Court o f Appeal in the South- 
West Province, S.M.L. Endeley, C.J.
24. M. Nkouenjin, "So liloque Sur Certains Problems Soulevés Par 
L'Organisation Ju d ic ia ire  de la  République du Cameroun", ' Receuil 
Penant', Vol. 86, 1976, page 5. Mr. Nkouenjin c ite s  two cases to 
demonstrate the extent of th is  problem:- In ' L 'A ffa ire  Evina Aben1, 
the p la in t if f  who won a judgement in a personal In juries case waited 
for more than two years before recovering the judgement debt because 
the presiding judge could not find time to w rite out and sign h is 
judgement as required by the C iv il Procedure Code.
In ' L 'A ffa ire  TheVfese Ndankeu', a land dispute had to be adjourned 
for more than two years: from February 1973 to Ap ril 1975.
homogeneous legal education, and also because they are less conservative 
than th e ir  older colleagues, one can only hope that they can provide the 
impetus needed fo r law reform. There has also been renewed government 
in te rest in  the subject. A Law Reform Commission fo r the preparation 
of a crim ina l and a c iv i l  procedure code was set up in 1976. Its d ra ft 
crim inal procedure code is  expected soon.
D: Access to Justice in Cameroon.
The focus here, is  on two aspects o f the legal system in  Cameroon: 
the cost o f  obtaining ju s tice  and the a v a ila b il ity  o f legal aid and legal 
advice to the pub lic .
( i ) Costs:
The Cameroonian constitu tion  proclaims the p r in c ip le  of 
equa lity  before justice  in i t s  preamble. Section 6(1) o f the Jud ic ia l 
Organisation Ordinance, 1972, s ta tu to r ily  provides that ju s tice  shall be 
administered "free o f charge, subject to the fixed provisions concerning 
stamp duty and reg istra tion ". These declarations appear however to be 
merely formal declarations, void of any content as the evidence shows.
The problem of costs is  becoming increasing ly important for a 
number o f reasons. There has been, p a rt icu la r ly  during the past decade, 
a s ig n if ic a n t  transformation o f the economic and socia l re lationsh ips 
brought about by the in flux  o f foreign multi-national companies, the 
p ro life ra t io n  of local businessmen and the growth of bureaucracy. These 
factors have triggered o ff an increase in l it ig a t io n .
The in i t ia l  costs incurred by the Cameroonian l it ig a n t  are court 
fees of which there are two categories: f i l in g  costs and service fees.
The amount payable as f i l in g  costs depend upon the pecuniary value of 
the claim. In the Court of F ir s t  Instance, which, i t  may be reca lled , 
deals with cases invo lv ing claims the pecuniary value o f which does not 
exceed 500,000 frs  CFA (obviously dealing with a l l  small cla im s), the 
f i l in g  costs in the Anglophonic Provinces d if fe r  from those of the 
Francophonie Provinces. In the former, fo r any action where the claim 
is  10,000 francs the f i l in g  cost is  700 f r a n c s . W h e r e  the claim 
is  50,000 francs, the fee is  2,600 francs; where i t  is  100,000 francs 
the fee is  3,900 francs, where i t  is  200,000 francs, the fee is  7,800 
francs. The maximum payable is  18,500 francs, where the claim is  
500,000 francs. In the High Court, where the pecuniary value of the 
claim is  above 500,000 francs, the f i l in g  fee is  25,000 francs. In the 
Francophonie provinces, the f i l in g  costs are calculated at 3 per cent of 
the pecuniary value o f the claim.
In addition to f i l in g  costs are service fees. In the Anglophonic 
provinces, the cost is  70 francs per document, plus a mileage charge.
In the Francophonie provinces, i t  is  1200 francs per document served.
To these costs should be added travel expenses to and from the 
courts. Furthermore, each p la in t if f  or defendant has to cater for his 
witnesses, unless such witnesses have been summoned by the court,in  
which case the court pays the ir expenses. Given that there are many 
d is t r ic t s  without courts, these expenses may be heavy i f  the parties 
have to travel long distances, as they often do. 25
25. Note: F if t y  C.F.A. (Communauté Franc A frica ine) francs are equivalent
to one French franc.
Needless to say, in  c iv i l  cases, evidence has to be co llected  and 
th is  en ta ils  more expenditure, some o f which may be very high i f  experts 
such as doctors, accountants, a rch ite c ts , surveyors e tc ., have to be 
consulted.
The charges o f counsel where any party chooses to h ire  one are not 
uniform. They have not come under s t r ic t  regulation.^26  ^ They vary 
from one counsel to another. Contingency fees are common in  insurance 
c la im s.
I t  is  obvious from the above that the costs o f l i t ig a t io n  are quite 
high, to put i t  m ild ly , and that they are enough to discourage an 
average Cameroonian from bringing an action before the courts. This is  
so espec ia lly  where the award the court might give is  not very substantia l. 
The consequences o f th is  state of a f fa ir s  have been spe lt out by Dean 
Roscoe Pound in h is  book, "The S p ir it  o f the Common Law". He wrote:
'I t  is  so obvious that we have altogether ceased to remark i t ,  that in 
petty causes - that is ,  with respect to the everyday rights and wrongs 
of the great majority o f the urban community, the machinery whereby 
righ ts are secured p ra c t ic a lly  defeats righ ts by making 1t impracticable 
to assert them when they are in fringed. Moreover, there is  danger that 
in discouraging l i t ig a t io n  we encourage wrongdoing.. . " J 27^
26. Practice in the Cameroonian Bar 1s governed by Law No.72-LF-5 of 23rd 
May 1972 as amended by Decree No.72-706 of 13th September 1972; No. 
74-11 o f 16th Ju ly 1974; No.76-16 of 8th Ju ly  1976; No.77-13 of 
December 1977. There is  also the Internal Rules and Regulations 
o f the Bar (u n o ff ic ia l) .  None o f these,however, prescribe the amount 
counsel might charge 1n any given case or fo r any p a rt icu la r service.
Cited in R. Egerton, Legal Aid. (London, Kegan Paul, 1945) page 4.27.
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( i i )  Legal A id :
The problems posed by the high costs involved in bringing 
an action before the courts have not gone unnoticed by the Cameroonian 
government. Before 1964, only very lim ited  legal aid was given and i t  
was re s tr ic ted  to those who were cr im ina lly  c h a r g e d . U n d e r  the 
Federal Government, Decree No.64-DF-155 of 6th May 1964, amended by 
Decree No.65-DF-93 o f 2nd April 1965 was enacted, setting up a system of 
legal aid which extended to c iv i l  actions.
These decrees were la te r repeated and Decree No.76-521 of 9th 
November 1976 was issued and i t  covered a l l  types of legal aid the 
c it iz e n  was en tit led  to.
The f i r s t  and the most welcome change the new decree brought about 
was the establishment in every court in the en tire  country of a Legal Aid 
Commission. Section 1 o f the decree stipu la te s  that legal aid is  granted 
"in  order to enable a natural person, party to a t r ia l  or in an ex-parte 
proceeding, to obtain judgment or the order applied fo r, or the ir 
execution, with dispensation to advance a l l  o r part o f the legal fees he 
ought normally to bear". The im plication of th is  Section is  that lega l 
aid is  lim ited  to cases which are before the courts. This is  deplorable 
because the main problem facing most ordinary Cameroonians is  the ir 
in a b il it y  to ascertain whether or not th e ir r igh ts are being in fringed .
The Legal Aid Commission examines app lica tions for legal a id . The 
app lications have to be accompanied by a number of documents, such as a 28
28. See Order 7. rule 83 of the Federal Supreme Court Rules, 1961 
(Revised Laws of the Federation of N igeria) and in the former 
East Cameroon, Decree No.60-224 of 5th December 1960.
ce r t if ie d  copy of the app lican t's  tax return, a ce r t if ic a te  from the 
loca l council ind icating  whether or not the app licant is  subject to the 
minimum fixed tax. Legal aid is  granted prim arily  by reason of the 
app lican t's  pecuniary s itu a tio n ; but the commission also looks at the 
importance to the applicant o f the exercise of h is r ig h t. The commission 
may also in v ite  the adverse party to the action to challenge the 
app lican t's  righ t to obtain legal aid . The decision of the Legal Aid 
Commission must then be substantiated by a reasoned judgment.
Only three categories o f persons are en tit led  to  legal aid as of 
righ t: injured employees, deserted wives, and any person appealing 
against a death sentence. Apart from these categories of persons, those 
to whom legal aid may be given are:- ( i)  ind igen ts, ( i i )  the rank and 
f i l e  o f the armed forces, ( i i i ) persons subject to the minimum annual 
f is c a l tax; ( iv ) a wife in divorce proceedings, i f  she is  a mother of 
an in fant ch ild  and has no income of her own, and (v) persons other than 
those already mentioned where the anticipated expenses of the action cannot 
be borne by the ir resoures, in i t i a l l y  thought to be s u ff ic ie n t .
An advocate commissioned under the legal aid scheme is  reimbursed the 
costs of trave llin g  and accommodation, the costs Involved in conducting 
the case (co lle cting  evidence e tc .) , and he is  paid 5000 CFA francs as 
re ta iner fee per day throughout the t r ia l .  Needless to say, th is  affords 
only the barest renumeration fo r his task. Nine out o f ten prominent 
advocates I Interviewed said they would not appear fo r  persons with legal 
a id . Most o f them voiced the fee ling that not only was the renumeration 
in fin ite s im a l in comparison with the time they would normally put in such
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cases, but a lso that recovery o f even these small sums was rendered 
d i f f ic u l t  by adm inistrative red-tape.
The basic reason fo r the reluctance o f advocates to deal with 
lit ig a n ts  benefiting from the legal aid scheme appears to be that because 
they are operating w ith in what is  e s sen t ia lly  a market economy, and because 
they are, l ik e  other professional people such as doctors or a rch itects , 
in short supply, they tend to deal only with those who can afford to pay 
them more. The unfortunate upshot o f th is is  that with the exception of 
persons appealing against death sentences where the State mandatorily 
provides a counsel and also the possib le exception o f cases where there 
is  a sizeab le claim (in  which case the advocate usually deals with the 
c lie n t  on a contingency fee basis, irre spective  o f legal a id ), more often 
than not, lega l aid only means that the beneficiary o f i t  is  merely 
exempted from paying court fees and h is  witnesses' travel expenses.
The assistance of a barr is te r is  a ra r ity .
( i i i )  Legal Advice;
"Insofar as knowledge o f what is  ava ilab le  is  a prerequisite 
to any so lu tion  of the problem o f unmet legal need, much more needs to be 
done to increase the extent of the pub lic awareness of availab le fa c i l i t ie s  
and how to use them ".^ ) This statement, although made in a d iffe ren t 
context, summarizes succ inctly  the most pressing need of the Cameroonian 
Legal system. It has already been observed that the fact that legal aid 
is  confined to actions before the cou rt, is  indeed a regrettable one. 
Regrettable because as Is the case w ith most of the less developed countries, 29
29. B. Abel-Smith, M. Zander and R. Brooke, Legal Problems and the
C itlzen  (London, Heinemann, 1973), p. 22.
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the almost tota l ignorance o f rights and the in a b il it y  to obtain legal 
advice is  a deep rooted malaise a ffecting  the bulk of the Cameroonian 
population.
Bringing an ac tion , irre spective  o f the costs or the a v a ila b il ity  
of legal a id , presupposes that the party can, even in a rudimentary sort 
of way, define the wrong he has suffered in legal terms, and also that he 
can determine how to go about enforcing his r ig h t , to say nothing about the 
p robab ility  of success or fa ilu re  in so doing. This presupposition 1s 
reflected 1n the adage that "ignorance of the law 1s no excuse". The 
fa ls it y  o f th is assumption and it s  converse, i .e .  that everybody knows 
the law and maybe the legal system is  so obvious in  the Cameroonian 
context that any sp e c if ic  demonstration of i t  is  o t i o s e . A l t h o u g h  
th is problem has been recognised by the M in istry  o f Justice , very l i t t l e ,  
i f  any, a ffirm ative  action has been taken to even attempt to solve the 
problem. In a survey I carried  out in  the Yaounde area (the cap ita l) in 
March 1982, only two out o f f i f t y  common people knew of the existence of 
the legal aid s c h e m e . T h i s  demonstrates the acuteness o f the problem: 
those who are supposed to be the bene fic ia rie s of the legal aid system 
hardly know of I ts  existence. I f  the problem can e x is t in  such a measure 1n 
the Yaounde area, one can surmise the dimension i t  w il l take in the rural 301
30. More than 80 per cent o f the adult population 1s s t i l l  I l l i t e r a te .
31. Those who know about the scheme came about the knowledge mainly 
through re la t iv e s  who e ith e r worked with courts or from previous 
experiences in  courts. Among the persons interviewed were twenty 
self-employed persons; twenty others worked with governmental 
departments (none of them had anything more than a secondary education); 
and the other ten were unemployed. One of the self-employed persons 
said he had applied fo r legal aid in an action against him for tax 
evasion. The other person who knew of the legal scheme was an 
office-messenger with the M in istry  of Transport.
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and remote areas o f the country.
I t  is  submitted that the problems raised here have a d ire c t 
im plication fo r the rest o f the discussion to fo llow . Laws and 
regulations which are designed fo r the protection and advancement of the 
public w i l l  ce rta in ly  be in e ffe c t ive  i f  they cannot operate in  a context 
which ensures not only that the public knows of th e ir existence, but also 
that the pub lic can e ffe c t iv e ly  use them in enforcing the ir righ ts when­
ever they are in fringed . The problem o f "access to ju s tic e " is  therefore 
an in tegra l part o f the study o f standard form contracts.
Section II: Cameroon's Economic Framework:
Most, i f  not a ll,c o n tra c ts , whether they involve goods, real property 
or serv ices, are necessarily  economic a c t iv it ie s .  This is  'a fo rt io r i' true 
of the types o f contracts which w il l be the subject o f th is thesis: 
standardized contracts. It  is  therefore appropriate that a thesis of th is 
kind should begin with a study, however concise, of the economic framework 
of Cameroon, e spec ia lly  as most of the standard form contracts to be 
studied emanate from some of the most prominent economic in s titu t ion s  of 
that country.
A study of the outlines o f the economy is  v ita l for yet another reason. 
Although th is  is  not the place to enter in to a debate about the ideological 
underpinnings of law, the fact that the philosophy underlying any country's 
economy determines to a very large extent the nature o f it s  laws - 
p a rt icu la r ly  in the areas of property and contract law has almost become 
t r it e  observation.
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A: General Features o f the Economy.
It does not require a detailed examination of the Cameroonian economy 
to rea lise  that lik e  most less developed countries, Cameroon has not yet 
escaped from some of the in tractab le problems that beset i t s  e ffo rts  in 
development such as the lack of su ff ic ie n t ca p ita l, the low leve ls o f 
technology and know-how, the lim ited size o f the market, and the high 
leve l o f rural unemployment.
The f i r s t  general cha racte ris t ic  o f the Cameroonian economy is  that 
i t  has not yet achieved a break from the co lon ia l structure which was 
imposed on i t  by her co lon ia l powers - B r ita in  and France. The "economic 
de tra ite "  pers is ts .
How far the co lon ia l framework has impcdeded the economic growth o f 
less  developed countries is  an issue which is  s t i l l  the subject of a great 
deal o f controversy.^3^
The fact remains, however, that B r ita in  and France, under the impetus 
o f Free Trade, used th e ir colonies e s s e n tu lly  as sources of raw materia ls. 
This "blood and plunder" imperialism established it s  own d iv is ion  of labour 
by which metropole countries came to be regarded as the sources of exotic 
consumer products which could not be made in the colonies.
To be sure, the co lon ia l powers had, and have ever since, continued 
to possess the technology necessary to sustain industria l production. 
However, they p o s it ive ly  s t if le d  the growth o f any form of manufacturing 
industry that attempted to emerge in the c o l o n i e s . I n d u s t r i a l  
production was considered to be a risky  business in the colonies. The
32. See Bauer, P .T ., and Yamey, B.S. The Economics of Underdeveloped
Countries, 2nd edn. (1970), pages 8 6 - 9 3 .Time and space prevent an
examination of th is controversy.
33. Brown M. Barra tt, A fte r Imperialism, (Heinemann, 1963), page 47.
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co lon ia l framework therefore prevented the emergence o f those conditions 
which are prerequisite fo r any meaningful programme o f economic development. 
This state of a ffa irs  had two very obvious and s ig n if ic an t consequences 
fo r the Cameroonian economy. The f i r s t  is  that the industria l tissue of 
the country is  very small, thus making agricu ltu re the principa l employment 
o f the bulk of the population. The second is  that the idea that the 
former co lon ia l powers (France espec ia lly ) , are the source of exotic 
consumer goods is  s t i l l  strongly held. Hence, in the big c it ie s  such as 
Yaounde and Douala, the"consumption pattern"that ex ists  there is  d iffe rent 
only in scale from that of Paris and Lyons, thereby transferring most of 
the country's earnings from agricu ltu re to manufacturers in France.
The second general feature o f the economy is  the sca rc ity  of cap ita l.
The ro le o f cap ita l in  the economic growth o f any country can hardly be 
overstressed. Even in  ag ricu ltu re , equipment, however prim itive is  essen tia l; 
machines, bu ild ings, too ls , roads etc. During the co lon ia l period, nearly 
a l l  that was produced was consumed, i.e .  income from the sale of cash crops 
was spent on consumer goods. I t  therefore took a good many years before 
any meaningful savings could take place in Cameroon. The main e ffect of 
the lack of cap ita l is  the underdeveloped state of technology and the 
economic in frastructu re of the country. Capital is important not merely to 
give industry a boost but also to enhance the growth o f the agricu ltua l 
sector which is  responsible fo r the lim ited amount of cap ita l that has 
been so fa r created. Hence, the less cap ita l accumulation, the lower the 
growth of the ag ricu ltu ra l sector becomes. The government has tried  to 
break th is v icious c ir c le  by appealing to foreign a id , which has been 
mainly French.
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The th ird  noteworthy ch a rac te r is t ic  of the Cameroonian economy is  
the smallness o f the national market. As Adam Smith put i t ,  d iv is ion  of 
labour and spec ia liza tion  are based on the size of the purchasing power 
and the s ize  o f the market. There are two foremost reasons fo r the 
smallness of the market in Cameroon. The f i r s t  is  the fa c t  that there 
is  no real national market because of an extremely poor communications 
network w ith in the country. The second is  that there is  a very inequitable 
d is tr ibu tion  o f income which i t s e l f  has a lo t  to do with the widespread 
unemployment in  the rural areas where about 85 per cent o f the population 
l iv e .
F in a lly , the economic strategy o f the country is  characterized by 
what it s  a rch ite c t, President Ahidjo, c a lls  the policy of "planned 
libe ra lism ". I f  th is epithet appears to be vague, or even contrad ictory, 
it s  import is  by no means so. It is  a po licy  whichholds that private 
in it ia t iv e  or enterprise is  the best means by which the country can be 
developed and that state intervention should be lim ited to the m obilisation, 
coordination and the orientation of e ffo rts  fo r progress. Hence, there is  
a strong bias towards private investment in Cameroon.
Section III: A B r ie f Survey of Cameroonian Economy.
A: A g ricu ltu re .
Agricu lture manifestly holds the pride of place in the Cameroonian 
economy as e a r lie r  mentioned. It  is  the primary generator o f resources 
for the development of the country. Secondly, i t  is  the sector par 
excellence which does most to a lle v ia te  the employment problem of the
34. See generally, United Republic o f Cameroon: Annual Year Book 1978 
(Yaounde).
country. There are three basic reasons fo r th is  s itua tion . In the 
f i r s t  place, about 80 per cent of the country 's 8 m illio n  inhabitants 
l iv e  in the rural areas where the only important economic a c t iv ity  is  
ag ricu ltu re . Secondly, ag ricu ltu re  furn ishes nearly 70 per cent of a l l  
Cameroonian exports and about 40 per cent o f the Gross National Income, 
and a lso, the bulk of i t s  foreign exchange earnings. Hence, Cameroon 
has chosen agricu ltu re as it s  platform fo r  eventual modernisation and 
in d u s tr ia lisa t io n . This sector therefore enjoys the widest financia l 
and other material assistance from the government. F in a lly , there is  the 
natural facto r, i .e .  the wide variety o f  ecological and c lim atic  conditions 
enjoyed by Cameroon which enables ag ricu ltu re  to come out as the most 
worthwhile o f economic a c t iv it ie s .
In sp ite  of th is  manifestly important ro le agricu ltu re  plays in the 
Cameroonian economy, there is  nevertheless a lo t  o f under-employment in 
th is f ie ld .  Less than 5 per cent of the surface area of the country is  
under cu lt iva t io n  and of th is , only about tw o-fifths accounts fo r cash-crop 
cu lt iva t io n . Farming methods are s t i l l  very rudimentary; modern methods 
are carried out only by agro-industria l companies and mainly with respect 
to the cu lt iva t io n  o f sugarcane, o il-pa lm s, rubber, banana and cotton.
The country's main cash crops are cocoa and coffee (both arabica and 
robusta). The government, conscious of the importance o f these crops, has 
set up two in s titu t io n s  which are expected to provide impetus further 
growth: S0DECA0 (Société pour le  Développement du Cacao), the Cocoa 
Development Corporation, and a S ta b ilis a t io n  Fund, which guarantees a 
single yearly price fo r a l l farm ers.'35) This fund bears the d iffe re n t ia l
35. Njike Nembo Michael - Les Caisses de S ta b ilis a t io n  des Prix .  Mémoire
presenté a la  Faculté de Droit et Sciences Economiques, (Yaoundé,
1973-74), unpublished.
t a r i f f  paid on the presentation o f way b i l l s .  For the 1973-74 season for 
example, the price guaranteed fo r robusta coffee was 130 frs  CFA per 
k ilo .  Meanwhile, in the French and the E.E.C. Market that same year, the 
price for a kilogram o f robusta coffee was 350 CFA francs. The marketing 
o f these cash crops is  carried  out e ssen tia lly  by the National Produce 
Marketing Board. Both crops are cu ltiva ted  on a surface area o f about 
seven hundred and th ir ty  hectares, g iving employment to about three m illion  
Cameroonians.
Large scale farming is  carried  out by agro -industria l complexes. The 
C.D.C., (Cameroon Development Corporation), a para-stata l corporation in 
the South-West Province o f the country, grows o i l  palms, rubber, tea and 
bananas. I t  is  one o f the country's biggest employers, with a workforce 
o f about twenty thousand. O il palm and rubber cu lt iva t io n  is  also carried 
out by Plantations Pamol du Cameroun (S .A .), Lobe, Ndian, a subsid iary of 
UNILEVER. It  accounts fo r about one-eighth o f the country's tota l rubber 
production and a th ird  o f  the o i l  palm production.
SODEBLE, another para-stata l corporation in the north of the country 
produced one hundred and twenty f iv e  thousand tons o f wheat in 1977/78.
The growing and marketing o f cotton 1s handled by S0DEC0T0N, (La Société 
pour de Développement du Coton). Cameroon's sugar production Is handled 
by two large factories 1n Mbandjock - SOSUCAM and CAMSUCO. Between them, 
they produce about e ighty thousand tons o f sugar (1977/78 figu res). 367
36. J.C . Ba rtle r, G. Courade, J. Tissandier,"Complexes ag ro -industrie lles 
au Cameroon," in Travaux et Documents de L'ORSTOM, ONAREST. YAOUNDE, 
pp. 17 and 91.
37. 'Complexes Ag ro -industr ie lles  au Cameroon," supra, pp. 249-251. Other 
types of ag r icu ltu ra l productions, such as r ic e  and tobacco are lis te d  
in the above.
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Because of the v ita l ro le of agricu ltu re in the Cameroonian economy, 
the need was soon f e lt  fo r the creation of an in s titu t io n a l frame-work 
to provide extension services and c red it to small farmers p a rticu la r ly .
Hence the FONADER - "National Fund fo r Rural Development" was created.
This in s t itu t io n  has a dual ro le: In the f i r s t  p lace, i t  helps to promote 
economic and soc ia l development programmes in the rural areas. It 
pa rtic ipa tes in the re a lisa t io n  of programmes which include, among other 
th ings, the se tting  up of young farmers, subsid ising the purchase of 
f e r t i l i s e r s ,  improving rural water supply and other material assistance 
in the in terests o f the rura l population. Its other function, which is  
more re levant here, is  that i t  is  a c red it in s t itu t io n . It gives cred it 
to both ind iv idua ls and co-operatives fo r a wide range of agricu ltu ra l 
a c t iv it ie s ,  v iz . ,  f ish in g , ca tt le  rearing, forest regeneration, and even 
rural housing pro jects. The contracts i t  makes with the recip ients of 
the loans w il l  be among the standard form contracts to be examined la ter.
Any person carrying out any of the above a c t iv it ie s  may apply for a 
FONADER loan provided they present an economically pro fitab le  and coherent 
investment programme. Unfortunately, because of adm inistrative complexities 
and the exceedingly stringent guarantee requirements FONADER imposes, much 
fewer farmers have benefited from the scheme than was o r ig in a lly  hoped 
for.<39>
38. Decree No.73-24 of May 29th 1973 (Journal O f f ic ia l ,  1973).
39. Since i t  w il l  soon be transformed into a bank, FONADER is  1n a 
dilemma. Should p r io r ity  be given to the "development" aspect of the 
scheme, in which case 1t runs the risk  of being less e f f ic ie n t , 
e spe c ia lly  with regard to debt recovery, or should p r io r ity  be given 
to e f f ic ie n cy , 1n which case the development aspect would certa in ly  be 
down-graded? A survey of the scheme I carried out showed that about 
h a lf  of the bene fic ia ries were c iv i l  servants, many of whom channelled 
the loans to purposes other than those fo r which they were given.
In 1979-'80 cred its  given out amounted to 2,796.638.790 francs C.F.A.
I t  is  obvious that s t r ic t  contro ls have to be made since the 
capab ility  o f the bulk of the borrowers to manage th e ir  projects 
successfu lly  and re a lise  s u ff ic ie n t p ro fits  to repay the loans is  not 
s ig n if ic a n t, to say the least. However, i t  is  questionable whether these 
s t r ic t  measures are en tire ly  in the righ t d irection  i f  the scheme has to 
improve the lo t  of the rural ag ricu ltu ra l population and not to be 
explo ited by urban bureaucrats. FONADER is  funded e ssen tia lly  by state 
subsid ies, fo rest ro ya lt ie s , loans from other c red it in s t itu t io n s , 
e spec ia lly  the B.C.D. (Banque Cameroonaise de D^v^loppement), p ro fits  
made by the National Produce Marketing Board, and a general surtax.
B: Industry.
Cameroon's industry, which saw a substantial growth during the f i r s t  
ten years fo llow ing independence, appears to be going through a decline 
since the seventies. Although there is  undoubtedly a non-negligible 
in dustr ia l network, 1t should be pointed out that the industria l in fra ­
structure is  very Insubstantia l. There are fewer than one hundred companies 
involved of which only about ten o f them arrogate fo r themselves nearly 
55 per cent of the to ta l Industria l output. There is  one fundamental 
reason fo r th is . Since 1970, the government's strategy has been "planned 
liberalism*'. Although state Involvement was not In s ign ifican t quantita tive ly  
or q u a lita t iv e ly , 1t never assumed the dynamic ro le of d irect Intervention 
1n industry. I t  merely created the appropriate conditions fo r foreign 
Investments and when necessary, complementing them. Thus, an examination 
of the share holdings in  the ex ist ing  industries reveals a very lop-sided
-35-
ownership in favour of foreign investors. Even among foreign investors, 
there is  a strong bias fo r French investors in  p a rticu la r, who dominate 
Cameroonian industry with as much as 45 per cent of the tota l ownership.
There are only two areas in  Cameroon industry where the French are absent: 
the exp lo ita tion  and transformation of sea products and also the leather 
and shoe industry. The po licy  of "planned libe ra lism " not only opened 
the doors widely and generously to foreign investors, but i t  also d is ­
couraged the growth of a tru ly  national in dustr ia l sector.
This po licy  however appears to be undergoing a vo lte-face. On the 
25th of August 1976, President Ahidjo, ou tlin ing  the general characteristics 
of the fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1976-1981), said: "The 
orien tation  of savings towards industria l development, the elaboration of 
a rationa l po licy  fo r public pa rtic ip a tion , the encouragement of dynamic 
and responsible national entrepreneurs, w il l  enable Cameroonians to take 
control of the management of the national economy".
There has therefore been, since 1977, a s h if t  in po licy . The public 
sector has now become the vertebral column of the new in du s tr ia lisa t ion  
progranme, the aim o f which is  to provide a more e f f ic ie n t  industria l 
structure , oriented especia lly  towards the exp lo ita tion  of natural resources. 
Since 1977, new fac to rie s  have been b u ilt  e n t ire ly  with public partic ipa tion  
and among them may be mentioned CAMSUCO (Cameroon Sugar Corporation),
HEVECAM, a rubber processing factory. A National Hydrocarbon Corporation, 
(S.N.H.) was set up in  1980 fo r the exp lo ita tion  of o i l ,  gas and coal. 40
40. Quatrième Plan Qulnqulnal de Développement, Yaounde, 1976 (my 
trans la tion ).
i
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In 1980-81, about 20 per cent of the Cameroonian budget was accounted 
fo r by revenue from o il exports. In 1981 a new o i l  refinery b u i lt  in 
Cape Limbo, V ic to r ia , went in to operation in 1981 and increased income 
from o il exports is  expected to finance further industria l pro jects.
Foreign partic ipa tion  as pointed out e a r lie r  on, dominates Cameroonian 
industry. In 1977, i t  contributed about 57.5 per cent of the en tire  
cap ita l outlay o f a ll factories engaged in production. Indeed, excluding 
agro-industry and e le c t r ic ity  and water supply industries, where 
Cameroonian holdings are 73 per cent and 80.5 per cent respective ly , 
foreign particpation in the rest of Cameroonian industry is  more than 
77 per c e n t .^  ^
Of the 42.5% Cameroonian holdings, about 39 per cent is  held by the 
State. This leaves approximately 3.5 per cent fo r private
Cameroonian holding which is  n eg lig ib le , to say the least.
Hence, when dealing with Industria l firm s, more often than not one 
is  dealing with e ither para-stata l corporations or with foreign owned 
companies. These foreign owned companies are usually a f f i l ia te s  o f large 
conglomerates; generally, trans-national corporations. This is  espec ia lly  
true of French owned companies which belong generally to the fo llow ing 
conglomerates: RIVAUD (1n agro-1ndustry and timber Industry), SCOA)
Societe Comnerciale Ouest A fr ica ln e ), 0PT0RG, CFAO, CCCE. Non-French 
partic ipa tion  1s essen tia lly  in  the leather and shoe Industry. Here,
BATA (Cameroon) dominates the f ie ld  and i t  is  70 per cent foreign (en tire ly
41. The fo l low ing s t a t i s t i c s  come from the United Republic o f Cameroon,
"Annual Year Book", note (35), supra.
non-French) owned, with a 30 per cent Cameroonian holding. 67 per cent
of the in terests in the fishe rie s  industry is  a lso foreign (non-French).
Non-French pa rtic ipa tion  also accounts fo r 39 per cent in  the timber 
industry, 37 per cent in the te x t ile  industry. Generally, I ta lia n ,
Dutch, Spanish and B r it is h  companies are involved.
The te x t i le  industry is  dominated by CICAM and SYNTECAM with 75 per 
cent foreign ownership (mainly French and German). In the tobacco 
industry, the Société J. Bastos de L 'A frique , w ith an 80.6 per cent 
French in te re s t and a 19.4 per cent Cameroonian public holding, has the 
monopoly. ALUCAM, a subsidiary of the French owned Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann 
is  the country's aluminium producer and top export earner in  industry.
In e le c t r ic ity  and water d is tr ib u tion , there are two monopolies:
SONEL (Société Nationale d 'E le c tr ic ité )  and SNEC (Société National des 
Eaux du Cameroon), in  which Cameroonian public ownership is  80.5 per 
cent and French ownership 19.5 per cent (C.C.C.E. and Pechiney Kuhlmann).^42  ^
In the drinks industry, S.A.B.C. (Société Anonyme des Brasseries du 
Cameroon) is  dominant. French partic ipa tion  here is  69 per cent and 
Cameroonian pa rtic ipa tion  is  23 per cent. Here a lso , there is  Société 
Guiness du Cameroon, which is  100 per cent fore ign owned, and ll.C.B.
(Union Cameroonaise des Brasseries), the only company with a 100 per cent 
Cameroonian private investment.
C: The Conmercial Sector.
Here again, foreign companies have a stronghold on the Cameroonian 
econony. Most of the big trading houses are foreign owned:- SCORE,
42. Yearbook, supra, pp. 253-256.
Compagnie Hollando Africaine, SHO, R.W. Kings etc. However the re ta il 
trade is  mainly in  the hands o f Cameroonian establishments which with 
very few exceptions, are e ith e r small or at best medium s ize . Lebanese, 
Greek and Indian ownership (the EMENS group for example), is  not 
neg lig ib le .
The commercial road transport network is  mainly Cameroonian. However, 
in the haulage business, MORY - ( i.e .  a foreign owned company) is  the 
most important company. The railway system is  run by a monopoly:
REG1FERCAM (Régime Ferre du Cameroon) which both Cameroonian and French 
owned. There is  a national a ir l in e ;  Cameroon A ir  Lines, which is  about 
70 per cent Cameroonian owned and the rest o f the ownership e ssen tia lly  
goes to A ir  France.
From the mid-seventies, much stress has been put by the Cameroonian
government on the importance o f savings and Cameroon now has one of the 
most dense banking systems 1n Francophonie A fr ic a . As with Cameroonian
industry, there Is a strong presence of foreign investors 1n the banking
network. Since 1973, the Cameroonian government must own one-third of
the shares o f any bank operating in the country.
Until 1977, there were f iv e  main commercial banks exp lo iting  the 
money market 1n Cameroon:- (1) The Société Camerounaise des Banques,
S.C.B. "Alpha Bank" was created in 1962. Since 1975, Its cap ita l has 
risen to two b i l l io n  francs. The Cameroonian government holds 35 per 
cent of the shares; 25 per cent 1s held by the Banque Camerounaise de 
Deve'lopement; Crédit Lyonnais o f France holds 25 per cent. I t  is  the
43. Yearbook, supra, pp. 242-244.
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th ird  commercial bank in Francophonie A fr ica  south of the Sahara. (2) BICIC 
(Banque Internationale pour le Commerce e t l'In d u s tr ie  du Cameroon). This 
bank deals mainly with small and medium size businesss - industria l and 
commercial. 65 per cent of the shares o f th is bank are held by foreign 
companies. Barclays International owns 17.5 per cent, SFOM (France) owns 
about 33 per cent and the Cameroonian government owns 35 per cent. (3) 
Cameroon Bank L td ., which orig inates from the former West Cameroon is  the 
only bank with a 100 per cent Cameroonian holding. I t  was created in  
1961 with a cap ita l o f 300 m illio n  francs owned by the National Produce 
and Marketing Board, the National Re-Insurance Fund and the "Société 
Nationale d'investissement" (S.N .I . ) .  (4) The S.G.B.C. (Société Generale
des Banques du Cameroun) was created in  1963 and it s  shares are divided 
between the Cameroonian government and Société Generale, the French owned 
banking group. (5) B.I.A.O. - Banque Internationale pour l'A fr ique  
Occidentale was created in  1974.
Since 1977, two new banks have been founded: Chase Bank of Cameroon 
and Boston Bank of Cameroon in  which the Cameroonian government owns one 
th ird  of the shares, while th e ir American parent companies own the re st.
The Cameroon Development Bank 1s not a commercial bank. Created in 
1964, Its  status was revised in 1976 by decree No. 76-89 of 3rd March
1976. I t  now has a cap ita l of s ix  b i l l io n  francs C.F.A. A r t ic le  3 o f it s  
statutestates that 1s object is  to provide 1n the form of loans, technical 
and financia l assistance to any pro ject which promotes the economic and 
socia l development of the country, with pa rt icu la r emphasis on the 
promotion of industry, trade and hand icrafts.
15 per cent fo r housing and consumer c red it, and 6 per cent fo r industria l 
pro jects. 70 per cent of the loans were given on short te rm .^ ) The 
S .N .I. (Sodete/ Nationale d' Investissement), a pub lic corporation is  
also one of the important financ ia l in s titu t io n s  in  the country. Its 
ro le however is  lim ited  to buying up shares for the government in industry.
Consumer c red it  is  not yet h igh ly developed in  Cameroon. Most
commercial banks finance consumer transactions p a rt ic u la r ly  with respect
to the purchase o f cars and expensive household equipment. There are a
few firm s, however, which deal exc lu s ive ly  with consumer c red it , the most
important o f which are SOCCA (Socie't^ Camerounaise de C red it Automobile)
and S.C.E. (SocieW  Camerounaise d'Equipement). The former is  an 
a f f i l ia t e  of the French group S .A .F.C .A ., and was established in  1959.
It finances the purchase of about 40 per cent of the cars imported in 
Cameroon. The la t te r  gives short term cred its with respect to the 
purchase of things such as household fu rn itu re , re fr ig e ra to rs , stereos, 
motor-bicycles etc. Besides these in s t itu t io n s , the big trading houses 
also give consumer c red it.
The above 1s merely an ou tline  which w il l  help to put the various 
kinds of contracts to be discussed la te r  1n perspective. As with a ll 
ou tline s , a l l  d e ta ils  have been le f t  out. Indeed there are some parts of 
the economic structure such as housing and Insurance which have not been 
discussed at a l l .  4
During the 1977/78 f in an c ia l  year, 15,885 m i l l i o n  francs were lent
out, 61 per cent o f  which was fo r  a g r icu ltu ra l  and fo re s t ry  pro jec ts ,
44. Banque Camerounaise de Dévéloppement, Rapport d 'A c t iv lt ls ,  
Exercise 1977-78, p. 13.
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The above exposition, however, shows that the structure of the 
Cameroonian economy has not dramatically changed from what i t  was during 
the co lon ia l period. Although there is  much more manufacturing industry 
going on, th is is  la rg e ly  confined to l ig h t  industry, most of which 
belongs to foreign companies anyhow. The economy therefore s t i l l  bears 
the t ra it s  of an "e'conomie de t ra ite " , based p rim arily  on agricu lture 
which provides foreign exchange fo r the importation of foreign (French) 
g o o d s . B e c a u s e  private in it ia t iv e  was the hallmark of the economic 
p o licy , i t  is  not su rp ris ing  that there is  such a dearth of Cameroonian 
in d u s tr ia lis ts  since few had the required bankroll to undertake 
in dustr ia l ventures.
The consequence o f th is in  terms of socia l formation, has been the 
creation o f a class whose function has been to act as intermediaries 
between the urban consumer population and the rural ag ricu ltu ra l 
co im in ity on the one hand, and loca l or, as i t  1s more often the case, 
foreign producers of consumer goods on the other. A strong merchant 
bourgeoisie class as i t  were. There has recently , however, been an 
increase in  state pa rt ic ip a tio n  in  the marketing of ag ricu ltu ra l produce 
and also in  the running of l ig h t  industry and fin an c ia l in s titu t io n s .
The th ird  sector has thus greatly Increased, and th is  has been followed 
by a hypertrophy in  bureaucracy. In a l l th is , the rural population, the 
bulk of the entire population, stand to lose since they do not enjoy 
the f ru it s  of the th ird  sector nor that o f the bureaucracy, In spite 
of being the main source of the wealth of the ®untry. 45
45. Samir Amin, Unequal Development, (The Harvester Press, 1973), 329-332.
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CHAPTER TWO;A GENERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
Introduction
The law re la ting  to standardized contracts is  an aspect of the 
general law of contract. I t  appears therefore that i t  cannot be 
examined in iso la t ion  from it s  context. Hence we sh a ll begin with 
an analysis of the law of contract. The c la ss ica l theory of con­
tra c t is  based on the idea of freedom of contract which was an 
o ffsp ring  of the la is se z  fa ire  economic theory of Adam Smith.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that long a fte r la is s e z - fa ire  
was abandoned, the courts continued however, to regard freedom 
of contract as th e ir mainstay in contractual theory. This chapter 
w i l l  show how u n re a lis t ic  th is  ju d ic ia l a ttitude was, given the 
fa c t that people were not free to enter into contracts on th e ir 
own terms. Furthermore, the assumption underlying the concept of 
freedom of contract was that there was free and unlim ited competition 
and also that the contracting parties were equal economic p a r t ic i­
pants, assumptions which on the evidence have proved to be 
unfounded. The idea of freedom of contract is  very much out of 
touch with re a lity  in the developed world, le t  alone when applied 
in the less developed countries such as Cameroon where there are 
even greater d isp a r it ie s  in the bargaining power and know-how 
between the loca l farmers and consumers on the one hand, and the 
emerging corporations on the other.
I f  i t  is  proved that the idea o f freedom of contract Is not 
only a superannuated idea but also a f ic t it io u s  one, then it s  
co ro lla ry , the sanctity  of contract should also f a l l  to  the ground 
since i t  is  predicatedon the idea of freedom of contract.
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It  is  possible to examine the law of contract as i t  stands today 
in order to determine whether i t  successfu lly  serves the ends i t  
purports to , that is ,  as an instrument of both economic d is tr ib u tion  
and planning. Such a stra igh t forward ana ly tica l study would 
however be de fic ien t in many respects. It appears that the essentia l 
purpose of the law of contract is  to  secure a so lid  basis fo r the 
ordering of socia l and economic re la tion sh ip  in any given society. 
Hence,to serve th is  end, the law o f contract must be sound in it s  
premises, acceptable in it s  p ra c t ica l consequences and desirable 
in it s  objectives. To pass any judgements on the above issues, 
we must therefore look at the law o f contract fu n ctiona lly . How 
successful has i t  been? For th is  purpose, we have to examine the 
law h is to r ic a lly  as w e ll. A lso, s in ce  the law of contract is  
not merely a physical and psychological re a lity  but is  above a l l 
a v o lit io n a l creation of man, we need to examine what forces have 
contributed to it s  creation, and a lso  the innumerable innovations 
that were brought to i t  through the ages. In th is ,  we need to 
d istingu ish between the formal theories of sources of law which 
serve to ra tiona lize  the process of ju s t ify in g  legal decis ions, 
and the h is to r ica l explanation of the evolution and reception of 
new legal doctrine. Hence, we sha ll look not only at the ro le 
of precedent and the creative ro le o f  judges, but also at the 
philosophical and in te lle c tu a l movements which have motivated 
any innovations.
The argument we shall put forward is  that the conception of 
a contract as merely a bargain in which the minds of the various 
contracting parties meet is  an inadequate theory of contract,
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especia lly  when applied to Cameroon. Contract, viewed in th is  
lig h t ,  usually regresses into a shorter and shorter ca lcu la tion  
of advantage, motivated by the h o s tile  and naked se lf- in te re s t  
of the dominant party to the bargain. On the contrary, contract 
must be looked a t w ith in the wider context of contract as a 
re la tionsh ip  among the various market pa rtic ipan ts . The need 
therefore a rises fo r the precise d e f in it io n  o f the parameters of 
th is  re la tion sh ip . Only when th is  is  done can a bargain cease 
to assume it s  e n t ire ly  adversaria l character and be seen as 
re flecting  w ith in  i t  the general consensus of the economic opinion 
w ithin the so c ie ty , espec ia lly  with regards to such matters as 
the price and other contractual terms.
Such a conception of contract is  e spec ia lly  necessary in a 
society where the c la ss ic a l notion o f freedom o f contract is  a 
travesty because o f the socia l and economic d isp a r it ie s  that 
ex is t among the economic partic ipan ts . I t  is  'a fo rt io r i ' necessary 
because of the fa c t  that the standardized contract has, instead of 
the contract by negotiation, become the norm. With th is  h o lis t ic  
perspective o f the law of contract, the question whether or not 
contracts have to be regulated becomes otiose because as in other 
forms of re la tionsh ips (Hke labour) , the need fo r regulation is  
apparent.
If throughout most of the d iscussion, sp e c if ic  reference is  
not made to Cameroon, i t  is  fo r the obvious reason that the law 
of contracts in Cameroon is  derived from the common 1 aw of England 
and French c iv i l  law. Secondly, to be sure, the level of In du str ia l­
iza tion  and commercialization is  less than in England; however,
the same patterns e x is t  there that e x is t in England. Also because 
of the greater d isp a r it ie s  pointed out above the need fo r a new 
theory o f contract in  Cameroon is  even more acute.
We sha ll proceed to examine the law of contract in two sections. 
F ir s t ,  we shall look at the h is to ry  of the law of contract which 
we sha ll d ivide in two parts: the formative period of the law of 
contract which ends a t about the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, and the second part which commences from the early part 
o f the nineteenth century. Then in the second part, we shall 
examine the concept of contract as a re la tion  instead of a mere 
transaction.
Section I: The Formative Period of the Law of Contract:
(a) Early Contract Law:
The development o f the law of contract before 1602 was very 
much blended with the development of negligence 1^ K The cases 
were concerned with positive wrongdoing. There were various kinds 
of actions that could be brought: action of covenant; action of 
debt (debt on a contract, debt on an ob liga tion ). An important 
aspect o f early contract law was the fac t that executory promises 
could not be enforced since in th is  case, i t  was not a question 
of pos itive  wrongdoing, but of nonfeasance. The assumption here 
was that a man was not to be held l ia b le  fo r h is intentions without 
an act done since words were not acts. Hence, the action of
1. Baker: Introduction to English Legal H istory (Butterworths 
1971), p. 275.
assumpsit could not be extended. The only cases where a person 
could be held l ia b le  fo r nonfeasance was where because of h is 
ca llin g  or status, fo r example, an innkeeper, a pub lic duty was 
imposed upon him to act. The action of assumpsit was also used 
to cover certa in cases of dece it. This could also constitu te a 
public offence, fo r example, when a lawyer took fees from both 
parties to a d is p u te .^
However, towards the end of the sixteenth century, d iffe ren t 
views were emerging. One view was that there ought to be 
re c ip ro c ity  or a quid pro quo of bargains. The second view was 
that i f  a party re lie d  on a promise to h is  detriment, the resu lting  
damage ought to be made good. It should be noted however that i t  
was not the promise qua promise that was being enforced, but the 
ensuing damage caused. Another reason why nonfeasance became 
actionable at common law was to curb the flou rish ing  contractual 
ju r is d ic t io n  the Chancellor had been exerc is ing. I f ,  i t  was 
reasoned the common law courts did not cover th is  area, i t  would 
have given the Chancellor the righ t to annex the whole f ie ld  of 
commercial law. "[Ajssumpsit did not l i e  to enforce the covenant, 
which was not enforceable without sp e c ia lity , but redressed the 
in jury suffered by acting or reposing in the b e lie f that i t  would 
be kep t'.'^  23
2. Statute of Westminster I (1275) c.29.
3. Baker, p. 280.
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Gradually, the action of assumpsit was extended to debt through 
irdebitatuB assumpsit but there was no ce rta in ty  in th is  respect 
u n til Slades Case in 1602. ' In that case, the r igh t to recover
a debt through assumpsit was established. That case has generally 
been held as marking the threshold of contract law since for the 
f i r s t  time, the various actions w ith in the spectrum of contract 
became un if ied . In sp ite  of th is  development, there was s t i l l  no 
proper theory of contract. As a re su lt of th is  change in the law, 
and also as a resu lt of the poor state o f the law of evidence, 
there was the fear of an increased rate of perjury in bringing 
actions of assumpsit. These developments provided a basis for 
the ra t io n a liza t io n  of the doctrine of consideration. As Jeffrey 
G ilb e rt explained, oral promises had to be backed up by consideration 
which rendered such promises enforceable, "otherwise a man might be 
drawn into an ob ligation  without any real intention by random words 
and ludicrous expressions, and from thence there would be a manifest 
in le t  to perjury because nothing were more easy than to turn the 
kindness of expressions in to the ob ligation  o f a real p rom ise ".^
A second d ire c t outcome of th is  s itua tion  was the passing of the 
Statute of Frauds, (1 677 )^ . The statute was enacted to make 
ce rta in  kinds of contracts unemforceable unless they were made in 
w rit in g . Again, these measures were designed to curb fraud and 
perjury.
I t  1s suggested that from th is  period onwards, the law of 
contract did not develop fo rtu itou s ly , but that Its development 456
4. Slade v Morely (1600 4 Co. Rep. 92a
5. Of Contracts (c. 1720) B r it t  L1b vs Hargrave quoted 1n Baker, 265.
6. Stat 29 Car 11 C3 SS4, 17.
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was conditioned by the development in other areas such as the law 
of evidence, the p o lit ic a l and in te lle c tu a l changes which were 
occurring in the country, as well it s  general economic and soc ia l 
conditions.
Before we proceed, i t  is  worthwhile remarking that the d iv is io n  
of the h istory of the law of contract into these various stages 
should by no means convey the impression that they represent c lear- 
cut d is t in c t iv e  phases in the development of contract law. Needless 
to say, the changes occurred imperceptibly because at no time is  
i t  possible to have philosophical or ju d ic ia l unanimity among the 
various in te lle c tu a ls  and judges.
(b) The period up to 1800:
Un til as late as 1800, the content of the law of content was 
very uncertain. Contract law was s t i l l  subordinated to the law of 
property as can be seen from Blackstone's Commentaries, Book I I , 
where contract appears as a branch of the law of property. The 
ru les of the law of contract ju s t began to be formulated by Lord 
Mansfield in the th ird  quarter of the eighteenth century. The only 
major doctrine that had emerged was that of the doctrine of con­
sideration and even that had not been en tire ly  settled fo r there 
were attempts made, especia lly  by Lord Mansfield,to broaden I ts  
scope to such an extent that i t  would have become a concept o f  more 
academic than p ractica l relevance.
In 1720, S ir  Je ffrey  G ilbe rt explained that the common law, in 
maintaining the doctrine, was taking a middle course, one between 
holding men r ig id ly  bound to th e ir  promises and enforcing only
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those contracts fo r which there was a "quid pro quo" The only 
exception to th is  doctrine was where the parties had reduced 
th e ir  contract to w riting  under seal fo r i t  was thought that 
i t  would be downright madness to t r i f le  w ith the solemnity of 
law and pretend a fte r the sealing that there was nothing 
seriously  designed.
In P illa n 8  & Rose v. Van Miewp and Hopkins, ^  Lord Mansfield 
sidestepped the requirements of assumpsit and it s  cornerstone, the 
doctrine of consideration,and invoked instead the simple and 
straightforward p rin c ip le s  of consent and fa ir-dea ling  of the 
law merchant. He ra tiona lized  his approach in the fo llow ing terms: 
"I take i t  that the ancient notion about the want of consideration 
was fo r the sake of evidence only; fo r when i t  is  reduced into 
w rit in g , as in covenants, spe c ia lt ie s , bonds, and so on, there 
was no objection to the want o f consideration".
Im p lic it in h1s approach was the downgrading of the importance
of the sea l. This did not go down well in  the bench as la te r cases
( 8 )proved, in  Rann v. Hughes' , Lord Mansfield re iterated h is view 
but he was reversed in error by the House o f Lords. Their Lord- 
sh ips, in a unanimous decis ion, held that an action could only be 
founded on a parol promise i f  i t  was supported by consideration.
It was held that the difference was not between written and oral 
contrasts but between deeds and parol contracts; hence the doctrine 
of consideration, the balance wheel of the emerging law of contract 
lived  on. 78
7. (1765 ) 3 Burr 1664.
8. (1778) 4 Bro Part Cas 27, 7 Term Rep 350.
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The doctrine of ‘ caveat emptor1 - " le t  the buyer beware", 
which was to atta in  it s  f u l l  development in the nineteenth century, 
had also emerged during th is  period. A warranty or guarantee was 
said to be a statement re la t in g  to the quantity or q ua lity  of the 
goods so ld , made by the s e l le r  at the time of the sale. I t  did 
not re late to anything in fu tu re , but was an assertion of a present 
fa c t. Therefore, whenever there was a breach of warranty, remedy 
lay in an action fo r deceit and not fo r a breach of contractual 
l i a b i l i t y .  Thus, in cases where no express warranty or guarantee 
was made, there was generally no remedy i f  the goods turned out to
be of poor qua lity . The ru le  'caveat emptor1 was followed, as
(9)in Chandelor v. Lopus.
Two factors were important in the shaping of the law of con­
tra c t in the eighteenth century. The f i r s t  was that the economic 
system was largely undeveloped and goods were not yet seen as 
being fungible.^9 10 1^ Exchange was not yet conceptualized in terms 
of future monetary return, consequently, expectation damages were 
not awarded by the eighteenth century courts. This proposition is  
illu s tra te d  by the case of Furreau v. Thornhill. In that case, 
a purchaser of a lease sued fo r fa ilu re  to d e live r because of a 
defect in t i t le .  He sought to recover not merely his deposit but 
also damages sustained as a re su lt of the loss of the bargain.
The court refused to grant him any more than h is re stitu tionary
claim and one of the judges said he could not "be en tit le d  to any
damages fo r the fancied goodness of the bargain which he supposes he has lo
9. (1603) Cro Jac 4, 8 H.L.R. 282
10. M. Horwitz, "H istory o f Contract Law", 87 Harv.L.R. (1974), p.920.
11. 2 Black W. 1079, 96 Engl Rep 635 C.P. (1776) quoted in Horwitz.above.
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In Dutch v. Warren' ' , a buyer brought an action fo r re s titu t io n
of money paid on the purchase of stock, the price of which had fa lle n
by the time of de live ry . The court held that the case was well
brought;“ not fo r the whole money paid, but the damages in not
transfe rring  the stock at that time". Although th is  case has
sometimes been cited  to support the proposition that expectation
(13)damages were recognised in the eighteenth century,' ' Lord
(14)Mansfield in Moses u. Macferlan' ' referred to i t  only to i l lu s t ra te  
the equ itab le nature of the action fo r money had and received. Cases 
where executory contracts were enforced without part performance 
were so infrequent that i t  took a long time before any precise 
rules could be developed.
Another cha racte ris t ic  o f eighteenth century contract law was 
Blackstone's d iv is ion  of contracts into express and implied contracts. 
Express contracts, he thought, consisted of ob ligations imposed by 
the courts or by statute. The second category of contracts, in 
which he Included a l l  common counts arose from "natural reason, 
and the ju s t  construction of law "^ ^ . For th is  category of 
contracts, he cited  Lord Mansfield in Moaee v. Macferlan where he 
said "In one word, the g is t  o f th is  kind of action is ,  that the 
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is  obliged by the 
t ie s  of natural ju s t ic e  and equity to refund the money" (page 
681, op.oit. ). There was thus an equitable conception of contract 
law in the eighteenth century. 12345
12. I Strange 406; KB Engl Rep 589, KB (1760)
13. J. Powell, ' Essay Upon the Law of Contracts and Agreement s ' ,  
(1790) 137-38.
14. 2 Bu rr, 1005, Eng Rep 676, KB (l76o)
15. Blackstone, Commentaries. 161, L^ondon 1791.)
(12)
We now turn to the second factor which shaped the law of contract 
in the eighteenth century and that was the economic and philosophical 
thinking in the eighteenth century. Th is, we can best do by looking 
at the ideas of Lord Mansfield whose tenure o f the o ff ic e  of Chief 
Justice of the King's Bench between 1756 and 1788 had a great 
influence on the law in the eighteenth century. When he took 
o ff ic e , according to Lord C a m p b e l l h e  had "a very low estimate 
of the Common Law of England which he was to adm inister".
On the one hand, the foundations o f nineteenth century contract 
law were firm ly  la id  down by Lord Mansfield as he attempted to free 
the law from pre-commercial forms of actions. He began providing 
a general theory of contract by abstracting from the various cases 
aspects common to a l l  agreements and thereby formulating ra t io na liz ing  
p r in c ip le s . On the other hand, h is approach was an tithe tica l to the 
nineteenth century approach fo r he analysed the law in terms of 
eighteenth century economic re a l it ie s .  In  Jones v. Randall, he 
said: " I t  would be strange, i f ,  a fte r so large an increase of 
commerce, a rt and circumstances accruing, we must go to the time 
of Richard I to find  a case and see what 1s law". Mansfie ld 's 
ju s t if ic a t io n  of h is approach 1s encapsulated 1n his c r it ic ism  of 
S h e lly 's  Caee. He said that " i f  courts of law w il l  adhere to the 
mere le t te r  o f the law, the great men who preside in Chancery w il l 
ever devise new ways to creep out the line s o f law and temper i t  167
16. The Lives of th$ (?h1ef_Jmt1ces, o f ing l^nd, vol 3 (New 
York 1873), p. 229.
17. (1774) L o ff t ,  p. 385 c ited  by F ifo o t, Lord Mansfield 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 227^
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with equ ity " ,' ' hence, that would "render the line s of property
very dubious and uncertain, by a d ifference in judgements in law
and equ ity". His assim ila tion  of law and equity led him to
emphasize the moral ob liga tion  in a l l transactions and thus
extended the w rit of assumpsit to many forms of extortion and
unfairness which previously only the Chancery could have handled.
(19)In Smith v. Bromley, he allowed a woman to recover money she
had paid to her bankrupt brother's cred ito r in the b e lie f that 
i t  would secure her bro ther's discharge.
M ansfie ld 's jurisprudence could be contrasted with that of 
Adam Smith, his contemporary, who was also to have a great deal 
o f influence in the nineteenth century. Mansfield's method was 
to apply human reason to the development of functioning in s titu t io n s , 
to enable them to cope with the needs o f socie ty, a method which 
appears to be very modern, while Adam Smith pursued the ana lytica l 
approach, "stressing deductions from observed material quantities 
and re la tionsh ips".^ 18 920^
Mansfield was influenced by the Roman legal trad it io n , 
e spec ia lly  that o f Ciceronian rationalism , the essence of which 
was that consultation between human beings was the s p ir it  of 
socia l progress. Hence Mansfield thought that the legal scholar 
had a ro le  in generalising and ra tio na liz ing  commercial usage.
Thus, in Pillane v. van Mierop lop. a it. ), he had no hesitation 
in saying that "the law merchant and the law of the land is  the
18. F ifo o t, Mansfield, at pp. 183, 188.
19. (1760) c ited  In F ifo o t, Mansfield, p. 118.
20. S. Todd Lowry: "Lord Mansfield and the Law Merchant",
Journal of Econ. Issues (1973), p. 619.
(18)
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same th ing". The idea of freedom of contract as i t  existed in
the nineteenth century was la rge ly  unknown in the eighteenth
century and i t  developed e s se n t ia lly , out of Adam Smith's
naturalism and la is se z -fa ire . Smith's naturalism in a nutshe ll,
meant that any intervention in commercial l i f e  was thought of
as unnatural since "the natural p rice has the greatest chance
to be the actual market price under conditions of a free exchange
(211
market and s t a b il it y  o f money". '
Adam Smith was therefore poles apart from Lord Mansfield since 
to Smith, any conceived body of m ercan tilis t law, designed to 
shape commercial l i f e  was an unnatural intervention. As i t  has 
been pointed out already, th is  became the fundamental premise 
of nineteenth century c la ss ica l law theory.
Section II: The Rise of the C lass ica l Theory of Law.
As already pointed out, Adam Smith's naturalism was the 
foundation stone of nineteenth century c la ss ica l thinking in 
both p o lit ic a l economy and jurisprudence. In examining the 
development o f c la ss ica l law, 1t is  appropriate that we begin 
with an exposition of Adam Smith's thoughts.
Although he is  known prim arily  as the founder of the school o f 
c la ss ic a l economics and the greatest exponent of la is se z -fa ire , 
i t  is  worth noting that h is approach to p o lit ic a l economy was from 
moral philosophy through ju risp rudence /21 2  ^ In his idea of the
21. Heinrich A. Rommen: "The Natural Law in the Rennaissance 
Period", Notre Dame Lawyer, y o l. 24 (1949), p. 487.
22. C.A. Cooke, "Adam Smith and Jurisprudence", 51 L.Q.R. (1935)
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in v is ib le  hand, Adam Smith stated that economic motivation is
benefic ia l to society and that th is motivation should be u t iliz e d
(2 3 )by the law subject o f course to the “ laws of ju s t ic e " . ' 1 The 
Wealth o f Nations is  an exposition of the working ru le s of 
society according to Adam Smith's view of socia l purpose and 
human motives. The essentia l element of his teaching in th is 
respect was the p r in c ip le  of economic freedom. His naturalism 
was b u ilt  on a d iffe ren t premise from that o f Ciceronian rationalism  
in which rationa l and e f f ic ie n t  conduct resu lts from the exercise 
of human reason. His idea of a rationa l person ( i . e .  the economic 
man), is  one who acts on h is s e lf- in te re s t to achieve his economic 
des ire s .In  th e ir  re len tle ss  fu lfilm en t of th e ir economic desires, 
they are guided by an in v is ib le  hand, which ensures that w h ilst 
seeking to promote th e ir  s e lf- in te re s t , they in c id en ta lly  promote 
the public Interest as well although they did not se t out to do so.^23 4  ^
This s e lf  in terest cannot however be pursued unless man possesses 
a large measure of freedom. This theory rests on the assumption 
that s e lf  Interest can only operate bene fic ia lly  when i t  is  expressed 
in  a free market. H1s deep conviction about the importance of 
freedom was such that 1t became fo r him, not ju s t an expedient in 
acquiring other values, but a value or an end in i t s e l f .  He refers 
to the r igh t of each person to private property and a l l  it s  incidents, 
such as the natural r ig h t o f men to associate with others on terms 
agreeable to a l l  o f them.
23. Wealth of Nations (Dent 1910) Vo l. I, p. 421, V o l. II , p. 154.
24. Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, p. 421.
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Smith thought of contract in  terms of sales and debts rather 
than lega lly  enforceable agreements creating future righ ts .
He c r it ic iz e d  the m ecantilist tra d it io n  of le g is la t in g  fo r p rices, 
standards and constraints in in terna l as well as external trade 
since such leg is la tion  was not in  accordance with h is  system 
of natural jurisprudence in which economics must be freed from 
any constraints and must be le f t  to natural forces of supply and 
demand. In these circumstances, a natural price would emerge 
towards which aggregate behaviour would tend to grav ita te . Adam 
Smith's approach appears to ignore the fact that the economic 
process has to function w ithin legal parameters. Indeed, his 
a ttitude to leg is la t io n  was i f  anything, negative. His p o lit ic a l 
reforms ca lled fo r the repeal o f ex isting  le g is la t io n  which 
interfered with economic freedom. The only necessary le g is la t io n  
was that re la ting  to the secu rity  of private property. He only 
looked at the crim inal aspect o f ju s tic e .
I t  is  well to remember that from Hume he drew the idea
that ju s tice  derives it s  o r ig in  from soc ie ty 's  sharing of it s  
lim ited  resources, and applied i t  to Hutchison's concept of a 
co-operative socia l l i f e .  As A.C. Cooke pointed out, "though 
Adam Smith made much of ind iv idua l In it ia t iv e  and c r it ic iz e d  
governmental cramping of i t ,  he attempted to estab lish  a va lid  
c r it iq u e  of law in terms of so c ia l and economic movement. This 256
25. S. Todd Lowry, note 20, supra, p. 615,
26. Hume, Treatise Of Human Nature, Bk III Part II S2.
26b. Cooke, C.A., supra, note 22.
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study of phenomena in terms of movement was large ly  abandoned in 
the nineteenth century development of both legal and economic 
theory. Under the influence of Bentham, Austin and Holland set 
up an abstract analysis o f the legal equilibrium  of a socia l 
system, ju s t as Ricardo, M ill and Jevons propounded an equilibrium  
analysis o f the economic order. In both f ie ld s ,  the ana lys is was 
s ta t ic ;  i t  investigated the working of given legal and economic 
mechanisms. And since fo r the purpose of deductive theory these 
mechanisms were separately evolved, a separation of economic and 
legal ana lys is  came about."
(a) U t ilita r ia n ism  and Legal Pos itiv ism .
Of Bentham, Dicey said in 1905: "He was the f i r s t  and greatest 
(2 7 )of legal philosophers". In the nineteenth century, u t ilita r ia n ism  
had a firm  g r ip  over legal scholarship. The p r in c ip le  of u t i l i t y  
was to Bentham and the U t il ita r ia n s  the foundation o f both morality 
and law. "By the p r in c ip le  of u t i l i t y  is  meant that p r in c ip le  which 
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to 
the tendency which i t  appears to have to augment or dim inish the 
happiness of the party whose in terest is  in question; or what is  
the same th ing in other words, to promote or to oppose that 
h a p p in e s s " .F u r th e rm o re ,  to Bentham, "Every law when complete 
is  e ither of a coercive or uncoercive nature. A coercive law is  a 278*
27. Law and Opinion in England, (Macmillan, 1914), p. 134.
28. Introduction to the P rin c ip le s  of Morals and L e g is la t ion
[ed. HarHson] p. 11.
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command. An uncoercive, or rather a d lscoerclve law, 1s the 
revocation In whole or in part o f a coercive law". From bentham's 
formulation of the u t i l i t y  p r in c ip le  and his view about the nature 
of law, emerged one proposition of great moment, l . e . ,  the pro­
position that le g is la t io n  can be used to shape society; and i t  is  
in  th is  aspect that he was a law reformer. Bentham was therefore 
one o f the f i r s t  philosophers to demystify the law.^30  ^ To him, 
the objective o f the law was to seek to sa t is fy  in an optimal way 
the desires of human beings 1n soc ie ty, which is  another way of 
saying that the law must conform with u t i l i t y .  Ames could therefore 
say: "The law 1s u t i l i t a r ia n .  I t  ex ists  fo r the re a liza t io n  of the 
reasonable needs of the community. I f  the Interests o f an 
Individual run counter to the ch ie f object of the law, 1t must be 
sacrificed ."^ 3^ In determining the u t i l i t y  of the soc ie ty, Bentham 
stressed that each member o f the community must count equally .
"[I]n  an arrangement designed to give to a l l  men the greatest possible 
sum of good, there 1s no reason why the law should seek to give more 
to one Indiv idual than to another. There are abundance of reasons 
why I t  should not, fo r the advantages acquired on the one side never 
can be equivalent to the disadvantages f e l t  on the other. The 
pleasure Is exc lu s ive ly  fo r the party favoured, the pain fo r a ll 
those who do not share In the favour"^32) This point 1s Important 
In two respects. In the f i r s t  place, 1t was an e x p lic it  proposition
30. Hart, "Bentham and Demystification o f the Law", 36 M.L.R.
(1973), p.5.
31. James Barr Ames, "Law and Morals", 22 Harr L. Rev.( 1908)
97, 110.
32. Bentham, Theory of L eg is la t io n . (Kegan Paul, 1911), p. 97.
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fo r the f i r s t  time that each person was to have an equal say in 
determining u t i l i t y .  Secondly, such a formulation of the p rinc ip le  
o f u t i l i t y  was bound to be hollow because 1t did not Imply that the 
law should ac tive ly  estab lish  any equa lity  since that would be a 
threat to the In s t itu t ion  of private property which to the u t i l i t a r ia n s  
was sacrosanct.
U t il ita r ia n s  shared a lo t  with the c la ss ic a l economists since 
they both believed 1n Individualism  both as a value In I t s e lf  and 
as a means o f socia l mechanism and also 1n the Idea of freedom of 
contract as a general p r in c ip le  o f law and economics:^33  ^ "No man 
o f ripe  years and of sound mind, acting fre e ly , and with h1s eyes 
open, ought to be hindered, with a view to h1s advantage, from 
making such a bargain 1n the way of obtaining money as he thinks 
f i t ,  nor (what Is a necessary consequence) anybody hindered from 
supplying him, upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to".^3^
The Idea o f freedom of contract was adopted for two reasons. The 
f i r s t  was the Idea that Ind iv idua ls knew the ir Interests best. The 
second reason was rooted 1n the philosophy that l ib e r ty  of contract 
was a natural r ig h t, an Idea which Bentham got from Grotius. 
Government's function was to Bentham, to confer that r igh t as well 
as other natural r ig h ts  upon Ind iv idua ls. In h is  essay "On L iberty",
J .S . M ill propounded the p r in c ip le  o f non-interference In contracts 
as a u t i l i t a r ia n  p r in c ip le . *34
33. P.S. A tlyah, The Rise and Fa ll of Freedom o f Contract 
(Oxford, 1979), p. 324.
34• «)_. Bentham*s Economic W ritings, ed. Stark (London, 1952);
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While th is  p r in c ip le  might have been an Ideal Instrument In 
demolishing the antiquated Institu tions which stood 1n the way 
o f progress. It  was developed Into a creed by u t i l i t a r ia n s ,  
p a rt ic u la r ly  Herbert Spencer, and 1t rap id ly  became an end In 
I t s e lf .  Before examining the main re su lt o f th is  Idea of freedom 
of contract, 1 .e ., the emergence of the w il l theory o f  contract 
and o f sanctity  of contract, I t  1s worthwhile looking at the 
Incidental e ffects of th is  u t i l i t a r ia n  position.
With the possible exception of J.S . M i l l ,  the c la s s ic a l 
economists and the u t i l i t a r ia n s  paid no attention to the question 
o f d is tr ib u tio n  o f wealth. They assumed that freedom of contract 
would operate 1n a system of perfect competition and consequently 
that 1t would bring about f a ir  d is tr ib u tion  but th is  assumption 
proved to be unfounded. They therefore remained b lin d  to Inequalities 
1n wealth and bargaining power. By resting freedom o f  contract on 
the moral p rin c ip le  o f u t i l i t y ,  they gave moral san c t ity  to the 
ex isting  market prices and ,s im ila r ly , moral b lessing was given to 
the In eq u a lit ie s .^ 5  ^ They reasoned that any red is tr ib u tion  In the 
society would d isrupt the economy since the expensive products would 
be bought by fewer people and the level of Investment would f a l l ,  
thus making society poorer. I t  was therefore contrary to the 
p r in c ip le  of u t i l i t y .  The overa ll re su lt was therefore to put 
people more firm ly  Into the ir grooves In society. Secondly, the 
problem of socia l costs, 1.e ., the costs Imposed on th ird  parties 35
35. Atlyah, The Rise and Fa ll o f Freedom o f Contract, p. 337.
- b l ­
and on society as a re su lt o f a contract between two or more parties 
was la rge ly  neglected. I t  followed that there was no socia l purpose 
in the law o f contract, outside the promotion of the Interests of 
the parties concerned. The importance o f private property and 
private righ ts was exaggerated a t  the expense o f the public r ig h t.
A fu rther consequence of the u t i l i t a r ia n  philosophy was the 
development of legal positivism  by Austin, Holland et a l. The 
judge's power to adopt the law to the changing re a l it ie s  was down­
graded, p a rt icu la r ly  1n the f ie ld  o f contract where the matter was 
le f t  to the private le g is la t io n  o f  the parties concerned. The 
premises on which legal p r in c ip le s  were founded were no longer 
examined; conceptions were fix e d , socia l progress became barred 
by precedents and what Dean Pound characterized as "mechanical 
jurisprudence was the predominant school o f thought In law".^3i^
To th is  may be added the Importance of p r in c ip le s , e spec ia lly  a fte r 
the trans la tion  Into English of P o th le r 's  Tralte* des Droits des 
Obligations".
Although 1t 1s now possible to c r i t ic iz e  the u t i l i t a r ia n  approach 
to the law of contract, 1t must be stressed that the p rin c ip le  of 
freedom of contract was o r ig in a lly  formulated to destroy the a n t i­
quated In stitu tion s  that s t if le d  economic progress. By 1800 as we 
have pointed out e a r lie r , executory contracts had become enforceable 
and contracts began to assume a dominant ro le  1n the economic system 
as being Instruments fo r "futures" agreements.^36 7) The u t i l i t a r ia n
36. Roscoe Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence", 8 Columbia L. Rev.
(1908), p. 605.
37. Morton J . Horwltz: 87 Harv. L . Rev (1974) 117-118.
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analysis o f law, with Its  off-spr1ng, legal positiv ism , were the 
nineteenth century answers to the problems created by the dynamic 
and expanding free enterprise economy. I t  was not fo rtu itous 
that Maine's famous dictum about the progression of modern economies 
from "status to contract" was uttered 1n 1861. As e a r lie r  mentioned, 
the co ro lla ry  o f the p r in c ip le  o f freedom o f contract was the "w ill 
theory o f contract" which In turn shaped the c la ss ica l paradigm of 
contract law: ru les dealing with o ffe r and acceptance, consideration, 
the canons o f In terpretation, m istake, m isrepresentation and the 
sanctity  o f contract.
(b) The W ill Theory o f Contract:
A re su lt o f  the nineteenth century u t i l i t a r ia n  philosophy and 
c la ss ic a l economics was the Idea that the free w il l  of the parties 
to a contract made law fo r them. The court had no more r ig h t to 
change the ir agreement than 1t had to change any other part o f the 
law. Hence, the w il l o f  the parties became the source o f the 
mutual r ig h ts  and duties the contracting parties had with respect 
to one another. In the words o f Morris Cohen, "[a]ccord1ng to the 
c la ss ic a l view, the law of contracts gives expression to and protects 
the w i l l  of the pa rtie s , fo r the w il l  1s something Inherently worthy 
o f r e s p e c t . . . " C o n t r a c t u a l1 s m  1n the law, that Is , the view 
that 1n an Id e a lly  desirab le system of law, a l l  ob ligations would 
a rise  only out of the w i l l  of the Individual contracting fre e ly , rests 38
38. Cohen, "The Basis o f Contract", 46 Harv L. Rev (1932) 553 
at p. 575.
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not only on the w i l l  theory of contract but also on the p o lit ic a l 
doctrine that a l l  re s tra in t is  e v il and the government is  best 
which governs lea st. This in turn is  connected with c la ss ica l 
economic optimism that there is  a sort of pre-established harmony
between the good of a l l  and the pursuit by each of h is own
(3 9 )se lf ish  economic g a in s" .' ' The idea of the w il l of the parties 
was derived from the h is to r ic a l school of thought o f Savigny and 
was predicated upon the assumption that a person's w ill had an 
autonomous power over him.
Quite apart from the psychological question whether or not 
such a w i l l  actua lly  e x is ts , there is  the question of how free 
such a w i l l  actua lly  is ,  a question which we shall turn to la te r. 
Rationaliz ing the enforcement of contracts on the basis that i t  
is  the re su lt of the w i l l  of the pa rtie s , is  in i t s e l f  very 
dubious for, as Lundstedt points out, even i f  we admit the fa lse 
dogma of the freedom of the w il l  as our starting  point, such an 
explanation is  no more than an a rb itra ry  declaration , a petitio  
principii. He goes on to say that " [ f]o r i t  1s obvious that so 
long as one cannot afford a real explanation of th is  wonderful 
effect of the w i l l ,  one takes fo r granted the very thing one 
is  supposed to prove, namely, that the w il l of the parties 
produces legal e ffec ts  due to th e ir own capacity. It  is  obvious 
that rationa l people could not d ire ct th e ir  w il ls  to the o r ig in  
of rights and du ties, 1f they did not know that th e ir  w il ls  re a lly  
were able to produce such an e ffe c t. I f  a person holds a gun 39
39. Cohen, supra, p. 558.
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in h is hand, he cannot wish or intend to shoot another with i t  i f  
he does not know that i t  is  a shooting weapon, and consequently 
does not know the connection between the pressure on the trigger 
and the sho t."^ 0  ^ He r ig h t ly  concludes therefore that the w ill 
theory of contract explains the basis of contract in a c ir c le .
The "W ill"  nevertheless became the "grundnorm" of a l l  other 
contract doctrines. In the la te r part o f the nineteenth 
century and ce rta in ly  in early  part of the twentieth century, 
the w il l  theory of contract was on the wane and we shall return 
to th is  la te r , but while i t  was the mainstay of contract theory, 
i t  was very in f lu e n t ia l in shaping c la ss ic a l contract law. For 
a s ta r t , since the w il l o f the parties determined th e ir  legal 
re la tion s , i t  followed that the law must concern i t s e l f  only 
with the actual intentions of the p a rtie s , except in so fa r as 
there was an i l le g a l i t y .  The court was lim ited  to the construction 
of the wording of the contract.
Secondly, fo r a contract to come into being, the minds of 
the parties must "meet" at one Instant o f time.
Th ird ly , since the w il l of the parties was the only source of 
any righ ts  and ob liga tion s, the law was powerless to f i l l  in any 
gaps in the contract the parties made.
F in a lly  and most Importantly, by assuming that the parties 
possessed the free w il l to enter into contracts the fact that 
there were many socia l and economic pressures that induced people 
to enter Into contracts, and the fa c t that some parties had a 
superior bargaining position v is -a -v is  others was shelved. 40
40. A. Wilhelm Lundstedt. Legal Thlnkinq Revised.(Stockholm. 
1956), pp. 241-242. ---------------“------------
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(c ) Nineteenth century innovations which resulted from the 
"w il l theory".
( i)  O ffer and Acceptance:
Until the nineteenth century, proof of the existence of an 
agreement was by estab lish ing  that consideration had been furnished 
for a promise but early  in the nineteenth century, the doctrine 
of o ffe r and acceptance had been superimposed on the requirement 
of consideration. Professor Atiyah suggests that o ffe r and 
acceptance and consideration were a l l  part of "an in v is ib le
(411t r in i t y ,  facets of one iden tica l notion which is  that of bargain".' '
The f i r s t  case in which the doctrine appeared however was Adams y.
(42)Lindsell, ' a case o f contract by correspondence. At common
law, a promise is  va lid  consideration fo r another made in return .
While th is  did not pose any problems in oral promises, i t  did pose
certa in d if f ic u lt ie s  in  contracts by correspondence since both
promises could not be made at the same time. In th is  particu lar
case, the d if f ic u lt y  was overcome by assuming that "the defendants
must be considered in law as making during every instant of the
time th e ir  le t te r  was tra v e llin g , the same identica l o ffe r to the
p la in t if f s " ,  a so lution borrowed from Poth ier's Treatise on the
(43)
contract o f s a le , ' where he deals with contracts by correspond­
ence":... 1n order that consent of the parties might take place .. .  
i t  1s necessary that the w il l of the party who makes a proposal 
in w riting  should continue un til h is le t te r  reaches the other 
party, and u n til the other party declares h is acceptance of the 4123
41. Atiyah, " Introduction to the Law of Contrac t" , 3rd ed.
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1981) p. 75.
42. (1818) IB & Aid 689.
43. Part I S. II a rt III quoted in Simpson, "Innovation In
Nineteenth Century Contract Law". Vo l. 91 Law Quarterly Rev". 
(1975) p. 211. ------*---------- 1------
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proposition: The w il l  is  presumed to continue i f  nothing appears 
to the contrary".
The doctrine of o ffe r and acceptance had to be accompanied by
an intention to create legal re la tions. Both requirements, unknown
to pre-nineteenth century contract theory, were predicated on the
in a rt icu la te  premise that i t  was the w il l of the parties that
mattered. The prominence of these doctrines was attested in the
(44)case of C a rlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. Ltd.
( i i )  The Doctrine of Mistake:
The question of mistake inev itab ly  arose from the proposition
that the w il ls  of the parties had to meet, i . e . ,  that there must
be consensus ad idem. Pothier observed that "Error is  the
greatest defect that can occur in a contract, fo r agreements
can only be formed with the consent of the pa rtie s , and there
can be no consent when the parties are in error respecting the
(45)
object o f the agreement".' '
I f  there was a mistake, there was no consensus and therefore, 
no contract. The question however was whether a subjective or 
an objective standard ought to be used in determining the 
in tention of the parties and th is  is  p a rt icu la r ly  important 
where an equivocal promise has been made and the partie s  disagree 
on i t s  import.
In the celebrated case of Raffleo v. Wichelhaue, the 456
44. [1893] 1Q.B. 265.
45. Note 43 at p. 267.
46. (1864) 2 H & C 906; 83 L .J . Ex 160.
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p la in t if f  sued for fa ilu re  to accept de live ry  of goods which were
to arr1ve“ex Peerless"from Bombay. The defendant pleaded that the
goods they had Intended to accept had to a rr ive  via the Peerless
which le f t  Bombay 1n December. Parol evidence was adduced by the
defendants to show that there way a mistake as to which ship was
Intended. Counsel fo r the p la in t if f s  pointed out that I t  was
immaterial by what ship the goods a rr ived , so long as the ship
was ca lled  "Peerless", an argument which appeared to make more
commercial sense. The court nevertheless thought that so long as
there was a mistake, that was an end to the matter; there had been
no consensus ad Idem, and consequently, no contract. The subjective
(47)standard was applied. In Dickinson v. Dodds, 1 not the lea st of
the problems Involved was to determine the meaning o f "This o ffe r 
to be le f t  over u n til Friday, 9 o 'c lo ck  am, June 12, 1874". The 
court again, used the subjective standard and held that the o ffe r 
could be retracted before Friday. Although the subjective standard 
was applied 1n England as the above cases have ju s t shown, 1n America, 
the courts held that a reasonable expectation, created by an 
appearance, ca lled  fo r enforcement to make good the expectation.
On the continent, the argument was that although the w i l l  of the 
parties was Important, I t  was the declaration of the w i l l  that had to 
be looked at.^4a  ^478
47. [1876] 2 Ch. D. 463
48. Roscoe Pound, "The Role of the W ill 1n Law", 68Harv.L. Rev. 3.
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(111) Consideration:
We saw that towards the end of the eighteenth century, Lord Mans­
f ie ld  attempted to abolish the doctrine of consideration. The changing 
philosophical bas is  o f the law 1n the nineteenth century, l . e . ,  the 
economic doctrine of Ia1ssez-fa1re, u t ilita r ia n ism  and the "w ill 
theory of con tract", was bound to have a fundamental bearing on the 
doctrine of consideration "The nineteenth century saw the return to 
'the doctrine o f  the fathers ' with the re jection  o f much that had 
been accepted 1n the previous one hundred years, and the blind 
acceptance of the p rin c ip les  la id  down two centuries before.
The eighteenth century notions o f moral ob ligation  1n contract 
were discarded 1n favour of the bargain theory of consideration, that 
1s, the theory that the common law simply gave e ffec t to bargains 
p riva te ly  a rr ived  a t. In Curriev. Mieat ^ Q^ Lush J.sa ld  "A 
valuable consideration In the sense o f the law may consist e ither 
1n some righ t, In te rest, p ro f it ,  or bene fit accruing to the one party, 
or some forebearance, detriment, loss or re spon s ib ility  given suffered 
or undertaken by the other". Central to th is  formulation was the fact 
that there should be a detriment to the promisee fo r not any act of 
benefit to the promisor was valuable consideration 1n the eyes of 
the law.^49 *51 52^ In Shaduell v. Shadwell, however, there was no
49. K.C. Sutton: Consideration Reconsidered (Unlv. of Queensland 
Press, 1974), p. l l .
60. (1875) LR. 10 Ex 162
51. K.C. Sutton, supra. p. 14.
52. [1860] 3 L . T628.
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detriment to the promisee but only a benefit to the promisor. The
benefit or detriment must have been the re su lt  of a bargain. The
court did not enquire Into the adequacy o f consideration since
bargains had to be le f t  free. The doctrine o f consideration however,
became so abstract that 1t could be used to explain why an o ffe r,
a lb e it  expressed 1n irre tocab le  terms, could nevertheless be
(531revoked as 1n Dickinson v. Dodds' 1 . As Prof. Gilmore points
out, the use o f consideration here makes the stipu la tion  that the
(541o ffe r was to be ' l e f t  over' en tire ly  Irre levan t' . Another case
which i l lu s t ra te s  the meaning consideration assumed 1n the nineteenth
(55)
century 1s Stilk  v. Myriok. '  In that case, two seamen deserted 
a ship while I t  was on a voyage atCronstadt where the ship had made 
port. The owners then offered to s p l i t  the deserters' wages to the 
rest of the crew 1f they accepted to work the ship back to London.
When the crew sued to recover the money, the defendants' case was 
that there was no consideration fo r the second contract and the 
court upheld th e ir contention.
A further consequence o f the general acceptance o f the w il l theory 
was that the courts began to look fo r  and require a contractual 
re la tionsh ip  ca lled  "p r iv ity " . Since a contract was the re su lt of 
the w il ls  of the pa rtie s , 1t followed that no th ird  party not 
Involved In the contract could have any r igh ts  or ob liga tions from 
the contract. This position  did not of course consider the problem 
of socia l costs brought about by contracts between various parties. 534
53. Note 47, supra.
54. Gilmore, The Death of Contra c t. (Columbus, Ohio State Unlv.
Press, 1974TTp. 29.
55. (.1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168
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This c la ss ic a l model o f contract, with ce rta in  modifications,
( fo r example, equitable estoppel as a re su lt of Hughee v. Metro­
politan R y lived  on to the twentieth century. I f  1t was an 
Ivory tower of abstraction even at Its  Inception, 1t was more so 
In the twentieth century when the conditions In Industry and the 
market had d ra s t ic a lly  a lte red . The re su lt o f these changes in 
Industry and the market, which we shall discuss 1n the next 
section, was that the moral idea of respect fo r the given word, 
the idea that the free w i l ls  o f the parties made contracts, 
dwindled. I t  w il l  be submitted la te r , that a d iffe ren t model of 
contract now ought to be considered.
Section III: The Decline o f the C lass ica l Contract Model
Me have put forward the view that the c la ss ic a l paradigm of 
contract was 1n the nineteenth century, an Ivory tower of abstraction 
and 1t is  even more so today. The question then 1s, why has that 
paradigm persisted fo r so long? The answer maybe l ie s  f i r s t  of a l l  In 
the fact that lawyers (court o f f ic ia ls ,  academic and practising 
lawyers^, have found 1t easier to stretch to new uses the c la ss ica l 
model rather than Introduce an en tire ly  d iffe ren t model which accords 
more with the re a lity  o f commercial and consumer practices.
Secondly, I t  Is a t r i t e  observation that In many respects, some 
concepts In c la ss ic a l contract law have been modified to such an 
extent that they can hardly be said to m irror th e ir  o rig ina l formulations. 56
56. ( lb77) 2 App. Cas. 439.
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From the discussion of the c la ss ic a l model above, we came to 
the conclusion that I t  was predicated upon the follow ing ideas:
(I) That the law o f contract frees the ind iv idual to determine 
h1s own norms of contract, l . e . ,  that he is  free from soc ie ty 's  
coercion to choose h1s options. I t  Is 1n th is  respect that S ir  
Henry Maine said that a l l  movement of progressive soc ie ties had 
been from status to contract;
(II) That 1n a s itua tion  of perfect competition, neither party 
to a contract has any power over the other. This meant that a 
formal equality was attribu ted to each person 1n processes of 
contract (1n the formation or performance o f a contract, or the 
reso lution o f a dispute a ris in g  therefrom);
(III) That the state should not Intervene 1n the bargaining process.
I t  should only provide a framework w ith in which such bargaining 
could take place, which Implies that 1t should confine I ts e lf  
w ith in the functions of c o n f lic t  reso lu tion, thereby ensuring 
voluntariness. This Is contrary to the view that the state should 
use the law as a means o f socia l engineering.
We shall now take each of these perspectives of c la ss ica l law 
fo r what 1t Is worth and see how I t  stands1n present day society. 
When S ir  Henry Maine made h1s famous dictum that progressive soc ie ties 
moved from status to contract, what he meant was that "the Individual 
1s substituted fo r the fam ily, as the un it fo r which c iv i l  laws take 
account". "Starting as from one terminus of h isto ry , from a condition 
of society 1n which a l l  these re la tions of persons are sumned up in 
the re la tions of fam ily, we seem to have stead ily  moved towards a
phase o f socia l order 1n which a ll these re lations a r is e  from the
(571
free agreement o f Ind iv idua ls". Hence, put 1n I t s  proper 
context, Maine's dictum was true 1n the sense that the shackles of 
servitude had by the middle o f the nineteenth century been destroyed, 
p a rt ic u la r ly  by the process o f democratization.
True, the population a t large had some power to enter Into 
transactions and re la tionsh ips which they deemed to be to th e ir 
advantage; but the question was, what options were open to them?
The central problem then becomes one o f the constra in ts (economic 
and so c ia l) , that canalize th e ir choices. Indeed, the Idea 1s 
being canvassed now, that status 1n th is  new l ig h t  now has a ro le 
to play 1n the adjudicatory process of the courts 1n contract 
matters.
The second Idea which, as we pointed out, 1s one of the main­
stays o f c la ss ic a l contract theory Is equally untenable. I f  the 
facts o f the present day economic order bear out anything, I t  Is 
that, (a) perfect competition 1s not only a p rac tica l Im poss ib ility , 
but a lso a theoretica l Im possib ility ; (b) because o f the r is e  of 
corporate In s titu tion s  and the continuation of the ex is t in g  forms 
o f c a p ita lis t  property re la tions 1n society, there 1s not, and cannot 
ever be any form of equa lity  between the contracting parties; (c) 
that, to a ttr ibu te  any such formal equality 1s to accentuate the 
domination of the stronger over the weaker party. 578
57. S ir  Henry Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection w ith  the Early 
H istory o f Socie ty  and Its  Relation to Modern "Ideas'"(London,
T. Murray, 1901) pp. 168-170.
58. Childrens and Sp itz , "Status 1n the Law o f Contract" 47 New 
York Un. L. Rev. (1972), p . l.
By 1900, the economic l i f e  o f  Great B r ita in  was dominated by
corporate In s titu tion s . These In stitu tion s  had the advantage of
m obilizing large sums o f money to  carry out projects which until
then could not be carried out owing to the lim ited bankroll the
small firms possessed. There was an unprecedented Increase 1n the
s ize  and concentration of these In stitu tion s  and some o f them
(59)
attained the proportions of monopolies. ' Firms which were not 
large enough to become monopolies combined to form Trade Associations, 
the primary purpose of which was to maintain the status quo.
I t  came to be recognized th a t 1t was Impossible even to a ttribu te  a 
theoretica l equality to the pa rtie s . I t  was also Impossible to 
have anything resembling perfect competition when the market could 
e f fe c t iv e ly  be dominated by la rg e , powerful monopolies.
Another Important consequence was that the structures of these 
large corporations meant that th e ir  management e ffe c t ive ly  became 
separated from the ownership. Hence, the managers, whose primary 
duty as stipu lated by law was to  the owners (shareholders), could 
break th e ir contracts at w i l l ,  1 f they thought 1t was In the Interest 
o f the shareholders for them to do so. This was fa c ilita te d  because 
1n the f i r s t  place they Incurred no personal l i a b i l i t y  and secondly 
because there was a decline o f the awarding of expectation damages 
about th is  time, they could do so at very small costs to the 
corporations. They could therefore,whenever possib le, evade or 
disobey laws which Impinged on th e ir  in te rests . As Warren S. Grairm 
put 1t , "There Is no natural tendency fo r pure competition. Rational,
59. A tlyah , The R ise and F a ll o f  Freedom o f Contract. 596-601.
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private s e lf- in te re s t  m ilita te s  fo r market control as well as for 
control of government to the extent possib le".
Where the ethos is  concern fo r gain, any concern fo r the 
public in terest recedes. Corporate in s titu t io n s  are not simply 
economic un its; they are indeed p o lit ic a l units because i t  is  in 
th e ir in terest to  be so. Thus, in the absence of any real constra ints, 
they w il l be able to t i l t  ru les and laws substan tia lly  to th e ir 
advantage. Th is , w ill be examined when standardized contracts 
w il l be looked a t in the next chapter. " I t  is  naive to expect 
otherwise . Why would an organization that is  a c t ive ly  seeking 
p ro fits  w ithin the rules of the game not seek further p ro f its  by 
a lte ring  the ru le s  of the game as well - especia lly  when it s  
structure makes i t  l ik e ly  that i t  would succeed?"^^ In view 
of the above observations, i t  can be said that there can hardly 
ever be a s itua tio n  of perfect competition. Even in a s ituation 
where the parties sta rt o ff  on approximately equal terms, such a 
s ituation  can on ly  be very transient for as soon as any of the 
parties Improves on his pos ition , he can then use h is improved 
position as a le ve r, to ex tract more favourable terms fo r himself 
and to change the in s titu t io n a l framework to h is  advantage whenever 
possible.
Professor Atiyah suggests that the growth of these mammoth 
commercial in s t itu t io n s  1s a ttribu tab le  to the la is se z -fa ire  
creed since i t  required that corporations be given the righ t to 601
60. "Industria l Capitalism and the Breakdown of the Liberal
Rule of Law". Journal o f Economic Issues, Vol. V II, (1973), 
p. 589.
61. V ictor Goldberg: "In s titu tio na l Change and the Quasi Inv is ib le  
Hand", 17 Journal of Law and Economics (1974) R 461 at p. 479.
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merge i f  i t  was in th e ir  in terest to do so. The consequences for
162)consumers were large ly  disregarded.' ' A ll th is  means that the 
expansion of the corporate state contained the seeds of the 
destruction of the c la ss ica l contract paradigm, since the assumptions 
on which i t  was based were shown to be untrue.
The th ird  point raised is  that o f state intervention in the 
bargaining process. This idea is  at the very root of c la ss ica l 
contract theory. This point of view presupposes that the state 
is  a neu tra l, value-free framework whose duty is  to ensure laws 
are abided by. Such is  the ideal la is s e z -fa ire  state. From what 
we have discussed so fa r , i t  can be concluded that inaction by 
the state is  in some measure tantamount to intervention a lb e it  of 
a negative va r ie ty , since i t  is  an approval of the status quo.
If large corporations can use superior bargaining power in getting 
fo r themselves advantageous terms in contracts, p a rt icu la r ly  those 
in standard form, when i t  is  acknowledged that the same in s titu tion s  
can use th e ir  power to change the In stitu tiona l framework to the ir 
advantage, the state which is  the decision making structure, by 
standing a lo o f, is  in actual fact approving the ensuing consequences. 
Seidman argues that 1t Is not only em p irica lly  Impossible but also 
th eo re tica lly  Impossible fo r the state to be impartial fo r 
"[t]he ru les that define any decision making process necessarily 
lim it  the range of potential Inputs, conversion processes, and 
feedback functions. These ru les , to that degree, predetermine 
outputs, that Is , the decisions. The state, perceived as a 
framework fo r the resolution o f c o n f l ic t ,  is  a decision-making 62
62. A tiyah, footnote no. 33, supra at p. 617.
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structure. No more than can any other decision-making structure 
can i t  be neutral. I f the decision-making structure cannot be 
neutra l, i t s  output cannot be value-neutral. The laws of 
property and contract which are required by the ideal type model 
o f the market-economy therefore cannot be neu tra l, for they are 
the products of a decision-making s tru c tu re ." ' 1
That fact was recognized by the end of the nineteenth century 
by people l ik e  Bernard Shaw, T.H. Green et al Freedom to
them, assumed a more positive ro le . It was no longer confined 
to trad it iona l freedoms lik e  freedom to contract, but also meant 
that there should be freedom to achieve se lf- fu lf ilm e n t.
Today, the law o f contract is  replete with statutory provisions 
which lim it  the ind iv idual’s lib e rty  to contract. These statutory 
provisions have not only benefited consumers, but they have a lso 
been of benefit to the business concerns who have sought the 
assistance of the leg is la tu re  where the market has fa ile d . The 
funeral oration of la is se z -fa ire  was given by J.M. Keynes who in 
1926, wrote: " I t  is  not true that ind iv idua ls possess a p rescrip tive  
'natural l ib e r ty ' 1n the ir economic a c t iv it ie s .  There is  no 
'compact' conferring perpetual righ ts on those who have or who 
acquire. The world is  not so governed above that private and 
socia l Interests always co incide. It  1s not so managed here below 
that 1n practice they always co incide. I t  1s not a correct 
deduction from the P rin c ip les o f Economics that enlightened s e lf  
Interest always operates 1n the public Interest. Nor is  1t true 
that s e lf  in terest generally 1s enlightened; more often Ind iv iduals 634
63. Seldman, R.B. "Contract Law, the Free Market, and State 
Intervention; A Jurisprudentia l Perspective". Vol. 7, Journal 
of Economic Issues (1973) p. 553 of 558.
64. G.B. Shaw: "The Road to Equality; L ibera l Leg is la tion  and 
Freedom of Contract 1n the Works of T.H. Green: ed. Nettleshlp 
(Longmans, 1885-8).
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acting separately to promote the ir own ends are too ignorant or 
too weak to a tta in  even these. Experience does not show that 
in d iv idua ls , when they make up a soc ia l u n it are always less 
c le a r sighted than when they act s e p a r a t e l y " . T h e  idea that 
economies should be managed rather than le f t  to gain th e ir own 
equilibrium  began to gain ground.
Today, the emergence of the state as a major source of 
revenue and wealth is  nearly un ive rsa l. Even in countries 
which are large ly  based on the market economy, the state usually 
has the largest stake in the economy. I t  is  d i f f ic u lt  to see 
any retreat from the present s itua tion  since i t  would mean that 
the giant corporations would simply replace the state in th is  
connection. There has been a gradual w ithering away of the 
s t r ic t  d is t in c tio n  between the public and the private sectors.
These developments have led many scholars to ta lk  of the death 
o f c o n t r a c t . T h e  main theme of these scholars is  to stress 
the fact o f the irrelevance of tra d it io n a l contract theory.
Professor Kessler showed with percipience that the c la ss ica l 
theory was out of touch with the re a lity  o f consumer contracts 
most of which are now in standard form.^65 78  ^ Professor Macaulay 
has also demonstrated the irre levance o f c la ss ica l contract theory 
on commercial contracts, since the ro le  o f contract in the c la ss ica l
65. The End of La issez-Fa ire , (London, 1926).
66. Reich, "The New Property", 73 Yale L.O. 733.
67. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract_[1974]; "Friedman and 
Macaulay: “Contract Law and Contract Teaching", [1967]
Wise L. Rev. p. 805.
68. Kessler, "Contracts o f Adhesion", 43 Colum L. Rev. [1943] 629.
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theory is  very l i m i t e d . W h a t  is  being advocated is  a more 
empirical version o f contract theory which re fle c ts  the manner 
in which present day contracts are made and enforced. To be 
sure, s ituations do a rise  in which the c la ss ica l model is  
appropriate. The point being made however is  that such contracts 
are no longer typ ica l o f the average contract today. This 
proposition, which has been gaining ground recently , is  that the 
reason why the c la s s ic a l model has fa ile d  is  partly  due to the 
fact that so fa r , the c la ss ica l model has viewed contracts only 
as transactions and that th e ir  re la tiona l aspect have large ly 
been ignored.
Before proceeding, i t  is  necessary to re late the above d is ­
cussion to Cameroon. In the f i r s t  place, i t  1s the c la ss ic a l 
paradigm which s t i l l  applies (fo rm ally), and th is  is  done without 
most o f the le g is la t iv e  constraints that have been applied in 
England and France. Secondly, the sectors of the economy that 
matter are dominated by re la t iv e ly  large corporations, public 
and private. This s itu a tio n , coupled with the high leve l of 
consumer ignorance and economic d isparity  among the economic 
partic ipan ts , makes the need fo r a new perspective to contract 
law even more strongly fe lt .  69
69. Macaulay: "Non-Contractual Relations in Business", 28 
Am. Socio. Rev. (1963) 55.
(a) Relational and Transactional Contract:
In the c la ss ica l contract model, a contract is  viewed essen tia lly  
as a d iscrete transaction. This perspective of contract has its  
roots in c la ss ica l economics. The view was that the various parties 
to a contract could by and large ascerta in th e ir long term interests 
and could as such, in a contract, bind themselves in future by the 
exchange of promises. Free choice is  of the essence in such a 
s itua tio n . It is  however, an empirical fac t that s itua tions w ill 
a r ise  where the acto r's  short-term perceived in terest w i l l  c o n f lic t  
with his long-term in terest which he may or may not have perceived. 
This is  the reason why many contracts are broken. It appears 
therefore that the question of free choice and ra t io n a lity  on 
which the c la ss ica l economists la id  so much emphasis was i l l- c o n ­
ceived. The attempt to explain a l l  socia l and economic processes 
so le ly  "in  terms of a self-generating system of atomic or 
ind iv idua l re lations based on subjective ra t io na lity "  is  
pervasive in the entire  h istory of contract law.^70  ^ It is  indeed 
c le a r that not only is  a great deal of contract breaking tolerated 
but that i t  is  also expected fo r promises are not absolute.
Abiding by one's promises (con tracts), serves a socia l and economic 
function. Where i t  1s therefore not benefic ia l to the promisor 
and where the onerous consequences of performing the contract 
outweigh the consequences of breaking 1t , the former course w ill 
frequently be chosen. Professor Atiyah also points out that in
70. S. Todd Lowry, "Bargainand Contract Theory", supra, footnote 20,
at p. 5.
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modern times there has been a re la t iv e  decline in free choice.
Hence, lawyers have more read ily  je ttisoned  the idea of ind iv idual 
ra t io n a lity  on which c la ss ic a l law is  based.^71 723^
In both legal and economic ana lys is , the fa ith  in the consistent 
cogency of the ra t io n a lity  of the ind iv idua l gave r is e , in economics, 
to what M ilton Friedman has termed "pos itive  economics', ' a 
pa ra lle l o f positiv ism  in law. In law, th is  gave r ise  to the 
d e fin it ion  of contract simply as "a promise or set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
(73)of which the law in some way recognises as a duty".' 1
Recently, many scholars have been wondering whether contract so 
defined represents what ac tua lly  transp ires in the real world. Is 
a contract simply a transaction or is  i t  something more; a part 
of an ongoing re la tionsh ip  between p a rtie s , the past, present and 
future of which one can 1n no way d istingu ish  c lea rly?  In h is * 
book, The Death o f Contract, Professor Gilmore contends that i t  is  
no longer possib le .to deduce a coherent body of p rin c ip les from the 
numerous transactions 1n dealing with modern exchange problems.
Morton Howltz also contends that the primal roots of contract were 
neglected by the early w rite rs on contract theory.^74  ^ Their
71. P.S. A tiyah, Rise and Fa ll of Freedom of Contract ,  p. 726.
72. A Coddington, "Pos itive  Economics"; 115 Canadian J . of 
Economics (1972) 1-15.
73. Restatement of Contracts. (1932), Paragraph 1.
74. Morton Howltz, "The H is to rica l Foundations of Modern Contract 
Law", 87 Harv Law Rev. (1974) 917-56.
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fundamental concern was to reduce contract law into a coherent 
body of p r in c ip le s , derived from a common core of ra t io na l, 
consistent transactional patterns which took place in the economy. 
Hence, they treated the exchange of promises essen tia lly  as 
sales. The"contract is  dead schooV'has therefore highlighted 
many issues which have resulted in the irrelevance of contract 
theory. This does not suggest to us however that contract has 
lo s t it s  ro le in present day society. It springs from the fact 
that anything that was inconsistent with the c la ss ica l contract 
paradigm was elim inated from the sphere of contract. Hence, 
many scholars, awoken to th is  fa c t, have sought to put things 
r igh t. This c la ss ic a l point of view presumes that no duties 
ex ist between the parties p rio r to the agreement and any duties 
that e x is t thereafter are determined at the formation stage. In 
Ian Macneil's words, there is  supposed to be a "sharp in by 
clear agreement, sharp out by c lear performance".^7^
While th is  may.be true of some contracts, there are many sorts 
of contracts to which such a description would be most inappropriate. 
Labour contracts fo r example, are en tire ly  outside the ambit of 
such a re s tr ic ted  view of contracts. The sp ec if ic  contracts 
which we Intend to examine, v iz . contracts fo r  the sale of 
ag ricu ltu ra l products, cred it and hire-purchase contracts, contracts 
fo r the supply of services e tc ., cannot also be brought w ithin such 
a s im p lis t ic  view of contract. We are in these cases, concerned 75
75. Ian Macnell, "The Many Futures of Contract", Vol. 47 Southern 
Ca lifo rn ia  Law Rev. (1974) 691 at p. 738.
with fa r more complex contracts. It is  also recognized now that 
in most contracts, certa in contractual duties may arise  even before 
the formation of the contract, such as a duty to bargain in good 
fa ith .
That economic re la tions are no longer confined to "transaction", 1 
evidenced by the emergence of status in present day economic 
re la t ion s , monopolies are being dealt with quite d iffe re n t ly  from 
other enterprises; i t  is  also recognized now that certa in  consumers 
require the law's protection more than others. Indeed, the very 
nature of the main economic un it - the modern corporation - 
epitomizes th is  a ttitude in it s  very structure: an ongoing re la tion  
of many people, which changes with time and circumstances. In 
m odern contracts, the tendency is  for future r isks to be adjusted 
e ithe r by v irtue of some clause in the contract requiring the 
m odification of contractual terms, or by some quasi adm inistrative 
process, rather than the s t r ic t  adherence to the le t te r  of the 
contract.
Contracting parties find  i t  to th e ir advantage to be f le x ib le  
espec ia lly  1n re la tion  to the contract p rice and they most often 
leave the p rice , p a rt icu la r ly  in supply contracts,to be set by 
agreement from time to tim e.^ ^
It might be contended that the view of contract as a re la tion  
does not add anything new since i t  does not redefine the trad it ion a l 
contract doctrines such as consideration, o ffe r and acceptance, the 
d is t in c tio n  between contractual terms e tc . It is  submitted however 76
76. ion Fu lle r and Robert Braucher, Bas ic  Contract Law (West 
Publishing Co. 1964), pp. 77-78.
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that there is  a fundamental d ifference in regarding a contract as 
a sing le  transaction where two or more parties are involved from 
that of viewing a contract as a re la tion  among the various parties.
In the one case, the contractual process is  necessarily an 
adversary type in which parties simply seek to further the ir 
s e lf- in te re s t . Contract here usually regresses into a shorter 
and shorter ca lcu la tion  of advantage, motivated by the hostile  
s e lf- in te re s t  of the dominant party to the bargain. In the other 
case however, the contractual process is  not necessarily adversaria l. 
I t  is  part and parcel o f an ex isting  re la tionsh ip  which is  not 
lim ited  by it s  formative stage but goes on into the future. Thus, 
the features of th is  re la tion  must be determined, and it s  parameters 
defined. It is  only w ith in such a framework that a socia l purpose 
can be in s t i l le d  into the contractual process as well as into the 
enforcement of contracts. Secondly, i f  i t  is  acknowledged that 
most contracts would f i t  into th is  framework, then the stigma 
attached to the interference with freedom and sanctity of contracts 
would be eroded since i t  would become the function of the law to 
estab lish  the framework fo r a l l  contractual re la tions.
More importantly, th is  perspective of contract Is not merely 
conceptual, but i t  corresponds more to what actua lly  takes place 
in socie ty. We sha ll v indicate the v a lid it y  of the above pro­
position by looking at Ian Macneil's treatment of re la tiona l 
contract in the a r t ic le  c ited above.
Before proceeding, i t  is  however necessary to consider another 
perspective of contract put forward by Professor Leff.^77  ^ In h is
77. Arthur Le ff, "Contract as a Thing", 19 American Unlv. L. 
Rev. (1970) 131.
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analysis which re la tes exclusive ly to consumer contracts, and 
standard form contracts in p a rticu la r, he suggests that in such 
contracts what one is  buying is  not merely the a r t ic le  or service, 
but the whole range o f the contract process, which includes 
bargained and non-bargained processes of which the most tangible 
and mutable is  the a r t ic le  or service. He suggests therefore 
that the whole bundle which resu lts should not be ca lled  a 
contract, but a "thincf since the actual subject of the transaction 
has not been bargained for at a l l .  He says that a "thing" presents 
i t s e l f  as what i t  is ,  to take i t  or leave i t ,  while a contract 
is  the end product of a bargaining process. He proceeds by 
stating that i f  such contracts are properly regarded as "th ings", 
the question whether or not they should be regulated does not a rise  
fo r inasmuch as regulation of other things are common (regulation 
may re late to tyglenic or safety standards), regulation of consumer 
contracts should not be questioned since they are also "things".
L e ff 's  view of whether a contract is  a transaction or re la tion  is  
not c le a r ly  spe lt out however. While he states that a contract is  
a deal as opposed to a more long term re la tion sh ip , he says on 
the other hand that a contract presupposes "not only a deal, but 
dealing".^78^
It is  submitted that while L e ff 's  analysis 1s useful 1n connection 
with standard form contracts, i t  is  more lim ited  in it s  scope than 
the concept of a re la tiona l contract discussed by Ian Macnell, 
which puts most, i f  not a l l  contracts In th e ir  true perspective, as 
aspects of an ongoing re lationsh ip  among economic actors.
78. L e ff, p. 138.
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(b) The Characteristics of Relational Contract
In discussing re la tiona l contract ( i.e .  contract as a re la t io n ),
we sha ll fo llow  c lose ly  the treatment given to i t  by Ian Macneil.
The c la ss ica l model of contract looked at a contract exclusive ly
as a transaction. In h is words, "Their great veh ic le was the
abstract but b r i l l ia n t  conception of consent: that to which consent
was given is  included, everything e lse is  excluded; consent once
(79)given, remains immutable".
The Primal Roots of Contract:
The reason why "contract" has been seen exclu s ive ly  as a 
"transaction" is  that the primal roots of contract and it s  socia l 
matrix have large ly been ignored. He l is t s  exchange as one of 
the basic roots of contract and he characterizes i t  as a pre­
condition fo r spec ia liza tion .
While i t  is  not ce rta in  that exchange as we know i t  was essentia l 
to spec ia liza tion  in p rim it ive  so c ie t ie s , i t  is  nevertheless true 
that exchange and spec ia liza tion  were indispensable to the develop­
ment of contract.
The second primal root is  the existence of a sense of choice. 
People must have the capacity to choose from a range of behaviours, 
otherwise, 1t would be impossible to ta lk  o f contract. To be sure, 
because of physiological determinism and socia l pressure, there is 
nothing l ik e  absolute choice. It  is  however rare to find a s itua tion  
where a l l choice is  taken away completely from the ind iv idua l. In
79. Macneil, p. 756.
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every contract s itua tion , there is  always an element of pressure 
on the ind iv idua l since the existence of an exchange it s e lf  
constitu tes a pressure fo r every person would rather have anything 
free rather than to have to give something up fo r i t .
For th is  reason therefore, even in cases where a party had 
very l i t t l e  choice, as is  the case in some adhesion contracts, 
provided there is  a "voluntary" exchange a contract situation 
would be deemed to e x is t. So long as there was any alternative 
open to the party, i t  would pose considerable problems trying 
to exclude some exchange from the ambit of contract, since the 
question w i l l  be where to draw a lin e  between what is  a contract 
and what is  not. How much choice would be necessary for a contract 
to ex ist?  Furthermore, we saw e a r lie r , one of the major 
cha rac te ris t ic s  of modern society is  the dwindling of choice 
given to the ind iv idual in economic matters. The trend is  towards 
co lle c t iv ism , especia lly  in production.- This is  reflected by 
the growth of standardised products and standard form contracts. 
Transactions tend to be more Individualized while re lations are 
more c o l le c t iv is t .  Hence, to the extent that co lle ctiv ism  
necessarily  tends to lim it  choice, 1 t follows that the lesser the 
choice, the more re la tiona l contracts are.
The th ird  primary root o f contract according to Macneil is the 
conscious awareness of the past, present and the future. He says 
that u n t il man or h is forebears developed th is  perception of the 
continuum of past, present and future, It was Impossible consciously 
to pro ject exchange into the f u t u r e " . T h e  view that contract
80. Macneil, p. 710.
is  a d iscrete transaction based on the ra t io n a lity  of the individual 
does not explain how the threshold of good fa ith  necessary fo r the 
continuation in future of the contractual re la tionsh ip  orig inated.
A re la tion  cannot lo g ic a lly  be derived from subjective ra t io n a lity  
but must be derived from a comprehensive socia l ra t io n a lity . One 
view of th is  threshold is  that habit and custom which were followed 
consistently by large groups o f people became c rys ta lised , thus 
forming the baseline or threshold of th is  r e la t io n /  ' The problem 
fo r the ju r is t  or economist is  therefore to analyse the various 
sorts of components comprehended by contract.
(c) D istinctions between transactional and re la tiona l contract:
The prupose of d istingu ish ing  between transactional and re la tiona l 
contract is  to show that the re la tiona l threshold is  a precondition 
o f for any contract. It is  d i f f ic u l t  to find a s itua tion  where a 
contract is  e n t ire ly  transactional or re la t io n a l. Two examples 
may be given to i l lu s t ra te  the two poles of contract. Macneil gives 
the i l lu s t ra t io n  of the purchase of petrol at a service station 
along a motorway.' '  The petrol purchase is  more akin to the 
transactional pattern in the fo llow ing respects: f i r s t ly ,  there 
might have been no precedent dealing between the parties and there 
might be no future dealing between them. The purchase takes only 
a few minutes, without any personal re la tionsh ip  between the parties. 
For the re la tiona l pattern, an employment s itua tion  could be used 
as an example. I f  X decides to jo in  an engineering firm , although 812
81. S. Todd Lowry, "Bargain and Contract Theory", 10 Journal 
of Econ. Issues (1976), p. 6.
82. Macneil, p. 720.
there is  a point in time when the contract may be said to have 
come in to being, there might have been previous dealing between 
the parties involved. There must have been several interviews, 
probably a probationary period etc. The duration of the contract 
might be uncertain and although X w i l l  ce rta in ly  be concerned 
about the sa lary he is  offered, long term prospects would most 
l ik e ly  be of greater importance to him. There is  a personal 
re la tionsh ip  between the parties which goes on fo r a long time.
In the f i r s t  case, although the purchase appears to be en tire ly  
transactiona l, i t  is  by no means so. There might have been some 
"brand" re la tionsh ip  created by e a r lie r  purchases or advertis ing. 
A lso, there might be some future re la tion  in the form of cred it 
arrangements. Sometimes, there is  even a human re la tionsh ip  such 
as when preference is  given to certa in  customers, p a rt icu la r ly  at 
periods when there are shortages.
In the second example, the exchange is  both economic and 
so c ia l. Hence, even in these extreme examples, i t  can be seen 
that even a simple purchase which appears to be a mere transaction 
has an element of "re la tion" about i t .
In the transactional case, the subjects o f the exchange must 
be e a s ily  monetized. This Is so whether the transaction is  to take 
place in the present or in the future. In the re la tiona l case, 
a l l  aspects of the re la tion  cannot be ea s ily  monetized.
The second major d ifference re la tes to the source of socio­
economic support the contracts have. Macneil puts forward the 
view that the socioeconomic support fo r transactions l ie s  outside 
the exchange transaction; for example, an exchange transaction 
can only occur i f  property righ ts receive
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socio-economic support. ' Although a re la tion  necessarily 
enjoys external socio-economic support, i t  also generates it s  
own internal support. The more parties are involved in the 
re la tion , the stronger th is support is ,  "The internal support 
which a re lation  establishes but which is  lacking in a pure 
transaction is  without question one of the most important 
d is tin c tions between exchange transactions and exchange 
re la tions. It is  a d is t in c tio n  a ffecting  the ir very aspect, 
from day to day casual operations to major planning to various 
d isasters to socia l reinforcement and contro l.
Another important d is t in c tio n  a ffects  the duration, commence­
ment and termination of the contact between the parties. In a 
purely transactional s itua tio n , the duration is  short and per­
formance of the contract is  instantaneous. However, there may 
be an extension of time, especia lly  when future delivery is  
concerned or where cred it arrangements are made. This may there­
fore cause a transa'ction to become more re la t io n a l. In a purely 
re la tiona l s itua tion , the duration of contract between the parties 
may be In fin ite  although there is  a point In time at which i t  
may be said to have commenced.
From the above discussion, i t  is  c le a r that the dominant 
mode of economic organization is  the re la tion  and not the d iscre te 
transaction. Production has always been accomplished by re la tiona l 
means and "consunption"has already become re la tiona l in many respects. 834
(83)
83. Macneil, p. 746
84. Macneil, p. 748.
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Businesses are now very conscious of these lim ita tion s  of the 
d iscrete transactions and are more concerned with long term 
re la tions to the extent that they are ca va lie r about de ta iling  
s t r ic t  rights and duties.
(d) Contract and Planning:
The ro le of contract is  not merely to transfe r anticipated 
r isk s  as the c la ss ic a l contract theory would have us believe, but 
also to bu ild  economic re lations in an im perfectly competitive 
market. In th is  way, economic planning can be developed to 
embrace complex business and consumer re la t io n s . It is  concerned 
with planning and organizing future long term re la tion s. Thus, 
the actual market exchange, while remaining important, becomes 
incidental or a n c illa ry  to the planning process.
Since most contracts are neither pure transactions nor 
en tire ly  re la t io n a l, contract planning w il l  therefore assume 
aspects of both. P.lanning in a re la tiona l context cannot be 
absolutely immutable since the re la tion  grows and changes with 
time and circumstances.^85 6  ^ This is  so because i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  
to specify every aspect of the contract. Moreover, as we pointed 
out, a re la tion  has an internal capacity fo r  growth. As a re su lt, 
there was a development of re la tiona l means in which both "promise" 
and the market played important ro les. On the production side, the
85. Macaulay, footnote no. 69, supra, pp. 55-67.
86. Macneil, p. 762.
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upshot was the growth of the modern corporation while on the consumer 
side the emergence of standardized products and standard form 
contracts.
As i t  can be rea lised , people are more w illin g  to adhere to 
already ex isting  re la tions than to enter into en tire ly  new re la tions. 
The mutual planning of the o rig ina l re la tion  is  therefore of utmost 
importance fo r i t  must re f le c t  the fa irness of the entire re la tion .
In the case of a consumer contract, who is  therefore to p a r t ic i­
pate in the process of mutual planning? I f  the planning is  en tire ly  
carried out u n ila te ra lly  by one party, the arrangement does not 
become re la t io n a l. Hence, i t  w il l be submitted a body which has 
the in terests of the consumers at heart, should engage in th is 
process of mutual planning with the producer. Although the entry 
of new members into the ex is t in g  re la tion  would be adhesive, i . e . ,  
without any bargaining, the o rig ina l operation which provided the 
standard would however be re la t io n a l. The essence of the planning 
is  to make a re la tion  less c o n f lic t  laden and to provide the 
p o s s ib il ity  of dealing w ith co n flic ts  through a variety of ways.
The planning of a re la t io n  also e ffects  the partic ipants'v iews 
about i t  which Inevitably have a bearing on h is actual behaviour 
v is -a -v is  the r e l a t i o n . I n  a purely transactional s itua tion , 
the ind iv idua ls ' subjective view of I t  is  en tire ly  motivated by 
se lf- in te re s t and nothing e lse . The contract must be performed 
and forgotten as quickly as possible. In a re la tion , however, 
which is  not d iscre te , ( in  a macro sense), the parties know that
87. Macneil, 794.
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they sha ll continue to deal with each other in future. There is  
the consciousness that as circumstances change, there w il l be a 
need fo r new planning in order to meet the emerging co n f lic ts .
CONCLUSION:
This chapter has been attempting to look at contract h is to r ic a lly  
and a n a ly t ic a lly , to ascertain whether i t  has tru ly  served the 
purpose i t  was designed to serve. The main argument that has been 
put forward, is  that the c la ss ic a l model of contract has been from 
it s  inception an ivory tower of abstraction and that today, i t  has 
very l i t t l e  relevance to what actua lly  takes place in the f ie ld  
of contracts. I t  has been suggested that one of the reasons why 
th is  was and is  s t i l l  so is  that a contract has been viewed simply 
as a d iscre te atomized transaction. The concept of an exchange has 
therefore been put in it s  true context: the re la tion . Transactions 
are increasing ly taking place w ithin a re la tiona l framework because 
transactions alone cannot cope with the planning needs of an 
increasing ly complex socio-economic system.
This perspective of contract therefore brings most of the 
d iffe ren t sorts o f contracts w ithin the general rubic of contract.
It provides a solution fo r the "contract is  dead school." The law 
of contract would therefore encompass a l l  contractual transactions 
which take place w ithin the framework of contractual re la tions. 
Macneil posits broad p rin c ip les  which may be deduced from a ll 
these contracts as follows " ( 1 ) re c ip ro c ity ; (2) ro le  effectuation; 
(3) lim ited  freedom of exercise of choice; (4) effectuation of 
planning; and (5) harmonizing of contracts with th e ir internal
(88)and external socia l m atrices."' '
As was mentioned e a r lie r , th is  perspective of contract does not 
do away with trad it iona l contract doctrines which were developed 
with the view that a l l  contracts are transactions. Those contracts 
which were inconsistent with th is  perspective of contract were 
simply le f t  outside the parameters of the general law of contract. 
Even so, i t  was applied to cases where i t  was most inappropriate.
To the extent that some contracts s t i l l  re f le c t the purely 
transactional pattern, the c la ss ic a l model with it s  doctrines 
s t i l l  serve a useful purpose. Such cases are however increasingly 
rare since most transactions are now taking place in re la tiona l 
frameworks. Furthermore, the model does not induce the le g is la to r 
to consider matters worth his attention . To conclude, we shall 
quote two passages which summarize re la tiona l contract and the 
importance of planning. Kohler states: "Thus, i t  is  the function 
of the law of ob ligations to smooth away inequa lit ie s and chance, 
and thereby make i t  possible fo r the values that are inherent in 
humanity to become e ffec tive  1n th e ir  proper proportions. In th is 
way, i t  libera tes development and re lieves i t  from the hazards 
of time. A great varie ty  of values l ie  in the future, and for 
the time being, do not ex is t fo r the present . . .  And, In th is 
contingency, i t  is  the province o f the law of ob ligations to 
draw the future in to the present."^8 9^
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88. Macneil, p. 809.
89. Kohler, c ited in Macneil, p. 801.
Todd Lowry a lso states that: "Relational contract is  best 
seen as an expression of the specialized structuring of re lations 
or private economic planning by partic ipants in an economic 
continuum, Commitments between businesses are planning and 
organizing operations which should be viewed in terms o f the ir 
contribution to socia l ends, which may include the protection of 
a zone of a rb itra ry  choice and in it ia t iv e .  Where corporate 
purposes c o n f lic t  with widely accepted socia l ends, the la t te r  
unquestionably w i l l  take precedence. Here he appears to be
dealing only with business re lations but in the lig h t  o f the 
above discussion, the same could be said of consumer re la tion s . 90
90. S. Todd Lowry, Bargain and Contract Theory, 10 Journal 
of Econ Issues, 1976 p. 18.
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CHAPTER THREE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
The thrust o f the la s t  chapter was to show that the c la s s ic a l 
conception o f contract has been exploded and that 1 t  has become 
more re la tiona l than transactiona l. This 1s re flected in  the 
medium through which th is  re la tion  occurs. No longer Is a con­
tra c t e ssen tia lly  negotiated between sp ec if ic  ind iv idua ls . On the 
contrary, the paradigm of contract 1 s (since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, 1 n the Industria lised  countries) the standardized 
contract.
Indeed such has been the rap id ity  o f th is  change that Slawson, 
w riting  1n the United States of America In 1975, estimated that 
standardized contracts account fo r about ninety-nine per cent o f  
a l l  negotiated tran sa c tio n s .^  While the same can hardly be said 
o f Cameroon, there 1s no doubt, as w i l l  be revealed when an exam­
ination  o f standardized contracts 1n Cameroon w il l  be carried out, 
that standardized contracts f u l f i l  an Important ro le , not le a s t 
because the most Important consumer contracts, as well as contracts 
fo r the sale o f ag ricu ltu ra l products are a l l  standardized.
This chapter seeks to do two th ings. F ir s t  o f a l l  1t attempts 
to e luc idate the o r ig in s and causes o f th is  standardization process; 
secondly. I t  seeks to delve into the ways and means by which French 
and English courts have accommodated standardized contracts. 1
1. Slawson, "Standard Form Contracts and the Democratic Control 
o f Law Making Power", 64 Harv. L. Rev. (1975), p. 529.
-96-
Section I: Origins and Causes of the Standardization of Contracts
The f i r s t  study of standardized contracts was carried out at 
the turn of the twentieth century by a French ju r is t ,  Raymond 
S a le ll le s ,  who 1n a study of part of the German C1v1l Code, wrote 
In 1901: "Doubtless, there are contracts and contracts, and we are 
re a lly  fa r from that unity of contractual type assumed by the law. 
Eventually the law must, Indeed, y ie ld  to the shading and differences 
that have emerged from socia l re la tions. There are pretended con­
tracts that have only the name, the ju r id ic a l construction of which 
remains yet to be made. For these, 1n any event, the ru les of 
indiv idual Interpretation should undergo Important m odifications,
I f  only that one might c a ll them, for a la ck  of a better term, 
contracts of adhesion, those 1n which a s ing le  w il l 1 s exclusive ly 
predominant, acting as a un ila te ra l w il l  which d icta tes Its  law 
no longer to an Ind iv idua l, but to an Indeterminate c o lle c t iv ity  
and which In advance undertakes u n ila te ra lly ,  subject to the adhesion 
of those who wish to accept the law of the contract and to take 
advantage o f the engagements Imposed on themselves.
KarlL lew e lyn  1 n h1 s cha racte ris t ic  manner, put the emerging 
problem of standardized contracts squarely Into perspective when 
he wrote, 1n reviewing P ranzn ltz 's pioneer work on the su b je c t/2 3  ^
that: "Pranznltz 1s concerned with a problem which has fo r some time 
now been a live  1n our law, and which 1 s on the Increase, but which has 
not yet made Its  way Into fa m ilia r ity ."
2. S a le ll le s ,  "De la Declaration de la Volonte" (1901) cited In 
Kahn-Freund, A,_Source-book On French Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1979), p. HO.
3. L. Prauznltz, The Standard ization  o f Commercial Contracts In 
English and Continental Law (London. Sweet and Maxwell, l f r » ).
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" I t  1 s b r ie f ly  put thus: when a contract ceases to be a matter 
o f d icker, bargain by bargain, and Item by Item and becomes In any 
f ie ld  o r any o u t f it 's  business or any trade's
practice a matter o f mass production o f bargains, w ith the back­
ground (apart from p ric e , qua lity  and the lik e )  f i l le d  1n not by 
the general law but by standard clauses and terms, prepared often 
by one of the parties only - then what? One "what" 1s clear: the 
presuppositions o f our general law no longer maintain 1 n such a 
s itua tion . Those presuppositions can be stated as follows:
(1) The general law 1s adequately spec ia lized , and 1s detailed 
and balanced to f i l l  1 n with moderate adequacy any gaps which the 
parties leave open In th e ir  bargaining. (2) Any pa rticu la r or 
specialized terms the parties are Interested In they w il l bargain 
out. (3) Almost any pa rticu la r clause Included In a deal presents 
the p a r t ie s 'jo in t  judgement as to what they want; and th is  alone 
Is ground enough fo r le tt in g  1 t ,  fo r thè deal 1 n hand, displace 
and replace the general law.. But when contracts are produced by 
the prin ting press, w ith the fountain pen used not fo r recording 
thought but fo r authentication, the adequacy o f the general law for 
f i l l i n g  gaps 1 n the conscious bargain 1 s f la t ly  negatived, 1 n the 
view of the parties preparing and ordering the form pads. And, 
commonly, that party 1 s 1n the good part righ t: spec ia liza tion  of 
ru le 1s then needed. And contracts which Incorporate by reference 
the fu l l  "ru les" of some association stand 1 n th is  on l ik e  footing.
In neither case, 1s 1t to be remembered, are the Individual vanatlons 
from the general law bargained about. The contract Is a block-contract,
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fo r one side (or both) to take or le a v e " .^
Hence, with the exception of commercial contracts between
businessmen, 1n the great m ajority of standardized contracts, no
m odifications are envisaged and the "servient party" 1 s compelled
(51to take or leave the contract proffered by the "dominant party"' ' 
as 1 t  stands.
While the Imposition of terms by one contracting party on the 
other remains thequlntessence of a l l  standardized contracts, the 
forms they take d if fe r  w idely. Some are simply the re su lt o f the 
c r y s ta ll iz a t io n  o f long-standing commercial practices 1n a given 
Industry. Contracts ofmarlne Insurance and charter parties are 
outstanding examples of th is  type of standardized contracts. The 
advantage of using such contracts l ie s  1n the fac t that because 
they have been 1n use fo r a long time, standard Interpretations 
of th e ir  clauses have been given by the courts, thereby precluding 
them from the uncertainty In ju d ic ia l construction which has plagued 
many other types o f contracts. Nowadays however, the elaboration of 
such contracts has been taken over by trade associations whose 
astuteness 1n protecting the ir members 1s beyond any question. They 
have however been met by le g is la t iv e  control over such contracts as 
sh a ll be seen la te r . 45
4. Llewelyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) pp. 700-701.
5. The terms "Servient and dominant" parties were used by Austin 
Wright, "Opposition of the Law to Business Usages", 26 
Columbia L  Rev. (1926) 917.
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A second category of standardized contracts comprises those 
which can properly be ca lled "adhesion contracts" 1n which the 
offeree has no option but to enter into a contract with the offeror 
on the la t te r 's  terms. This is  often the case where the good or 
service in question is  so essentia l that the offeree cannot do 
without i t  and where the o ffero r in question is  a monopoly or 
quasi-monopoly. Contracts made between users, and e le c t r ic ity  
and water au tho rit ie s , and railway companies f a l l  in  th is category. 
One commentator has ca lled such contracts "compulsory co n tra c ts " .^  
Because these corporations are under a public duty to deal with 
anybody requiring the ir services 1 t  1 s Impossible fo r them to 
operate without the use o f standardized contracts.
A th ird  category o f standardized contracts f a l l  within the ambit 
of what Josserand has termed "contractual d lr lg ls m " .^  In th is  
case, certa in  specified contracts, or contract terms are prescribed 
and others proscribed by le g is la t io n , th is  type of contract occurs 
more In France and*other continental European countries than In the 
United Kingdom. Persons who wish to carry out a particu la r form of 
a c t iv ity  are compelled to enter Into certa in  contracts by law. A 
typ ica l example o f th is  type o f contract Is the th ird  party accident 
l ia b i l i t y  Insurance contract which must be entered Into as a matter 
o f law by anybody wishing to own or drive a ca r. The protection of 
the public d icta tes that legal prescrip tion must displace private 67
6. Lenhoff, "The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper", 43 Columbia
L. Rev. (1943) at 586.
7. Wilson, "Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts", 14 I.C.L.Q.
(1965) 172 a t 176.
-1 0 0 -
negotiation between parties, because there is  an acknowledgement 
that private negotiation 1 s In su ffic ie n t to guarantee the public 
in terest. Although such contracts could be wholly regulated by 
le g is la t io n , usually however, le g is la t io n  only prescribes part 
of the terms and the re s t Is up to the dominant party to determine.
F in a lly , there are standardized contracts which do not belong 
to any o f the above categories. They are en tire ly  put forward by 
indiv idual firm s - monopolies, wholesalers, re ta ile rs , e tc ., - 
big or small, to which consumers 1n pa rticu la r simply adhere. Such 
contracts Incorporate the great majority o f everyday transactions. 
They Involve contracts for the sale of goods, hire-purchase con­
trac ts , service contracts, c red it contracts. I t  Is with respect 
to such contracts that th is  thesis 1 s prim arily  concerned, especia lly  
because they make up the bulk of standardized contracts In Cameroon. 
I t  1s only very recently (and only 1n Western European and North 
American countries) that such contracts have come under le g is la t iv e  
c o n t r o l . I t  1s therefore 1n such contracts that one finds the 
majority of unconscionable clauses. Clauses contained In th is  type 
(as well as other types) of standardized contract Include exclusion 
and lim it in g  clauses; clauses relevant to quan tities, clauses 
determining the contract price and the mode of payment; penalty and 
fo rfe itu re  clauses; a l l  clauses spe lling  out technical d e ta ils  where 
necessary.
8. Early legislation such as the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, although
applicable to standardized contracts for the sale of goods,was
nevertheless not designed for such contracts.
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Standardlzed contracts are more often than not w ritten . In the 
Industria lized  countries, they are Invariably w ritten. In the less 
developed countries such as Cameroon, there is  less adherence to 
"form". Hence there are many types of contracts which are standardized 
in the sense that a pa rticu la r enterprise deals widely on de fin ite  
and ascertainable terms, known to the contracting pa rt ie s , without 
having those terms 1n w riting . While th is appears to be Inconsistent 
with the meaning "standardized contracts" (although not yet a term 
of a rt) has assumed,^ 1 t  is  d ictated by social r e a l it ie s  such as 
I l l i t e r a c y .  In the sale o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce such o ra l standardized 
contracts are typ ica l. This obviously presents d i f f ic u lt ie s  inasmuch 
as I t  Is more d i f f ic u l t  to prove 1n terms of an o ra lly  made agreement 
than those of a written one. Indeed 1t is  evident that having things 
In w riting  may avoid disputes and l it ig a t io n .
The fa c t that most standardized contracts are w ritten  does not 
however automatically shelve the question o f proving the terms of the 
contract fo r quite often, the terms of the contract are found 1n more 
than one document and the question becomes one of determining which 
o f the documents formed part o f the contract.
The main Impetus fo r the standardization of contracts has been 
economic. Since contract 1s the Instrument through which the processes 
of economic decision making and commercial exchange are carried out, 9
9. The term "standardized contract" does not appear as a term of 
a r t  1n any of the recognized law d ictionarie s  although 1t has 
been 1n use since the early  part o f th is  century.
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the radical transformation of the economies of the Western European 
and North American countries by the turn o f the twentieth century 
was bound to Induce s im ila r changes 1n the nature of contract. As 
Lenhoff put 1t, "In the advanced Industria l soc ie ty , the economic 
apparatus 1 s no longer focused on the pa rticu la r tastes and particu la r 
desires of Ind iv iduals, but 1 s based on mass production and mass 
d is tr ib u t io n ... This . . .  has by necessity become more and more 
standardized; and th is  standardization has Its  counterpart In 
standardized forms fo r dealing with the customers.
The growth of Industria l cap ita lism  was therefore the source 
of the standardization of contracts. By g iving r is e  to Industria l 
concentration (ve rtica l concentration), 1 t  created Immense economic 
d ispa r it ie s  among economic partic ipan ts . The upshot of th is  was 
the creation of an acute d isequ ilib rium  1n bargaining power between 
the firm  and the Ind iv idua l. The former could therefore d icta te  his 
terms to the la t te r  who could no longer'pro tect h is Interests. 
Standardized contracts therefore helped to found what Kecsfcer has 
termed "a new feu la l o r d e r . S t a n d a r d i z e d  contracts became the 
only real lin k  between the firm  and i t s  c lie n ts , 1 .e ., the public 
and they also provided the means of reducing waste and Increasing 
e ffic iency  1 n the d is tr ibu tion  process. 102
10. I.enhoff, "Contracts o f Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A 
Comparative Study 1n the Light o f American and Foreign Law".
36 Tulane L. Rev. (1962) 481.
11. Kessler, "Contract o f Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract". 43 Columbia L. Rev. (1943) 629 a t 640.
12. K1rsh, Trade Associations 1n Law. (New York, 1938)
I t  thus became possible fo r firms to delegate to a team o f experts
the task of d ra fting  standardized contracts applicable to whoever
dealt with them. Naturally  the experts' primary concern was to
protect the ir employers as well as they could and as fa r as the
law allowed them. The Introduction of new products which could
cause harm to consumers, and the extension o f tortious l i a b i l i t y
to manufacturers as a re su lt o f the House o f Lord's decision In 
(131Donoghue v. S t e v e n e o n '  meant that 1n order to avoid l ia b i l i t y ,  
firms had to Incorporate exclusion and lim it in g  terms which were 
all-embracing.
Furthermore the spectacular r ls e ln  the demand for luxury goods 
1n the developed countries since the second world war has In turn 
led to the Increased re liance on department stores rather than on 
small re ta ile rs . This fac to r, together with the growth o f consumer 
c red it accentuated th is  standardization process.
F in a lly , In Europe, the advent o f the European Economic Community 
and Increased in ternationa l trade meant that uniform contracts had 
to be developed on the International le v e l. This constituted an 
added factor to the standardization o f cont ract s .^^
The above conditions e x is t  1n Cameroon, a lb e it  to a lesse r degree. 
Since Independence, the trend 1n the consumption of luxury goods has 
been upwards, patterned on that o f France In pa rticu la r, a t any rate 
In the c it ie s .  134
13. [1932] A.C. 562.
14. Benjamin, "E.C.E. General Conditions of Sales and Standard 
Forms", Journal of Business Law (1961) 113.
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From the point o f view of the business community, i t  1s d i f f ic u l t  
to over-emphas1ze the importance of standardized contracts. Industry' 
wide standardized contracts drafted by trade associations can be 
used to s t i f le  competition among the partic ipants in the industry. 
This is  not uncommon 1n the Insurance Industry, where in sp ite of 
the fa c t that there may be many firms operating, a person seeking 
insurance cover w il l  nevertheless be faced with identica l terms. 
Secondly, standardized contracts are the most e ffective  tools 
possessed by firms 1 n eliminating,whenever possib le, market r isks 
Inherent 1n the production, d is tr ib u tion  and consumption o f the ir 
products. Because contracts are often d irected towards the future, 
they are never free o f uncertainties.^15  ^ These contingencies may 
therefore be provided fo r In the firm 's  standard contract. As an 
Instrument of economic planning, standardized contracts are 
Invaluable.
The same may apply to l it ig a t io n .  A decision given 1n connection 
with a pa rt icu la r type o f standardized contract may serve as a test 
case, thus avoiding numerous other actions to be brought on s im ila r 
Issues, Because of the lack o f consistency 1n the manner the 
courts have treated most cases on standardized contracts, th is 
positive aspect has not unfortunately been vindicated.
15. Cohen, "The Basis o f Contract", 46 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 
553 a t 583.
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A b r ie f  h isto ry of standardized contracts:
The e a r lie s t  standardized contracts were made 1n the la te r part 
o f the sixteenth century In connection with marine Insurance.^
Two centuries la te r , they were mainly used by common ca rr ie rs . 
Standardized contracts made by the la t te r  are important fo r two 
reasons. F ir s t  of a l l ,  they were widely used, thus a ffecting  a 
great many people; secondly they presented the type o f problems 
which are a t the core o f standardized contracts generally, l . e . ,  
the problems o f exclusion and lim it in g  terms. The position  of 
common ca rrie rs  at comon law was analogous to that o f 1nn-keepers. 
Because they exercised a public service, the ir righ ts and l ia b i l i t ie s  
were determined by the common law Instead of being le f t  to the 
partie s , fo r reasons o f public pollcy.^16 7  ^ Their l i a b i l i t y  for 
the goods or persons they carried was two-fold: they were lia b le  
as bailees fo r the goods they carried,on the one hand,and,on the 
other, they were l ia b le  as ca rr ie rs  fo r the safety o f the persons 
they carried. The only Instances when they were absolved from 
l i a b i l i t y  was when the act resu lting  1 n damage was from (a) an 
act o f God; (b) an act o f the queen’s enemies; (c) the fa u lt  of the 
consignor or (d) an Inherent vice In the goods themselves.^18 19^
With Increased m ob ility  and trade 1n England In the eighteenth 
century, the l i a b i l i t y  that became Imposed on ca rr ie rs  was described 
by Lord Ellenborough as of "ruinous e x t e n t . " ^ C a r r i e r s  therefore
16. Adams, note 19, In fra , at p. 138.
17. Halsbury's Laws o f England. 4th ed. (1973) Para. 302.
1«. Halsbury's Laws o f Enoland. Para. 333 and 344.
19. Leeson v Holt [,18161 1 Stark 186. quoted In Adams, "The Stan- 
dardizatlon of Commercial Contracts or the ContractualIzatlon
° f Stand*rd Forms, 7 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. (1978), 140.
- 1 0 5 -
A b r ie f  h isto ry  of standardized contracts:
The e a r lie s t  standardized contracts were made In the la te r part 
o f the sixteenth century 1n connection with marine Insurance.
Two centuries la te r , they were mainly used by common ca rrie rs . 
Standardized contracts made by the la t te r  are Important fo r two 
reasons. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  they were widely used, thus affecting a 
great many people; secondly they presented the type o f problems 
which are a t the core o f standardized contracts generally, 1 .e ., 
the problems o f exclusion and lim it in g  terms. The position of 
common ca rrie rs  a t conrnon law was analogous to that o f Inn-keepers. 
Because they exercised a public serv ice , th e ir righ ts and l ia b i l i t ie s  
were determined by the common law Instead o f being le f t  to the 
pa rtie s , fo r reasons o f public p o l i c y . T h e i r  l i a b i l i t y  for 
the goods or persons they ca rried  was two-fold: they were lia b le  
as bailees fo r the goods they carried,on the one hand,and,on the 
other, they were l ia b le  as c a rr ie rs  fo r the safety of the persons 
they ca rried . The'only Instances when they were absolved from 
l i a b i l i t y  was when the act resu lting  In damage was from (a) an 
act o f  God; (b) an act o f the Queen’s enemies; (c) the fa u lt  of the 
consignor or (d) an Inherent v ice In the goods themselves.^16 78^
With Increased m ob ility  and trade In England 1n the eighteenth 
century, the l i a b i l i t y  that became Imposed on ca rr ie rs  was described 
by Lord Ellenborough as o f "ruinous extent. Carriers therefore
16. Adams, note 19, In fra , a t p. 138.
17. Halsburv's Laws of England. 4th ed. (1973) Para. 302.
1U< Halsburv's Laws o f England. Para. 333 and 344.
19* Leeson v Holt [18161 1 Stark 186, quoted 1n Adams, "The Stan­
dardization o f Cormerclal Contracts or the ContractualIzatlon
° f Stand«rd Forms, 7 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. (1978), 140.
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started issuing special acceptances in order to lim it  th e ir
l i a b i l i t y  under the contract. This was done by declin ing to
carry certain goods except on a special acceptance in which
l ia b i l i t y  fo r loss or damage to the goods was excluded. In
Bodenham v. Bennett, Wood, B. held that unless the words
of the special acceptance were su ff ic ie n t ly  compelling, the
ca rr ie r 's  l i a b i l i t y  "qua" ba ilee was not negatived, but that
in any event, h is l ia b i l i t y  as an insurer was thereby excluded.
( 2 1 )In Nicholeon v. William, Lord Ellenborough said: "We 
cannot do other than to sustain such a right ( i.e . to make a 
special acceptance) however lia b le  to abuse and productive of 
inconvenience i t  may be; leaving to the leg is la to r i f  i t  sha ll 
think f i t  to apply such remedy hereafter as the ev il may require". 
However, the courts had already begun by th is  time to require 
reasonable notice of the terms of the contract to be given to 
the other party to the co n tra c t/20 12^
The public d isqu ie t that followed the widespread use of 
these special acceptances brought about the passing of the 
C a rr ie r 's  Notices and C a rr ie r 's  Act 1830. The Act sought to 
a lle v ia te  the burden on ca rrie rs  in respect of th is  l i a b i l i t y  
imposed on them when the parcel carried was valued at more 
than E10. The Act did not however succeed in precluding the
20. (1917) 4 Price 31, c ited in Adams, supra, at p. 141.
21. (1804) 5 Edst 507, c ited in Adams, p. 141.
22. Clarke v. Gray. (1802) 4 Esq. 17, cited in Adams, see 
note 19, at p. 140.
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making of special contracts because ca rr ie rs  began p rin ting  the ir 
contract terms on the back of th e ir t icke ts . Because the terms 
written on ticke ts  were not deemed to be public notices, they 
did not therefore constitute special contracts, and were therefore 
not covered by the 1830 Act.
A typ ica l c a r r ie r 's  t icke t providing that: "This t ic k e t is
used subject to the regulations and those conditions stated in
the Company's timetables and b i l ls "  was held to constitu te a 
(231va lid  con tract.' ' Contrary to the view they took before the 
passing of the C a rrie r 's  Act, 1830, faced with the new standard­
ized contracts, printed on rece ip ts, the courts no longer imposed
the requirement of notice afte r the passing of the Act (at any
(2 4 )rate , not u n til Parker v. S.E.Ry. ). Lord Cockburn's decision 
(25)in Zuna v. S.E.Ry. ' epitomizes the a ttitude taken by the courts. 
He said at p. 544: "However harsh i t  may appear in practice to 
hold a man lia b le  by the terms and conditions which may be 
inserted in some small p rin t upon the t ic k e t , which he only 
gets at the la s t moment a fte r he has paid h is money, and when 
nine times out of ten he 1s hustled out of the place at which 
he stands to get h is t icke t by the next comer - however hard i t  
may appear that a man shall be bound by conditions which he 
receives in such a manner, and moreover when he believes that 
he has made a contract binding upon a company to take him, 2345
23. Le Blanche v. London and North Western Ry. Co. f18761
TCVP-.D. 228.----------------------------------------- L------
24. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416
25. (1869) L.R. 4Q.B. 539.
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subject to the ordinary conditions of the general law, to the 
place he desiresto be conveyed s t i l l  we are bound on the au thorities 
to hold that when a man takes a t ic k e t with conditions on i t  he 
must be presumed to know the contents of i t ,  and must be bound 
by them".
It is  d i f f ic u l t  to explain th is  complacent a ttitude of the 
courts towards these standardized contracts except perhaps on 
the ground that during th is  period, the la is s e z -fa ire  doctrine 
of freedom of contract was at i t s  peak. Indeed such was the 
complacency that the terms of a contract couched in the follow ing 
terms were held enforceable:^26  ^ "This t ic k e t is  issued subject 
to the owner's undertaking to bear a l l  the in jury by conveyance 
and other contingencies; and the owner is  required to see to the 
e ffic iency  of the carriage, before he allows h is horses or l iv e ­
stock to be placed there in, the charge being fo r the use of the 
railway, carriages and locomotive power’ on ly, and the company 
w il l not be responsible for any defects in th e ir carriages or 
trucks, unless complaint be made at the time of booking, or 
before the same leave the station; nor fo r any damage however 
caused, to horses, c a tt le , or livestock  of any description; 
trave llin g  upon the railway or in th e ir veh ic les". It surely 
requires an over-stretching of one's imagination to think of 
any exclusion clause more sweeping than th is . That did not 
unfortunately influence the court. B a s ica lly , as w il l be seen 
in the next section , th is  attitude taken by the courts per­
sisted well in to the twentieth century (with certa in  m odifications).
26. Austin v. Manchester, Sheffie ld  and Llnconshlre Ry, (1850) 
10 C.b. 453.
The e ffec t of standardized contracts has been discussed by
(27)Lord Denning in h is book, "The Road to Ju stice ", where he 
describes the sequel to the Court o f Appeal decision in Adler 
v. D i c k s o n In that case, the p la in t if f  was injured when 
she was mounting the gangway o f a ship at a port of c a l l .  The 
ticke t which had been issued to her contained an exemption clause 
which stipulated that the p la in t if f  was sa ilin g  en tire ly  at her 
own r is k  and that the company, it s  servants and any persons 
d ire c t ly  or in d ire c t ly  in the employment or service of the 
company were exempted from any l ia b i l i t y ,  however a ris in g . The 
p la in t if f  brought an action against the master and boatswain of 
the ship and the Court of Appeal gave judgement in her favour, 
holding that the contract did not deprive her of the righ t to sue 
the defendants in ^ort. Denning L .J . fo r h is part, went further 
to hold that such an exemption clause required the assent, whether 
express or ta c it ,  of the p la in t i f f ,  which she did not in th is 
case give.
Furious at th is  decision, the steamship companies and other 
ca rr ie rs  added to a l l th e ir t ic k e ts , a printed s l ip  designed to 
absolve the master and crew from any l ia b i l i t y  however a ris ing . 
Ignoring the problem of p r iv ity  that might be raised here for a 
moment, Lord Denning pointed out the action of the companies in 
modifying th e ir standard contract forms was comparable to Parliament 
passing a 'Shipowner's Servants Indemnity B i l l " .  This te llin g  
e ffec t of standardized contracts has led some commentators to 
ask whether they should Indeed be considered as contracts a fte r 278
27. Denning, "The Road to Ju stice " (Stevens & Sons, 1955), p.93
28. [1955] 1Q.B. 158.
- 1 1 0 -
a ll.< 29>
The next section shall delve into the ways in which the 
English and French courts have dealt with the problems raised 
by standardized contracts.
29. L e ff, "Contract as a Thing", 19 American University L. Rev. 
(1970), p. 131.
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SECTION II: English and French Jud ic ia l Treatment of Standardized 
Contracts.
In the f i r s t  chapter, the point was made that the law of 
contract in Cameroon is  drawn from English and French law with 
very few local m odifications. To th is  extent, i t  is  requisite 
therefore that the French and the English ju d ic ia l treatment of 
standardized contracts be examined. There have been in recent 
years, important le g is la t iv e  innovations in th is area of the law, 
both in England and France. This section w ill not concern it s e lf  
with these le g is la t iv e  innovations which w il l be dealt with by 
a la te r chapter. The innovations in question are the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act, 1977 of the United Kingdom, and the French 
Law No. 78-22 of the 10th of January 1978.
In comparing the ju d ic ia l treatment of standardized contracts 
in English and French law, i t  1s imperative to preface any d is ­
cussion with a short account of the methodological differences 
that ex is t between "the two systems. With a few exceptions, the 
rules governing the interpretation of standardized contracts in 
English law have been elaborated by the courts as w ill be seen .^  
In France, a r t ic le  5 of the C iv il Code sp e c if ic a lly  states that: 
"Judges are forbidden to pronounce decisions by way of general
and regulative d isposition  on causes which have been submitted 
1 2 )
to them".' Only the le g is la t iv e  body has such a righ t. Because 
the phenomenon of standardized contracts is  posterior to the 12
1. For example, the Hire-Purchase Act, 1965; the Supply of Goods 
(Implied Terms Act) 1973; and the Unfair Contract Terms Act,
1977.
2. Translation by Crabb, J.H. "The French C iv il Code" (New 
Jersey, 1977).
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elaboration of the C i v i l  Code, there are no e x p lic it  provisions in 
i t  designed to deal with problems that have arisen in connection 
with such contracts. To be sure, many of i t s  provisions have been 
amended since 1804. However, the French judges have succeeded in 
extrapolating from many of the unchanged provisions in order to 
accommodate standardized contracts. This has been done essen tia lly  
by techniques of ju d ic ia l in terpretation not d is s im ila r to those 
u t ilis e d  by English judges. It is  also relevant to note that 
a r t ic le  4 of the Code states that: "The judge who refuses to judge, 
on pretext of s ilen ce , obscurity or in su ffic iency  of the law, may 
be prosecuted as g u ilty  of a denial of ju s t ic e ."
Because there was, u n til f a ir ly  recently,a dearth of le g is la t io n  
to deal with standardized contracts in France, the great majority 
of the guiding p r in c ip le s  of law in th is  connexion are derived from 
case-law. This is  a manifestation of the much favoured f ic t io n  of
(3)
French law that "there is  always an applicable rule o f law 1e,"lo1 . ' 
In certa in  respect», case-law, when i t  has become consistent, i . e . ,  
"jurisprudence constante", has achieved a force nearly equivalent 
to that of law, I.e . “ lo i" .  Indeed, Francois Geny, w riting  in 
1909^ said that confronted with the re a lit ie s  of s ilence or 
in su ffic iency  of the law (I.e. " l o i " ) ,  ju d ic ia l precedent has what 
he ca lled  "j vo ir prétorien", by which he meant that by making up 
for these de fic ien c ie s , the Judges are 1n a manner of speaking, 
creating law.
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An attempt w il l be made to d iffe ren tia te  the methods by which
standardized contracts are generally controlled or interpreted.
There is  one general cha rac te ris t ic  of these methods which must
be pointed out forthw ith. They are nearly a l l ,  in varying degrees
(5)what Karl Llewelyn described as "covert too ls". ' Underlying them 
is  the assumption that standardized contracts are lik e  other types 
of contracts and ought to be treated as such: while on the other 
hand, th e ir often glaring unfairness is  recognised but not overtly  
dea lt w ith. The wide gamut of "too ls" that have been used are 
examined below.
The many features of standardized contracts have been narrowed 
to four which represent the major problem areas. These are the 
problems related to the incorporation of terms into contracts; the 
control over exemption and lim ita t io n  clauses; the problem of 
exemption clauses and th ird  pa rt ie s , and f in a l ly  the problem of 
penalties and fo rfe itu re  clauses.
A: Incorporation into Contracts
T h e .firs t question the courts often ask themselves when faced 
with a standardized contract 1s whether the clause in issue (where 
one of the parties re lie s  on an exemption or lim ita tion  clause 
fo r example), formed an Integral part o f the contract.
This question often arises 1n two contexts. F ir s t  of a l l ,  
the clause may have been written 1n a document such as a rece ipt 
or notice which is  not a contractual document. Secondly the clause *40
5. Llewelyn, K. "What Price Contract - An Essay In Perspective",
40 Yale L .J . (1931) 704 at p.
may have been written in a contractual document. The question then 
becomes one o f determining whether the document formed the whole 
or only part o f the contract. The la t te r  case is  cha racte ris tic  
of commercial agreement^ while the former are cha racte ris t ic  of 
consumer contracts and have sometimes been ca lled  " t icke t ca se s " .^
In the " t ic k e t cases", there is  no doubt that a contract has 
been concluded between the parties; there is  doubt however as to 
whether one o f the parties had knowledge of the terms put forward 
by the other party. Such terms are often burled among others in 
printed re ce ip ts , invoices or t ic k e ts .
I. In English Law:
The determination of th is  issue in English law has turned upon 
whether su ff ic ie n t  notice as to the existence of the terms has been 
given by the party re ly ing on the clause to the other party since 
the decision 1n Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co. ^
The facts o f th is  case, which are indeed a perennial occurrence, 
were as fo llow s: The p la in t if f  deposited a bag in the cloak-room 
of the defendants' railway station . He paid 2d, and received a 
t icke t. On one side of the t ic k e t , a date and number were w ritten, 
so also were the words: "see back". On the back of the t ic k e t, 
several clauses were printed, one o f which stipulated that "the 
company w il l not be responsible fo r any package exceeding the value 678
6. There is  a related problem 1n connection with commercial contracts 
ca lled the "Battle of Forms", where the parties exchange the ir 
respective standard contract forms and each tr ie s  to assume that 
h is own form governs the transaction. Swan and Re iter. Contracts: 
Cases, Notes and M ateria ls . (Butterworths, Toronto 1978) 3-89.
7. Atiyah, P.S. The Law of Contract. 3rd ed. fClarendnn P r*« .
Oxford 1981) p iTST;
8. ( 1877), 2C.P.D. 416, C.A.
of £10", the p la in t if f  did not read that clause. When he presented 
h is t ic k e t to claim h is bag the same day, i t  could not be found.
He brought an action claim ing £24.10s, before Pollock B. The
defendants pleaded that th e ir acceptance of the goods fo r bailment
was so le ly  on the condition that th e ir  l i a b i l i t y  would not in any 
event be more than £10 and fo r support, they re lied  on the afore­
mentioned term in the t icke t they issued. The p la in t if f  admitted 
that he knew on receiving the t ic k e t that i t  contained w riting  
on i t  but contended that he thought i t  was merely a rece ipt issued 
fo r the money he paid. In the course of the t r ia l ,  the judge 
directed the jury as follows: (1) Did the p la in t if f  read or was 
he aware of the special condition upon which the bag was deposited?
(2) Was the P la in t i f f ,  under the circumstances under any ob ligation
to read or make himself aware of the condition? The ju ry answered
both questions in the negative.
The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal on the 
ground of m isdirection and the case was sent back fo r a r e - t r ia l.
M e llish  L . J ,  in h is judgement, which has become the "locua
(Q )
alas8iauo" on th is  subject, stated the law as fo llow s:' '
"I am of opinion, therefore, that the proper d irection  to leave to 
the ju ry in these cases is ,  that I f  the person receiving the t icke t 
did not see or know that there was any w riting on the t i cket ,  he 
i s  not bound by the conditions; that 1 f  he knew there was w riting , 
and knew or believed that the w riting  contained conditions, never­
theless he would be bound, i f  the de livering  of the t ic k e t to him 
in such a manner that he could see there was w riting on i t ,  was,
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of £10", the p la in t if f  did not read that clause. When he presented 
his t ic k e t to claim h is bag the same day, i t  could not be found.
He brought an action claim ing £24.10s, before Pollock B. The
defendants pleaded that th e ir acceptance of the goods for bailment
was so le ly  on the condition that th e ir  l i a b i l i t y  would not in any 
event be more than £10 and for support, they re lied  on the afore­
mentioned term in the t ic k e t they issued. The p la in t if f  admitted 
that he knew on receiving the t icke t that i t  contained w riting 
on i t  but contended that he thought i t  was merely a rece ipt issued 
for the money he paid. In the course of the t r ia l ,  the judge 
directed the jury as follows: (1) Did the p la in t if f  read or was 
he aware of the special condition upon which the bag was deposited?
(2) Was the P la in t i f f ,  under the circumstances under any obligation
to read or make himself aware of the condition? The jury answered
both questions in the negative.
The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal on the 
ground of m isd irection and the case was sent back fo r a r e - t r ia l .
M e llish  L .J , in h is judgement, which has become the " locuo
(9)olaBBiouB" on th is  subject, stated the law as fo llow s:' '
"I am of opinion, therefore, that the proper d irection  to leave to 
the ju ry  in these cases 1s, that i f  the person receiving the ticket 
did not see or know that there was any w riting on the t ic k e t , he 
is  not bound by the conditions; that i f  he knew there was w riting , 
and knew or believed that the w riting contained cond itions, never­
theless he would be bound, 1f the de livering  of the t ic k e t to him 
in such a manner that he could see there was w riting on i t ,  was, 9
9. At page 423.
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in the opinion of the ju ry , reasonable notice that the w riting 
contained conditions." He further went on to say: "the p la in t if f  
was ce rta in ly  under no ob ligation to read the t ic k e t, but was 
en tit led  to leave i t  unread i f  he pleased, as the question does 
not appear to me to d ire c t the attention of the jury to the real 
question, namely whether the railway company did what was reasonably 
necessary to give the p la in t if f  notice o f the condition". This 
formulation of the law has not gone uncrlt ic ized . One commentator 
thinks that i t  does not adequately re f le c t  the importance given 
by modern contract law to the doctrine o f constructive notice 
and c a lls  fo r the law in th is  connection to be restated.
Although M ellish L .J 's  formulation has undergone "a certain amount 
of embellishment and g lo s s . . ." ,  in attempts to narrow the scope
o f the p rin c ip les la id  down, with the course of time, i t  has been
( 12 )approved by the House of Lords and applied in numerous cases. '
The question whether reasonable notice as to the existence of 
any pa rticu la r clause has been given depends on a number of 
factors.
(a) The nature of thè document:
In Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co., M e llish  L .J. 
pointed out that in certa in  cases, 1t is  reasonable to expect a 
person who receives a paper containing w riting  to treat i t  merely 
as an acknowledgement of the payment of money. He gave an 
example o f a person who, driv ing through a turnpike, receives 1023
10. Malcolm Clarke, "Notice of Contractual Terms", 35 Cambridge 
Law Journal (1976), p. 51 at p. 52.
11. Atlyah, supra, note (7) at p. 157.
12. See: Spencer v. towntree [1894] A.C. 217, 219 (H.L)
McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 4W.L.R. 125 
Hood v. Anchor L in e T td. 11918] A.C. 837.
13. See generally, T re ite l,  The Law of Contract .  5th Edn.
(London, Stevens & Sons 1979), Chapter 7.
a t ic k e t. Such a person might r ig h tly  assume that the t ic k e t was
meant to be produced at some other turnpike as evidence that he 
(141had already pa id ,' ' without more.
Hence, the circumstances in which the document is  given might
convert i t  to mere evidence of some act, other than notice of
the contractual terms. This view has been espec ia lly  applied
(15)in Chapelton v. Barry U.D.C. In that case, deck chairs were 
stacked by a notice requesting persons who wished to h ire them to 
obtain ticke ts  from an attendant. The p la in t if f  took two chairs 
and obtained two t ic k e ts  which he did not read. One of the chairs 
was defective and i t  co llapsed, in juring the p la in t i f f .  The ticke t 
contained a provision stipu la ting  that the h ire rs  would not be 
responsible fo r any accident which arose from the use of the chair.
The Court of Appeal held that the t icke t was no more than a receipt 
fo r money paid.
(b) Time of notice:
One of the factors which' led to the decision in chapelton v.
Barry U.D.C. (above) was the fa c t that ticke ts  were often issued 
only a fte r the contract had been entered in to . In Olley v. Marlborough 
Court Ltd. the p la in t if f  and her husband booked a room in a hotel 
and paid the charges in advance. When they entered the room reserved 
fo r them, there was a notice on a wall stating that "The proprietors 1456
14. Supra. note 8, at page 422.
15. [1940] 1 K.B. 532
16. [1949] 1 K .B ., 532.
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w il l not hold themselves responsible fo r a r t ic le s  lo s t or stolen 
unless handed to the manageress fo r safe custody". The Court of 
Appeal held that the p la in t i f f ,  whose furs were stolen from the 
room during her absence,was not bound by the excluding clause 
because the notice had been given to her only a fte r the contract 
had been made, and therefore too la te .
In such cases therefore, i t  is  a matter of determining when, 
in accordance with the p rin c ip le s  of o ffe r and acceptance, a 
contract is  made.^^
This point is  further dea lt with by a more recent case,
(18)Hollingworth v. Southern F e rr ies  Ltd. (The Eagle). ' The 
p la in t if f ,  through a friend o f hers, contracted to trave l on 
the defendants' boat from Southampton to Lisbon. While on one 
of the ship's restaurants, the p la in t if f  f e l l  and injured herse lf 
due to the defendant's negligence. In an action against them, 
the ship owners denied l i a b i l i t y ,  re ly ing on a clause on the 
t ic k e t they Issued.which excluded such l ia b i l i t y ,  a clause which, 
the ship-owners argued, formed an integral part of the contract. 
I t  was established however that the p la in t i f f 's  friend who booked 
the t r ip ,  co llected the t ic k e ts  on a la te r day, i.e .  the tickets 
were delivered only a fte r the contract had been made. Olley v. 
Malborough Court Ltd  was applied and the defendant's contention 
did not stand. The defendant's argument that the p la in t i f f 's  
friend must in any event have known of the exclusion clause from 178
17. Clarke, "Notice of Contractual Terms, vol.35 Cambridge Law 
Journal (1976) at p. 65.
18. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 70.
a brochure he had read p rio r to entering into the contract was not
upheld. The court f e lt  that fresh notice had to be given since
the notice from the brochure had spent i t s e l f .  It is  contended 
(191that4 ' because the ru le is  that notice of the term be in the
party 's mind at the time he makes the contract, that the notice
was given e a r lie r  should in p rin c ip le  be immaterial. "The Eagle
is  demonstrative of the fac t that English courts are quite astute
in holding that a term was not brought to the knowledge of the
other party before the contract was entered into.
It is  arguable that a person who receives a t ic k e t posterior to
the conclusion of the contract and does not object to any of the
terms im p lied ly  accepts a variation o f the contract. Such an
argument 1s however unsound for two reasons. F ir s t  of a l l there
would be no consideration fo r th is "new contract". Secondly, in
(211Burnett v . Westminster Bank L td .,  Mocatta J . held that in a 
continuing contractual re la tionsh ip , any variation of the terms 
of the contract must be sp e c if ic a lly  brought to the knowledge of 
the other party to the contract. Accordingly, notice of a term 
Inserted on the front cover of a chequebook by a bank was in s u f f ic ­
ient to vary the o r ig ina l contract between the other contracting 
party and the bank. This leads on to the th ird  factor which the 
courts take into consideration 1n determining whether notice of 
terms has been properly given: 19
19. C larke , Note, (1978) 37 .C .L .J., p. 21 at p. 23.
(c) Degree of notice:
This depends on the steps the party re ly ing  on the term has 
taken to give notice thereof, and also on the nature of the term 
it s e l f .  He must do what is  reasonably su ff ic ie n t in bringing 
notice of the term to the other party. In doing th is , he is  
not obliged to know of the pa rticu la r circumstances of the other 
party.
( 2 2 )In Thompson v. London, Midland and S co ttish  Ry. Co., the
Court o f Appeal held that as long as what was done was su ff ic ie n t
to bring notice of the terms to the knowledge of the members of
the public the fact that the p la in t if f  had a pa rticu la r d is a b il it y ,
i .e .  i l l i t e r a c y ,  was of no moment in deciding the issue. M ellish
L .J . put i t  thus in Parker' v. The South Eastern Railway Co: "a
pa rticu la r p la in t if f  ought not to be in a better position than
other persons on account of h is exceptional ignorance or s tup id ity  
(23)
or care lessness".' '
(24)In Geier i>. Kujava , ' t h e  p la in t if f ,  a passenger in the 
defendant's car could not read English, a fa c t which the defendant 
was aware of. It was held that the p la in t if f  was not bound by a notice In 
English displayed in the car. The decision does not however derogate 
from the p rin c ip les  la id  down In Thompson v. London, Midland and 
S co ttish  Ry, since the decision turned on the pa rticu la r facts of 
the case. 23*
22. [1930] 1 K.B. 41
23. I t  1s submitted that the question whether a person can read 
a clause should be distinguished from the question whether 
he can understand 1t. More often than not, such clauses are 
de libe rate ly  couched so as to be u n in te llig ib le  even to people 
of average understanding.
[1970] 1 L loyd 's Rep. 364.24.
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In a recent case, Smith v. South Wales Switchgear, a con­
tractual document provided that the company's general conditions 
were ava ilab le  on request. The p la in t if f  had been issued with the 
1969 copy of the general conditions. The House of Lords held that 
an incorporation by reference to the conditions of the 1970 copy 
was va lid  because had p la in t if f  requested a copy, one would have 
been duly sent to him.
The nature of the clause in question may also a ffect the degree
(2 6 )of notice required. In J. Spurting Ltd. v. Bradshaw, Denning
L .J . as he then was said: "Some clauses I have seen would need to
be printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand
pointing to i t  before the notice could be held s u ff ic ie n t" . On
account of the facts in th is  case however, he thought that such
notice was not required. This view has been applied in Thornton 
127)
v. Shoe Lane Parking. The p la in t if f  in th is  case parked his 
car in the defendant's m ulti-storey automatic car-park and got a 
t icke t from a machine.. Outside the car-park there was a notice 
l is t in g  the parking charges, at the bottom of which was a clause 
stating .that a l l  cars were parked at owners' r is k s . While leaving 
the car-park, there was an accident in which the p la in t if f  was 
severely in jured. In a personal in jury action, the defendants 
re lied  on th e ir  conditions of contract which excluded l ia b i l i t y  
fo r " . . .  Injury to the customer or any other person occuring when 2567
(25)
25. [1978] 1 A ll E.R. 18
26. [1956] 1 W.L.R. 461 at p. 466
27. [1971] 1 A ll E.R. 686.
the customer's motor vehicle is  in the Parking Building howsoever 
that . . .  in jury shall be caused...". This clause was among many 
others displayed in a panel on a p i l la r  opposite the t icke t machine. 
The t ic k e t issued to the p la in t if f  contained a clause stating 
that: "This t icke t is  issued subject to the conditions of issue 
as displayed on the premises."
Lord Denning held f i r s t  of a l l  that the clause was not in co r­
porated in the contract because the p la in t if f  could only have read 
i t  a fte r the contract had been made. He went further to say that 
even i f  he was wrong on that score, the defendant cannot in any 
event re ly  on the clause because i t  was so wide and so destructive 
of righ ts that i t  had to be s p e c if ic a lly  drawn to the atten tion  of 
the other contracting party. Megaw L .J . ,  while agreeing with Lord 
Denning stressed on his part the unusualness of that clause - 
unusual because i t  extended the exemption to personal in jury as 
well as to damage or loss of the car o r* its  contents. It has 
been suggested that "unable.to declare a clause void because i t  is 
unreasonable, the courts are now declaring i t  unincorporated because 
i t  is  unusual."' ' In order to ascertain whether a p a rt icu la r 
clause Is unusual, reference has to be made to s im ila r contracts 
to see whether they contain l ik e  conditions. This, the court 
refrained from doing. The court was actua lly  judging the 
reasonableness of the clause Instead, although even Lord Denning 
was timorous enough to say: "I do not pause to enquire whether 28
28. C larke, (1976) Cambridge Law Journal, note 17, supra 
at p. 70.
the exempting condition is  void for unreasonableness. In Parker 
v. S.E. fly.Bramwell L .J . c le a rly  states that in h is judgement, 
exclusion clauses have to be reasonable. He said: "I think there 
is  an implied understanding that there is  no condition unreasonable 
to the knowledge of the party tendering the document and not in s is t in g  
on it s  being read".^29 30 31^ Unfortuantely, h is  judgement has been 
large ly neglected as fa r as th is  area of the law is  concerned.
There are however certa in instances in  which the court does not 
require notice of terms to be given as outlined above. This involves 
instances which are so recurrent that a party is  presumed to know 
that certa in  conditions attach to certa in  contracts. In Parker v.
The South Eastern Ry, no such knowledge was presumed with respect 
to contracts fo r the deposit of luggage in  cloak-rooms at railway
(311
stations. Seventy years la te r in Alexander v. Railway Executive, 1 
Devlin J. noted that "most people nowadays know that railway 
companies have conditions subject to which they take a rt ic le s  into 
th e ir cloak-rooms". One can say the same about special contracts 
entered into between professionals. They would be presumed to be 
seised of knowledge of whatever terms are common in such contracts. 
This is  presumably what Mellish L .J . was re ferring to 1n Parker's 
case when he sa id , " in  the greater majority of cases persons 
shipping goods do know that the b i l l  of lading contains the terms 
of the contract o f carriage; and the shipowner, or the master 
de livering  the b i l l  o f lading, is  en tit led  to assume that the person
(29)
29. [1971] 1 A ll E.R. 686 at p. 690.
30. Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co. note 8 supra at p.428.
31. [1951] 2 K.B. 882 at p. 886.
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(32)shipping goods has that knowledge."
(33)B ritis h  Crane Hire Corp. Ltd. v. Ipswich Plant H ire Ltd. 
i l lu s tra te s  th is  point. The defendants contracted by telephone to 
h ire a drag lin e  crane from the p la in t if f s .  The p la in t if f s  la te r 
sent a confirmation note which contained printed conditions. The 
crane got stuck in mud, and a dispute arose as to who was to bear 
the costs of removing i t  from the mud. This turned on the question 
whether the p la in t if f 's  conditions on the confirmation note were 
incorporated into the contract, thereby making the defendant 
lia b le  for the costs. The Court of Appeal gave judgement for 
the p la in t if f .  Lord Denning said at p. 310: "Each was a firm  of 
plant h irers who hired out plant. The defendants themselves knew 
that firms in the p lant h iring  trade always imposed conditions in 
regard to the h iring o f p lant; and that th e ir conditions were on 
much the same lin e s . . .  In these circumstances, I think the con­
d itions on the form should be regarded as incorporated into the 
contract".
(d) Previous course o f dealing:
Where there has been a previous course of dealing between the 
parties to a contract, the party proferring an exclusion or other 
term may assume that the other 1s aware of the terms. If therefore 
on any given occasion the terms are not given to the other party, 32
32. Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co., (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416 
at p. 422. Although most laymen would not have such knowledge, 
in tru th , most i f  not a l l shipping business is  handled by 
professional shippers and 1t is  the ir business to have such 
knowledge.
33. [1975] Q.B. 303; th is  case may be contrasted with Hoi H e r v.
Rambler Motors (A.M.C) Ltd. [1972] 1 A ll E.R. 399.--------------
they may nonetheless apply. Course of dealing must be distinguished
from trade usage. In the former, the parties may not consider
themselves bound by such a term at a l l times while in the la t te r ,
(341they must/ ' I t  su ffices that there must be a regu la rity  of 
dealings between the parties fo r a course of dealing to be implied.
The degree of regu la rity  required has however not been decided on 
by the courts.
(35)In Henry Kendall & Sons v. W illiam  L i l l i o o  <5 Sons, a con­
t ra c t  for the sale of poultry feeding stu ffs  was made and a con­
firm ation note was sent the next day which included exemption clauses. 
The parties had dealt with each other fo r about three years, entering 
in to  three or four contracts monthly. The House of Lords held that 
there was a su ff ic ie n t course of dealing to warrant the incorporation 
of the exemption clauses. In J , Spurling v. Bradshaw, "the 
defendants had received many landing accounts before" and that was,
in the view of the court, equivalent to 'a course of dealing.
(37)In McCutcheon u. David MacBrayne, ' Lord Pearson said, "It 
is  the consistency of a course of conduct which gives r ise  to the 
im p lication  that in s im ila r circumstances a s im ila r contractual 
re su lt  w il l fo llow . When a contract is  not consistent, there is  
no reason why i t  should produce an invariab le contractual re su lt."  34567
34. See Hoggett, "Changing A Bargain by Confirming It" 33 M.L.R. 
(1970) 518 at 520.
35. [1968] 2 A ll E.R. 444 (House of Lords)
36. [1956] 2 A ll E .R ., 121 at 125.
37. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 125 at 134.
In the instant case, the p la in t if f  had sometimes signed the 
defendant's r isk  note; at other times, he did not. It was 
therefore held that there was no course of dealing.
The same reasoning underlies Edmund Davies L .J 's  judgement
(38)in Mendelssohn v. Normand Ltd. In that case, the p la in t if f  
parked his car in the defendant's garage. He had done so about 
three or four times previously. On th is  occasion, he was told 
by the defendants attendant not to lock h is car. The valuables 
in the car were stolen. Lord Denning treated the case as one 
of fundamental breach of contract. Edmund Davies L .J . thought 
that there was inconsistency in the course of dealing which 
precluded the exclusion clause from being incorporated into the 
contract. Because the attendant had changed the course of dealing 
the clause was not incorporated.
(e) Written Contracts:
In Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co., M ellish  L .J .^ ^  
said: "In an ordinary case, where an action is  brought on a written 
agreement which is  signed by the defendant, the agreement is  proved 
by proving h is signature, and in the absence of fraud, i t  is  
wholly immaterial that he has not read the agreement and does not 
know the contents".
This dictum was applied in L'Eutrange v. Graucob L td . ^  The 
proprietress of a cafe bought an automatic c igarette vending machine. 38940
38. [1970] 1 Q.B. 177
39. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416 at p. 421
40. [1934] 1 K.B. 394.
The sales form which she signed without reading contained an
exemption clause written in very small p rin t. The machine was
defective and she brought an action fo r breach of the implied
warranty of fitness fo r purpose. The Court of Appeal held that
she was bound by the clause. Southern L .J . said: "When a document
containing contractual terms is  signed, then, in the absence of
fraud, or I w il l add, m isrepresentation, the party signing is
bound, as i t  is  wholly immaterial whether he has read the document
or not. Maugham L .J . said the same thing but added that there was
(411another defence, l .e .  the plea of 'non est factum '.'
This ru le has come under heavy c r it ic ism  and has even been
(421dubbed as "a menance to the community".' ' I t  is  thought that a 
d iffe ren t re su lt could have been reached on the authority of 
Hitchman v. Avery. I n  that case, H, a dairyman, persuaded 
h is roundsman to sign a document containing a covenant forbidding 
him from setting up a r iv a l business whenever he le f t  H's service.
He knew A could not read. Wright J . ,  held that A 's signature could 
not estop him from denying consent to the warrant because H knew A 
could not read. Accordingly, because the defendant 1n L'Eatrange v. 
Grancob did not expect the p la in t if f  to read the exemption clause, 4123
41. Langdon argues In a note on th is  case that non est factum is a 
plea which has been confined to actions of covenants and that i t  
was a mistake to apply 1t in a case l ik e  th is . Langdon, Note
51 L.Q.R 272 at 274.
42. Langdon,, supra at p. 272. See also Samek, 52 Can. Bar Rev. 351
43. (1892) 8 T.L.R. 698; See Spencer, "Signature, Consent and the 
Rule in L'Estrange v. Grancob" (1973) Cambridge L. J. 104-122.
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le t  alone understand i t ,  the p la in t if f  should s im ila r ly  be allowed 
to deny consent to the exemption clause in question. P lausib le  as
th is  argument seems, the courts have consistently upheld the rule
( 44)
in L'Estrange v. Grancob.
( 45)
In Curtis  v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. L td ., the 
p la in t if f  took her wedding dress fo r cleaning and was asked to sign 
a rece ipt containing an exclusion clause. When she asked for an 
explanation of the contents of the rece ipt, the effect of the term 
was innocently misrepresented to her by the attendant. The dress 
was damaged. The Court of Appeal held in an action brought by the 
p la in t if f  that because of the misrepresentation, no regard was to 
be paid to the exemption clause.
( i i )  The Position in French Law:
Although exclusion and lim ita tion  clauses were in use especia lly  
in contracts fo r the carriage of goods by sea and also in insurance 
contracts at the time the "Code C iv il"  was elaborated, the la t te r  
did not make any spec ific  mention of those clauses, possib ly because 
they were not flagrant enough to require statutory attention. With 
the m u ltip lica tion  of these clauses, especia lly  with the advent of 
standard form contracts,the courts and legal scholars had to f i l l  
th is  gap. The French courts have drawn on a rt ic le s  1134 and 1135 
of the C iv il  Code to deal with the problem of Incorporation of terms 
Into contracts. A rt ic le  1134 states that: "Agreements le g a lly  made 4567
44. Lord Devlin in MacCutcheon v. David MacBrayne, supra, note 37; 
Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, note Z7, supra.
45. [1951 ] 1 K.B. 805.
46. Jacques v. Lloyd George and Partners Ltd. endorses th is view:
T T W J T  AIT E.R. 187!--------------------------
47. See Generally Georges B e rlio z , Le Contrat d1Adhesion. (L.G .D .J., 
Paris 1973), pp. 56-67.
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take the place of law for those who make them
"They may be revoked only by mutual consent or fo r causes which
the law authorises.
"They must be executed in good fa ith " .
A rt ic le  1135 states that: "Agreements ob ligate not only fo r what 
is  expressed therein, but also fo r a l l  the consequences which 
equity, usage or the law gives to an ob ligation  according to it s  
nature."
Three situations can be distinguished in cases dealing with the 
incorporation of terms into contracts: when the term is  inserted in 
a notice; when i t  is  in a receipt or t ic k e t;  when i t  is  written in 
the contractual document it s e lf .
(a) Terms written in notices:
From the premises of the a r t ic le s  of the C iv il Code mentioned
above, some authors have maintained that because consent is
absolutely necessary fo r contractual re la tions to come about, terms
which have not been written into the contractual document are merely
un ila te ra l d ispositions by one party, not consented to by the other.
Since consent presupposes knowledge o f the terms, the party re lying
on the term must prove that the other party had knowledge of the term.
There must be positive evidence to that e ffe c t. This view appears
» »
to be the equivalent of the ru le la id  down by M ellish  J . in Parker'a  
oaee but i t  is  in re a lity  much s t r ic te r .  48
48. See Jean Carbonnier, Droit c i v i l . tome 4 (Presse U n ive rs ita ire  
de France 1969), p. 66; Boris S tarck, Dro it  c i v i l .  Ob l igations,  
tome II. (L ibraries Techniques 1972), no. 1157. -------
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In one case, the owner of a vehicle frequently serviced the
vehicle at a p a rt icu la r garage which had notices excluding l ia b i l i t y
fo r the loss of any veh ic le . P la in t i f f 's  veh icle was lo s t when a
f ir e  broke out in  a garage. It  was held that because the notices
did not form part of the contract, they did not bind the p la in t if f .
The fact that the p la in t if f  had been to the garage several times
and could therefore be presumed to have seen the exclusion notice
was of no import. The court required spec ific  proof of knowledge
(491and assent to the clause in question.' '
In another case, the Cour de cassation held that the displaying
of an exemption clause does not constitute proof that the other
contracting party knew of and accepted the clause.
Like the English courts, French courts consider the time the
purported notice was given as fundamental in deciding whether a term
(511is  incorporated into the contract. In one case,' the p la in t if f  
le f t  his car in the garage of a hotel. Minutes la te r , goods which 
had been tied to the roof o f.the car were sto len. It was held that 
because he saw a notice lim it in g  the l ia b i l i t y  o f the hotel in 
connection with such losses only a fte r he had parked his car, he was 
not bound by i t .  The court held further that fo r such a clause to 
be e ffe c tive , the hotel guard ought to have drawn the p la in t if f 's  
attention to the clause before or at the time the car was parked. 49501
49. Colmar, 24 de^embre 1953, D. 1953, 375.
50. Bordeaux (1ere Ch.), 20 Janvier 1972, Gaz. Pal. Ju1n 1972.
51. Lyon, 12 ju ln  1950, 0. 1951 Som P.2. On the same p rin c ip le , see 
also T rib . c iv . Toulon, 4 ju in  1952, 0. 52 jurisprudence, 769. 
This decision Is very s im ila r In p rin c ip le  to O lley v. 
Malborough Court.
French law is  so antogonistlc to attempts to incorporate exclusion
or lim ita tion  clauses into contracts through displaying notices
that one commentator states that cases which have upheld such
(52)clauses are mere " ju d ic ia l c u r io s it ie s " , ' because for th is  to 
happen, the courts require exceptional evidence that such clauses 
have been brought to the knowledge of the other party to the contract 
and sp e c if ic a lly  accepted by him.
French law is  therefore, at lea st, as intent on protecting 
the weaker party to a contract from the devices used by the other to 
exempt himself from any l ia b i l i t y  as English law. In th is ,  French 
law, unlike English law, makes a d is t in c tio n  between consumer and 
commercial transactions. Because the underlying ju s t if ic a t io n  of 
protecting the adhering party is  not expedient in commercial trans­
actions, French law takes a d iffe ren t view. In these cases, exemption
or lim ita tion  clauses could be Incorporated into contracts by reference
(53)or by the d isp lay of a no tice .' '
There are however certa in instances where a party to a contract 
w il l be presumed to have had knowledge o f, and given h is consent to 
clauses which figure In notices which do not form part of the con­
tractual document. These are Instances when the clauses in question 
have been approved by an adm inistrative body. Thus, where a ca rr ie r 
had a notice in his o ff ice  which contained a time-Hmit fo r claims 
clause s tipu la ting  that any claim against the ca rr ie r must be made 523
52. Robert, "Une source a mineur de d ro it  c i v i l ,  les a ffiches et les 
écriteaux", J.C .P . 1958. 1. 1458.
53. N. Emmanuel de Pontivace, Révue T rim estr ie lle  de d ro it 
Commercial, 1968, p. 925; See also Be rlio z , note 47 supra, 
p. 63.
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within ten days, a f i r s t  instance court held that the c a rr ie r had 
done what was s u ff ic ie n t to bring the clause to the knowledge of 
h is customers as was required by a r t ic le  105 of a decree of 12th 
June 1939.(54)
(b) Tickets and receipts:
In the nineteenth century, and the early part of th is  century, 
French courts upheld conditions which were printed on t icke ts  and 
rece ipts. The courts decided thus on the ground that the conditions 
on the t ic k e t or rece ipt had modified the o rig ina l contract and the 
other party was presumed to have accepted the modifications i f  he 
did not protest a fte r receiving the t ic k e t.
In one case, a rece ipt stipulated that the contract price was 
payable at the s e l le r 's  residence. This s tipu la tion  had important 
consequences Inasmuch as in the event of a dispute, the proper 
forum w il l  be that of the s e lle r 's  residence. The court upheld 
the clause, stating that the buyer received the rece ipt without 
com pla in ing/54 5^
This view did not take account of the fact that more often 
than not, such rece ipts are not read.
Legal scholars roundly opposed the above reasoning and the 
courts soon followed su it. The changes began with Insurance con­
trac ts , where the courts refused to uphold certa in clauses Inserted 
on receipts and unsigned documents generally. In one case, the
54. Montepelller, 9 novembre 1954, D. 1955, som., p. 35.
55. Cass. Req. 26 dicèmbre 1898; D.P. 99, 1, 319.
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court said that modifications which are of considerable weight, such 
as the exclusion or lim ita tion  of l i a b i l i t y  should take a more 
formal form .^^ The weight of ju d ic ia l opinion henceforth was 
that because the parties to the contract (at any rate one of the 
parties) had not directed th e ir minds to any posterior provisions, 
i t  was wrong to uphold clauses figuring in tickets and receipts.
Hence, an exclusion clause inserted into a receipt was held not 
to " f u l f i l  the required conditions to make i t  va lid " by the "Cour 
de cassation".
Clauses appearing in the main contractual document:
In th is  case, French law, lik e  English law, attribu tes paramount 
importance to signed documents. A signature indicates that the 
terms appearing on the document have been taken notice of and 
a c c e p t e d . T h e  court cannot in th is  case hold that the party 
who signed the contract did not have knowledge of the terms, unless 
of course there was deceit or misrepresentation. Consequently only 
the s t r ic t  in terpretation  of such clauses can come to the aid of 
the adhering party to the contract.
B. The Control of Exemption and L im itation Clauses:
In th is process one cha racte ris tic  is  common to both legal 
systems. The legacy of the nineteenth century "freedom of contract" 
philosophy enshrined In the "w ill theory of contract" or the 567*
56. Trib. Gde Instance, S iine , 15e Ch. 19 de'cembre 1966, R.G.A.T.
1967, p. 32
57. Cass. c iv . 1ere, 14 a v r ll 1970, J .C .P . 1971 11 16687. See also: 
Civ. 2 a v r i l 1971, D. 1972 Som 4. B e r lio z , note 47 supra at p.65; 
Limoges, 2 Ch., 18 Janvier 1973; J .C .P . 1973 11 17339.
C1v. 1er f^vrler 1953, D.53 1. 77 at 30 mars 1892, S.93.1.13.58.
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p rin c ip le  of "1 'autonomie de la volonté" in French law, has been 
that the courts have never considered themselves as having the 
authority to n u ll ify  a contract which has been properly concluded 
between two or more parties. It is  useful to re ca ll a r t ic le  1134 
of the C iv il Code which states in categorical terms that: "Agreements 
le g a lly  made take the place of law for those who make them."
Simultaneously however, they have realised that quite often, 
clauses inserted into contractual documents have been unconscionable 
on one of the parties and conscious of th e ir ju s tice  dispensing ro le 
( i.e .  fa irness), they have devised means of preventing clauses which 
they deem harsh from applying without saying so in so many words. 
Although the objectives have been the same, French and English law 
have proceeded to do th is  in rather d iffe ren t ways.
I. In English Law:
English law has used three tools in con tro lling  exemption and
lim ita tion  clauses: A court may construe the clause s t r ic t ly ,  against
the party re ly ing on i t ;  i t  can decide that the party in breach has
(59)committed a fundamental breach;' ' f in a l ly ,  a court may use the 
doctrine of p r iv ity  o f contract to lim it  the range o f persons who 
are en tit led  to be covered by such a clause.
(a) S t r ic t  Construction:
The ru le succ inctly  states that whoever seeks to avoid any form 
o f l ia b i l i t y  must use words which unequivocally cover the case in 
hand. It is  simply another version of the 'contra-proferentem' 59
59. I t  w il l be seen la te r that th is  Is no longer an independent 
ground for inva lidating  such clauses.
ru le  which states that a contractual clause w i l l  be construed 
against the person proffering i t .  In the case of Pallia,Son and Hello 
v. P r a t t , there was a contract for the sale of what was 
described as "common English sa in fo in ". The contract contained a 
term stating that "the se lle r  g ives no warranty express or implied 
as to growth, description or any other matter". The seed which 
was delivered under the contract was known as ' g ia in t sa in fo in ', a 
seed of lower qua lity . There was therefore a breach o f S.13 of 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, i . e . ,  a breach of the implied condition 
that the goods must f i t  the descrip tion . Meanwhile, the p la in t if f -  
buyer had accepted the goods and the breach of condition was con­
sequently treated as a breach of warranty w ith in the meaning of 
S.11 (1)(C) of the Sale of Goods Act. The House of Lords held 
nonetheless that the defendant could not re ly  on the exemption 
clause because i t  only covered warranties and not conditions.
Their Lordships fe lt  that the fa c t  o f acceptance of the goods did 
not change the essential nature o f  the term from a condition to 
a warranty. “ •
In Henry Kendall i  Sono v. W illiam  L i l l i c o  & Sona,^^ there 
was a clause excluding l ia b i l i t y  fo r "la tent defects" of goods.
The House of Lords held that the expression "la tent defects" only
covered l ia b i l i t y  fo r the qua lity  of the goods and did not
exclude l ia b i l i t y  fo r breach of S.14(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, i . e . ,  601
60. [1911] A.C. 394.
61. [1968] 2 A ll E.R. 444
fitness fo r purpose. In Andrew Brothers (Bournemouth), Ltd. v. 
Singer & C o a clause exempted a l l  implied warranties and a l l 
l ia b i l i t ie s .  The court held that the clause did not apply to 
an express term describing the a r t ic le  in the contract and 
therefore, i t  did not exempt the s e lle r  from l ia b i l i t y  fo r 
delivering an a r t ic le  of a d iffe ren t description.
( 6 3 )
M in is ter o f  Materials v. Steel Bros. & Co. L td .,  ' is  an 
example of how fa r the courts are prepared to go in th e ir s t r ic t  
construction of such clauses. It was held in that case that a 
clause which lim ited to s ix ty  days the right of one of the parties 
to complain about the qua lity  of the goods did not apply where the 
complaint was about defective packing. This decision goes very 
far because in N ib le t t  v. C on fection er's  M aterials Co. L td . , 
i t  was held that the qua lity  of goods includes the state of th e ir 
packing. The law reports are replete with s im ila r cases. In 
some instances, one cannot but think th it  few lawyers can foresee 
a l l the d iffe ren t types of in terpretations the courts would give 
to these clauses. It requires a considerable stretching of one's 
imagination to fo re s ta ll a l l  the possible objections a court can 
raise. I t  Is submitted that to suggest as the courts have often 
suggested that clauses which have a fte r a ll been drafted by sk ille d  
lawyers do not 1n fact cover cases they were designed to cover is  
sometimes patent absurdity. This tendency of the courts to go 
quite beyond th e ir  lim its  is  motivated by the desire to protect 
one of the parties to the contract. 6234
62. [1934] 1 K.B. 17
63. [1952] 1 T.L.R. 499
64. [1921] 3 K.B. 387; See Lawson, Exclusion Clauses. (Oyez 
Press Ltd. London, 1978), at p. 22.
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This tendency is  even more conspicuous where the cases involve 
negligence. The courts assume that i t  is  "inherently improbable 
that one party should intend to absolve the other party from the 
consequences o f the la t te r 's  own n e g l i g e n c e " . " I f  there is 
a r e a l is t ic  p o s s ib il ity  that a party can be made lia b le  irrespective 
of negligence, an exemption clause in general terms w il l not be 
construed so as to cover l ia b i l i t y  fo r negligence."^65 6 678^
In White v. John Waruick & Co. Ltd . a contract fo r the
h ire of a b icycle  contained a clause which stated that: "nothing 
in th is  agreement sha ll render the owners l ia b le  for any personal 
in ju r ie s  to the ride rs of the machine h ired". The p la in t if f  f e l l  
when the saddle of the b icycle (which was defective) tipped over.
It was established that the defendants were negligent. The 
defendants were lia b le  e ither in s t r ic t  l i a b i l i t y  fo r breach of 
contract or in negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the 
exemption clause could only cover the former and not the la tte r 
ground. _
The high water mark of such construction must be H o llie r  v. 
Rambler Motors (A .M .C .) L t d The p la in t if f s  car was in the 
defendant's garage when a f ir e  broke out as a resu lt of the 
defendant's negligence and as a re su lt , the p la in t if f 's  car was 
destroyed. The defendants re lied  on an exclusion clause in the ir 
defence which was as follows: "The Company is  not responsible for
65. G ille sp ie  Bros. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. [1973]
Q.B. 400 at 419.
66. T re lte l:  Law of Contract. 5th edn. (London, Stevens & Sons 
1979), at p. 158.
67. [1953] 1 U.L.R. 1285
68. [1972] 1 A ll E.R. 399.
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damage caused by f ir e  to customers' cars on the premises". Because 
the defendants were bailees, they were only responsible in negligence. 
Although the Court acknowledged th is , i t  went on to hold that the 
clause did not however cover th is  case. Salmon L .J . said at p.406:
"In my view, the words of the condition would be better understood 
as being meant to be a warning to the customer that i f  a f ire  does 
occur at the garage which damages the car, and i t  is  not caused by 
the negligence of the garage owner, then the garage owner is  not 
responsible fo r damage". It is  not d i f f ic u l t  to see why some 
commentators have taken issue with the Court of Appeal on th is 
case .^ ^  Surely, i f  there was only one means by which l ia b i l i t y  
could come about, then that is  what was envisaged by the drafters 
o f the exemption clause.
In G ille s p ie  Broa. Ltd. V. Roy Bowles Transport L td . , ,
Buckley L .J . held that a clause by which one party agreed to 
indemnify the other "against a l l  claims*or demands whatsoever", 
was applicable wherje the l ia b i l i t y  arose out of negligence. He 
said words l ik e  "however a ris ing " and "from any cause whatsoever" 
were su ff ic ie n t to exclude l ia b i l i t y  fo r negligence. His judge­
ment did not however find favour with the House of Lords in Smith 
v. South Walea Switchgear, where 1n a contract to overhaul a 
factory, there was a clause that the overhaulers were to indemnify 
the factory owners against any l ia b i l i t y ,  lo ss , claim or proceedings 69701
69. See Barendt, (1972) 35, Modern Law Review p. 644. This case 
can be contrasted with Rutter v. Palmer [1922] 2 K.B. 87
70. [1973] 2 Q.B. 400
71. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 165.
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aris ing  in the courseof executing the order. The House of Lords 
held that the factory owners could not be indemnified against 
l i a b i l i t y  which had been incurred as a resu lt of the ir negligence. 
They could only be indemnified against l ia b i l i t y  aris ing  from acts 
or omissions committed by the other party in performing the con­
trac t. On the facts of th is  case, th is  seemed a proper decision.
The House of Lords however went fu rther to c r it ic is e  Buckley L .J 's  
statement that the words "whatsoever" and "however aris ing" 
necessarily covered negligence. They fe lt  that the word "negligence" 
or a synomyn of i t  ought to be used.
(b) Fundamental Breach:
Un til recently, the doctrine of fundamental breach was a major
device used by the courts to deal w ith the in justices of exemption
or lim ita tion  clauses. The essence of the doctrine has been very
simply described thus: "A party who has been gu ilty  of a fundamental
breach o f contract cannot re ly  on an exemption clause inserted in to
(72)the contract to protect him“-.' ' What precise ly amounts to
fundamental breach and the question whether i t  is  a substantive 
rule of law or merely a ru le of construction have been subject to 
a lo t  o f controversy and i t  1s only f a ir ly  recently that the House 
of Lords has given a categorical answer to the la t te r  q u e s tio n /72 3  ^
The o r ig in  of the doctrine has been traced to a series of three 
judgements given by Devlin J. as he then was. The f i r s t  of these
72. A.G. Guest, "Fundamental Breach of Contract", 77 L.Q.R. 98.
73. See Coote, Exception Clauses. (Sweet and Maxwell, London,
1964); Coote, "Discharge fo r Breach and Exception Clauses 
since Harbutt's P la s t ic in e " , (1977) 40 M.L.R. 31; T re ite l,
29 M.L.R. 546; Fridman,Alberta Law. Rev. 281.
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three was Chandrin v. Iebrandtsen-Moller, ' where Devlin J.
referred to a breach of contract as being a "fundamental breach
going to the root o f the contract". In the second case, Alexander 
(75)v. Railway Executive, 1 a bailee allowed some unauthorised 
person to claim the p la in t if f 's  goods. Devlin J. held that that 
was a fundamental breach which d isen tit led  the bailee from re ly ing 
on an exclusion clause in the contract. In so far as these cases 
related to contracts for the carriage of goods and bailment, there 
was no pa rticu la r novelty fo r the House of Lords had expressed 
s im ila r views in Ha-in S.S. Co. Ltd. v. Tate and Lyle L td .
The novelty came when Devlin J. applied the same reasoning to a 
sale of goods contract in Smeaton llanacomb v . Sasoon I .  S e t t y .^ ^  
Timber sold by description did not correspond to the contract 
spec ifica tions. There was therefore a breach of the condition 
implied by S.13 o f the Sale of Goods Act 1893. The contract 
however contained a fourteen-day time lim it  clause on claims which 
had expired before-the complaint was made. Devlin J. held that the 
clause applied since the logs delivered were "round mahogany logs" 
as the contract stipu lated . He went on to say that: " I t  is  no 
doubt a p rin c ip le  of construction that exceptions are to be construed 
as not being applicable for the protection o f those fo r whose 
benefit they are inserted i f  the benefic iary has committed a breach 7456
74. [1951] 1 K.B. 240 at p. 248.
75. [1951] 2 A ll E.R. 442
76. [1936] 2 A l l E.R. 597
77. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468
( 7 4 )
of fundamental term of the con tract..." He went on to express a 
test fo r what may amount to fundamental breach as being whether 
there was performance e n t ire ly  d iffe ren t from that contemplated 
by the contract.^78  ^ Lord Wilberforce in the Suisse Atlantique 
re iterated the test when he said: " I f  the breach resu lts  in a 
non-contractual performance of the contract so that the innocent 
party is  deprived of the to ta l benefit of the agreed consideration, 
then i t  is  a fundamental breach of the contract. In other words, 
i f  the purported performance is  to ta lly  d iffe ren t from that which 
the contract contemplates, there is  a fundamental breach of 
contract“ 7^9 .^ This element of tota l fa ilu re  of consideration 
distinguishes fundamental breach from a breach of condition or 
fundamental term.^80 81^
Although Devlin J . was careful not to say expressly that th is
new doctrine was substantive, i t  did not take long fo r Lord Denning
to restate i t  in substantive terms without any quibble. In
(81)
Karoaleo (Harrow) -Ltd. v. W allis, ' the defendant agreed to 
h ire a car from a finance company. He was shown a car which was 
subsequently towed at n ight to the defendant's premises, most 
of it s  detachable parts having been taken away, and the car would 
not go. The Court o f Appeal held that a clause excluding a l l 
conditions and warranties, express or implied, did not bind the
78. M e lv ille , 130 New L .J . 646 1s righ t in saying that fundamental 
breach was Invented 1n a purely hypothetical s itua tion . It was 
Irrelevant to the facts of Smeaton Hanscomb v. Sassoon I. Setty. 
Although Devlin J .  was purporting to apply a ru le  of construction, 
he was on a close reading of the three cases actua lly  applying a 
substantive doctrine.
79. See note 85, in f r a , p. 393.
80. See Thomson, “Fundamental breach in Scots and English Law", The 
Ju rid ica l Review (1977) p. 38 at 41-42.
81. [1956] 2 A ll E.R. 868.
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defendant. In his judgement, Denning L .J . ,  as he then was, said: 
" i t  is  now settled that exempting clauses of th is kind, no matter 
how widely they are expressed, only avail the party when he is  
carry ing out his contract in i t s  essentia l respects." "They do 
not ava il him when he is  gu ilty  o f a breach which goes to the 
root of the contract."
Prof. Coote has pointed out that th is substantive doctrine
put forward by Denning L .J . lacked previous warrant. Secondly,
Prof. Coote contends that th is doctrine is  tantamount to saying
that the core of ob ligation in a contract cannot be excluded, a
pronouncement c le a r ly  incompatible with the decision in Rose &
( 8 2 )Frank v. Crompton B ros . ' ' where the House of Lords accepted that
a l l  sorts o f ob ligations could be excluded through the use of an 
'honour c lause '.
This substantive doctrine of fundamental breach was applied
(831in Yeoman C redit Ltd. v. Appo. '  where a car subject to a h ire- 
purchase transaction suffered from such a congeries of defects 
as to constitu te a fundamental breach, thereby excluding the 
exemption clause.
This new formulation of the doctrine of fundamental breach did 
not go unchallenged. In U.G.S. Finance Ltd. v. National Mortgage 
Bank o f  Greece and National Bank o f  Greece, Pearson L.J.
sa id that the rule of fundamental breach was a ru le of construction
82. [1925] A.C. 445
83. [1962] 2 A ll E.R. 281
84. [1964] 1 Lloyds Rep. 446 at 453; see also Game Farm v. Suffolk 
Agr ic u ltu ra l and Poultry Producers Assn. Ltd. [1966]' 1'W.L.Ri 
281 ,  at pp. 341-743.
which gives e ffe c t to the intention of the parties and not a rule 
of law. This view was endorsed, although not with enough emphasis, 
in the Suisse A tlan tique  c a s e Although th e ir Lordships held 
that the rule was one of construction, they did not overrule the 
cases which referred to i t  as a ru le of law, preferring to explain 
them as instances of construction. Some of th ed ic ta o f the Law 
Lords might be taken to in fe r that the ru le could at times, be one 
of law. The facts of th is  case were not ideal because the clause 
which was in issue here was a demurrage clause stipu la ting  the 
payment of $1000 per day and not an exclusion clause. The owners of 
the ship lo s t earnings on a hundred and f i f t y  days lo s t because of 
the chartere r's  delay. Because that loss was much more than the 
damage payments would have amounted to , they brought an action 
against the charterers arguing that the excessive delays amounted 
to a fundamental breach of contract. A further tw ist to the 
facts was that the owners had affirmed the contract a fte r having 
had knowledge o f the alleged fundamental breach. The House of 
Lords held that assuming that the clause was an exception clause, 
and that the breach iri question was a fundamental breach, the
• I
clause would s t i l l  have applied because there was no rule of law 
that in the event of a fundamental breach, the application of any 
exclusion or lim ita t io n  clause was thereby excluded. Lord Reid 
refused to accept the substantive doctrine because i t  "would not 
be a sa tis facto ry  solution to the problem which undoubtedly ex ists" 
(the problem o f exclusion and lim it in g  clauses). Lord Wilberforce
85. [1967] 1 A.C. 361.
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on h is part expressed the view that while the doctrine was not 
substantive; “one may safe ly say that parties cannot in a contract 
have contemplated that the clauses should have so wide an ambit as 
in e ffect to deprive one party 's stipu la tion  of a l l contractual 
e ffe c t" . Lord Reid however said that i f  the innocent party elects 
to treat the contract as discharged, then the en tire  contract as 
well as the exclusion clause comes to an end. This remark enabled 
the Court of Appeal, p a rt icu la r ly  Lord Denning to revert to the 
substantive doctrine of fundamental breach in Harbutt'a  Plasticine 
v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. L t d In that case, the defendants 
agreed to design, build and in s ta ll a heated p ipe -lin e  and tank 
system for the p la in t if f .  The in s ta lla t io n  eventually proved 
wholly unsuited fo r its  purpose and the p la in t i f f 's  factory was 
consequently burnt down. There was a clause in the contract lim iting  
the defendants' l i a b i l i t y  fo r loss to the contract p rice , which 
was immeasurably less than the actual damage su ffe red .' Stephenson
J . ,a t  f i r s t  instance, held that the defendants had committed a 
fundamental breach of contract which d isen tit le d  them from relying 
on the lim ita tion  clause. The Court o f Appeal affirmed the judge­
ment. Lord Denning held that the Suisse A tlantique  decision that 
there was no substantive ru le of fundamental breach applied only
86. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447 (Court o f Appeal)
87. The p la in t if fs  had meanwhile been large ly compensated by 
the ir Insurers who brought th is action in the p la in t if f 's  
name.
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in cases where the innocent party had affirmed the contract (as
was the case in the Suieae A t la n tiq u e ), and in support fo r his
decision, he re lied  on Lord Reid 's view that where an innocent
party elected to treat the contract as discharged the whole
contract including the exclusion or lim ita tion  clause came to an 
(88)end. ' This reasoning was re iterated by Lord Denning in
(89)
Famworth Finance F a c i l i t ie s  Ltd. v. A ttryde. In th is  case,
there was a "congeries of defects" in a motor-cycle under a* 
hire-purchase agreement which according to the Court o f Appeal, 
amounted to a fundamental breach. Lord Denning f e lt  that that 
was s u ff ic ie n t to d ise n t it le  the finance company from re ly ing  
on the ir exemption clause.
In the aftermath of Harbutte P la s tic in e  and Famworth Finance
F a c i l i t ie s  v. Attryde, the courts have been torn between follow ing
either the House of Lords decision in the Suisse A tla n tiqu e  or
the Court of Appeal in H arbutt’s P la s tia in e . Thus, in Kenyon,
(91)
Son i  Craven Ltd. v. Baxter Hoare, '  Donaldson J. thought that 
there was no authority 1n the Suisse A tlantique  case fo r  applying 
the doctrine of fundamental breach in cases other than those where 
the breach resu lts in an en t ire ly  d iffe ren t performance from that
88. See Leigh-Jones & P ickering: "Harbutt's P la s tic ine  v. Wayne 
Tank & Pump Co. Ltd . , Fundamental Breach and Exemption Clauses. 
Carnages and Interest"; 86 L.Q.R. (1970) p. 513.
89. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1053
90. Lord Denning Introduced the notion of unequal bargaining 
power in  th is case.
91. [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep. 232.
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contemplated by the contract. Hence, an exception clause in a
bailment contract between the p la in t i f f  and the defendant was
enforced although the defendant's negligence caused twenty per
cent of the p la in t if f s  ground-nuts to be destroyed by rat
in festa tion . That case therefore l im its  the scope of Harbutt's
P la s tic in e .  Kerr J.showed himself unimpressed by Lord Dennings
(921reasoning when in The Angelia , he said an event fo r which
l ia b i l i t y  is  c le a rly  excluded by an express agreement could not
be a breach, le t  alone a fundamental breach. Lord Denning and
the Court o f Appeal however, persisted with the substantive
(93)ru le of fundamental breach.' 1
(94)
Photo Production Ltd. V S ecu rico r (Transport) Ltd. has 
f in a l ly ,o r  at any rate fo r the time being, put the controversy 
to rest. The case involved a contract in which the defendants 
provided patrol services to the p la in t if f s  factory. A clause in 
the contract provided that under no circumstances should the 
company be responsible fo r any in ju r iou s act or default by any of 
it s  employees unless such act or defau lt could have been foreseen 
and avoided by the exercise of due d iligence on the part of the 
company as h is  employer. Another clause lim ited  the defendant's 
l i a b i l i t y  in any event. The defendants' employee who was on 
inspection de liberate ly  started a f i r e  which resulted in p la in t if f '  
loss of i615,000. At f i r s t  instance, the p la in t if f  argued that the 923*
92. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 210
93. See Wathes v. Austins (Menswear) Ltd . [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep. 14;
Levison v. PatenT"Steam Carpel Cleaning Co. [1978] Q.B.68.
94. [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283.
defendant had committed a fundamental breach which therefore
divested them of th e ir  r igh t to re ly  on the exception clause.
(95)McKenna J . ,  re fe rring  to Kerr J. in the Angelia, ' held that
since the parties had expressly provided that the defendant would
not be "responsible" i f  a pa rticu la r event occurred, the occurrence
of that event cannot be treated as a breach of c o n t r a c t .^
This was c le a r ly  against the view Lord Denning and the Court
of Appeal had been canvassing a l l  along; not su rp ris ing ly  therefore,
the judgement was reversed on appeal. In h is judgement, Lord
Denning said: "The Court i t s e l f  deprives the party of the benefit
o f an exemption o r lim ita tion  clause i f  he is  g u ilty  of a breach
of fundamental term or of a fundamental breach of one of the terms 
(97)of the contract". ' He therefore gave the doctrine an even wider 
scope than he had previously done. He tr ied  to appear consistent 
with the Suisse Atlantlque decision by saying that i t  was the 
presumed in tention of the parties that fn the face of a breach 
such as the present one, i .e ,  destruction due to defendant's 
employee's arson, the exception clause would not apply.
The House o f Lords seized the occasion to give a death blow 
to the substantive doctrine of fundamental breach. Lord Diplock 
endorsed McKenna J 's  view that the exception clause modified the 9567
95. Note 92 supra at pp. 230-231.
96. This view had been put forward by Coote: Exception Clauses 
note 73 supra, where he said exception clauses are of two 
types. Some prevent the accrual of primary rights while 
others are mere shields to claims.
97. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 856 at p. 863.
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primary ob ligation  imposed on the defendant.' ‘ The House of 
Lords made i t  c lea r that in construingthe contract, regard must 
be paid to the question whether i t  is  a commercial or a consumer 
contract. In commercial contracts where r isk  a llocation  is  fa ir  
a l l  the parties can take the necessary steps to get insurance
cover, the courts should not be astute in construing the clause 
(9 9)too s t r ic t ly .  Harbutto P la s tic in e  and Uathea v. Austins 
(Men swear) Ltd. were overruled.
(c) Exemption Clauses and Third Parties:
The doctrine of p r iv ity  o f contract has been used to lim it 
the range of persons who may benefit from an exclusion clause.
This is  usually applied in commercial cases where persons such as 
agents or independent contractors seek to avoid or lim it  the ir 
l i a b i l i t y  by pleading an exclusion or lim ita t io n  clause inserted 
in the contract between parties other than themselves. The attitude 
of the courts has been u n til very recently to prevent such th ird  
parties,w ith  the possible exception of agents, from benefiting 
from such a clause.^98 100  ^ This approach was thought to have been 
made sactosanct by the House of Lords In the case of Scruttons v. 
Midland S ilico n e s  L td . ^  The defendants, Scruttons L td ., were 
stevedores acting fo r the United States Lines in London. Their 
contract with the la t te r  Included a clause stipu la ting  that they
98. [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283 at p. 295.
99. Ibid at pp. 296-295.
100. See Dunlop v .S e lf r id g e  & Co. Ltd . [1915] A.C. 847; Lord 
Haldane said:»Our law knows nothing of a jus quaes 1 turn 
te r t lo  a ris in g  by way of contract" at p. '853.
1. [1962] A.C. 462.
(9 8 )
were to have the benefit of any excluding or lim iting  terms 
inserted in the b i l l  of lading. This was however unknown to 
the p la in t if f s ,  owners of a drum of chemicals damaged by the 
defendant stevedores. In an action against them, they sought 
protection under the lim it in g  clause in the b i l l  of lading- The House 
of Lords held that the defendants could not benefit from any o f it s  
clauses. The established exception to th is ru le , v iz , that the party 
who entered Into the contract did so as an agent fo r the party 
benefiting from i t  did not apply since the defendants could not 
by any stretch of imagination be considered the p rin c ipa ls of 
the shipping lin e . The stevedores were c le a r ly  independent 
contractors. The stevedores further argued that even i f  they 
were Independent contractors, they were s t i l l  en tit led  to the 
benefit of the exemption clause in the b i l l  of lading on the
(2 )au thority  of Elder, Dempster & Co. o. Patterson Zoohonis & Co. 
Viscount Simonds in dismissing that argument, said that the House 
of Lords was bound by precedent only i f  the ra tio  decidendi 
of the case was c lear. That was not the case with the decision 
in Elder, Dempster, he thought. It was not c lea r, he fe lt ,  
whether the House of Lords sp e c if ic a lly  decided that the exception 
to the doctrine of p r iv ity  could be extended to independent 
contractors. 2
2. [1924] A.C. 552. The House of Lords assumed in th is  case 
that a person not a party to a contract could under certa in 
circumstances get the benefit of an exclusion or lim ita tion  
clause Inserted in the contract.
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In Mersey Shipping & Transport Co. Ltd. v. Rea L td ., ' Scrutton,
L .J . explained the rationa le 1n Elder, Dempster thus: " . . .  where there
Is a contract which contains an exemption clause, the servants or ayents
who act under the contract have the benefit o f the exemption clause.
They cannot be sued 1n to rt as Independent people, but they can claim
the protection of the contract made with th e ir employers on whose
behalf they are acting". In Viscount Simond's view, the use of the
word "agents" thus excluded Independentcontractors.
(4)In Adler v. Diakeon, 1 servants o f a company, i.e .  master and
boatswain, could not get protection from a clause which was part of
an agreement between the company and the p la in t i f f  which stated that
.. ." th e  Co. w il l not be responsible fo r any Injury whatsoever...
a r is in g  from or occasioned by the negligence o f the co 's servants".
Jenkins L .J . said ca tegorica lly  that the company's servants are not
parties to the contract. I t  follows that however the clause was
drafted, no servant of the company could bene fit from 1 t.
This stringent way o f construing exemption clause with regard to
th ird  parties did not appeal to a l l  judges. Devlin J. attempted to
create an Inroad Into th is  construction In Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Soindia 
(51Navigation Co. Ltd. ' The p la in t if f  In th is  case was not a party 
to a contract o f carriage of goods which had been made between the 345
(3)
3. [1925] 21 LL.L.R. 378
4. [1954] 1 A ll E.R. 397
5. [1954] 2 Q.B. 402.
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defendant and a th ird  party. That contract contained a lim ita tion  
clause. P la in t i f f 's  goods were damaged by the defendants. Devlin 
J .  held that although not a party to the contract, the p la in t if f  was 
bound by the clause because he would have been en tit led  to Its 
benefit. Commenting on th is  decision, Viscount Simonds 1n Midlands 
S ilic o n e s , fe lt  that the decision turned on the special facts of the 
case which ju s t if ie d  the Implication of a contract between the 
p la in t if f  and the defendant.^
The f i r s t  case to go expressly against the ru le la id  down in 
Soruttone v.Midlands S ilico n e s  was New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v 
A.M. Satterthw aite A Co. an appeal to the Privy Council from New 
Zealand. In that case, stevedores were sued by the consignees of 
machinery which was damaged while being unloaded. The stevedores 
were not o f course parties to the contract which contained a clause 
stipu la ting  that: " I t  Is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or 
agent of the ca rr ie r (Including every Independent contractor from 
time to time employed by the ca rrie r) shall In any circumstances 
whatsoever be under any l i a b i l i t y  whatsoever to the Shipper, Consignee 
or owner of the goods or to any other holder of th is  b i l l  of lading for 
any loss or damage or delay o f whatsoever kind a r is in g  or resulting 
d ire c t ly  or Ind irectly  from any act, neglect or defau lt on h1 s part 
while acting In the course o f or In connection with h1 s employment...". 
The stevedores re lie d  on a one-year time lim it  on cla ims clause contained 
1n the Hague ru les which were Incorporated In the b i l l  o f lading. 6
6. [1962] A.C. 446 a t p. 471.
-152-
The P rivy  Council, by a majority o f three to two, decided,not without 
some d if f ic u lt ie s ,  that the stevedores could claim protection under 
the clause, although not being themselves parties to the contract.
As Lord Wilberforce put i t ,  the d if f ic u lt ie s  lay in the fact
that " . . .  English law, having committed i t s e l f  to a rather technical
and schematic doctrine of contract, in application takes a practica l
approach, often at the cost of forcing the facts to f i t  uneasily into the
marked s lo ts  of o ffe r, acceptance and con s id e ra tion ".^  In th is
case therefore, 1 n order to circumvent the doctrine of p r iv ity ,  the
majority of the Privy Council thought that the " b i l l  of lading brought
into existence a bargain I n i t ia l ly  un ila tera l but capable of becoming
mutual, between the shippers (consignors) and the stevedores, made
(9)through the ca rr ie r as agent".' ' Only by tw isting established 
p r in c ip le s  re la ting  to the formation o f contracts could they succeed 
In g iv ing expression to the c le a r ly  d isce rn ib le  Intention of the 
parties. Not su rp ris ing ly , th is approach was conceptually d istaste fu l 
to the m inority who f e lt  that to read Into the contract an agency 
re la tionsh ip  was stretching the law too far.
Donaldson J . has given a new dimension to th is new approach. In 
Johnson Mathey & Co. Ltd. v. Constantine Tem inale L t d 'A ' balled 
goods w ith ' B1 who sub-balled them with 'C ',  In whose care the goods 
were lo s t .  Donaldson J. held that 'C ‘ could re ly  on an exclusion clause 
made between 'A ' and ' B' . He thought that Soruttone Ltd. v. Midland 
S ilic o n e s  would have applied only I f  'A ' could sue without a lleg ing bailment. *910
U. Ib id a t p. 1020
9. Ibid a t p. 1020.
10. [1976] 2 Lloyds Rep. 216
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In the l ig h t  of these Inconsistencies, T re ite l states that:
"The doctrine o f p r iv ity  was never a sa tis facto ry  Instrument for 
con tro lling  undesirable exception clauses, and should no longer be 
used for th is  purpose now that such clauses are d ire c t ly  controlled 
under the Un fa ir Contract Terms Act 1977".^^
II The Pos ition  In French law:
The treatment o f exclusion and lim ita t io n  clauses In French law
Is by no means read ily  ascertainable. As 1t has already been pointed
out, i t  consis ts  of extrapolating from certa in  a r t ic le s  o f the C iv il
Code by the courts; consequently as 1n English law the decisions from
the courts are not always consistent. Attempts to apply one general
p rin c ip le  such as the doctrine o f "abus de dro it" (abuse of righ t) have
fa ile d  e ssen tia lly  because I t  1 s fundamentally Inconsistent with the
general provis ion o f a r t ic le  1134 of the C iv il  Code which states that:
"Agreements le g a lly  made take the place o f law for those who make
them". Unlike English law however, there had been many le g is la t iv e
Interventions 1 n th is  area even before the comprehensive law of 10th
Jan. 1978 on standard form contracts.
The question whether exclusion or lim ita tion  clauses properly
speaking should be distinguished from clauses defining the scope of
contractual ob liga tions has also been raised In French law. In one
( 12)
case,' ' a company which hired out refrigerated trucks stipulated 1 n 12
11. T re ite l,  Law o f Contract . 5th ed. (London, Stevens & Sons, 1979) 
at p. 473.
12. Com. 15 Ju1n 1959, D. 1960.97 cassant Paris, 13 Ju1n 1957 D. 1957 
531, note Rodifere.
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1 ts contract that 1 t  did not warrant the truck to be of the required 
temperature. The h ire r lo s t  his consignment of chickens because the 
temperature 1n the truck was 40°C. The "Cour de cassation" held 
that the clause was one defin ing the extent of the h ire r 's  contractual 
undertaking; he simply undertook to provide a re f lg o r lf lc  truck without 
promising to ensure that 1t was In fac t f i t  for Its  purpose. This 
d is t in c tio n  is  very Important because while such clauses are upheld 
by the courts without any qua lif ica t ion s , the story 1 s en tire ly  
d iffe ren t when the clause Is adjudged to be an exclusion or lim ita tion  
clause which seeks only to avoid or re s t r ic t  l i a b i l i t y .  The la tte r , 
although va lid  1n p r in c ip le  has been hedged by numerous qua lifica tions 
and the courts have held In certa in  cases that they are downright Invalid 
as a matter o f law. Important as th is d is t in c tion  may be, I t  Is very 
tenuous Indeed; and very few cases do draw the d is t in c tio n .
(a) Exclusion and lim ita t io n  clauses 1n contracts generally
These clauses are 1n p rin c ip le  upheld’ In accordance with the 
p r in c ip le  of freedom o f contract. A llus ion  Is often made to a rt ic le  
1150 o f the C iv il  Code In support o f the v a lid ity  o f these clauses.^ 
A r t ic le  1150 states that: "A debtor Is held only to damages which were 
foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time of the contract, 
when 1t 1s not.by M s w ilfu lness that the ob ligation Is not executed".
I f  a contract therefore stipu lated that damages shall not exceed a 
ce rta in  amount, that Is c le a r ly  foreseeable w ithin the meaning of a rt. 
1150. A prelim inary point to note Is that I f  non-performance Is 
de liberate, then the general p rin c ip le  w il l not obtain. 13
13. B. Starck: D ro it c i v i l .  O b liga tions, tome II L ib raries Techniques 
(1972) no 21«"p. ¿ 3 a . ------
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A1though the same p rin c ip le  applies to both exclusion and 
lim ita tion  clauses In theory, 1 n practice , the courts have treated 
them d iffe ren t ly . As Starck^14  ^ argues, a contractual ob ligation 
which Is devoid of a l l  sanctions Is not at a l l an ob ligation ( 1 .e. 
when there 1s a clause excluding a l l  l ia b i l i t y ) .  Hence, the courts 
have been s t r ic te r  1n the ir Interpretation of exclusion clauses than 
In the ir Interpretation o f lim ita tion s  clauses. Indeed, before 
194b the difference was very remarkable. The only e ffect of 
exclusion clauses was to reverse the onus of proof. In order to 
elucidate th is  point, 1 t  Is necessary to d istingu ish between what 1 s 
known In French law as "ob ligation de moyens" from "obligations de 
re su lta t" . In the former, the promisor undertakes to provide the 
"means" he possesses to ensure performance. An example of such an 
ob ligation  1s the contractual ob ligation o f a doctor to cure h1 s 
patient. He 1s not 1n breach of h1s contract I f  he does not cure 
h is patient provided he acted with the care and d iligence. To 
determine that he 1 s 1 n breach, the promisee w ill have to prove fa u lt.
On the other hand, 1n "ob ligation de resu lta t ", the promisor promises 
a de fin ite  re su lt, fo r example, a car dealer or manufacturer undertakes 
to provide a car that functions properly. Whereas 1n the former case, 
a promisee a lleg ing  breach o f contract by the promisor has to prove 
1 t, 1n the la t te r  case, the very non-performance of the ob ligation  
Implies fa u lt  and the onus to disprove fa u lt  therefore l ie s  on the 
proml sor.^15^
14. B. Starck:"Observations sur le  regime jurld lque d§s clauses de 
non-responsabH1t¿ ou Um ita tIves de responsablllte" D. 1975, 
Chronlque XX, no. 25.
15. Jean Carbonnier, Droit civil, tome 4, P.U.P., no. 71, p, 233.
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Before 1948, the courts held that the e ffe c t of an exclusion clause 
was to reverse the onus of proof and to lay I t  on the promisee. I f  the 
promisee succeeded 1n proving a fau lt on the part of the promisor, the 
exception clause did not apply, however s l ig h t  the fau lt was.^16 178^
This obviously applied only 1n cases of "ob ligation  de resu lta t".
The reason given for th is in terpretation ( i f  one might ca ll th is 
interpretation) o f exception clauses was that a tortious l ia b i l i t y  was 
born out o f the contractual re la tionsh ip . Since tortious l ia b i l i t y  was 
1n the public in te re s t (ordre pub lic), no party might exonerate himself 
from 1 t.
This Interpretation of exclusion clauses was obviously not co rrect 
as fa r as legal scholars were concerned. As Starck put 1t ,  "rarely 
was such a number o f mistakes accumulated 1 n a single jud ic ia l 
In te rp re ta tion".^ ^  Non-performance of a contractual obligation, 
even 1 f  caused by a fa u lt  on the part of the promisor can only lead 
to contractual and not tortious l ia b i l i t y .  As far as French law Is 
concerned, th is  reasoning 1s patently wrong.
In 1948, 1n a series o f cases, the "Cour de cassation" made a 
volte-face 1n the Interpretation o f exclusion clauses. In one c a s e / 1*^  
an employee'parked h1 s b icycle In a garage provided by his employer 
fo r that purpose. There was however a clause which figured In a notice 
In the garage as well as In the employment contract In which the 
employer excluded re spons ib ility  fo r the lo ss of any vehicle parked
16. See C1v. 3 août 1932: D. 1933 1, 49, note Josserand.
17. Starck, Observations, note 15 supra; no. 29.
18. Soc. 3 acftit 1948: D. 1948 536.
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1n that garage. The b icyc le  was stolen. The Court of Appeal o f the 
Seine held that the th e ft could only have taken place because of lack 
of proper organisation 1 n the garage or because the guard fa ile d  1n 
h1s duty. The court held therefore that the employer could not re ly 
on the exclusion clause. The 'Cour de cassation' held that the lower 
court was wrong. Even 1f  1t was established that the employer was 
at fa u lt , I t  was not su ff ic ie n t ly  serious to deprive the exclusion 
clause of Its e ffec t.
This appears to be the new approach 1n dealing with exclusion 
clauses^19 .^ Clauses lim it in g  l ia b i l i t y  have on the other hand been 
generally upheld. Whenever the court however th inks that the e ffec t 
of the clause 1 s to l im it  l ia b i l i t y  so much that 1 t  becomes derisory 
1n comparison with the actual damage suffered by the Innocent party, 
such a clause would be construed as an e x c lu s io n /20  ^ Before 1948 this 
would of course mean that Its e ffe c t would simply have been to sh ift  
the burden of proving fa u lt  onto the Innocent party. Since 1948 the 
gu lf between the Interpretations o f the two d iffe ren t clauses has 
been narrowed. Both are now va lid  unless the party re lying on the 
clause did coimrit a serious fa u lt  ("faute lourde") or deceit ("dol")
1n the performance of the contract.
19. Some cases have s t i l l  been dealt with on the basis o f the pre-1948 
construction. In one case, the p la in t if f  rented a warehouse at the 
defendant* railway station. A carriage containing benzol standing 
near the warehouse caught f ir e  and the f ir e  spread to the warehouse, 
destroying Its contents. The "Cour de cassation" held In an appeal 
brought by the p la in t i f f 's  Insurers that the exclusion clause 1n the 
contract was Ineffective because although contractual l i a b i l i t y  
appeared to have been excluded, tortious l i a b i l i t y  which sprang from 
the contract remained.
20. See Colmar, 24 nov. 1950; D .1951, 150;C1v. 17 mal 1950, D. 1950, 
p. 465. Martine; "L'Option entre la  responsabilité ' contractuelle 
et la responsab ilité  de llc tu e lle "  (These) Paris 1957 L .6 .O.J.
Tl
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There has been some uncertainty as to whether a clause excluding
or lim it in g  l ia b i l i t y  fo r personal in jury resu lting  from a breach of
contract can be va lid . The weight of opinion 1s that such a clause
Is a n u ll ity  because I t  goes against the p r in c ip le  of " in ta n g ib ilite  et
in d isp o n ib ilité ' de la  personne humaine"/21 2^ What th is  means is  that
because man cannot be evaluated In purely commercial terms, no clause
should re s t r ic t  the l ia b i l i t y  which ought to follow personal in jury
or death resu lting from a breach of contract. I t  ts assumed that
such a clause would lead to carelessness and 1 t  Is therefore 1n the
pub lic Interest to oppose the v a lid ity  of such clauses. This contention
1s predicated upon the fa lse  premise that the clause w il l permit manu-
(221facturers e tc ., to cause th e ir customers to be Injured with Impunity.' ' 
This 1s not however the case because a l l that the lim ita tion  clause 
achieves 1 n th is  connection 1 s to l im it  the damages which would have 
to be paid to the injured party; I t  does not absolve him from l ia b i l i t y  
altogether. What the supporters of the above view desire 1s that 
l i a b i l i t y  for personal Injury should never be excluded from the scope 
o f the contractual obligations between the parties which 1 s a d iffe ren t 
question from whether such l i a b i l i t y  could be lim ited.^23^
This Issue Is no longer as Important as I t  was before special 
le g is la t io n  was enacted to deal with I t  1n contracts fo r the carriage 
o f persons where such problems often arose. In a f a ir ly  recent case,^24  ^
a lim ita tion  clause which purported to cover personal In juries was validated 
by the “Courde cassation".
21. Mazeaud #et de Jug la rt, Leçons de d ro it  c i v i l . t.2  Editions 
Montchrestien, 1973, no. ¿36.
22. See Toulouse, 23 Octobre 1934.,D. 1935. 2.49; Paris 25 mars 1954,
Sem. Jur. 1954 8094, note Rodlere; Mazeaud, Gaz. Pa l. 1934 2.890.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. Civ. iere 3 JH n ;  1970, D. 1971 373.
The major barriers to the app lication of exclusion and lim ita tion  
clauses in French law are "dol" and "faute lourde".
The English law term which 1s nearest in meaning to "dol" In 
French law 1s "deceit",althouyh "dol" does not necessarily suggest 
a fraudulent motive. A r t ic le  1116 of the C iv il Code states that: 
"Deceit 1s a cause for n u ll it y  of an agreement when a r t if ic e s  used 
by one of the parties are such that i t  is  evident that, without such 
a r t if ic e s ,  the other party would not have contracted". The courts 
have enlarged the scope o f the app lica tion  of th is  a r t ic le  to 
Include bad fa ith ; fo r Instance 1 f  a party remains s ile n t when he 
ought to have made a s t a t e m e n t . I t  has also been held In sale 
of goods contracts that fa ilu re  to explain or d isc lose the meaning 
of a s t ip u la t ion  Is tantamount to deceit, 1.e. "dol".^2^ The 
above 1s s im ila r  to cases 1n English law where an exclusion or 
lim ita tion  clause has been held to be Inapplicable because of a 
misrepresentation.^2^ I t  re lates to the formation o f the contract.
I t  should be distinguished from what Is known as “faute doloslve",
l.e . Intentional fa u lt  during the performance o f the contracts.
Where a party w ilfu lly  commits a fa u lt  which leads to a breach of 
contract, he cannot get the benefit o f an exclusion or lim ita tion  
clause. "Faute lourde" which l i t e r a l ly  means a serious or grave 2567
25. C iv. con. 29 nov. 1971 Gaz. Pa l. 1972 1. 237.
26. See de Jug lart, "L'ObUgatlon de renseignement dans les 
Contrats", Riv. trim  de d ro it  c iv . 1945 p.
27. See Mendelssohn v. Normanol Ltd (1970) 1 Q.B. 177.
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fa u lt  which induces a breach of contract is  a fau lt which although not 
intentional ( 1 .e. faute do losive"), is  so gross that the perpetrator is 
treated in  law as having Intended^*^ Its consequences.
Although an ordinary fault» resu lting 1n a breach o f contract 
w il l not exclude the application of an exemption or lim ita tion  clause, 
the courts have often expanded the scope of "faute lourde", i.e .
broadened Its  d e f in it io n , so as to exclude the app lication of clauses
(29)they consider to be very harsh.' '
Special Cases:
(b) Contracts fo r the sale of goods:
A r t ic le  1641 o f the C iv il Code states that "The s e lle r  is  held to 
a guarantee against hidden defects 1n the thing sold which render 1 t 
unsuitable to the use fo r which I t  1 s Intended, or which so diminish 
such use that the buyer would not have purchased 1 t , or would have 
given only a lesser price for 1t, had he known o f them". This law is  
however not Imperative and can be varied by the parties. This has 
led many dealers and manufacturers to Insert exclusion or lim ita tion  
clauses 1n .their standard sale forms. A rt ic le  1643 states that: 289
28. This approach to exclusion and lim ita tion  clauses by French law 
1 s not without some resemblance to the substantive doctrine of 
"fundamental breach". In the Photo Production case for Instance, 
the Court o f Appeal held that because the fa u lt  which led to 
the breach was Intentional, I.e . “ faute dolosive" 1n French law. 
The exclusion clause would not apply. S im ila r ly , 1n Harbutt's 
p la s t ic in e , although the fa u lt  was not Intentional, 1 t was so 
serious ("faute lourde" 1n French law), that the gu ilty  party 
was not allowed to re ly  on the lim ita tion  clause. See Com. 12 
ju ln  1950, Gaz. Pal. 1950, 2. 195.
29. Joseph Frossard, "La d istinctiondes ob ligations de moyens et 
des ob ligations de re su lta t". Paris L .6.D.J. 1965, no. 472.
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"He[the s e lla r ]  1s l ia b le  fo r hidden defects, even though he did not 
know of them, unless, In such a case, he had stipulated he would not 
be obligated for any guarantee". From th is a r t ic le ,  I t  can be inferred 
that 1 f  the s e lle r  knows of the hidden defect, then the exclusion or 
lim ita t io n  clause w ill not apply 1n any event. The a r t ic le  1s 
therefore consistent with the general Interpretation of exclusion of 
lim ita t io n  clauses, 1 .e. 1 f  there 1 s deceit or a serious fa u lt  on 
the part o f the person re ly ing on the clause, the clause becomes 
Inapplicable.
Contrary to the s p ir i t  of a r t ic le  1643,however, the courts In 
France have nevertheless refused to give any e ffect to exclusion or 
lim ita t io n  clauses Irrespective of whether the se lle r  knew of the 
hidden defect 1n the goods sold so long as the se lle r  was a professional 
person - manufacturer, wholesaler o r even re ta ile r  - In the business 
concerned. The courts have established a presumption that such a 
s e lle r  has knowledge of the hidden defect In the goods sold and this 
presumption has become Irrebuttable.^30  ^ Even a clause 1n a contract 
s t ip u la t in g  that the goods are sold u1n the state 1n which the buyer 
finds It" has not succeeded 1n circumventing th is  exceedingly s t r ic t  
rule.^31  ^ Some se lle rs  tr ied  to side-step the force o f th is  ru le by 
lim it in g  only the time during which a claim based on the legal guarantee 
required by a r t ic le  1641 and 1643 (1.e. time-Hm1t clause on claims).
The courts have treated such clauses as lim ita t ion  clauses.
30. See Ph ilippe Mallnvaud, "Pour ou contre la  va lid i té des clauses 
11mlt a t ives de la  guarantie des vices eachds". Sem. Jur. 1975 
D. 2690.
31. See also: J.F . Overstake, "La responsIb iU te  du fabrlcant des 
produits dangereaux". Rév. trim , de dt. c iv . 1972 485.
This position  was taken by the "Cour de cassation" in the mid- 
f if t ie s^ 32  ^ and has seen l i t t l e  or no changes. I t  1 s d i f f ic u l t  to 
fathom the reason fo r imposing such a s t r ic t  l ia b i l i t y  on s e lle rs .
I t  is  cornnon knowledge that a defect in a single screw might 
1nmob1l1se an o i l  tanker. Why should the manufacturer or s e lle r  be 
l ia b le  fo r such an unpredictable damage even when no fa u lt , however 
s lig h t can be attributed to him? I t  has been held by the "Cour de 
cassation" that the reason lie s  In public policy.^33 34^ I t  1s in the 
public Interest that the public a t large should at a l l times be 
protected from defective goods. I t  1s the place o f the se lle rs  to 
Insure against any possible defects 1n th e ir goods.
Controversy s t i l l  looms over the question whether th is  presumption 
of "bad fa ith "  on the part o f the s e lle r  should be lim ited to Instances 
where he deals with non-professional people, l.e .  consumers, or 
whether I t  should be extended to cases where he deals with another 
professional person.
(341In a recent case' ' ,  an engineering company which was bu ild ing  a 
fru it - ju ic e  factory In Morocco bought a machine fo r f i l l in g  and corking 
bottles from the defendant. The machine had a hidden defect. The 
defendant however re lied  on an exclusion clause and contended that 
the p la in t if f 's  company being experts themselves, the exclusion clause
32. C1v. 24 a v r ll 1954 J.C.P. 1955 II 8565
33. Cass. con. 20 janv. 1970; Cass. c1v. l ere 28 a v r ll 1972 11 17280.
34. Cass. Com. C pa rtia lle , 28 a v r ll 1980 Sem. Jur. 1980 1v p. 263. 
A lso, Cass. com. R. 6 nov. 1978, Sem. Jur. 1979 1v. 24.
ought to apply. The "Cour de cassation" held that because the 
p la in t if f s  were sp e c ia lis ts  1n a d iffe ren t f ie ld ,  they bought as 
"consumers". The exclusion clause was thereby uneffective. Many 
ju r is ts  have roundly condemned th is manner o f dealing with exception 
c l a u s e s . O n  the one hand, to say a firm  o f engineers buys a 
machine as consumers because they are not sp e c ia lis ts  In that f ie ld ,  
is  stretching the meaning of consumer to breaking point. On the 
other hand, 1n such cases, the public In te rest Image of the "Cour 
de cassation 's" Interpretation 1s en tire ly  without any grounds.
Because 1t Is un like ly  that a commercial contract between such 
parties would be an adhesion contract, the need fo r protection Is 
absent.
Many legal scholars think that there should be a d is t in c tio n  
between consumer contracts and commercial contracts In th is respect, 
and that the presumption of "bad fa ith " should only apply In the 
f o r m e r . I n d e e d  some decisions of the "Cour de cassation" have
opened the way fo r such a d is t in c tio n . In one case, a ffa ire  Lerondel
(37)o. Lizzul, '  a garage owner bought a second hand lo rry  from the 
defendant who was a lso a motor dealer. The lo rry  had a hidden defect. 
The judges a t f i r s t  Instance held that the exclusion clause which 3567
35. See espec ia lly , J. B igot, Plaidoyer pour les clauses lim ita t iv e s  
de guarantle e t de responsabilité dans les contrats de vente et 
defournlture entre les professionnel.
36. See J . Bigot note 35 supra; Ph llllp p e  Mallnvand, "Pour on contre 
la  v a lid ité  des clauses lim ita tives  de la  garantie" note 32 supra, 
no 19-22, B. Stark, Observations sur le  régime jurid ique des 
clauses de non-respons*b1 l 1 té on lim ita t iv e s  de responsabilité ',
D. 1974, Chronique XX no. 64-71.
37. Cass, con 8 octobre 1973; D. 1973, som. 152; J.C .P . 1975, 11, 17927 
obs. Ghestin.
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stated that the sale Is "a t the buyer's r isk "  was applicable . The 
"Cour de cassation", In affirm ing the lower court's judgement, said 
that the buyer, a professional person, had bought the lo rry  with the fu l l 
knowledge of the r isks involved. In another case,^38  ^ the "Cour de
H
cassation quashed the decision of a lower court because i t  did 
not enquire whether the buyer was a professional person In the same 
l in e  of business before holding an exclusion clause Inapplicable. 
Furthermore, because the 1978 le g is la t io n  on standard contracts makes 
a c le a r d is t in c tio n  between consumer and commercial contracts, i t  1 s 
reasonable to expect the courts to fo llow  su it.
(c) Transport contracts:
A r t ic le  103 of the "Code de commerce", modified by the " lo i Rabier" 
o f 17th March 1905 expressly prohibited the Inclusion of clauses 
excluding a l l  re sp o n s ib ility  with respect to the loss or damage of 
goods, and a fo rtio ri, personal In jury. L im itation  clauses on the 
other hand are allowed subject to the overrid ing provision that there 
1 s no deceit (Including misrepresentation) In the formation of the 
contract, nor an in tentiona l fa u lt  (faute dolosive) In the performance 
o f the contract. In th is  case however, a serious fa u lt  Is not enough 
to preclude the app lica tion  of a lim ita t io n  clause. That was the 
position  taken by the "Cour de cassation" 1n 1932. 3^9  ^ In th is area,
38. Cass. com. 18 j u i l l e t  1975, D.R.P.C. Lemarchand, inéd it.
39. See C iv. 3 a<fut 1932, 0. 1933 1. 49 note Josserand. A more 
recent decision has taken the same position . Com. 26 ju in  1972,
D. 1972 607. B u ll.  C1v. 1v no. 204.
there are numerous m in is te ria l orders which f ix  the minimum amount any 
lim ita t io n  clause may stipu la te .
The problem that often a rises concerns cases where the amount 
provided fo r by the lim ita t io n  clause or a m in is te ria l order is  derisory 
1n conparison with the actual damage suffered by the Innocent party. 
Before 1950, the courts held that,because the law o f 1905 was designed 
to pro tect users o f conmercial transport from unfa ir practices by 
the operators, such a clause should be treated l ik e  an exclusion 
clause and declared a n u ll it y .
This manner o f Interpreting lim ita t io n  clauses was changed by the 
(411
"Cour de cassation" 1n 1951.' '  In that case, a c a rr ie r lo s t clothes
belonging to the p la in t if f .  A m in is te ria l order had fixed minimum 
compensation In the event o f damage or loss o f the goods which in the 
Instant case was fixed  at 140 francs. The ca rr ie r , who had a lim ita tion  
clause 1n h is contract, offered to pay th is  amount. The lower court 
held that the amount was too small in comparison with the actual loss 
and refused to apply the clause.
The "Cour de cassation" overruled thè lower court. Their ground 
fo r doing so was that the consignor had a choice between declaring 
the value o f the goods and entering Into a special contract with the 
c a r r ie r ,  or sending the goods without declaring the ir value in which 
case he was bound by the lim ita t io n  clause. The consignor had chosen 
the la t te r ;  hence he was bound by the clause. The "Cour de cassation" 401
40. Rodare: "La v a lid ité  des clauses lim ita t iv e s  de responsabilité
dans les transports terrestres'! D. 1955, Chronique xxl p. 123;
See C1v. 12 j u i l l e t  1923 D.P. 1926, 1.229 Paris , 3 mal 1949,
D. 1950 283, Colmar 24 nov. 1950, 0. 1951, 150.
41. Corn. 4 j u i l l e t  1951, Bu ll transport 1951, 559.
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f e l t  that 1n the former case, the contract price would be much 
higher than in  the la t te r  case. The r isk  of receiving much reduced 
compensation was,the court sa id , the price paid fo r the lower contract 
price the consignor paid.
The pos ition  therefore seems to be that 1n dealing with a 
lim ita t io n  clause 1 n a carriage o f goods (by land) contract, two s i t ­
uations must be distinguished.^42  ^ Where the ca rr ie r gave the consignor 
the opportunity to choose between contracting on a special contract 
basis or on a lim ited l i a b i l i t y  basis, the clause app lies, Irrespective 
o f the smallness of the compensation 1t s t ipu la te s . I f  on the other 
hand no a lte rna tive  1 s given (as 1 s the case In the great majority 
of standard contracts), then 1 f  the compensation Imposed by the 
clause 1s deriso ry , the clause w i l l  be treated as an exclusion clause 
and denied a l l  va lld lty .^ 43^
The bailment of goods with Innkeepers or hotel proprietors:
French law has been, 1n comparison with English law, a lo t  more 
severe on Innkeepers. A r t ic le  1953 o f the C iv il  Code, amended by 
Law No. 73-1141 o f Dec. 24th 1973, a r t ic le  2 states that: "They 
[Innkeepers and hotel p roprietors] are responsible fo r theft or damage 
to such e ffec ts  [c lo thes, baggage e tc j whether the theft was committed 
or the damage was caused by the ir domestics and employees or by strangers 
going In and coming Into the hotel.
42. R od lire , note 42: supra, p. 126. Starck, note 15, supra at 
51 and 52.
43. Whether a sum Is derisory or not 1s determined ob je ctive ly ,
1 .e. I t  1s compared to the value a reasonable ca rr ie r  would 
put on the goods.
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"Such re sp on s ib ility  Is unlim ited, notwithstanding any clause to 
the contrary, 1n case of theft or deterioration of objects of any nature 
deposited in  th e ir hands or which they refused to receive without 
leg itim ate reason."
"In a l l  other cases, damages due the tra ve lle r are, to the exclusion 
o f any agreed lower lim ita t io n , lim ited  to the equivalent o f 100 times 
the price of rental of lodging per day, except when the trave lle r 
demonstrates that the harm which he suffered resulted from a fau lt 
of him who sheltered him or o f persons fo r whom the la t te r  Is 
responsible."
This new formulation o f a r t ic le  1953 Is self-explanatory. The 
French le g is la to r  has made 1t v ir tu a lly  Impossible to opt out of the 
legal l i a b i l i t y  Imposed on Innkeepers and hotel proprietors. Even 
before the le g is la to r  Intervened, the French courts made 1t extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  fo r any exclusion or lim ita tion  clause to apply.
I t  Is very c lea r that 1n the end, EngTIsh and French law have 
t ra d it io n a lly  sought to protect.adhering parties from the harsh terms 
Inserted by the business conmunlty In the ir standard contracts. English 
law has not,always c le a r ly  stated Its  premises, hence I t  has opted for 
devices such as the doctrine of fundamental breach or other Interpretative 
devices and the re su lt has been that there has not been a d is t in c tion  
between purely consumer transactions and commercial ones, a d is tin c tion  
which Is fundamental to the Issues Involved.
44. See fo r example, Tr1b. c iv . S ilne 4 Janvier 1930. Gaz. Pal. 1930,
1 536; T rlb . Inst. Cannes 12 J u l l le t  1963.
French law has been more undisguised 1n it s  approach, which has 
led to a greater degree of consistency 1n the courts. Furthermore, 
there has been more le g is la t iv e  Intervention In th is area.
D: Penalties and Forfe itures:
Businessmen have not lim ited  themselves to exclusion and lim ita tion  
terms 1n th e ir desire to s h if t  most contractual r isk s  on the persons 
who deal with them. Penalty and fo rfe itu re  clauses are designed to 
fo re s ta ll the problem of assessment of damages In the event of a 
breach of contract by one of the parties. With the growth of h ire 
purchase transactions penalty and fo rfe itu re  clauses are now a major 
means by which parties with superior bargaining power have exploited 
such power to drive hard bargains 1n the ir standard forms.
I The Position 1n English Law
*
For centuries, the courts have tra d it io n a lly  exercised control 
(45)
over these c lauses.' '  Their approach has been to d is tingu ish  between 
penalties and Hqu Ida ted damages. A penalty clause Is one which 
attempts to enforce performance o f the contract by providing for 
"a payment o f money stipu lated as In terrorem o f the offending party".
A liqu idated damages clause on the other hand "Is a genuine attempt 
by the parties to estimate 1n advance the loss which w i l l  re su lt from 456
45. Swan & Re ite r, Contracts. Casest Notes A M ateria ls. (Butterworths, 
Toronto, 1978), 6-117.
46. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd, v. New Garage. [1915] A.C. 79.
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the breach.' ' The courts have not however been consistent in stating
the basis o f th is  d is t in c tio n .* 47 8 49*
The modern law on th is  subject was stated by the House of Lords
(49)in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage Motor Co. Ltd.
The appellants in  th is  case entered Into a contract with the respondents 
in  which the la t te r  agreed to se ll the appellants' motor-tyre covers 
and tubes and also bound themselves by a clause not to s e l l to th ird 
parties a t less than the current 1 1 s t  price Issued by the appellants.
Clause 5 o f the agreement was as fo llow s: "We agree to pay Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd. the sum o f £5 fo r each and every tyre, 
cover or tube sold or offered 1n breach of th is agreement, as 
by way o f liqu idated damages and not as a penalty". The respondents,
1n breach o f contract, sold Items a t  under the current 1 1 s t  price.
The House of Lords, reversing the Court o f Appeal, held that the clause 
was not a penalty. Lord Dunedin formulated four ru les o f construction 
fo r the purpose of d istingu ishing a liquidated damages clause from a 
penalty clause. The mere use of the words "liqu idated damges" or 
"penalty" was Inconclusive and I t  was fo r the court to find  out the 
real Intent o f the parties by construing the contract as a whole.
He sa id:*50*
a " I t  w i l l  be held to be penalty 1 f the sum stipu lated  fo r Is extravagant 
and unconscionable In amount In comparison with the greatest loss that 
w il l  conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach".
47. T re lte l,  note 11, supra, p. 736.
4B. See Legh v. L il le e  [1860] 6H & H. 165. W a llis  v. Smith. 21 Ch. D.243.
49. [1915] A.C. 79.
50. Note 51 supra a t pp. 87-88.
(47)
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b " I t  w ill be held to be a penalty 1f the breach consists only In paying 
a sum of money, and the sum stipu lated Is a sum greater than the sum 
which ought to have been paid".
c "There 1s a presumption (but no more) that 1t Is a penalty when a 
single lump sum 1 s made payable by way o f compensation, on the 
occurrence of one o r more or a l l  of several events, some of which may 
occasion serious and others but t r i f l in g  damage", 
d " I t  Is no obstacle to the sum stipu lated  being a genuine pre-estimate 
of damage, that the consequence of the breach are such as to make precise 
pre-estimation almost an Im poss ib ility . On the contrary, that is  ju s t 
the s ituation when 1 t  1 s probable that pre-est1mated damage was the 
bargain between the partie s".
In the Instant case, the House of Lords f e l t  that not only was the 
stipulated sum not extravagant, but a lso  that the precise damage caused 
by the breach of the price maintenance agreement was uncertain. I t  was 
therefore most l ik e ly  that the clause was intended as a liqu idated 
damages clause.
(51)In the Suieee Atlantique aaee, 1 one of the grounds of appeal 
was that the clause which Imposed damage payments o f £1000 per day was 
a penalty clause which ought therefore to be excluded from the contract. 
The House of Lords held that I t  was a liqu idated damages clause, no 
doubt because the amount was even less than the amount which an ordinary
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assessment of damage would have awarded. Hence, the clause was not
( 52)designed to act in  terrorem . '
In the Canadian case o f U.F. Clarke Ltd. v Thermidaire Corp. Ltd.
no fixed sum was stipulated to be paid by the company 1n breach. The
clause provided that an amount equivalent to the gross p ro fits  of a
company was payable as liqu idated damages. This amount proved to be
ex orb ltan t and the Supreme Court of Canada held that the clause was
a penalty, and not a liqu idated damages clause.
Forfe iture clauses have s im ila r objects to penalty clauses, 1.e.
essen tia lly  to enforce the performance of the contract. In th is case,
a deposit 1s paid on the understanding that goods or deposit w il l  be
seized 1 f  the purchaser, h ire r o r other does not complete the contract,
or 1f he breaches any of the terms. Forfe iture clauses are especia lly
(54)
common 1n hire-purchase con tra c ts .' '
(55)In South Bedfordshire E le c t r ic a l  Finance Ltd. v. Bryant, ' there 
was a hire-purchase agreement 1n respect o f a cold-room. On the h ire r 
fa ll in g  Into arrears tilth  h is payments, the owners obtained judgement 
for the amount due to them; but when the judgement-debt was not sa t is f ie d , 
they sued for possession. The Court of Appeal held that they were 
en tit led  to possession since the f i r s t  action, being fo r Instalments due, 
did not transfer the property 1n the cold room to the h ire r. Greer L .J . 5234
52. Ce llu lose Acetate S ilk  Co. Ltd, v. Mldnes Foundry [1926] Ltd . [1933]
A.C. 20
53. [1974] 54 O.L.R (3d) 385.
54. The common law position has been substan tia lly  changed by 
Statute; fo r example, the H ire Purchase Act 1965.
55. [1938] 3 A l l E.R. 580.
(53)
s a id / 55) "This 1s an unfortunate case, and i f  we were en tit led  to 
exercise our judgement by reason of our sympathies with the unfortunate 
defendant, who may have to pay, or have judgement given against him 
fo r the fu l l amount of a l l  Instalments, and at the same time is  
ca lled  upon to return the goods . . .  we might think there was a great 
deal to be said fo r the unfortunate defendant. Having become lia b le  
to pay under a judgement everyone o f the Instalments provided for 1n 
the contract, he 1s now asked to de live r up the goods to which, I f  he 
had e ffe c tua lly  paid a l l  the money, provided for by the agreement, he 
would have become en tit led  as the owner. Unfortunately however, we 
have merely to consider the agreement between the parties having 
regard to the fac ts  that were before the judge." This passage is  
worth quoting because 1 t  1 s demonstrative of the harshness o f certain 
fo rfe itu re  clauses and a lso  o f the helplessness of the judges in dealing 
with 1 t squarely, because o f trad it iona l legal views 1n th is  connection.
However, le ss  than twenty years la t e r / * 57) Denning L .J . (as he 
then was), and Sommervell L .J . said that 1n such circumstances (as 
above), there 1 s an equity o f re s t itu t io n  1n favour o f the party in 
breach which could enable him to recover his deposit. They maintained 
that th is  depends on whether I t  1s unconscionable to allow the other 
party to keep the deposit. I f  a court can Intervene and Invalidate a 
fo rfe itu re  clause In a hire-purchase contract where there 1 s only an 
option to purchase, then 1 t  can, a fo r t io r i ,  do the same In a contract 
o f sale.
5b, note 57 supra a t p. 581.
57. Stocklosser v. Johnson [1954] 1 q.B. 478
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II The Position  in French Law:
Whereas English law has for a long time made a d is t in c tio n , at le a s t 
in theory, between a clause Imposed In terròrem against one of the con­
tracting pa rtie s , and a liquidated damages clause; French law treated 
a l l clauses which Imposed any sum o f money to be payable or fo rfe ited  
on breach by one o f the parties on the same footing, 1 .e. they were 
va lid . Their v a lid ity  was entrenched by a r t ic le  1152 of the C iv il 
Code of 1804 which stated that "When an agreement provides that he who 
fa l ls  to execute 1 t  sha ll pay a sum ce rta in  by way of damages there may 
not be awarded to the other party a greater or lesser sum." At the time 
the C iv il  Code was elaborated, that position taken by a r t ic le  1152 
was novel because before then the weight o f opinion among French 
ju r is ts  was that judges could Intervene and reduce the so-called 
liquidated damages 1 f  they were 1 n re a lity  penalties which were 
manifestly over and above what was required to Indemnify the cred ito r 
1n the event o f a breach by the debtor. This view was p a rticu la r ly  
upheld by Poth ler. Pothler thought that the penalty clause ("clause 
pedale"), 1 s Inserted In contracts so that the cred ito r might be 
adequately compensated 1 n the event of non-performance;^58 59^ a view 
endorsed by a r t ic le  1229 of the C1v11 Code. Pothler therefore 
reasoned that I f  the damage suffered was less than what the penalty 
clause s tipu la ted , the judge had to Intervene and reduce the la t te r .
I f  a promisor consented to a penalty clause which was c le a r ly  In 
excess o f the real damage, Pothler f e l t  that such consent was given 
1n e rro r, and therefore Invalid .
58. Poth ler, Traite' des Obligations, rééd. Pa ris , 1813, t  1 no. 346.
59. Jean Thllmany: "Fonctions e t R é v ls lb llIte' des Clauses Pénales
en D ro it Conpare", Rev. Int. de d t comparé, 1980 p. 17 at p. 19.
-174-
The C iv il Code however took a d iffe ren t view and denied judges 
the power to review penalty clauses because e ffe c t  had to be given 
to the agreement reached by the parties to the contract In accordance 
with the then preva iling  p rin c ip le  of "Autonomie de la volonté'. 
Furthermore, the French leg is la tu re  did not at that time, tru st the 
magistracy enough to confer upon them the task of con tro lling  contracts 
p riva te ly  made.
I f  th is  approach to the problem of penalty clauses was necessary 
a t the time, i t s  weaknesses^or rather Its fa ilu re s , soon became 
apparent as from the beginning o f the twentieth century. Standard 
form contracts gave the opportunity fo r businessmen to Insert draconian 
penalty clauses,w ith the knowledge that few, 1 f  any,persons would 
pay any pa rticu la r attention to such clauses, espec ia lly  In c red it 
contracts and hire-purchase transactions. Indeed, penalty clauses 
become what one commentator has described as: "l'Instrum ent de tyrannie 
des groupes e t des puissances financières en mesure the m obiliser et 
meme de monopoliser toutes les resources d'un system ju rid ique".
In the face o f th is  contractual terrorism , f i r s t  Instance judges 
na tu ra lly  sought fo r ways to avoid the harshness of the ru le  In 
a r t ic le  1152 o f the C iv il  Code. The f i r s t  means by which they attempted 
to do th is  was by applying a r t ic le  1231 which stated that: "When the 
engagement has been executed In part, the agreed penalty must be 
diminished by the judge 1n proportion to the Interest which the pa rtia l 
execution procured for the c red ito r, without prejudice to the application 601
60. Fenet, Receuil complet des travaux pre*parato1res du Code c iv i l ,
Paris 1827-28, t  x l l l ,  procès vertaux de la  séance du 11 bumalre
an x11, p. 57.
61. Cornu G. obs. Revue. Trim estriè lle de D ro it C iv i l ,  1971, p. 167.
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of a r t ic le  1152“ .
This attempt at avoiding the harshness of a rt. 1152 did not find
favour with e ither the lega l scholars nor th e 'Cour de cassation*who thought
that 1n many Instances, there could not be any p a rtia l performance.^6^
The “ Cour de cassation" always found that the parties to the contract
(63)did not contemplate the p o s s ib il it y  of part performance/ ' hence 
a r t ic le  1231 was Inapplicable 1n most cases. Secondly, a r t ic le  1231 
could be excluded by the parties to the contract. I t  was not necessary 
to exclude 1 t  s p e c if ic a lly  fo r any clause which provided that the 
penalty was payable "pro-rata" to the extent of part-performanee was 
construed as excluding the p o s s ib il ity  o f ju d ic ia l review o f the 
contract. 6^*^  The scope o f  a r t ic le  1231 was thereby extremely lim ited .
Other attempts were made to circumvent the e ffe c t o f a r t ic le  1152. 
These attempts were qu ick ly  s t if le d  by the “ Cour de cassation 1 because 
they went against the p r in c ip le  la id  down by the le g is la to r  1 n a r t ic le  
1102 o f the C iv il Code.^62 345  ^ The concept o f natural ju s tic e  and fairness 
was raised 1n some cases. The absence o f "Cause", and the 
concept o f abuse of r igh ts  were also used without success.^66  ^ Judges 
could only succeed 1n avoiding penalty clauses where such clauses were
62. Monsieur Bey, "Les Aspets Juridiques de la  Convention de C réd it-Ba il 
m ob ilier", L.C.P. éd C .I. 1-28 adU  1969, 86634. See Câss. corn.
14 a v r il 1972 J.C .P . ed. CI 6 ju in  1974 11407.
63. Jean Thllmany, not 61 supra at p. 28.
64. See Bruno Boccara, "La Réforme de la  Clause Pé'nale: Conditions et 
Lim ites de l'In te rven tion  Ju d ic ia ire " , Semaine Juridique 1975, 1,
2742 Ho. 3.
65. See Cass. 23 mal 1940, D.S. 1940 pp. 161-162; Cass. 21 octobre 1974,
D.S. 1972 p. 782; V.E. A lfandarl, "Le Control des Clauses pénales 
par le  Juge", J . C.P. 1971, I. 2395.
designed to circumvent usury laws.^6^ This la s t  option had a very 
re s tr ic ted  la titude  because I t  was only applicable in purely nonetary 
loan contracts. I t  did not extend to hire-purchase or other contracts.
Because the courts could do very l i t t l e ,  I f  anything, to lessen the 
in equa lit ie s  of penalty clauses, there were clamours p a rt ic u la r ly  by 
consumer associations and legal scholars fo r the leg is la tu re  to act.
In 1975, the war of a t t r it io n  against penalty clauses by ju r is ts  
ended 1n reforms enshrined . 1n the Law of 9th Ju ly 1975 [Loi No. 75-597 
du 9 j u i l l e t  1975]^6^ , which modified a r t ic le s  1152 and 1231 of the 
C1v11 Code on penalty clauses. A r t ic le  1 o f the new law, which 
complemented the o r ig in a l a r t ic le  1152, states that: "Nevertheless, 
the judge may moderate or Increase the penalty which had been agreed,
1f I t  1s manifestly excessive or p i t i f u l .  Any contrary stipu la tion  
w il l be considered not w ritten". A r t ic le  2 of the new Law also adds:
"Any contrary stipulations w il l be considered not w ritten ", to a r t ic le  
1231 o f  the C iv il Code.
In view o f the fa c t that a r t ic le  1152, as mod1f1ed,has now given 
the judges powers to Intervene and modify manifestly excessive or 
p it i f u l  clauses, a r t ic le  1231 Is no longer o f much relevance. However, 
while the new a r t ic le  1152 requires the penalty to be manifestly excessive
67. Tr1b.corr.de Dunkerque, 25 janv. 1963; D. 1963, Som. 76; Tr1b. com. 
Sdlne, 24 oct. 1967: L.C.P. 68, 11 15450.
68. T .L . Evade "La reduction des clauses p^nale excesslves", Gaz.
P a l. 1976, doctrine, p. 450.
69. See Carbonnler, note 16 supra a t no. 79; Cornu,, note 63 supra; 
A lafandrl note 67 supra. Lo1 No. 75-597 du 9 j u l l l e t  1975,
L.C .P . 1975, III 43664.
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or p i t i f u l ,  th is  Is not a requirement of a r t ic le  1231. A ll that Is 
required 1 n th is  case Is part performance.
The question has been asked whether the new laws empty penalty 
clauses o f the ir conmlnatory e ffec t. Boccara thinks not for
the follow ing reasons: F ir s t  o f a l l ,  because the penalty has to be 
manifestly excessive, Boccara thinks that penalty clauses s t i l l  have 
a deterrent e ffe c t. Hence, 1n reviewing penalty clauses, judges must 
s t i l l  maintain a considerable d ifference between the amount of the 
penalty clause and the actual damage Incurred. This contention is  
d i f f i c u l t  to appreciate I f ,  as 1 t  were, the new le g is la to r 's  target 
was the e lim ination of unfairness by the business coronunlty v is -à -v is  
the consumer population. Indeed that contention 1s not borne out 
by the cases decided subsequent to the new le g is la t io n .
A case study of cases on penalty clauses brought w ith in the 
f i r s t  f ifte e n  months of the new law ^ 1  ^ show that 109 cases were brought 
1n the High Court o f Paris ('Cour de P a r is ') .  This fa c t, l .e .  that 
only 109 cases were brought In th is  connection,allayed fears that the 
courts were going to be Innundated w ith pleas to review the clauses 
by consumers. Of these 109 cases, a l l  o f which were brought fo r the 
reduction o f the penalty, the courts declined to reduce the penalty 
1n only 26 cases. Hence 1n more than 75 per cent o f the cases, the 
amount was reduced. Among the 83 cases 1n which there were reductions, 
the reduction was by a t least h a lf o f the amount stipulated 1 n the 
penalty clause. *2
70. Boccara, note 64 supra, no. 2.
71. Nectoux: "La Revision Jud ic la re  desclauses P^nales", J.C .P. 1978.
2. 2913.
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Nectoux fu rther found that the type of contracts which the leg is la tu re
desired to a ffe c t most, hire-purchase and other h ire contracts were in
the lead 1n numbers, o f a l l  the cases which were adjudicated upon and
in which the court reduced the penalty. Most o f the cases were founded
upon a r t ic le  1152 and not 1231. The c r ite r ia  on which the judges
based th e ir reductions were various. Prominent among them were the
actual damage Incurred by the promisee;1n h ire  contracts, the
residual value of the goods h ired; the p o s s ib il it ie s  open to the
promisee In getting a new contract. Judges have made overt references
to p rin c ip les  of equity and good fa ith . The Cour de cassation has
held that In modifying a penalty clause, the judge must Indicate by
(72)
how much the clause 1s manifestly excessive or p i t i f u l .  v ' Although 
a judge must not necessarily  l im it  the penalty clause to the actual 
damage Incurred, th is  1s a c r ite r io n  which 1 s pa rt icu la r ly  taken Into 
consideration; e spec ia lly  1 n consumer contracts.
This new French law approach, 1t Is humbly submitted Is highly 
commendable. I t  makes 1t unnecessary to draw the often very tenuous 
d is t in c t io n  between penalty and liquidated damages clauses as In English 
law and Instead, seeks to reduce the amount stipulated I f  and when It 
1 s considered to be excessive; conversely, to Increase I t  1 f  1 t  Is 
adjudged to be p i t i f u l .
72. Cass. c1v 3eR. 17 Janvier 1979, J.C .P. 1979 IV 98»
Conclusion:
The above discussion has attempted to demonstrate the ways by 
which English and French courts have grappled with the problems of 
standardized contracts. Certain doctrines are common to both. They 
have both fashioned s t r ic t  ru les In connection with the Incorporation 
o f terms Into contracts, the French ru les being much s t r ic t e r  than 
the ir English counterpart.
The English doctrine of fundamental breach which was fo r decades, 
the most Important " to o l" , 1n addition to s t r ic t  construction, for 
con tro lling  un fa ir exclusion or lim ita t io n  clauses has been riddled 
with inconsistencies as the cases have shown. The French law concepts 
o f "faute lourde" and "faute doloslve" have been the p rin c ip a l tools 
for Invalidating un fa ir exclusion and lim ita t io n  clauses. On the 
whole, th e ir app lica tions, espec ia lly  with regard to sale o f goods 
contracts and transport contracts, have been much more consistent than 
the app lica tion  of the doctrine of fundamental breach 1n the English 
courts. Nevertheless, l ik e  the la t te r ,  they have proved r ig id ,  and 
consequently, th e ir app lica tion  has extended to contracts which are 
not by any means un fa ir.
The fa ilu re  by both'the French and English courts to state 
ca tegorica lly  th e ir  reasons fo r Intervention Is a ttr ibu tab le  to the 
fact that U p  service Is at lea st being paid to the c la s s ic a l paradigm 
of contract which as Chapter Two demonstrated, no longer holds sway.
73. See Cass. com. C. p a r t le lle ,  28 a v r ll 1980, Sem. Jus. 1980, 
IV. 263.Harbutt's P la s t ic in e  v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] npr; 447.------ --------- e-----
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The next chapter w il l  examine to what extent the Cameroonian courts, 
whose contract law 1s bas ica lly  derived from French and English law, 
have also dealt with the problem of standardized contracts.
The view w il l be put forward 1n Chapter Five, that the notion of 
"unconsc1onab1Hty" provides the most sa tis facto ry  basis for In te r­
vening 1n contracts. Unless the unconscionable aspect of standardized 
contracts 1s given e x p lic it  recognition by the courts, the ir treatment 
w il l  continue to be plagued by uncerta inties and Inconsistencies.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
THE JUDICAL TREATMENT OF STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS IN CAMEROON
It has already been pointed out in  the introductory chapter on 
the legal framework of Cameroon that the law of contract in  Cameroon 
is  derived from French and English law and also that there is  a dearth 
o f local le g is la t io n  in  th is  area of the law. The purpose of this 
chapter is  to see how the Cameroonian courts have dealt with standardized 
contracts, with pa rt icu la r emphasis on how and to what extent they have 
taken into consideration the economic and socia l conditions that ex is t 
in  the country.
Section I: P a rt icu la r Problems A ris ing in  Cameroon:
Standardized contracts, i t  has been seen, are a sp in -o ff of the 
growth of large scale enterprises and the dpsurge in "consumption". In 
th is  l ig h t ,  some may cast doubts on the idea of discussing standardized 
contracts w ith in  the context of a developing country such as Cameroon. 
The point has however been made that "consumption patterns" in  Cameroon 
d if fe rs  from those in  any developed country merely in  sca le , and not in 
e ssen ce .^  Standardized contracts are therefore as much a re a lity  in 
Cameroon as they are in  France fo r example. Indeed, the problems posed 
by standardized contracts come across much more sta rk ly  In Cameroon 
than they do 1n any developed country 1n as much as the ir existence, 1
1. The fo llow ing analysis is  based on f ie ld  research work carried out
by the w rite r between January and August, 1981.
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which is  la rge ly  due to a change in the nature of contract, has not 
been matched by a s im ila r  change with respect to other socia l re a lit ie s .
Before embarking on a study of the ju d ic ia l treatment of these 
contracts, one further point ought to be made. Such a study is  severely 
handicapped by the to ta l absence of any proper law reporting in Cameroon. 
This factor renders any comprehensive review of the decisions of the 
courts an uph ill task. This is  fu rther complicated by the fact that 
there are seven Courts o f Appeal in  the country at the moment, five in 
the French Law ju r is d ic t io n s , i.e .  the French speaking part of the 
country, and two in  the common law ju r is d ic t io n , i .e .  the English 
speaking provinces o f the country. This fa c to r, coupled with the fact 
that there is  no s t r ic t  adherence to precedent in  Cameroon makes i t  
d i f f ic u l t ,  to say the le a st, to determine exactly what the courts w ill 
decide in any given case.
*
A: The problem of I l l i t e r a c y :
I l l ite ra c y  is  a problem which a ffe cts  nearly eighty per cent of 
Cameroonians. Because more often than not, standardized contracts are 
In w ritten form, i l l i t e r a t e  persons are evidently prejudiced. This 
problem is  not pecu lia r to Cameroon and i t  is  prevalent In most of A fr ic a . 
However, unlike many other A frican c o u n tr ie s ,^  Cameroonian courts 
have demonstrated an acute lack o f s e n s it iv ity  in  th is respect: no 2
2. See E .I. Nwogugu,"An Examination o f the Position of I ll ite ra te s  
1n Nigerian Law." 1968-69 Journal o f A frican Law, p. 32. Also,
S.K. D a te -Bah ,"Illite ra te  Parties and Written Contracts," 3 Review 
of Ghana Law (1971), p. 181.
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le g is la t io n  fo r the protection of i l l it e r a te s  ex ists in  Cameroon and 
as the cases w ill show, considerable risks of the misrepresentation of 
standardized terms to i l l i t e r a t e  contracting parties ex ist.
In French law, there are no provisions to deal with such a s itua tion .
(3)In English law, the case of Thompson t>. L.M. & S. Railway Co. is  
often c ited as authority fo r the proposition that an i l l i t e r a t e  person is 
bound by a w ritten contractual document. This case, however, dealt 
only with the app lica tion  of an exclusion clause. In that case, the 
p la in t i f f ,  an i l l i t e r a t e  lady, bought a railway excursion t ic k e t, a 
condition of which referred to the company's timetables and notices which 
excluded l ia b i l i t y  in  respect of any in jury to the p la in t if f ,  however 
caused. The p la in t if f  pleaded her i l l i t e r a c y  at the t r ia l but the Court 
of Appeal held that i t  was immaterial and did not a ffe c t the legal 
consequences of the exemption clause.
(4)In the Cameroonian case of D irec t Suppliers Co. Ltd. v. Daiw Kilu, ' 
the appellants were dealers in  agriculturaT produce and the respondent, 
an i l l i t e r a t e  farmer.- The la t te r  supplied the former with a quantity of 
co ffee, worth about £200 and was. issued with a prin ted rece ipt in  standard 
form. One pf the clauses appearing on the rece ipt was an acknowledgment 
that the price fo r any produce supplied had been paid . The respondent 
was made to thumb-print a duplicate copy o f the rece ip t with a representation 
by the respondent's agent that the rece ipt would be withdrawn when payment 
fo r the coffee was made. In an action fo r the p r ic e , the appellant 
contended that the rece ipt was clear evidence that payment had been made. 34
3. [1930] 1 K.B. 41.
4. C1v. Appeal No. BCA/23/74 of 28th Nov. 1974, Court of Appeal,
Bamenda (unreported).
The High Court of Bamenda (in the English speaking part of the country) 
held that the contents of the rece ip t had been misrepresented to the 
p la in t i f f  who was therefore not bound by the afore-mentioned clause.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal o f Bamenda. By 
deciding the case on the grounds o f misrepresentation, the Bamenda Court 
o f Appeal shirked the re sp on s ib ility  of determining what measure of 
protection the courts ought to g ive to i l l i t e r a t e s  in such circumstances.
(51In another case however, Ukpai Meeka v. AGIP (Cameroon), S . A ' the 
s itua tion  was d iffe ren t. In that case, the p la in t i f f  was an i l l i t e r a t e  
person who ran a small re ta il business. The defendants were d is tribu to rs  
o f petroleum products. In 1967, they entered into a standardized contract 
whereby the p la in t if f  would operate and manage the defendant's f i l l in g  
sta tion . A rt ic le s  5(1) and (2) o f the contract stipulated that the 
dealer, i .e .  the p la in t if f ,  would run the business with products 
exc lu s ive ly  supplied by the defendants and would pay cash for such products. 
A r t ic le  6 provided that the p la in t i f f  would pay two hundred thousand francs 
as a refundable guarantee.' P la in t i f f  made an in it ia l  order of five  hundred 
thousand CFA francs(about one thousand pounds) worth of products. A fter 
subsequent dealings, the p la in t i f f  brought an action claiming that he had 
erroneously paid the sum of f iv e  hundred thousand francs Into the 
defendant's account which the defendants refused to refund. At the t r ia l ,  
a fte r reviewing the facts and evidence of the case, the judge in g iving 
judgment fo r the defendants, sa id  apo logetica lly : " I t  would seem that the 
p la in t if f  has a l l along been under a te r r ib le  misapprehension as to his 5
5. Su it No. HCSW/56/74, High Court, Buea (unreported).
dealings with the defendant in regard to the in i t ia l  order which he has 
placed. The p la in t i f f  is  I l l i t e r a te  and th is unfortunate condition is  
without doubt the cause of h is misapprehension."
Hence, in  sp ite  of the judge's avowal that i l l i t e r a c y  was the cause 
of the p la in t i f f 's  misapprehension of the contractual terms, there was 
no question, barring fraud or misrepresentation, o f giving him any 
r e l ie f  whatsoever.
Related to the problem of i l l i t e r a c y  is  that o f entering into a 
contract w ritten  in  a language a lien  to a contracting party, a problem 
which recurs constantly in  as much as there are two o f f ic ia l languages in 
Cameroon; French and English. An example of th is  s itua tion  is  the case 
o f Olabi Fayez v. Cie. Industrielle d'Automobile du Cameroun. ^  The 
p la in t if f  entered into a contract with the defendants for the purchase of 
a new car. Having paid about h a lf the cost price o f the car, he was made 
to sign a form printed in  French - a language he could not read - which 
was headed "Demande de Financement d'un Véhicule". The p la in t if f  understood 
th is to be a hire-purchase agreement. In fac t, the form was an application 
fo r a loan to be raised on a Paris ian  bank. The loan could not be raised 
because the bank would not accept the defendants as guarantors. When he 
did not obtain de livery  o f the car, p la in t if f  brought an action against 
the defendants 'for breach of contract. The t r ia l  judge found as a fact 
that the p la in t i f f  e n tire ly  misunderstood the standard form contract 
because i t  was w ritten in  a language he did not understand. Nevertheless, 6
6 . Su it No. HCSW/4/73, High Court, Buea (unreported).
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he went on to hold that that fact was of no moment in deciding the case.
Although s im ila r d if f ic u lt ie s  may also be prevalent in negotiated contracts, 
the absence of d ic k e r in g in  standardized contracts aggravates the problem. 
Peasants who have l i t t l e  understanding of complex transactions are 
p a rt icu la r ly  vulnerable to such d if f ic u lt ie s .  This problem is  not prevalent 
in  England or France (although i t  must be pointed out, the recent in flu x  
o f immigrants, p a rt icu la r ly  from the Indian sub-continent in England, who 
are i l l i t e r a t e  in English points to the fact that th is  may be an emerging 
problem even in these countries). Hence guidance in th is  connection can 
only be had from other African countries with s im ila r problems. In Nigeria 
where there is  le g is la t io n  designed to protect i l l i t e r a t e s ,  the courts 
have taken a more r e a l is t ic  approach to th is  problem. In one old case,
Otegbeye v. L ittle , ^  agents o f the p la in t if f ,  entered into a contract 
with a steamship company for the carriage of h is kola nuts. The contract 
contained an exemption clause. In an action fo r the loss of h is goods, 
the defendants pleaded the exemption clause! The court, however, found 
that the agents o f the-p la1ntiff. were i l l i t e r a t e s ,  who could not read the 
rece ipt. The court held, therefore, that the defendants "had in th is  
country [not] done a l l  that they could reasonably be expected to do" to 
bring the exemption clause to the notice of the p la in t if f s ' agents.
S im ila r ly , in Ghana, since the Privy Council decision in Kwanin v. K ufuor,^  
where 1t was held that the fact o f a party 's I l l i t e r a c y  should be taken 
into consideration in determining whether a contract should bind that party, 
a number o f decisions have been taken by Ghanaian courts on those l in e s .^  789
7. [1907], I.N.L.R. 70 Cited in  Nwogugu E .I . ,  note (2) supra at p. 46.
8 . [1914] 2 Ren. 808, c ited 1n S.K. Date-Bah, note (2) supra, at p. 185.
9. See also U.T.C.V. Tetteh, [1965], unreported in  Date-Bah, supra, at p. 187.
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In an a r t ic le  on the treatment of exemption clauses by Sudanese 
courts, Zaki Mustapha^10 1^ points out that the Sudanese courts have 
generally been inclined to fo llow  the English decision o f Thmpaon v.
L.M. & S. Railway Co. He however submits that that decision was predicated 
on two grounds. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  he contends that im p lic it  in  the Court of 
Appeal's judgment, there was an assumed business awareness which should 
have led the p la in t if f  to re a lise  that excursion ticke ts  were generally 
accompanied by exclusion clauses. Secondly, the Court o f Appeal took 
into consideration the general standard o f education in England at the 
time o f the decision was given. He contends that those factors should 
also be considered by Sudanese courts in connection with contracts involving 
i l l i t e r a t e s .  Date-Bah for h is  part,^11  ^ submits that the Ghanaian courts 
should apply the p rin c ip le  of good fa ith  in such contracts and inva lidate 
contracts in which an i l l i t e r a t e  party has not had the contractual terms 
explained to him. Concrete proposals in th is  connection w i l l  be reserved 
for a la te r chapter. I t  is,however, obvious that the stance taken by 
Cameroonian courts 1n ¿he above cases is  c le a r ly  inadequate because they 
have merely evaded the problem altogether as 1f i t  did not e x is t. Curiously 
however, the plea of 'non est factum' was not raised in any of these cases. 
While that plea may apply in  certa in  circumstances i t  is  c le a r ly  not 
adequate since 1t is  applicable only when a party is  mistaken as to the 
class and character of a document, and not as to the sp e c if ic  contents of 
the contract.
10. Zaki Mustapha,"Exemption Clauses in  Sudan Courts" 1967. J.A .L. 119 
at 121-135.
11. Date-Bah, note (2) supra, at p .186.
- 1 8 8-
B: The Problem o f Business Awareness:
While the problem of i l l i t e r a c y  is  indeed acute as demonstrated 
above, i t  is  by no means the only major problem. The lack of consciousness 
on the part o f the majority o f Cameroonians with respect p a rt ic u la r ly  to 
consumer issues is  another problem. That th is area of the law constitutes 
an ever growing problem is  incontrovertib le  as a few of the cases sugest. 
However, because most consumers are not conscious of the legal im plications 
of the contracts they enter in to d a ily , the level of l it ig a t io n  concerning 
such contracts is  very low. The reasons fo r th is state of a f fa ir s  are 
manifold. Prominent among them is  the fact that because the claims 
involved in  consumer l it ig a t io n  are more often than not re la t iv e ly  small, 
and also because consumers have to deal with very large companies, often 
para-stata l in s t itu t io n s , there is  an understandable reluctance to resort to 
l it ig a t io n .  This problem is  not pecu lia r to Cameroon. In the words of 
one commentator^12) on th is  subject, " probably the greatest danger posed 
to consumerism in Nigeria 1s that most people are not aware of the dangers 
Involved 1n being indi'ffer*ent..*. "He points out that i t  is  only recently 
that consumer problems have been-considered important.
Section II: Jud ic ia l Treatment o f Spec if ic  Standardized Contracts:
Because standardized contracts cover a wide gamut of contracts, only 
Important types of contracts w il l be examined. These are c red it  and h ire - 
purchase contracts; contracts Involving the sale of ag ricu ltu ra l produce;
12. Kwesi Esslen, "Consumer Protection in Nigeria: The Case for Reform."
Unpublished paper presented at the Annual Law Teachers Conference,
at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 8-11th April 1981,
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sale o f goods and service contracts. One major area, insurance contracts
(131have been omitted because they present pa rticu la r problems.' '
A: Credit Contracts.
Three p rin c ipa l types of c red it contracts can be discerned in
Cameroon which are entered into on the basis o f standardized contracts:
Business c re d it , the bulk of which is  accounted fo r by the commercial
banks and a lso  the Cameroon Development Bank; ag ricu ltu ra l c red it, the
outstanding lender fo r which is  the National Fund for Rural Development
(FONADER), and consumer c red it, fo r which the commercial banks are the 
M41main lende rs .' '
In addition to these princ ipa l lending in s t itu t io n s , there are other 
private lenders whose operations account for a s ig n if ic an t share of the 
overall c re d it  transactions such as cred it unions and private money lenders. 
Some of them, such as the c red it unions come under government regulation.
The majority o f them (ind iv idua l money lenders) cannot however be regulated 
otherwise than by blanket usury"laws. Because o f the short supply of 
cred it in comparison with the ever increasing demand for i t ,  such 
le g is la t io n  is  usually ine ffe ctive  in as much as 1t Is d i f f ic u lt  to 
enforce. Many borrowers, p a rt icu la r ly  1n the ru ra l areas, have no options 
than to resort-to  I lle g a l loan agreements with loan-sharks. Curiously, 
however, hardly any s ig n if ic a n t disputes a r is in g  from such contracts do 
reach the courts. One can only surmise that because of the i l le g a l i t y  of 
these contracts, the parties always find an e x tra - ju d ic ia l means of 
se tt lin g  any disputes that a rise . 134
13. See Fonkam.s.A.: State Regulation of P riva te  Insurance i n Cameroon, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University o f London, 1981.
14. See Chapter One for an outline of these in s t itu t io n s .
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Unfair contract terms o r practices are, however, not lim ited to 
private money lenders as an examination of a few of the standardized 
terms of a few of the recognised lending in s titu t io n s  w il l ind icate.
The law re la ting  to c re d it  contracts in  Cameroon is  essen tia lly  the 
law o f contract as app licab le  in the anglophonic and francophonie provinces. 
The Ordinance No. 73-27 o f 30th August 1973 regulating banking a c t iv it ie s  
in Cameroon deals predominantly with the setting up o f banking in s titu t ion s  
and does not deal with banker and customer re la tionsh ips. I t  is  not 
therefore germaine fo r the present purpose. Hence the general law of 
contract is  what is  app licab le .
The contracts entered in to between the National Fund for Rural 
Development (FONADER) and farmers are p a rt icu la r ly  important not only 
because they a ffect a great number o f persons, but also because of the ir 
impact on the economic development o f the Cameroon - agricu lture being 
the mainstay of Cameroon's economy. The fairness o f some of the ir terms 
must surely be d i s p u t a b l e . A r t i c l e  9(d) o f th e ir General Conditions 
of Contract s tipu la tes*that any-tax, charge or f is c a l duty however a ris ing  
in connection with any c re d it  contract must be borne by the borrower. 
A rt ic le  12 provides that 1 f FONADER 1s compelled to resort to lit ig a t io n  
in connection with any o f Its  c red it contracts, i t  would exact a penalty 
equivalent to f ifteen  per cent of the to ta l amount o f the loan. It is  
noteworthy that th is clause binds the other party irrespective of the 
actual amount of the loan that remains outstanding. Hence, even i f  ninety 
per cent of the loan has been repaid and FONADER brings an action to 15
15. FONADER: Conditions Générales d'Ouverture de Credit du FONADER,
Yaoundé.
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recover the remaining ten per cent, the clause means that fifteen  per 
cent o f the tota l loan w ill be paid as a penalty, i . e.  more than the 
outstanding sum. >
In one case decided in the Yaounde High Court ( i.e .  in  the French- 
speaking j u r i s d i c t i o n ) t h e  in i t ia l  loan granted to the defendant 
was 3,300,000 CFA francs, and the amount repayable, including in te rest, 
was 3,729,565 CFA francs. The defendant defaulted in the repayment of the 
loan and FONADER, the p la in t if f ,  brought an action cla im ing 4,554,536 CFA 
francs which included the fifteen  per cent penalty. The Court gave 
judgment to FONADER fo r that amount even without discussing the v a lid ity  
o f the fifteen  per cent penalty. I t  was seen in the la s t  chapter that 
although the French courts generally refused to in te rfe re  with penalty 
c lauses, since the passing of the Law No. 75-597 of Ju ly 1975, French 
courts are empowered to modify penalty clauses. However, because th is law 
is  not applicable in Cameroon, the courts which follow  the French law 
tra d it io n  do not Interfere with penalty clauses. Such a case has not yet 
come up for adjudication tn English speaking provinces but one can only 
speculate, on the basis o f their'treatment o f fo rfe itu re  clauses in h ire- 
purchase contracts to be discussed la te r, that the re su lt would be the same; 
although English law c le a r ly  draws a d is t in c tion  between a liquidated 
damages clause end a penalty clause, enforcing the former and not the la t te r .
Another clause, a r t ic le  25 o f the same general contract conditions 
reserves to FONADER the righ t to suspend u n ila te ra lly  any cred it contract. 
Such a one-sided r ig h t of withdrawal from a contract could put the other
16. Affaire Mme. Edoa Marie, 27 Nov. 1980, Trlb. de l^re Instance
Yaounde* (unreported).
- 1 92-
party in  a quandary and i t  is  submitted that i t  ought not to be validated 
by the courts. When, in an interview with the D irector o f Credit (in 
June 1981), I put i t  to him that those clauses were overtly very onerous 
on the company's customers, he replied that such measures were necessary 
in order to deter most borrowers from breaching th e ir  contracts, p a rt icu la r ly  
with regard to the non-repayment of loans.
One aspect o f FONADER'S standardized contract that has often been 
challenged in the courts is  th e ir guarantee clause. The clause provides 
that the surety w i l l  be bound to pay FONADER any sum that the p rin c ipa l 
debtor fa i ls  to pay however such defau lt.
In a ffa ire  Ebownbou MoudomP^ a case decided inthe French-speaking part of 
the country, the borrower defaulted in  the payment of part of the loan.
A fter receiving judgment for the debt, FONADER immediately proceeded to 
impound the surety 's goods in order to sa t is fy  the debt, whereupon the 
surety brought th is  action against FONADER, contending that because h is  
l i a b i l i t y  was secondary, FONADER had to seize the debtor's goods before h is. 
The Yaounde High Court found for the p la in t if f ,  holding that only when a 
seizure of the debtor's goods could not sa t is fy  the debt should FONADER 
proceed to seize the surety 's goods as w e ll.
Because o f th is judgment, o f f ic ia ls  of FONADER are seeking to modify 
th e ir  standard terms so as to give themselves the righ t to seize a 
defaulting debtor's goods or those o f h is sureties even without obtaining 
a court order to that e ffe c t. Such a term is  already inserted in the 
standard contract form of the Cameroon Development Bank. The la t te r
17. Trib. de Grande Instance, YAOUNDE, 1980 (unreported).
-193-
possesses Its  own agents who, on defau lt by any o f it s  debtors in repaying 
a loan, simply seize the debtor's goods or those o f his surety in order to 
sa t is fy  the debt. Although the Bank asserts that th is  term is  designed to 
fa c i l i t a te  debt recovery, i t  is  submitted that i t  is  too oppressive to 
be allowed to stand. What the term in e ffe c t does is  to reverse the 
in it ia t iv e  of bringing actions in debt recovery cases. Instead of the 
Bank in it ia t in g  a legal action, i t  becomes up to any debtor or surety who 
deems h is goods to have been wrongly seized to bring an action before the 
courts. Considering the d if f ic u lt ie s  to be faced by any eventual p la in t if f  
in th is connection, the chances are that very few indeed would do so, while 
the great majority would be compelled to se tt le  with the bank on the la t te r 's  
terms. Judging from the manner the courts have dea lt with other unconscionable 
clauses appearing in  the Bank's standard contract form, for example, the 
penalty clause discussed above, one can only speculate that the provision 
would be enforced.
Commercial banks also come in for scrutiny as the follow ing cases 
reveal. In Mofor Alexander v. Cameroon Bank Ltd., and Othera, a  case 
decided in  the English speaking part o f the country, the p la in t if f  was a 
guarantor in a c re d it  contract between the th ird  defendant and the bank 
involving three m illio n  CFA francs. The contract was concluded in May 
1976. In October the same year, the sum o f three m illio n , one-hundred 
and f i f t y  thousand CFA francs was paid Into the f i r s t  defendant's account.
The p la in t i f f  therefore considered himself discharged from his obligations 
under the contract o f guarantee. Meanwhile, the th ird  defendant entered 
into a further contract with the bank whereby he obtained a further loan
18. Suit No. HCB/15/80 of April 22nd 1981, High Court, Bamenda (unreported).
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of three m illio n  francs. When he defaulted in the payment of th is  loan, 
the bank blocked the p la in t i f f 's  account on the ground that the term of 
the o r ig ina l guarantee contract provided that the p la in t if f  was a guarantor 
to a running account.
The Bamenda High Court decided that in view of the serious im plications 
o f such a term, it s  im plications ought to have been made abundantly c lear 
to the p la in t if f .  Because that was not done, the court held that the 
p la in t i f f  had to s p e c if ic a lly  guarantee the second loan agreement i f  he had 
to be bound since his ob ligations under the f i r s t  agreement had been d is ­
charged when money was paid in to  the borrower's account in October. In 
th is  case, the p la in t i f f 's  account with the defendant bank was blocked 
fo r two years, causing him great hardship simply because the bank sought 
to protect i t s e l f  against loss by a ll means, however unfair.
A further il lu s t ra t io n  o f th is  point 1s provided by the case of 
A lb e rt Ngafor v . Cameroon Bank L td . In th is  case, the p la in t i f f
entered into a contract with the defendants in which the la t te r  granted 
him overdraft f a c i l i t ie s  fo r three m illion  C.F.A. francs. The p la in t if f ,  
a small businessman mortgaged a deed - the 'C e r t if ic a te  of Occupancy'
(akin to a freehold) on a property of h is valued at three and a h a lf 
m illio n  C.F.A. francs, as secu rity  for the loan. When on an app lication 
fo r an 1ncrease-of the loan the defendants refused to grant i t ,  the p la in t if f  
repaid the loan and demanded the return of h is 'C e rt if ic a te  o f Occupancy' in 
order to obtain another loan from a d iffe ren t bank. The defendants did not 19
19. Su it No. HCB/3/79 of January 16, 1981, Bamenda High Court (unreported).
release the deed un til s ix  months la te r  when the p la in t if f  f i le d  th is 
su it  against them. Their defence was that one o f th e ir standardized 
contract terms stipu lated that no secu rity  could be handed back to a 
c lie n t  u n t il the bank was sa tis f ie d  that the c lie n t  did not owe any of 
i t s  branches, and that s ix  months was required to check and cross-check 
the p la in t i f f 's  indebtedness towards any of i t s  branches. The High Court 
of Bamenda held that irrespective of the said term, there was an implied 
condition that the deed would be returned to the c lie n t  as soon as he 
liqu idated the debt and that a period o f s ix  months was in any event an 
unreasonably long time to ve rify  the p la in t i f f 's  indebtedness towards the 
bank.
I t is  obvious, therefore, that the commercial banks are c le a r ly  
flou ting  both the French law provisions and the common law provisions on 
guarantee and suretyship contracts. A r t ic le  2021 of the C iv il Code 
app licab le in the French speaking part o f the country provides: "A surety 
is  obligated toward the cred ito r to pay only upon the debtor's defau lt, 
whose assets must firs .t be Investigated, unless the surety renounced the 
benefit o f  investigation or unless he is  obligated jo in t ly  with the debtor, 
in which case the e ffec t of h is engagement is  regulated by the princ ip les 
which have been established for jo in t  debts." The e ffe c t o f FONADER'S 
contract o f guarantee is  tantamount to transforming a surety in to  a jo in t  
debtor. Their desire to Impose s t r ic t  conditions on the ir suretyship 
contracts is  understandable in view o f the fa c t that as the D irector of 
Credit o f  the above company pointed out, some customers are in c lined  to 
defau lt in  repaying the ir loans. However, as the researcher found out,
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the company is  already very astute in accepting as guarantors only 
persons who are very l ik e ly  to repay the loans, such as c iv i l  servants 
and businessmen. In addition they often require real estate and personal 
chatte ls to secure loans. Hence there is  no real need to make the guarantee 
contracts as harsh as they appear.
It  may also be said that any cred it contract involves a certain amount 
of r isks to be undertaken by the lender. However the Cameroonian banks, 
by using stringent guarantee contracts, and by using very unfair practices 
in enforcing those contracts, are in e ffec t freeing themselves of a ll the 
r isks involved and placing the brunt o f a l l  the risks on the other parties. 
This state of a f fa ir s  sometimes has very adverse consequences on the other 
contracting pa rtie s . In A ffa ire  Pharm cie Nnam c/b1C1C, a case decided in 
the French speaking area of the country, a c red it contract was entered into 
between one of the largest commercial banks and a small pharmacy. The bank 
granted the la t te r  an overdraft o f one and a ha lf m illio n  CFA francs 
(about three thousand pounds). Thereafter, without g iving the p la in t if f  
any reason, the bank u n ila te ra lly  rescinded the contract on the basis of 
a contractual clause giving them a r ig h t to do so. The Yaounde High Court 
however, in holding for the p la in t i f f ,  said the clause was Invalid , in 
view of the d ire consequences 1t could and did cause to the p la in t if f  ■ 
putting the la t te r  in a quandary v is -à -v is  Its suppliers. This case shows, 
however, that the courts are not altogether Insensitive about such problems. 
However they appear to Intervene only when established contract p rincip les 
are d ra s t ica lly  flouted. Otherwise, the cred it in s titu t io n s  get th e ir way.
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B: Contracts o f Hire-Purchase:
Hire-purchase contracts have undergone what may be described as an 
explosion since the early s ix t ie s  in Cameroon. They are important for 
two reasons:- f i r s t  of a l l ,  they are now exceedingly common in Cameroon 
today and secondly, th e ir subject matter is  l ik e ly  to be an expensive item 
such as cars or expensive household items such as fu rn itu re , re frigerators 
e tc . Hire-purchase contracts were introduced in Anglophonic Cameroon as 
part o f the common law in 1900 and they are s t i l l  governed by the common 
law because Cameroon, unlike some other African States, has not yet enacted 
any leg is la tion  on th is  subject.
In the French speaking part o f the country, the French Commercial 
Code governs hire-purchase transactions which may take the form of "vente 
à c réd it" , "location-vente" or "vente à tempe'rament". As in English law, 
numerous French decrees which are inapplicab le in Cameroon have modified 
the law of hire-purchase. Hence the legal consequences of hire-purchase 
1s the same in  both the French and English speaking ju r isd ic t io n s  as the 
cases w il l  reveal. Attention w il l be paid e ssen tia lly  to the unconscionable 
practice o f what has come, to be known as "snatch back" in th is  section.
The fa c t that hire-purchase transactions have become common in 
Cameroon has not unfortunately made them any less complex to the majority 
o f Cameroonians. On the contrary, the stronger desire on the part of 
most Cameroonians to acquire luxury goods, coupled with the astuteness 
of salesmen who not Infrequently misrepresent terms couched in  arcane legal 
language, buried in  fine  p r in t, make hire-purchase transactions even more
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complex today than when they were f i r s t  introduced. The case of
( 2 1 )J. Ngole Masako V. C.N. Menyoli Motors Enterprises L td ., ' i l l  lustrates 
th is  point. In 1964, the p la in t if f  entered into a contract for the purchase 
of a F ia t Saloon car. The contract price was 669,917 CFA francs, of which 
a down payment of 375,000 CFA francs was made. The defendant's standardized 
contract terms made i t  c lear that the contract was one o f hire-purchase.
Later on, while the car was in a garage, the defendant repossessed i t  
because the p la in t i f f  had fa ile d  to meet h is  payments. The p la in t if f  
argued that he signed the contract without appreciating it s  terms, thinking 
that i t  was a simple contract o f sale on c red it terms. His counsel's 
submission that hire-purchase agreements were v ir tu a lly  unknown to the local 
law fa ile d  to influence the court.
Hire-purchase is  financed in  Cameroon predominantly by the commercial 
banks and by trading in s t itu t io n s . In the case of automobiles, which 
figure prominently in hire-purchase agreements, there is  one company,
SOCCA (Soci^t^ Commerciale de Cre'dit Automobile) which spec ia lizes in 
financing hire-purchase agreements.'
As e a r lie r  mentioned, unlike countries such as N igeria , Tanzania 
and Kenya, which have enacted leg is la t io n  (to a considerable degree on 
the lin e s  of the B r it is h  Hire-Purchase Acts of 1954, 1 9 6 5 )  ^ Cameroon 
has no such le g is la t io n . Hence, the common law position as stated in 
Helby v. Matthews, s t i l l  governs the re la tionsh ip  between the h irers 21
21. Su it No. WC/26/65 o f 18th March 1966, High Court, Buea, (unreported).
22. See the Nigerian Hire-Purchase Act 1965, discussed in H icks, A: Nigerian
Law of Hire Purchase. Ahma du Be llo  University Press, Zaria , 1977.
See also the Kenyan Hire Purchase Act, discussed 1n Rogers, M., "A
Note on Hire-Purchase and Chattels Mortgage in Kenya)' 19.J.A .L. (1975) 
pp. 154-162.
[18951 A.C.471.23.
and the purchasers. Dealers have not fa ile d  to exp lo it th is s ituation  
to the h i l t  and the practice of "snatch back" is  s t i l l  r i fe .  This 
problem was discussed by.the Court o f Appea 1 of Buea (in the English 
speaking part of the country) in the case o f John H olt Motors v. Eta
K.J. TsewoleS^  The dispute between the parties arose from three h ire - 
purchase agreements fo r the purchase of three lo rr ie s  which were explo ited 
by the buyer commercially. On the 19th o f July 1968, the appellants 
no tified  the respondent that i f  the la t te r  did not pay the arrears of 
the hire-purchase instalments which had fa lle n  due, they would seize the 
lo rr ie s  in accordance with the hire-purchase terms. When the respondents 
did not make the said payments, the appellants proceeded to seize the lo rr ie s . 
It  was found as a fac t that a balance o f 2,775,427 CFA francs remained due 
from the respondents. The important question that the then West Cameroon 
Court o f Appeal was confronted with turned on the question, raised by the 
respondents counsel, o f the app lica tion  o f equitable p rin c ip les . Having 
re-sold the lo rr ie s  fo r 4,650,000 CFA francs, the respondent's counsel 
pleaded that equitable, p rinc ip les should be applied so as to enable the 
respondent to recover what remained from the re-sa le , a fte r setting o f f  
the sum that remained outstanding on the hire-purchase contracts.
When th is issue was raised at f i r s t  Instance, the presiding judge, 
Endeley J . ,  said: "Agreements once law fu lly  and duly executed are made 
to be enforced and respected. The p la in t if f s  were p la in ly  1n breach of 
the ir hire-purchase agreements with the defendants who were therefore well 
w ithin the ir rights to redress themselves by resorting to the contractual 
remedy of seizure and sa le ."
24. Civ. Appeal No. WCCA/21/70, April 7th 1971, Buea (unreported).
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The majority o f the Court of Appeal agreed with Endeley J 's  decision 
and added that: "Equity, i t  has been r ig h t ly  sa id , mends no man's bargain 
except in the most exceptional circumstances." In th is  case, decided in 
1971, when as already mentioned a good many A frican  States of the common 
law trad ition  had already enacted leg is la t io n  afford ing some protection 
against such se izu re, the West Cameroon Court o f Appeal s t i l l  f e lt  i t s e l f  
in c lined  to fo llow  Helby v. M a t t h e w s . However, one of the three 
judges, C o tran .C .J ., while agreeing with the others that the respondent 
was in arrears on each of the hire-purchase agreements, however dissented 
on the question o f the application of equitable p rin c ip le s  to the facts 
of th is  case. In h is  dissenting judgment, he sa id : " I t  is  common ground 
that the appellant, having seized the three veh ic le s, la te r sold them for 
the sum o f 4,650,000 CFA francs and a fte r se tt in g  th is sum o ff  against 
what was due from the Respondent, the balance o f 2,775,426 remained in 
th e ir  favour. In my judgment, the Respondent 1s en tit led  in equity and 
fairness to receive th is  balance." He went on to say that: "Under Section 
14 o f our Southern Cameroon High Court Law, 1955, where there is  any co n f lic t  
or variance between the rules of .Equity and the ru les of Common law, the 
rules of Equity sha ll prevail.»..". He then said: "I accept o f course 
that the courts o f England w il l  not read ily  apply equitable p rin c ip les  to 
hire-purchase agreements. The reason for th is , however, is  that the 
hire-purchase le g is la t io n  o f England is  so designed as to protect the 
h ire r . For example, the owner 1n England cannot seize the property a fte r 
the h ire r pays one-th ird o f the purchase p rice . Unfortunately, we have 
no such protective le g is la t io n  in  West Cameroon, and for th is reason I 25
25. See note (23), supra.
take the view that our Courts should more read ily  apply equitable 
p rin c ip les to hire-purchase agreements."
Cotran C .J 's  d issenting judgment puts the problem of not only h ire- 
purchase contracts but other standardized contracts in perspective.
While they such contracts have greatly increased in numbers, the law 
regulating them has been at a v irtua l s ta n d s t il l.  The judgment of the 
West Cameroon Court o f Appeal reads more lik e  an English nineteenth 
century judgment, with i t s  emphasis on the sanctity  of contract and its  
tota l disregard of the fa irness of the contract terms, than a 1971 judgment 
in a country whose consumer population have only recently been exposed to 
such contracts. The d issenting judgment brings to lig h t the dire need 
for leg is la t ion  in th is area o f the law. In the opinion o f Cotran C .J., 
the absence of protective legislationought to induce the courts to make 
more use of the provision 1n the Southern Cameroon High Court Law (Section 
14) authorising the app lica tion  of equitable p rin c ip les . Another provision 
of the same law, Section 27(4) states that: "In cases where no express 
rule is  applicable to "b matter in  controversy the court sha ll be governed 
by the p rinc ip les o f ju s t ic e , equity and good conscience." Although th is 
provision usually applies to a co n f lic t  of laws s itua tio n , i t  could be 
applied 1n the case of standardized contracts. It  has already been 
argued In the second chapter that the common law o f contract was not 
designed to deal with standardized contracts. In the la s t  chapter, It 
was seen that English judges had to devise numerous tools such as the 
doctrine o f fundamental breach, s t r ic t  Interpretation e tc . ,  in an attempt 
to accommodate the common law of contract which in I t s e lf  Is conceptually
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inadequate to deal with standardized contracts. Even those devices 
have not turned out to be e ffe c tive ; hence, numerous pieces of leg is la tion  
have been and are s t i l l  being passed to deal with standardized contracts.
I t  may therefore be argued that the common law o f contract handed down to 
the then Southern Cameroon was not designed to deal with the bulk of 
standardized contracts, and that th is  hiatus in the law should be f i l le d  
by Section 27(4) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law, 1955. This point 
has a lso been put forward by Zaki Mustapha^^ in re la tion  to the treatment 
o f exemption clauses by Sudanese courts. He argues that exemption clauses 
couched in  English, and not s p e c if ic a lly  brought to the notice of persons 
i l l i t e r a t e  in English in Sudan,ought not to bind the parties. He holds that 
the courts ought to in te rp re tia  s im ila r provision enabling the application 
o f " ju s t ice , equity and good conscience" in Sudan, to exclude such 
exemption clauses from applying. As the case of John H o lt Motors o. Eta.
K.J. T a e w o l e shows, Cameroonian courts, l ik e  the Sudanese courts, 
are not in c lined  to follow  such a view.
(29)In one case, however,- - Menyoli Motors Co. Ltd. v. Frederick Ezedigboh ' '
the West Cameroon Court o f Appeal applied the English case of Stookloaaer v. 
J o h n s o n where the English Court o f Appeal upheld a general power to 
grant equitable r e l ie f  against the fo rfe itu re  o f the buyer's deposit in a 
hire-purchase cpntract a fte r re sdss iono f the contract where the sum 
fo rfe ited  was out o f a l l proportion to the damage suffered by the se lle r  2678930
26. This w i l l  be more fu l ly  dealt with in the next chapter on "Unconsdon- 
abH1ty"and also in the chapter dealing with recent le g is la t iv e  innovations.
27. Zak1 Mustapha, note (10), supra, at pp. 130-131.
28. Note (24), supra.
29. C iv. Appeal No. WCCA/7/68, Buea, (unreported).
30. [1954 I 1 Q.B. 476.
and when i t  would be unconscionable fo r the s e lle r  to reta in the money.
That case, i . e . ,  Menyoli Motors Co. Ltd . v. Frederick Eaedigboh, has,
however, never been followed by any court since i t  was decided. In a
recent case, Mbah Mathias v. Joseph Tata,^3^ the parties entered in to a
hire-purchase contract for the sale o f a car. The defendant had already
paid more than three-quarters o f the contract price when he fe ll  into
arrears. The p la in t i f f  thereupon seized the car and brought an action
claim ing the hire-purchase instalments which had already fa lle n  due in
accordance with the contract terms. In giving judgment fo r the p la in t if f ,
the judge said: "In my opinion the p la in t if f  was perfectly  within h is
rights under the hire-purchase agreements to seize the car as the essence
(321of hire-purchase as stated in Helby v. M a t t h e w s 1 and that the ownership 
o f the goods h ired remains with the owner un til a l l  payments have been 
made and the h ire r  has exercised his option to purchase." Up un til now, 
the law o f hire-purchase in  anglophonic Cameroon is  not d iffe ren t from 
what i t  was in England in the nineteenth century.^31 23 34^
Increasing ly, judges are recognising the Incongruity of continuing 
with the app lica tion  of the above common law princ ip les to modern standard­
ized hire-purchase agreements.- In Ngang Chumbon v. Munswha Zebulon 
although the hire-purchase contract from which the case arose was not a 
w ritten standardized contract. Its terms as acknowledged by both parties 
to the action were not d iffe ren t 1n any way from the major terms inserted 
In the majority o f standardized hire-purchase contracts, p a rt icu la r ly
31. S u it No. HCB/7/78 o f Feb. 8th 1979, High Court, Bamenda (unreported). 
This case was decided 1n the English speaking part o f the country.
32. See Note (23), supra.
33. I t  w i l l  be seen la te r that the s itua tion  1s not d iffe ren t in the 
francophonic provinces of the country.
34. S u it No. HCB/53/78 o f 18th June 1979, Bamenda High Court (unreported).
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with regard to seizure for the non-payment o f instalments. The subject 
matter o f the hire-purchase contract was a Peugot 504 car and the h ire- 
purchase price was 2,450,000 CFA francs. The contract was entered into 
in  October 1975. In January 1978 when the car,which the p la in t if f  used 
as a taxi cab, was in a garage undergoing repairs*, the defendant seized 
i t  on the grounds that the p la in t if f  had fa lle n  in  arrears in the payment 
o f the two la s t instalments which amounted to 250,000 CFA francs, i.e .  
ju s t  about one-tenth of the tota l hire-purchase p rice . In deciding 
whether the defendant was w ith in 'h is  legal" r ig h t in  seizing the car, the 
judge used two lin e s  pf reasoning. He said: "Hire-purchase contracts 
are a typical example of standard form contracts which have been perfected 
over the years to give maximum possible protection to the se lle r  and a 
heavy burden on the buyer. So, whereas a judge may f i l l  in large gaps 
in  a sale under a common law contract he w il l ra re ly  have any gaps in a 
hire-purchase contract since v ir tu a lly  every contingency w ill already be 
sp ec ia lly  provided fo r." He then went on to hold that the present contract 
was not one of hire-purchase and to buttress th is  conclusion, he cited the 
B r it is h  Hire-Purchase Act of 1938, Section 2 o f which stipu lates that a 
hire-purchase contract must be in w riting , evidenced by a note or memo­
randum and signed by the parties. I t  must be pointed out that th is was 
c le a r ly  against Section 14 of the Southern Cameroon's High Court Law 1955 
which excludes the application of post-1900 B r it is h  leg is la t ion . Be that 
as i t  may, having found that the contract in  question was not a h ire- 
purchase contract, he held that 1t was at best governed by the common 
law contract o f conditional sale in which the defendant agreed to pass the
property o f the car to the p la in t i f f  only upon the completion of the la s t 
instalment. The question then was whether in view of the fact that the 
p la in t if f  had defaulted in the payment of the la s t two instalments, the 
defendant could le g a lly  seize the veh icle. The judge fe lt  that fo r 
seizure to be e ffec tive  and to override the princ ip les of equity, the 
r ig h t o f seizure must be an express and written term of the contract. He 
however went on to say that even i f  he were wrong on that score and that 
the defendant indeed had a r ig h t o f seizure, that righ t had not in his 
estimation been properly exercised. He said: "For a sale o f 2,450,000 
CFA francs, i f  there was a balance o f 250,000 CFA francs le f t ,  I think 
i t  was unreasonable fo r the defendant to seize the car even though the 
property had not been passed to the p la in t if f . "  He concluded that the 
only remedy open to the defendant was an action in damages fo r the non­
payment o f the la s t two instalments.
The novelty in  Judge Ekor' Tarh's decision in th is case is  that he 
held that even i f  there is  in  a contract a righ t o f seizure, such a r igh t 
must be exercised o n ly  i f  i t  is-reasonable. Although he did not treat 
the present case as one o f hire-purchase, that fact was o f no moment as 
fa r as h is judgment is  concerned and he could equally have reached the 
same decision had 1t been a standardized hire-purchase contract. This is  
a fundamental departure from the position taken by the West Cameroon Court 
o f Appeal 1n John Holt v. Toeuole and i t  is  a c lear recognition of 
the inadequacy of the common law in th is area of the law: contracts must 
be reasonable i f  they are to be enforced by the courts. I t  is  hoped 35
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that a la s , other judges in the English speaking part o f the country where 
th is case was decided w ill follow su it. The signs are, however, that 
th is might not be the case. It has already been seen that in a s im ila r 
hire-purchase case decided the same year as the Ngang Chumbon case, a 
d iffe ren t judge in the same court re lie d  squarely on Helby v. Matthews, 
ca tego r ica lly  rejecting the concept of reasonableness.^3^
The fate is  not d iffe ren t in the francophonie provinces where French 
law app lies. In French law generally, property passes to the hire-purchaser 
only upon the payment of the la s t instalment. The h ire r  can rescind the 
contract upon non-payment o f any instalment.^36 7 38^ In one decision of the 
Court o f Appeal in Yaounde, La S oc ié té  cl'Equipement Pour l 'A fr iq u e  du 
Cameroun (S .E .A .C .) a/ Danzouri Karamou,^3^ a h ire-purchase contract was 
entered in to  between the parties, in connection with a Mercedes Benz truck 
in 1971 fo r  a tota l sum of 3,402,440 CFA francs. In March 1974, SEAC 
seized the truck when the sum of 316,250 francs which remained outstanding 
was not paid. In sp ite of the fact that t ii is  amount was less than one- 
tenth o f the total hire-purchase p rice , the Yaounde Court o f Appeal held 
that CEAC were w ithin the ir legal righ ts in accordance with the contract 
in se iz ing  and re -se llin g  the truck. The problem of "snatch-back" is 
therefore a feature of hire-purchase contracts in the whole country.
36. See Mba Mathias v. Joseph Tatah, Note (31), supra.
37. See Mazeaud, Leçons de Droit C i v i l . Tome 3e , Principaux Contratspar 
de Jug la rt, (Editions Montchréstien, Paris 1974), 921-925.
38. Anêt No. 102/ADD du 6 Adut 1975, Cour d'Appel, Yaoundé (unreported).
C: Contracts for the Sale of Agricultural Produce:
Consideration has been given to contracts re la ting  to the marketing 
of ag ricu ltu ra l produce because they a ffect a large number of people 
(cash crop cu lt iva to rs ) and also because o f th e ir m u lt ip lie r e ffe c t on 
the economy.
Basic to a l l  marketing a c t iv ity  is  the confidence of the farmers 
that a sale can take place without fear o f extortion or unfairness in the ir 
dealings with buyers. The major po licy  goal here should therefore be to 
ensure fa ir  bargaining processes and also to ra ise the bargaining power 
of cash crop producers. I t  was to f u l f i l  these requirements that the 
National Produce Marketing Board was created in Cameroon. Its ch ie f 
aims are to serve as a buyer and export s e lle r  o f cocoa and coffee from 
farmers and also to f ix  and maintain prices through a fund for s ta b iliz in g  
prices. While the establishment o f th is Board may lead one to think that 
l i t t l e  room i f  any is  le f t  for unconscionable contract terms or practices, 
the re a lity  be lies such a view. The Marketing Board, constitutes the 
largest s ing le buyer o f product but Is not a monopoly. It operates along­
side other buyers who do not come under s t r ic t  governmental control and who 
not Infrequently take advantage of the i l l i t e r a c y  cha racte ris tic  o f the 
majority o f farmers as the case o f Direct Suppliers Ltd. v. Dairu K iu S ^  
shows.
Because the Board Is lim ited 1n it s  capacity to go into the four 
corners o f the country, i t  often acts through licensed buying agents.
It  is  therefore the la t te r  (in  addition to co-operatives wherever they ex ist)
39. Civ. Appeal No. BCA/23/74 of Nov. 28th 1974, Bamenda Court of Appeal
(unreported).
who contract with farmers most of the time and who for the most part carry 
out unfa ir practices as against farmers.
The licensed buying agents who operate in given geographical areas 
may, because of the poor transport network in rural areas, w ield monopoly
y
power over farmers, thus enabling them to press hard bargains against the 
la t te r . Among the unconscionable terms found to be common in  such contracts 
were: a) the imposition of penalties. Before the harvesting season, 
buyers enter in to  contracts with producers for the supply o f spec ific  
quantities o f the produce with a s t ip u la t ion  that i f  the producer does not 
supply that quantity, he w il l be subject to the payment of a fine. In 
Muyuka Co-operative Ltd. v. Otto the Buea High Court (common
law ju r isd ic t io n )  held that such a term was a penalty and was in va lid .
This decision is  surely r ig h t because ag ricu ltu ra l production being fraught 
with uncertainties (much depending on the weather), i t  would ce rta in ly  
be un fa ir to impose a fine on a producer who does not produce the amount 
stipulated in the contract. A second widespread malpractice consists in 
wrongly grading the qua lity  o f the produce by buyers. Because many farmers 
are uncertain about the buyers' good fa ith , they accept lower prices for 
ungraded produce. 4012
40. Many licensed agents set up sham companies designed to defraud 
ignorant farmers. In Ndefru v. George Fonkwo and Others, Appeal No. 
BCA/7/76 o f March 4th 1977, Bamenda (common law ju r isd ic t io n ) the 
appellant company was described by the judge as founded on "actual 
dishonesty", designed to take advantage o f farmers.
41. Su it No. HCSW/3/76, High Court Buea (1976) (unreported). The above 
cases were a l l decided In the English speaking part o f the country.
42. See Pa tr ic k  Ateghanq v. Ntamandam C.P.M.S. Ltd. Su it No. HCB/13/76 
o f February Znd 1977, Bamenda High Court (unreported).
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The extent to which buyers cap ita lize  on the ir monopoly power is 
evidenced by the contracts which the Pamol Plantations du Cameroon,
S.A., an a f f i l ia t e  o f UNILEVER enters into with producers of palm-nuts.
The company operates in  a geographical area that makes i t  a monopoly in 
so far as i t  is  the only company that processes that produce. Two of its  
contractual terms pa rt icu la r ly  come in fo r c r it ic ism . F ir s t  o f a l l ,  the 
farmers with whom they deal are bound to s e ll exclusive ly to the company 
but the la t te r  is  under no corresponding obligation to buy th e ir  produce.
The company fixes the contract price u n ila te ra lly  and reserves the right 
to reduce the price. P a rticu la rly  deplored by farmers who enter into 
contracts with the company is  the practice of the company (although no 
term ex ists in the contract to th is e ffect) in deducting up to ten per 
cent o f the weight o f the produce at certa in periods, p a rt icu la r ly  the 
rainy season. The company's reason for so doing is  to compensate for the 
excess weight which is  made up of water. However va lid  th is  reason is ,  
the fact that 1 t  1s u n ila te ra lly  decided by the company is  indeed resented 
by the fanners generally who nevertheless have no options but to submit 
to such terms and practices. * '•
Farmers are unable to Influence such buyers for two basic reasons.
F ir s t  o f a l l ,  even 1f they could resort to courts (which as w i l l  be seen 
la te r 1s by no means ea s ily  done), because they deal with monopolies, there 
is  the apprehension that 1n taking any legal action, they might lose the 
benefits the contracts afford them 1n sp ite of the fact that some of them 
are g la ring ly  un fa ir. Secondly, apart from producers of cocoa and coffee, 
the producers o f other cash crops are not at a l l organized, hence, they 
do not possess su ff ic ie n t  bargaining power to countervail that o f the buyers.
-2 1 0-
Dr Service Contracts:
Service contracts, which range from such everyday contracts as 
carriage of goods or persons, contracts fo r the supply of e le c t r ic ity  
and water, to contracts fo r the repair o f veh icles e tc ., constitute the 
bulk o f standardized contracts in Cameroon. Indeed, some of them are so 
t r i f l in g  and recurrent that i t  hardly dawns on consumers that they are 
entering into contracts at a l l .
Here again, the absence of law reporting makes i t  impossible to have 
a c le a r p icture o f how the courts deal with such contracts, p a rt icu la r ly  
with exemption clauses which are invariab ly  incorporated in these contracts. 
Most o f  the cases that have come before the courts have turned on important 
contracts (important in  terms of the sums o f money involved) such as 
contracts fo r the repa ir o f vehicles. With regard to contracts such as 
those for the supply o f e le c t r ic ity  and water, because the corporations 
involved are para-stata l corporations, most disputes tend to be se ttled  
through internal adm inistrative procedures rather than through the regular 
courts. "  * . *•
An examination o f a few of the contract terms put forward by firms 
Involved in the repa ir o f vehicles shows how high-handed these firms are to 
consumers. In Albert Ngafor v. S.H.O. A frioauto,^^  the p la in t if f  towed 
h is ca r, valued'at fiv e  hundred thousand francs, to the defendant's garage. 
A "Job Order Card" was opened for the p la in t i f f .  Two months la te r , no 
repairs had been carried  out on the car. Thereafter, the p la in t if f  made 
repeated attempts to get back h is car to no a va il. Meanwhile, the
43. Suit No. HC/16/72 of 16th July 1973, Bamenda High Court, (unreported).
-2 1 1 -
defendants had sold the ca r. The p la in t if f  therefore brought th is action 
for damages for breach o f contract. The defendants re lie d  on a clause in 
th e ir standardized contract which stipulated that f i f t y  per cent of the 
estimated costs of repairs had to be paid before they could undertake to 
repair the car. They argued that because the p la in t i f f  had not made the 
said payment, they considered the car abandoned and were therefore well 
w ithin the ir rights in s e llin g  i t .  The Bamenda High Court held that the 
defendants were precluded from re lying on the ir contract terms because 
by opening a "Job Order Card", they were estopped from re ly ing on the ir 
contractual terms to negative the existence o f a contract. The Court 
held, therefore, that the defendants had acted unreasonably in se llin g  
the car.
The case of A.T. Jin o r v. Martha N g u a dea lt with the v a lid ity  
o f an exclusion clause in  a contract for the repa ir o f a car. The 
respondent delivered her car to the appellant fo r s lig h t  repairs for 
which she paid s ix  thousand CFA francs. After having completed the 
repa irs , the appellant,reta ined the car on the pretext that some other 
fau lts  had developed in the car. Four months la te r ,  the appellants had 
s t i l l  not delivered the ca r. In th is action against him for the loss of 
the car, he re lie d  on a term in the contract excluding l ia b i l i t y  for loss. 
The court, however, r ig h t ly  held that because fa ilu re  to de liver the car 
was deliberate, the appellants could not re ly on th e ir exclusion clause 
and were therefore l ia b le .
The Courts 1n the a/iglophonic part of Cameroon have taken the 
sensible approach of d isa llow ing garage proprietors from re lying on any
44. Suit No. BCA/36/74 of 29th November 1974, Bamenda Court of Appeal
(unreported).
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protective contractual clause whenever there has been a total loss 
of a vehicle. Although these decisions have not been expressly couched 
in terms o f the doctrine of fundamental breach, that doctrine is  im p lic it  
in the above decisions.
The Courts in the francophonic provinces have reached s im ila r 
decis ions, a lb e it  via a d iffe ren t lin e  of reasoning. In Affaire Batoum 
Joseph C/ Kaptue H y p o l i t e the p la in t if f  delivered h is car to the 
defendant's garage on the 12th of January 1973 for repairs. A fter 
several weeks, the defendant presented the p la in t if f  with a b i l l  fo r 
ninety-one thousand CFA francs, being the cost o f the repairs. Meanwhile, 
the car which had a l l along been exposed to rain had greatly depreciated 
in value, with many of i t s  parts completely w ritten -o ff. The p la in t if f  
sought to recover damages fo r  the depreciation o f the car, while the 
defendant argued that he was covered by a clause lim it in g  l i a b i l i t y  for 
such depreciation. The Yaounde High Court, in determining the contractual 
l i a b i l i t y  of the defendant, analysed the na’ture of a contract o f repairs.
I t  held that the contract was analogous to a contract o f bailment which is 
governed by A rt ic le  1782 o f the C iv il Code .^ ) The defendant had two 
d e f in ite  ob ligations under the contract: a) to repair the car, b) to 
re -de live r the car to it s  owner, at the very lea st, in  the state in which 
he received 1 t% The Court went on to hold that the defendant had fa iled  
in both these ob ligations and could therefore not re ly  on any exemption or 
lim ita t io n  clause. The contract was "sui generis", with de fin ite  obligations 
which the defendant could not exclude. 456
45. Judgment C iv il  No. 114 du 10 Septembre 1974, Tr1b. de Grande Instance, 
Yaounde', (unreported).
46. A rt ic le  1782 of the C iv i l  Code stipu lates that: "Carriers by land and by 
water are subject fo r the keeping and conservation of things which are 
entrusted to them to the same obligations as 1nn-keepers as is  given
in the t i t le  Bailment and Sequestration."
SHO Afrioauto o/ Ntamark E d m o n d is  another in teresting case.
The respondent gave h is car to the appellants fo r repairs. A fte r having 
taken the car to p ieces,-the appellants demanded immediate payment of the 
invoice - eighty three thousand CFA francs. The respondent refused to 
se tt le  the b i l l  u n til his car had been repaired. The appellants thereupon 
levied a da ily  charge on the car fo r the period i t  was in the ir garage.
The Yaounde Court o f Appeal, a ffirm ing the judgment of the Court o f F ir s t  
Instance, held that because the recognised trade practice in th is  connection 
was that payment was made only a fte r repairs had been effected, any 
contractual term s t ipu la tin g  otherwise had to be sp e c if ic a lly  brought to 
the notice of the other contracting party. It  therefore refused to lend 
weight to the appe llant's contract term providing that the invoice had to 
be paid before any repairs were made. This decision is  an app lication of 
the doctrine of notice. The appellant had already dismantled the car when 
the invo ice was presented to the respondent. Because the clause was in 
derogation of the established trade practice , i t  was incumbent upon the 
appellants to sp e c if ica lly . Intimate to the respondent the terms on which 
they were to repa ir the la t te r 's  car before dismantling i t .  In Cie.
C.F.A.O. a/'Antoine Longue, the appellants did some minor repairs on 
the respondents car for which the respondent owed about th irty-th ree 
thousand CFA francs. The respondent co llected the car from the appellants' 
garage but the c a r 's  engine s ta lle d  only four kilometres from the garage, 
whereupon the respondent took the car back to the appellants' garage.
The la t te r  however contended that h1s ob ligation on the o r ig ina l contract 478
47. A rrê t No. 488 du 9 j u i l l e t  1970, Cour d'Appel de Yaoundé' (unreported).
48. A ffa ire  No. 10/72, 1972, Yaoundé, (unreported).
had been discharged and demanded payment for any subsequent repairs to 
be carried out on the car.
The Yaounde Court o f  F ir s t  Instance however held that irrespective 
o f the terms o f the contract between the partie s , the mere fact that the 
ca r 's  engine s ta lle d  four kilometres away from the garage was ind icative 
o f the fa c t that the appellant had not discharged his obligation under the 
o r ig ina l contract. The Court of Appeal, however, ordered for an expert 
inquiry to determine whether the s ta llin g  of the engine was in any way 
connected to the repairs which had already been carried out on the car.
Contracts fo r the repair o f vehicles is  one of the few "success areas" 
therefore, where the courts in the English speaking and French speaking 
parts o f the country a lik e , have intervened in  contracts so as to deprive 
the garage owners (some of whom are quite large enterprises, for example, 
SHO Africanto and C.F.A.O.) the use of standardized contracts in driving 
hard bargains against consumers. The position taken by the courts within 
the French law trad it ion  appears pa rt icu la r ly  interesting. By asserting 
that such contracts are special contracts with defin ite  obligations which 
should not in any event be excluded, they s t i f le  the e ffect of exclusion 
and lim ita t io n  clauses.
Contracts fo r the carriage o f goods have come under some sort of 
regulation. P rice control le g is la t io n  (which w ill be examined in a la te r 
chapter) f ix  the t a r if f s  fo r the transportation of d iffe ren t categories 
o f goods. They do not, however, touch on other equally important aspects 
o f these contracts, v iz . ,  the problem of exclusion and lim ita tion  terms. 
Nearly every t ic k e t Issued by the Road Transport Association (SETRACAUCAM),
or by the National Railway, or the National A ir lin e  contains an exclusion 
or lim ita tion  clause. Curiously, however, there is  a paucity of cases 
decided by the courts in,Cameroon. Judging from the way in which the 
Cameroonian courts within the common law trad ition  have dealt with 
exclusion contracts in sale o f goods contracts (to be examined next), i t  
is  more l ik e ly  than not that these exclusion clauses w il l be validated 
by the courts.
A recent Supreme Court decision^49) is  o f monumental importance, 
although it s  application is  confined to the courts w ithin the French law 
trad it ion . On the 21st o f October 1970, goods were delivered to the 
National Railway Company at Obala, to be transported to Douala. The goods, 
which consisted o f twenty parcels, were stored in the company's warehouse 
for eventual transportation. Seven months la te r , the addressee was notified  
that the parcels had arrived. However, three parcels among the lo t  were 
unaccounted for and the sender brought an action fo r damages. The Railway 
Company re lied  in the ir defence on the fact that the claim  was time-barred 
by statute. The Supreme Court o f Cameroon, follow ing a 1973 French 
decision o f the Conmercial Chamber of the"Courde cassation'^50) held that 
the statute.was only applicable to contracts o f transport. In th is case, 
they held that the contract was not one of transport because two Important 
prerequisites o f a contract o f transport had not been met, i.e .  the time 
the goods are put on the tra in  and the date on which they were to arrive 
had not been mentioned in the contract. The contract was therefore a mere 
contract o f bailment. In the words of President of the Court: "Attendu 
qu'un contrat de transport do it contenir la date d'embarquement et la
49. Cour Suprime du Cameroun, 26, Oct. 1978, Pe'nant, 1980 vol. 91 p. 75 
(jurisprudence).
50. B u lle t in  de Transport, 1973, p.231.
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date de lavraison (puisque c 'e s t d ‘ a il le u rs  a compter de cette 
derniere que courent les dela is de 1 ’ a r t ic le  108); qu'en l'absence de 
cette s tipu la tion  i l  ne pourait avant l'embarquement e f fe c t if  e t la 
le t t re  d 'av is  d 'arrive'e y avoir entre les parties qu'un contrat de 
dépSt." This decision is  important inasmuch as i f  the present contract 
was not a contract o f transport, then any accompanying exclusion or 
lim ita t io n  contracts would be inoperative.
However, as G ilbe rt Mangin^51 52^ w rite in a note on th is case, th is 
decision ought not to be taken as a general rule because in th is  case 
seven months had elapsed before the goods were f in a lly  transported.
Surely, a contract of transport might involve many phases:- the goods 
may be warehoused fo r some time before being transported.
Hence i t  is  not c lear how fa r the above decision can give protection 
to any person sending goods on a contract containing exclusion or lim ita tion  
clauses. . .
That the majority o f consumers or other persons fa i l  to take notice of 
lim ita t io n  and exemption clauses Inserted in most service contracts is  
common knowledge. Indeed, Counsel fo r the M in isty of Post and Telecomm­
unications, Yaounde, revealed that most people whose goods have been lo s t 
in tra n s it  by the Post O ffice expressed dismay when they were confronted with 
the Post O ff ic e 's  lim ita tion  clause which lim its  the amount recoverable on 
any loss to Just about four thousand CFA francs per parcel (about eight 
pounds ) ( ^
51. Note (49) supra at p. 77.
52. Conversation with Mrs. Dibo Yankey, then Legal Adviser to the M in istry
o f Post and Telecomnunications, Yaounde on the 31st of Ju ly  1981.
E: Contracts For the Sale of Goods:
Although the majority of sales of goods take place in markets 
in which there is  considerable haggling over prices and other contractual 
terms, th is area nevertheless constitutes an important one. Most contracts 
fo r the sale of expensive goods such as cars, e le c tr ic a l instruments 
(re frigerators, cookers, radios etc .) are standardized, carried out by 
large firms. Here again, the nature of the contracts is  la rge ly  determined 
by economic imperatives. The dominance of a few firms in  the market fo r 
some of these goods and the fact that the supply of these luxury goods 
can hardly ever meet th e ir escalating demand means that se lle rs  have a 
much superior bargaining power which, as the cases show, they do not 
hesitate to exp lo it to the h i l t .  This has been most acute in  the sale 
of second-hand cars. P ra c tica lly  a l l  businesses involved in  that trade 
have standardized contract terms negativing any warranty, express or 
implied.
* (531
In Soholaatioa Noaiboti V. F e lix  Ezeafor, '  ' the appellant
bought a second-hand (Tar from the respondent car dealer who made oral 
representations to the e ffect that the car was one year old and in good 
working condition. The oral representation proved to be untrue since the 
car was indeed older than that and was u tte r ly  defective. The contract, 
however, contained a term that excluded l ia b i l i t y  fo r any defect in the 
car and for any Implied or express warranty. The Bamenda Court of Appeal 
(in the English speaking part of the country), in  upholding the High Court 
decision in favour of the respondent had th is to say: "Restricted though
53. Appeal No. BCA/6/73 of March 1974, Bamenda Court of Appeal (unreported).
-2 1 8-
the doctrine of 'caveat emptor' might be in it s  application to contracts 
of sa le, i t s  app lica tion  in the buying of a second-hand car is  in  niy 
opinion most f i t t in g  since there is  very l i t t l e  by way of guarantee that 
the s e lle r  could g ive as to it s  fitness" - per Rupert Thomas J . ,  President 
of the Court.
I f the above case shows the courts in  the Anglophonic provinces of 
Cameroon to be insensitive to the problem of exclusion clauses in connection 
with the sale of second-hand cars, the case of Michael Ebwe v. Hubert 
Euverte^^  accentuates th is point. On the 13th of May 1974, at about 
10 a.m., the p la in t i f f  entered into a w ritten contract with the defendant 
fo r the sale of a second-hand car. The contractual document stipulated 
that the buyer had been given the opportunity of examining the car and 
that any l ia b i l i t y  whatsoever was excluded. The p la in t if f  signed the 
contractual document allegedly without reading i t .  On the same day the 
sale took place, a t about 5 p.m., the ca r 's  engine s ta lled  and the car was, 
on la te r examination, proved to be considerably defective. The p la in t if f  
tried to get a refund of the contract p rice from the defendant on the 
grounds that the ca r was worthless, whereupon he brought th is action.
The Buea High Court held that the terms of the contract were c lea r and 
wholly unambiguous and that in  the absence of fraud, they were binding 
on the parties.*
This case is  s im ila r  1n certa in  respects to Karaalea (Harrow) Ltd. v. 
V a llie ^ ^  where the p la in t if f  bought a second-hand car which "would not 
go". In that case, however, the English Court of Appeal refused to uphold 54
54. Su it No. HCSW/24, 1974, Buea High Court (unreported).
55. [1956] 2 A l l .  E.R. 868.
a s im ila r clause excluding l ia b i l i t y  because the defendant had been 
g u ilty  of a fundamental breach of contract. In the above Cameroonian 
case, the fac t that the car was second-hand appears to have been the 
paramount factor in deciding the case. The courts there take the view 
that a dealer is  en tit led  to pass on to purchasers anything that looks 
l ik e  a car: whether i t  is  functioning or not appears to be irre levan t.
It  is  submitted that inasmuch as used cars are more lik e ly  to be 
defective in some way, the fa c t that a car which is  represented by the 
dealer to be in good working condition should be discovered to be wholly 
defective, incapable o f se lf-p ropu ls ion , a matter of hours a fte r i t  has 
been bought, must be s u ff ic ie n t evidence that there has been a fundamental 
breach o f contract as in Koreales v. Vallie (above).
The problem of unfairness in  standardized contracts fo r the sale of 
goods is  not lim ited to exclusion clauses. In Mangm v. SCOA 
the p la in t if f  entered into a written agreement with the defendants which 
he understood to be a contract fo r the sale’ of a “Peugot 404' car on the 
19th of August 1969. -He paid s ix  hundred thousand CFA francs as a deposit 
fo r the car. The defendant motor-dealers ordered the car but eventually 
sold i t  to another o f th e ir c lie n ts  when i t  arrived, whereupon the p la in t if f  
brought th is action fo r  breach of contract. The defendants re lie d  on a 
clause w ritten 1 n very small p rin t 1 n the ir contract form which provided 
that the agreement entered Into was merely to order a car and not an 
agreement fo r the sa le of a car. I t  fu rther stipu lated that any deposit 
was paid on those terms. The Buea High Court in holding fo r the
56. Suit No. WC/93/69, 1970, Buea Hight Court (unreported).
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defendant, said that the p la in t if f  was mistaken as to the nature of the 
transaction which was not a sale and that provided the defendants 
refunded the p la in t if f 's  deposit, they were not in  breach of the agreement. 
I t  is  evident, however, that the p la in t if f  paid the deposit on the under­
standing that he was entering into a contract o f sa le. The defendants 
must have also known th is but because of the afore-mentioned clause they 
inserted into the ir standardized contract, they knew they could proceed 
to s e ll the car to a d iffe ren t buyer without any qualms, which they 
successfu lly  did. Although the point that adequate notice as to the 
existence of that pa rticu la r clause was not given to the p la in t if f  was 
not argued by him, the Court ought to have taken th is into consideration, 
p a rt icu la r ly  in  view of the fac t that i t  is  an unusual clause. Few buyers 
i f  any would pay a deposit fo r a car i f  i t  was not going to be sold to 
them at the end of the day. I t  is  un like ly  that most Cameroonians would 
read the fin e -p r in t of a sales agreement, le t  alone to appreciate the 
d is t in c t io n  between an agreement to order a car and an agreement to se ll 
a car.
The only case which was discovered in  which a Court in the English 
speaking part of Cameroon Introduced the notion of reasonableness of 
contract clauses is  that of Kcndu v. Cameroon International Co. Ltd.
The p la in t if f  In th is case paid fo r a deep-freezer but up to s ix  months 
la te r  he had not obtained delivery of the deep-freezer. In an action 
fo r breach of contract, the defendants contended that i t  was the practice , 
which was made known to the p la in t if f ,  that th e ir  customers had to wait 
fo r some time before obtaining delivery and that this was Indeed a term
57. Suit No. HCSW/12/78, 1979, High Court, Kumba (unreported).
of th e ir  contract with the p la in t i f f .  The Court held that such a term 
must be subject to a condition of reasonableness and that in this case, 
s ix  months was an unreasonably long time to wait fo r delivery.
A widespread complaint made by Cameroonian consumers against se lle rs 
is  that although most of them s e ll valuable items such as cars with 
guarantees, the guarantee clauses are often not respected or are construed 
very re s t r ic t iv e ly  by the se lle rs . Two decisions of the Yaounde courts 
in the French speaking part of the country demonstrate th is point. In 
Levendia Athanaae o/ SHO A fricau to ,^ ^  the appellant bought two cars from 
the respondents. Clause 7 of the respondents' standard sales agreement 
provided that the cars were sold under a guarantee fo r twelve months or 
f if te e n  thousand kilometres, whichever was longer. Before th is guarantee 
had run out, various parts o f the car were replaced in  the respondents' 
garage and the respondent bought a claim before the Yaounde F ir s t  Instance 
Court fo r the cost of the replaced parts. The Court of F ir s t  Instance held 
that the guarantee clause did not cover such replacements but that 
decision was reversed J>y the Yapunde Court of Appeal which held that such 
a lim ita t io n  of the guarantee clause was improper.
A good many of the guarantee clauses examined provided that the
guarantee covers only major defects. That was the case in  Kundr.m Simon 
159)a/ SHO AfrioanU>, 1 where the guarantee clause, s im ila r to the one above 
provided that only major defects In the car were covered. Before the 
guarantee expired, the car developed minor fau lts  which were repaired by 
the defendant and paid fo r by the p la in t if f .  Thereafter, a series of 589
58. A ffa ire  No. 25/72, 1973, Cour d'Appel, Yaounde', (unreported).
59. Judgment No. 55 du Janvier, 22, 1974, Grande Instance, Yaounde 
(unreported).
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fau lts developed in  the car which, taken separately, were minor but which, 
taken together, were major. The p la in t if f  then instructed the defendants 
to se ll the car and the la t te r  did so fo r the sum of s ix  hundred thousand 
CFA francs. However, they only tendered to the p la in t i f f  eighty s ix  
thousand CFA francs, claiming that the balance, five  hundred and fourteen 
thousand francs, covered the cost of repairs. The Yaounde High Court held 
that the defects in  the car were covered by the guarantee clause and 
further held that in any event such a lim ita tion  of the guarantee was 
unfa ir. In the words of the Court, the defendant had acted in an 
"abusive, arb itra ry and un justified" manner. This is  i l lu s t ra t iv e  of 
the high-handedness with which dealers treat consumers.
A c la ss ic  example of th is high-handedness is  the case of Bmaaerieo 
du Cameroon v. Mokake E l a l i . ^ '  In 1970, an agreement was entered into 
between the appellant brewers and the respondent, whereby the former were 
to supply the la t te r  with the ir drinks, which the la t t e r  sold on a 
commission basis. Sometime thereafter, some of the respondent's customers 
complained that they h'ad bought unwholesome beer from the la t te r 's  o ff-  
licence shop. The respondent wrote to the appellants about i t  and the 
la t te r  sent-him five  bottles of beer as compensation which he refused to 
accept. In 1973, the respondent again received many complaints about the 
unwholesomeness of the drinks he sold, complaints which were corroborated 
by the loca l health superintendent. As a resu lt, the p la in t if f  began 
losing a lo t  of h1s custom. He therefore wrote to the D irector of the 
local branch of the appellant company expressing h is concern. Consequently,
60. Civ. Appeal No. CASWP/14/79, 1980, Buea Court of Appeal (unreported).
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the appellants stopped supplying him with the ir products whereupon he 
brought an action fo r breach of contract. It must be pointed out that 
the appellants, who account fo r about seventy per cent of the country's 
tota l drink production, enter into s im ila r agreements with small re ta ile rs  
a ll over the country. A card is  issued by the company to the re ta ile r  
containing the re ta ile r 's  address and a code number. The High Court judge 
held that the issuing of that card, along with the subsequent practice 
of de livering  the ir drinks at the respondent's shop, constituted a 
de fin ite  agreement which the appellant had b r e a c h e d . T h e  company 
appealed, contending that the issu ing  of the card and the subsequent 
course of conduct were in su ff ic ie n t to imply a continuing contract between 
the pa rtie s , and that each delivery by them constituted a separate 
contract of sa le. The Buea Court o f Appeal (conmon law ju r isd ic t io n )  
agreed with the appellants. Thus, in  spite of the fac t that the company's 
action in  ceasing supplies was an a c t of v ic tim iza tion  fo r the p la in t if f 's  
ju s t if ie d  complaints, and regardless of thé course of conduct of the parties 
which was consistent fo r four years., the Court o f Appeal held that there 
was no defin ite  contract between the parties.
Hence,-by de liberate ly  eschewing defin ite  terms from th e ir contracts, 
the company can therefore breach an agreement entered into with re ta ile rs  
at th e ir pleasure with absolute Impunity. The Court of Appeal decided 
th is case purely in  terms of o ffe r and acceptance, paying no attention to 
the reasonableness of the agreement, neither to the fac t that numerous 
other re ta ile rs  w il l  be equally affected. 61
61. The High Court judge re lied  p a rt ly  on the p rin c ip le  of equitable
estoppel, and cited Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. Mi ah Trees
House L td . 11947) 1 K X ------------------- ----------------------------------J----------
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F: Evaluation of the Cameroonian Pos it ion :
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the Cameroonian courts in 
dealing with standardized contracts w il l  be dealt with in the la s t 
chapter of th is  thesis. However, some conclusions can be drawn right 
away from the above discussion. The f i r s t  is  that although the law of 
contract in Cameroon is  patterned on the law contract in England and 
France, both the anglophonic, i .e .  the comnon law ju r is d ic t io n , and the 
francophonic, the c iv i l  law ju r is d ic t io n , have not re a lly  applied the 
techniques used by English and French law in  coping with the problems of 
standardized contracts. Not in a s ing le  case have the Cameroonian courts 
attempted to deal with the prelim inary problem of incorporation of terms 
into the contract as have both the English and French courts.
In the contro l of exemption and lim ita t io n  clauses, the English 
doctrine of fundamental breach was not mentioned in any of the cases in 
the Cameroonian courts of Common Law tra d it io n . Neither is  the concept 
of a "serious fa u lt"  ( i.e . faute lourde o r’ faute dolosive) re lie d  upon 
by French courts used-in the francophonic courts. The la t te r , however, 
in  the manner o f the French courts, are quite astute in holding a 
businessman, l ia b le  where 1 n a sale of goods contract, the good had a 
hidden defect.
Secondly,'the concept of freedom o f contract,and it s  co ro lla ry , 
the sanctity o f contract s t i l l  have a cardinal ro le to play in  Cameroon, 
although the ir importance fo r the law of contract 1n both England and 
France has withered Immensely. One would have expected that in view of 
the severe socio-economic and cu ltu ra l problems already alluded to that 
are prevalent in  Cameroon, i . e .  i l l i t e r a c y  which affects about eighty per
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cent of the population, vast d ispa rit ie s  in  economic power e tc ., the 
courts would impose s t r ic te r  controls over standardized contracts.
In Ukpai Meoha v. AGIP (Cameroon), the court recognised the fact 
that the p la in t i f f 's  i l l i t e r a c y  was the cause of his misapprehension of 
the terms of the contract, the court was merely apologetic about i t  and 
no r e l ie f  given whatsoever.
Rather unfortunately, the ava ilab le cases do not permit a more 
thorough andelaborate study of the way exclusion clauses in  pa rticu la r 
are dealt with by the courts. However, the cases examined above prove 
that both the courts of the common law and the c iv i l  law trad itions in  
Cameroon do not look at the reasonableness of such clauses. To be sure, 
rarely have the p la in t if f s  raised th is point. However, that does not 
explain why the courts, whose duty is  a fte r a l l  to dispense ju s tice , do 
not take the reasonableness of the clauses in  dispute in  enforcing them.
In th is  regard, Cameroon 1s not alone. A cursory look at the
decisions o f the Courts of a few other African countries reveal the
same ju d ic ia l a t t itu d f. In a study of the ju d ic ia l treatment of exclusion
clauses in  Sudan, Zaki Mustapha -concludes that: "one can say that the 
general attitude of our courts ( i.e .  Sudanese courts) to exemption
clauses, as usual, has been a fa ir ly  unsettled one, lacking in con­
sistency and proceeding on no clear p r in c ip le ."  He further states that:
"Our courts have shown no serious Inc lina tion  to go into the merits of 
exemption clauses or to question the ir reasonableness or con sc ionab ility ,"(62 3 64) 
The Nigerian courts also simply follow the English ju d ic ia l attitude 
towards such contracts, taking l i t t l e  account (except in  the case of 
I l l i t e r a te  parties as explained above) of local factors.
62. Note (4) supra.
63. Zaki MustaphaT note (10), supra at pp. 166-167.
64. See Achike. Nigerian Law of Contract (Enugu, 1972), pp. 106-113.
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In other c iv i l  Law ju r isd ic t io n s  in A fr ica , the ta le  is  the same.
In one Tchadian Court of Appeal case ,^ ^  the p la in t if f  dispatched 
goods through the "Unitchadienne" - the National Railway Company. He 
was issued with a t ic k e t which contained a lim ita t io n  clause. The 
p la in t i f f  contended that he did not read the clause which was written 
on the back of the t ic k e t. The court held that i t  was firm ly  established 
by case law that such a clause was en tire ly  le g a l, provided i t  stipulated 
that the minimum legal indemnity was payable. That the p la in t if f  did 
not read i t  was immaterial. A s im ila r case in  the Republic of Congo 6^^  
was s im ila r ly  decided. The reasons fo r the fa ilu re  of the Cameroonian 
courts (and these may be equally va lid  fo r the other ju r isd ic t io n s  
mentioned above), w il l  be looked at in  the la s t chapter. However, i t  
would appear that they have not found a strong conceptual basis to 
ju s t if y  interference with contracts. An elaboration of such a conceptual 
basis is  the task of the next chapter on uoconscionability. The princip le 
of unconscionability has in  recent years been resorted to pa rticu la r ly  
by Anglo-American Courts whose chequered treatment of standardized 
contracts by the use of "covert too ls ' such as s t r ic t  in terpretation 
and the doctrine of fundamental breach made i t  d i f f i c u l t  to say the least 
fo r businessmen, consumers and even lawyers a like  to ascertain when a 
standardized contract w il l be upheld by the courts or n o t J 6^
65. Cour d'Appel de Fort Lamy, 24 Octobre 1969, P^nant, 1972, v o l. 82. 
p. 393.
66. Cour d'Appel de B ra zzav ille , 12 janv le r 1968, Pdnant, 1970, vol. 80, 
p. 472.
67. See Chapter Three generally.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
"UNCONSCIQNABILITY"IN STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS 
Section 1: H istory of "Unconscionabllity1'
Although I t  is  only recently that 1t has emerged in the lim e light 
1n legal lite ra tu re , the concept o f unconscionabiUty has existed since 
the early  years o f the common law. The concept was never unequivocally 
spe lt out but various aspects of i t  were manifested not only in the 
early w ritings but also 1n some o f the decisions. There were three 
strands to the doctrine: the Roman law concept of "laesio enormis"; 
the medieval theory o f the " ju s t price" which was the common law 
adaptation of the "laesio  enorm1 s " i the refusal to enforce contracts 
on the grounds o f Inadequacy o f consideration 1 n the early part of 
the eighteenth century.
The beginnings of the concept o f unconscionabllity go back as far 
as Roman Law which provided for the doctrine o f "laesio enormis", a 
doctrine Inspired by the moral Ideas whlctf proposed a fa ir  exchange 
as the ideal o f a contract. The doctrine was however of very lim ited 
app lication since 1 t  provided that 1 n the sale of land, the vendor 
could demand rescission I f  the p rice  received was less than ha lf of the 
value o f the land. The doctrine was therefore very narrow In scope but 
the underlying, moral Idea that a contract could be rescinded because I t  
was unconscionable was of cardinal Importance. The doctrine could be 
broadened to Incorporate the sale o f Immovables and that 1 s precisely 
what legal scholars and theologians did during the medieval period 
1 n developing a concept of " ju s t p rice".
1. T. Aquinas: Commentarla In X. Llbros Ethlcorum and Nlcomachum. 
11b. v. Lect. 7.8.9 Parma Ed o f Omnia XXI, 10B, 171, 1727“
The concept o f " ju st price" owes it s  formulation to the Scholastics, 
most notably to Thomas Aquinas^  and A lbert Magnus who based the ir 
comments on A r is to t le 's  "Nlcomechean Eth ics", where he makes the point 
that contractual ju s tice  requires that there must be an equivalence 
between what 1 s given and what 1 s received and that any exchange which 
v io la tes th is  ru le  1s an unfair one. A r is to t le 's  position  could be 
Interpreted from a Marxist point of view to mean that the ju s t price
i
of a product should correspond to the cost of production which In 
mediaeval England would have considered mainly o f labour costs. That 
was not however Aquinas's position fo r he stated that the ju s t price
Is "the one, which at a given time, can be gotten from the buyers assuming
( 2)common knowledge and 1n the absence of a l l fraud and coercion". ' This 
has been taken to mean that Aquinas upheld the market p rice . It  must be 
remembered however that the notion of a market then was not the abstract 
notion o f a market known today, but was lim ited to the physical place 
where exchange law fu lly  took place. Underlying h1s position 1s the 
supposition that there Is perfect competition In the market, although 
the expression was not used un til the 16th century by Louis de Mollner. 
There 1s also a stress oh the absence of any fraud or undue Influence.
He further stated that the " ju s t price of things 1s not fixed with 
mathematical p recis ion , but depends on a kind o f estimate, so that a 
s lig h t addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the Equity 
of Justice .
2. Comments on Sumna Theologlca, 11.11 qu 77 a rt 1 (Leonine ed ition,
v l,  1949) c f  Lewis Watt, "The Theory Lying Behind the H is to rica l 
Concept o f the Just P rice", In V.A. Dumant, ed, The Just Price, 
(London, 1930) p. 69. ------------------
3. Sumna Theologlca. Part 2 Q 77 a rt 1 a t 320 [Fathers o f the English 
Dominican Province Translation, 1929],
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La ter scholastic doctors followed In th is vein and by the 16th 
century price was adjudged to be fixed  by "conmon estimation" which of 
course, assumed the existence of a perfectly  competitive market.
Whenever the market fa iled  to function properly, fo r Instance in the 
case o f a monopoly, 1 n the view of the scho lastics, the le g is la to r 
had to step 1n and regulate the p rice . The price would thus be the 
"legal p rice". The scholastics were therefore a t one 1n the condemnation 
of any practices which were deleterious to the maintenance of competition. 
The only way o f ensuring that the " ju s t price" was arrived at was the 
adoption of a po licy which encouraged competition. Thus, peasants were 
encouraged to take the ir products s tra igh t to the market and se ll them 
there, thus elim inating middlemen.
Some commentators,like Horwltz, have argued that there was, from 
the medieval period up un til the 18th century the Idea that things
(4)had the ir proper value, Independently o f the operation o f market fo rc e s /  1 
He thus puts forward the view that there existed 1n pre-19th century 
contract law, a substantive notion o f consideration. Others such as 
Simpson argue that no such notion existed; and that on the contrary, 
the value o f the product depended on the market.'4 5  ^ Given the restr ic ted  
meaning of market 1n pre-19th century economy and the fac t that the 
le g is la to r could Intervene and Impose a legal p rice whenever the market 
did not function properly, the question then 1s whether these seemingly 
an tithe tica l points of view cannot a fte r a l l  be reconciled. I t  has 
already been pointed out that Intervention came about e ither as a
4. Horwltz; "The H is to rica l Foundations of Modern Contract Law",
87 Harv. L. Rev (1974), p. 917.
5. A.W. Simpson; "Horwltz and the H istory of Contracts", 46 Unlv. o f 
Chicago L. Rev., (1979), 633.
re su lt o f unfa ir competition or as a re su lt of an Imbalance created 
by e ither an unusually heavy demand or poor conditions of supply.
In the absence o f these facto rs, the "communisaestimatio" which 
determines the p rice  w il l surely approximate more or less to the value 
of the product I t s e lf  In the eyes of the consumers. Any price 1n 
excess o f that would surely be unconscionable.
Although the philosophical w ritings during th is  period did not 
on the ir own determine the course o f contract law, I t  1 s f a ir  to say 
as Professor Simpson points out, that academics and philosophers have 
Influenced the growth and development of the common law much more than 
is  made out 1n the standard text books on c o n t r a c t . T h u s ,  the 
" ju s t price" of the medieval period found Its way Into the substantive 
doctrine o f consideration and u ltim ate ly  Into the equitable doctrine 
of unconsclonablUty.
Horwitz asserts that eighteenth century courts accepted the 
"substantive doctrine of consideration". $1mpson contends that th is  
point o f view cannot be vindicated for the evidence 1n support of the 
"Horwitz thesis" 1s not unequivocal. Nevertheless, an examination of 
some of the eighteenth century cases bring out two points:
(1) The courts refused to grant a decree o f sp e c if ic  performance where 
the facts o f the case pointed to an Imbalance 1n the exchange and what 
the p la in t if f  got a t best was substitu tionary r e l ie f .
(2) Where the Imbalance resulted from in equa lity  of bargaining power 
of the parties on ly , no r e l ie f  was granted a t a l l .  Some 18th century 
cases I llu s tra te  these points. 67
6. W. Ashley, Economic History and Theory. (1931) pp. 132-148.
7. Simpson, note 5 supra.
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(8)In Barradieton v. Linguood, ' there was an agreed sale for the 
remainder o f an estate for £300. I t  was established that the value of 
the estate was much more than the price paid and the vendor brought 
an action to set aside the sale while the purchaser brought a cross 
action fo r sp e c if ic  performance. Lord Hardwlcke, Lord Chancellor, held 
that the question whether fraud existed or not was Immaterial fo r " 1 f 
i t  1 s only a hard bargain or unreasonable bargain, that 1 s a reason 
su ff ic ie n t why th is  Court w il l  not give Its Assistance". He held that 
the consideration fo r the estate was so small that 1 t  rendered the sale 
Inva lid .
(Q)
S im ila r ly , 1n Tounaend v. Warrent K ' and 1843 case, an action was 
brought to set aside the purchase o f an estate which was sold for an 
Inadequate p rice . Although the court refused to set aside the contract, 
1 t  referred 1 t  to a master to enquire I f  the sale was at an undervalue 
and 1 f  so, to require the purchaser's representatives to pay the 
d ifference. In Savile v. Savil, the contract was not set aside 
e n tire ly . A bidder had offered to pay £10,500 fo r "Halifax House" In 
St. Jaméis Square and had paid a deposit of £1000. Lord Macclesfie ld
L.C. held that a party would not be bound to pay an unreasonable price 
fo r an estate. The court however gave re stitu tionary  r e l ie f  tantamount 
to an award o f liqu idated damages to the vendor by upholding a fo rfe itu re  
o f the deposit. The remedy sought by the vendor - sp e c if ic  performance- 
was not awarded. In Underuood v. H i t o h o x a case 1n which spec ific  
performance was sought fo r a contract for the sale of an estate, the Lord 8910
8 . 2 AtK, 133 27 Eng Rep. p. 669 (1740)
9. 6 Ir Eq R. 629, 14 Digest o f Eng Case Law 1407 (1843)
10. 1 P.Wmb 745 24 Eng Rep 596 (1721)
11. 1 Ves Ser. 249; 27 Eng Rep 1031 (1749)
-232-
Chancellor said: "undoubtedly every agreement o f which there should
be sp e c if ic  performance, ought to be 1n w riting , ce rta in , and fa ir
1n a l l  Its  parts, and fo r adequate consideration. He further said
that mere valuable consideration was not enough. The same decision
11?)
was reached 1n Buxton v. L ie te r , '  which dea lt w ith the sale of 
chatte ls.
In some other cases however d iffe ren t decisions were arrived at
by the 18th century courts. Hence, the evidence fo r  the Horwltz
(13)
thesis does not go uncontroverted. In Heathcote v . Paignon, 1 the
Lord Chancellor said "[1 ]f there Is such Inadequacy as to show that
the person did not understand the bargain he made, or was so oppressed
that he was glad to make 1 t ,  knowing Its Inadequacy, 1 t  w il l shew a
command over him which may amount to fraud. I f  the transaction be
such as marks an over-reaching on one side, an Im becility  on the
other, 1 t  puts the parties 1n such a s itua tion , as to show I t  could
not have taken place without superior power on the one side over the
other". Although the sale o f the annuity In th is  case was set aside
for Inadequacy of price , the reasons given were d iffe ren t from the
reasons In Undewood v. H itohox  which was based en tire ly  on Inadequacy
(14)
o f p rice . The decision 1n Guynne v. Heaton' ' was s im ila r ly  decided. 
In an action  for r e l ie f  against a conveyance, Lord Thurlow said "To 
set aside a conveyance, there must be an Inequality so strong, gross 1234
12. 3 A ik 338, 26 Eng Rep. 1020. Ch. (1746)
13. 2 Brocc 167, 29 Engl Rep. 96 Ch. (1778) at p. 100.
14. 1 Bro cc 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 949.(178Q
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and manifest, that i t  must be Impossible to state I t  to a man of 
common sense, without producing an exclamation at the inequa lity  of 
I t “ .
Towards the end o f the lbth Century therefore a contract could be 
set aside only when there was an Imbalance which suggested fraud or
undue Influence, and not merely on the ground that there was an
{ 1 5 1
inadequacy of consideration. 1
The question of price 1s simply one aspect o f unconsclonabllity 
1n contracts. Other cases point to the fac t that the courts have 
In one way or the other Interfered with contracts 1n the teeth of 
the pa rtie s ' Intentions. This Is pa rticu la r ly  so In fo r fe itu re  and 
penalty cases where equitable r e l ie f  has always been given by the 
courts, notwithstanding the c la r it y  o f the terms of the contract, 
so long as the court considered the terms unconscionable.
In R» Dixont Heytiee v. D i x o n Rigby L .J . said: "The Court 
of Chancery gave r e l ie f  against the strictness of the corrmon law 1n 
cases o f penalty or fo rfe itu re  fo r  non-payment of a fixed  sum on a 
day ce rta in , on the p rin c ip le  that fa ilu re  to pay the p rin c ipa l on 
a certa in  day could be compensated su ff ic ie n t ly  by payment of principa l 
and In terest with costs a t a subsequent day."
This Is not the place to Investigate the whole maze o f equitable 
remedies which’ protected parties from the unreasonableness of contractual 
terms. The main concern here 1s to show that unreasonableness and 156
15. With the development of the doctrine of consideration 1n the 
19th century, the p rin c ip le  that a court w il l not 1n general 
enquire Into adequacy of consideration was formulated.
16. [1900] 2 Ch. 561 at 576.
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unconscionabWty were the o rig ina l basis fo r the courts' interference 
with contracts. This is  evident from the cases discussed above. The 
courts Increasingly became formalized 1n the nineteenth century and 
th is  process made them less astute to refer to vague notions such as 
unconsc1onab1Hty or fa irness. The end product of th is  was the 
development o f  other techniques w h ich .Iron ica lly , sometimes led to 
the s tr ik in g  down of contracts which were qu ite f a ir  and reasonable.
An example o f th is  was the development of the ru le against co lla te ra l 
advantages which came under attack from Lord Halsburg 1n Samuel v. 
Javrah Timber Co. He said "A perfectly  f a i r  bargain made between
two parties to 1 t ,  each of whom was quite sensible as to what they 
are doing, 1 s not to be performed because a t the same time a mortgage 
arrangement was made between them". Decades la te r , a s im ila r resu lt 
was arrived a t  through the doctrine of fundamental breach 1 n the 
celebrated case of H arbutt'e P la s t ic in e  Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump 
Co. L td .,  as already observed In Chapter Three.
SECTION TWO "Unconsclonability" : The P rin c ip le
From the current lite ra tu re  and the Innumerable statutory enact­
ments, p a rt ic u la r ly  In the United States of America; and through the 
Influence o f a great many judges, notably Lord Denning and Lord 
Devlin, I t  can safe ly be said that contract law has undergone a 
volte-face from Its e a r lie r  stance and the p rin c ip le  of unconsclon­
a b il it y  has become very much in the forefront of contractual analysis. 17
17. [1904] A.C. 323.
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While th is  fact has become incontrovertib le , a great deal of con 
troversy looms as regards what the p rin c ip le  should consist of.
Princip les and Rules
Although courts have always acknowledged the use of general
standards (for tha t is  a fte r all what the law is  made up of ) ,  i t
was Professor Dworkin who brought into the forefront of legal analysis
(18)the v ita l role o f  princip les in Anglo-American Law. ' Dworkin 
distinguishes f i r s t  of a ll between standards such as ’ p rin c ip le s ' 
and 'p o lic ie s ' on the one hand, and 'ru le s ' on the other. P rinc ip les 
(used here generica lly  to cover standards other than ru les) form a 
residuary category of standards and they do not completely dispose 
of cases the way rules do. He says a ru le , such as one imposing a 
maximum speed l im it  is  applicable in an a ll-or-noth ing  manner.
A rule therefore either applies to a situation  or contributes nothing 
to the decision. To be sure, even fo r a ra le  to apply in th is 
manner, a l l it s  exceptions have to be Incorporated in it s  formulation. 
To illu s tra te  th is  point, Dworkin discusses two cases: In the 1889 
New York case o f Riggs v. Palmar, a  beneficiary to a w ill murdered 
the testator, h1s grandfather. In the absence of any ru le governing 
the s itua tion , the court re lied  on the p rin c ip le  that "no man shall *19
T8. Dworkin: Taking Rights Serious ly . (Duckworth, 1977) pp.22-39 
Roscoe Pound distinguished between "standards" on the one hand 
and "p r in c ip le s", "rule" or "conception" on the other. Hence 
he terms "standard" what Dworkin terms "p rin c ip le ". See Pound, 
"Theory of Jud ic ia l Decision", 36 Harv L. Rev. 641, 645-46 
(1923)
19 • Dworkin, p. 24.
20., 115, N.Y. 506, 22 N.E 188 [1889].
be permitted to p ro f it  by his own fraud, or to take advantage of 
h is own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own in iq u ity , or to 
acquire property by his own crime". The court consequently held that
the murderer could not receive the inheritance.
. (211In the more modern case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Ino.
the question turned on the extent to which an automobile manufacturer 
could lim it  h is  l i a b i l i t y  in case the automobile was defective. An 
accident was caused and personal in ju r ie s  sustained due to defects 
in the automobile. The court, in holding that the manufacturer could 
not re ly  on the lim ita tion  of h1 s l ia b i l i t y ,  grounded it s  decision on 
three p rin c ip les: ( 1 ) that the courts w il l not themselves be used as 
instruments of inequity and in ju s tice ; (2) that "the courts generally 
refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a 'bargain' in which 
one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of 
the o th e r..."  (3) that "the manufacturer is  under a special ob ligation 
in connection with the construction, promotion and sale of h is cars". 
Thus, the d irections given by p rin c ip les  d if fe r  in character from the 
d irections given by ru les. Dworkin further points out that p rin c ip les 
have a dimension of weight and importance which rules do not have.
As in the Henningsen case, many p rin c ip les may in tersect and such 
cases may only be resolved by taking into consideration the re la t ive  
importance of p rin c ip le s . In Henningsen, the protection of consumers 
was the overrid ing p rin c ip le . Dworkin concludes therefore that in 
"hard cases", where no settled ru le 1 s recognised, a proper decision 
can only be arrived at through an argument of p rin c ip le . 21
21. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A 2d 69 [I960].
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A1though the term "p rin c ip le " has been so far used here to denote 
standards other than ru les, Dworkin makes the d is tin c tion  between a 
p rin c ip le  and a po licy . _ A p rin c ip le  is  a standard which is  adhered 
to irrespective of the advancement of any particu la r goal. It is  
applied because i t  is  a requirement of ju s t ic e , fa irness, or any other 
dimension of m orality. A po licy  however is  a standard which sets 
out a goal to be attained, notably some economic, p o lit ic a l or social 
improvement of the community.
It is  in th is  respect that unconscionability can be described 
as a p rin c ip le  in the broader sense. On the one hand, i t  prescribed
that there should be a certa in standard of fa irness not merely in
(221commercial transactions, but also in consumer transactions. ' On 
the other hand, i t  takes the form of a p o licy , v iz . to ensure that 
consumers w il l  not be unduly exploited by the offers of goods and 
services. Unfortunately, such goals have usually been put forward 
in a very se lf-ev ident manner and not much-effort has been put in 
by researchers who posit them to give them the necessary precision 
and exp lic itness. In the f i r s t  place what is  posited abstractly  as 
a goal may simply be a substitu tion of the values held by a c la ss 
of people. The 19th century and early 20th century formulation of 
the p rinc ip le  of freedom of contract and 'taveat emptor,,were 
undoubtedly a re fle c tio n  of the values of a small class - the 
business community- but I t  had it s  greatest Impact on the consumers. 
It  Is 1n th is  regard that public opinion is  Indeed relevant. In 
determining legal standards, i f  resort Is had to abstract eth ica l
22. What this standard of fairness should be and how it is arrived
at will be the subject of this chapter.
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standards, i t  then becomes easy to substitute the values of a pa rticu la r 
group fo r those of the society at large. If on the other hand resort 
is  had to public opinion, i t  then becomes possible to bring into 
ju d ic ia l consideration the broader socia l and economic interests 
of the public at large. This has been the case in the sphere of 
i l le g a l and immoral contracts. Such contracts had been made 
unenforceable by the courts not merely in the interests of the 
parties to the contract but for the benefit of the public. To be 
sure, the question may be asked as to how public opinion is  monitored 
and stated. This question w il l  be delved into la te r but su ffice 
i t  to say that fo r the purposes of unconscionability many factors 
w ill have to be taken into consideration.
In recent years, there have been a good many a rt ic le s  and 
comments on the p rin c ip le  of unconscionability. The breadth of 
meaning academics and even judges give to the concept ju s t if ie s  the 
point which was made e a r lie r ,  that the p r in c ip le  has not been posited 
with as much explic itness.and precision as would be required for i t s  
p ractica l working. This fact lends weight to the contention 
that uncons.cionability is  an amorphous and meaningless concept. 
Furthermore, by not defining the precise parameters of the p r in c ip le , 
some commentators fear that too wide a la titude  w il l be given to 
those charged with it s  enforcement, thus making the princ ip le  l ia b le  
to abuse. Some however object to having a concrete de fin ition  of 
the p rin c ip le  fo r various r e a s o n s . T h e  f i r s t  reason is  that i t  is  *9
23. J.C. Fort: "Understanding UnconsclonablUty: Defining the P rin c ip le "
9 Loyola Univ. L .J . (1978) at p. 765.
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doubtful whether there can emerge from the various commentaries and 
cases which have a bearing on the p rin c ip le  any d e fin it ion  which 
can cover a l l  possible cases that may f a l l  under the ambit of the 
p rin c ip le . Even i f  i t  were possib le, the d e s ira b il ity  is  questioned 
f i r s t  of a l l  because by formulating s t r ic t  d e f in it io n s , the p rin c ip le  
of unconscionability may take the form of a ru le  which as was 
discussed e a r lie r , is  applicable in an a ll-o r-no th ing  manner. From 
the f i r s t  chapter i t  was seen that the ta le  o f the law of contract 
has been one of in f le x ib i l i t y  of doctrines, an in f le x ib i l i t y  resulting 
large ly from the reduction of p rinc ip les in to  s t r ic t ly  adhered to 
ru les. The p rin c ip le  of unconscionability has had it s  antecedents in 
the common law doctrines of fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. 
However once they were reduced into spec ific  ru les , these concepts 
became water-tight and could not cover the so rt of unfairness that 
resulted from the use of standardized contracts. The argument against 
having a s t r ic t  d e fin it io n  of unconscionabjlity is  grounded on the 
assumption that any s t r ic t  de fin it ion  would sooner or la te r become 
outmoded and thus incapable of keeping pace with commercial develop­
ments.
A more fundamental question concerns the d e s ira b ility  of the 
p rin c ip le  of unconsdonability I ts e lf .  The quintessence of the 
p rin c ip le  is  that the parties to a contract must deal with each other 
In good fa ith  as to the formation of the contract and that the 
terms of the contract must be reasonably f a i r .  Certain cr it ic ism s 
may be leve lled  against th is proposition. I t  might f i r s t  of a l l be 
contended that the notions of good fa ith  and fairness are too vague 
to be taken seriously fo r any meaningful app lica tion; secondly i t  
might be said that th is  is  taking a m ora lis tic  position in the law
of contract. Th ird ly, i t  has been suggested that these notions 
can only be applied subjectively by whosoever is  charged with it s  
application (judges and adm inistrators); f in a l ly ,  i t  may be said that 
covert instruments such as statutory in terpretation, misrepresentation 
and the doctrine of fundamental breach have been successfu lly used 
and that the use of the p rin c ip le  of unconscionability may simply 
bring about uncertainty.
Certa in ly, when legal concepts are formulated in categories other 
than ru les, the ir app lication becomes more problematic and uncertain.
This appears however to be a small price to pay for the higher objective 
of arriv ing  at ju st re su lts . It is  t r i t e  to say that equitable notions 
of good fa ith  and fa irness permeate the whole of the law of contract, 
and indeed of the law in general, as evidenced by to rt law and crim inal 
law. The princ ip le  of unconcionability however is  not merely an 
abstract notion but i t  has spec ific  referents which w il l be examined 
in due course.
In most cases, parties acting in an unconscionable manner in 
contracts frustrate the ju s t if ia b le  expectations of the other parties.
They may do so by using th e ir  superior position (as drafters of 
standard contracts) to exp lo it the weaker position of others (pa rticu la rly  
the poor, 111-lnformed and necessitous consumers). Hence, the doctrine 
of unconsclonablUty, although derived from the general requirement 
of good fa ith  and fa irness in contractual re lationships (and in most 
other legal re la tionsh ips), nevertheless has it s  own spec ific  content 
and as such i t  is  a substantive and not an abstract p rin c ip le .
The p rin c ip le  of unconscionability ce rta in ly  has overtones of 
morality, but surely that c r it ic ism  does nothing to inva lidate it s  
v a lid ity  since overtones of morality are prevalent in a l l  other 
branches of the law. The whole of to rt law is  a fte r a ll a general 
standard of what is  so c ia lly  thought to be wrongful c iv i l  conduct; 
so is  the crim inal law. The standards they set encapsulate the 
moral ideas of any given society. In the second chapter, the 
myth that contract law is  d is t in c t because i t  derives it s  source 
from a consensual arrangement has already been exploded, and need 
not be discussed further.
The argument that the p rin c ip le  cannot be ob jective ly  applied 
is  surely the most d i f f ic u lt  to d iscard. This argument is  based on 
the assumption that those charged with i t s  application can only do 
so by re lying on emotional and in te lle c tu a l considerations instead 
of objective factual ones. Unfortunately, a good deal of the cases 
based on the p rin c ip le  both in England and the United States where 
the p rin c ip le  has been most a live  fo r some time, have been dealt with 
on a more or less ad hoc basis and therefore tends to lend weight 
to the above contention. The thesis put forward here however, is  
that although i t  1 s not desirable or even possible to formulate the 
p r in c ip le  in to .ru le s , a conceptual framework can nevertheless be 
established w ithin which there can be an objective application of 
the p rin c ip le .
The basic question to ask in formulating a framework fo r the 
p r in c ip le  is  what concepts are Involved in it ?  What types of contractual 
terms are harsh enough to be rendered unenforceable and what would be 
the yardstick in determining such harshness?
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From most of the discussions on unconsclonability the commentators
appear to be agreed on one point: that there are two aspects to
unconsclonablllty - procedural and substantive unconsclonabilIty, a
(241d is t in c tio n  f i r s t  put forward by Professor L e f f . ' 1 Procedural 
unconsclonablllty refers to the abuses Inherent In the formation of 
the contract and 1 t  has two components: "unfair surprise" which implies 
some sort of deceptive conduct during the formation of the contract, 
and "oppression" which bas ica lly  resu lts  from the adhesive nature of 
standard contracts whereby one party determines the terms of the 
contract while the other party simply takes the contract or leaves 
I t .  Substantive unconsclonablllty re fers to actual unfairness 1n 
the terms of the contract. On the f in a l objection that the use of 
other surreptitious methods have ensured that contracts have been 
f a ir ,  one can only quote Llewellyn 's famous tag that "covert tools 
are never re lia b le  too ls". The attack on un fa ir contracts by such 
devices as construction, fundamental breach etc, make I t  possible 
fo r the draftsman to redraft the clause 1'n such a manner that no leeway 
Is le f t  for the judge to construe the contract against him. More 
Importantly, the use of Such devices Is predicated upon ju d ic ia l 
Intervention. In Cameroon, because of the high costs of lit ig a t io n  
and the nearly complete absence of legal education on the part of the 
consumer population, only an In fin itesim al number o f cases on un­
conscionable contracts ever reach the courts. 24
24, Le ff, A, "Unconsclonablllty and the Code - The Emperor's New 
Clause". 115, University o f Pennsylvania L. Rev. (1967), 485.
With the adoption of the p r in c ip le  of unconsclonablllty however 
other forms of con tro l, such as adm inistrative controls may be envisaged. 
Moreover, 1t w ill give r ise  to a greater p re d ic ta b ility  o f jud ic ia l 
decisions.
Section 3: "UnconscionabHity11: Analysis
As e a r lie r  pointed out, there are two aspects to the p rin c ip le  of 
unconsclonablllty. While the presence of any procedural defect 1s not 
alone su ff ic ie n t to render a contract unenforceable, 1 t Is nevertheless 
of cardinal Importance because as w il l be ascertained from the cases,
In many Instances, substantive unfairness 1 s a d ire c t consequence of 
procedural defects. The documents on which standard contracts are 
printed exh ib it ce rta in  cha racte ris t ics . In the f i r s t  place they are 
not a t a l l  easy to read. The most Important clauses, usually those 
which l im it  or exclude l i a b i l i t y  are often .couched in very ambiguous 
terms 1n very fine  pr1_nt on the back of the form. The contracts hardly 
ever spell out the fa c t that the mere fac t o f appending one's signature 
"on the dotted lin e "  constitutes an acceptance o f a l l the terms therein. 
Thus an unscrupulous door-to-door salesman (p a rticu la r ly  1n hire-purchase 
and Insurance contracts) might, by making vague and worthless promises, 
Induce buyers to enter Into contracts without le tt in g  them appreciate 
the fac t that they are thus committing themselves. The content of the 
contract may also be ambiguous with respect to Its  meaning. I t  is  not 
unusual therefore to find  terms which severely l im it  the guarantee the 
vendor offe rs for h is product or service under the heading "guarantee
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clauses". This leads the ordinary buyer into thinking that he is  being 
given a guarantee while the term in effect denies him any guarantee 
whatsoever.
Secondly, the standard terms do not always contain the complete 
terms of the contract. Reference 1s often made to other terms contained 
1 n documents such as catalogues, notices, gazettes e tc ., which are not 
usua lly  made availab le to the "adhering party" to the contract. 
Unfortunately, such documents usually contain the most important clauses 
such as exclusion clauses. Hence one party enters Into the contract 
without having fu l l knowledge of Its  terms.
I t  has already been seen that,In Cameroon, widespread I l l it e r a c y  
and the nearly complete unawareness of contractual r ig h ts , on the part 
o f most parties to standardized contracts makes th is problem acute 
Indeed. The problem equally ex ists  1n England and France as the section 
on Incorporation of terms Into contracts revealed.
A. Doctrine o f Notice and Disclosure
Proponents of 'procedural unconsclonab lllty 1 hold that the source 
o f unconsclonablllty Is the lack of knowledge o f the nature of the 
terms of the contract. Thus, they c lin g  to the basic bargaining 
hypothesis of contractual formation and assert that I f  a l l  the terms 
o f the contract are properly and conspicuously disclosed, 1 t  would 
re su lt  In a reasonable a llo ca tion  o f r isk s  since there would thus 
e x is t  some form of bargaining or.absent that, 1 t  would g ive the 
adhering party to the contract a basis for exercising any meaningful 
choice.
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The thesis that w il l be put forward here Is that although procedural
unconsc1onab1 1 1 ty Is a component of the unconsclonablllty problem,
1 t  1 s not on Its own a su ffic ie n t analysis o f the entire problem which
as w ill be seen, has more to do with the nature of the market in which
the contract Is made. Nevertheless, d isclosure 1s c le a r ly  very relevant
to the Issue for as Dauer puts 1t: "Knowledge or real comprehension of
the consequences of a jura l act, can be obtained by adequate d isclosure.
And choice, even In an Imperfectly competitive market, can be had by
elim inating the lack o f knowledge, one of the more Insidious of the
entropies o f monopolies, real or a r t i f i c i a l " / 25^
The Idea that a contract could be rendered unenforceable because of
non-disclosure of Its  terms or conditions 1s not new In the law of
contract. The doctrine of d isclosure has been cardinal In Insurance
law since Lord Mansfields decision 1n Carter v. BoehmZ 26 27^
Although the decision was In an Insurance case which has now been
recognised to constitute a separate branch o f law from the general law*
of contract, Lord Mansfield f e lt  he was applying a general contract 
ru le . He said with respect to the requirement of d isclosure that "the 
governing p rin c ip le  Is applicable to a l l contracts and deallngs"^2^ 
and he considered the rule to be drawn from the princip les of natural 
equity. The duty of disclosure Is Imposed to protect the commercial
25. Dauer, "Contracts o f Adhesion 1n the L igh t o f the Bargain 
Hypothesis: An Introduction", S Akron L. Rev. 1, a t 39.
26. 3 Burr 97 English Report.
27. Carter v. Boehm, supra. at p. 1164.
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expectations of good fa ith  and fa ir  conduct In exchange re lationsh ips.
The f i r s t  question to be asked Is, under what circumstances must 
there be a duty to d isc lose any fac t In contract formation? The answer 
to th is  question according to Lord Mansfield was simply whenever good 
fa ith  and fa ir  dealing demanded d isclosure. Such an answer Is however 
so broad that 1t would be without any referents. I f  one looks at the 
insurance contract In which a duty of d isclosure 1 n the formation process 
1s required, ce rta in  facts can be drawn. In the f i r s t  place, I t  Is a 
contract with fundamental Importance to the parties, 1n which a lo t  
of money Is at r is k  and 1 t  1 s also Important 1 n economic planning. 
Secondly, an Insurance contract Is not a simple contract. I t  1s quite 
complicated and usua lly  demands a level of comprehension over and above 
that of an ordinary lay person for Its  terms to be understood. A duty 
to d isclose 1 n any other contract should be predicated upon s im ila r 
circumstances. I t  should be a requirement where the contract in 
question Is one which has some considerable bearing on the economic 
condition of the party concerned. I t  may be contended that th is  approach 
w il l Involve the making of assessments o f the economic weight of 
d iffe ren t contracts which Is not an easy thing to do. The Important 
factor In th is context 1 s the status of the contracting party fo r 
surely the Impact of a particu la r contract, fo r example a c red it 
contract, w il l ’depend on how economically viab le the adhering party 
to the contract 1s. In Cameroon, among such Important contracts are 
finance contracts, contracts for the sale of ag ricu ltu ra l produce 
which are o f p a rt icu la r Importance to the rural population and contracts 
fo r the sale of expensive household and other Items. These are contracts 
which are also much too complicated for the average Cameroonian to read ily  
grasp the ir scope and breadth.
- 247-
Having determined that the duty to d isclose should be required
only in re la t iv e ly  important contracts, the next question is  what
sorts o f facts have to be disclosed? In th is  regard, i t  is  necessary
to delve into case-law and examine what types of facts have been
required to be disclosed. It must be prefaced however that un til
recently , there has not been a general duty to d isclose in contract
law since the problem had not acquired the perspective now given i t
by academics and judges a lik e . Instead, attempts made to require
d isclosure took the form of the doctrine of notice. This doctrine
(291was the mainstay in the decision of Henderson v. Stevenson. '  ' In
that case, i t  was held that exculpatory terms contained in a ticke t 
were not necessarily incorporated into the contract. Lord Chelmsford 
had th is  to say: "I think that such an exclusion of l i a b i l i t y  or 
negligence cannot be established without very clear evidence of the 
notice having been brought to the knowledge of the passenger and 
h is having expressly assented to It.- The’ mere delivery of a ticket 
with a condition endorsed upon It ,1s very fa r , in my opinion, from 
conclusively binding the passenger". Although couched in the c la ss ica l 
manner - 1,.e. requiring assent- what Lord Chelmsford said is  not in 
substance fa r removed from a requirement of d isclosure. The general 
rule being that the offeror should bear l ia b i l i t y  fo r negligence, 
he could not be allowed to pass on th is  onerous re spon s ib ility  to 
the passenger without making I t clear before the contract was entered 
Into. This approach was unfortunately not followed subsequently, since 
la te r the passenger was deemed to have had constructive notice of 29
29, [1875] L.R. 25.
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the terms of the contract.^30 312^
Recently however, the doctrine of notice has again surfaced in
(31)Anglo-American case law." In Lacks v. F id e lity  & Casualty Co. 
the p la in t if f  was not bound by the terms of a f l ig h t  insurance 
policy he had purchased because he had no notice of it s  terms and 
therefore no reason to suspect that h is  f l ig h t  would not be covered 
by the po licy .
The American landmark case of Henningsen v. B loom field Motors 
(321In c . best i l lu s t ra te s  the resurgence of the doctrine of notice or 
disclosure as i t  is  now known. The facts of that case were simple: 
a saloon car was delivered to Mr and Mrs Henningsen and ten days 
la te r , while Mrs Henningsen was driv ing there was an accident caused 
by a mechanical defect in the car in which she sustained personal 
in ju rie s  plus extensive damage to the car. The standard form con­
tained two paragraphs in very fine p rin t to the effect that both 
sides of the standard form made up the contract and the purchaser 
would be deemed to have read and accepted the terms contained therein. 
On the back of the form was a warranty clause stating that the 
manufacturer promised replacing any parts of the car which were 
defective due to workmanship w ithin ninety days of delivery or before 
the car was driven four thousand m iles, whichever occurred f i r s t .  
Concatenating that warranty was an exclusion of any other warranty,
30. Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co. [1877] 2 C.P.D. 416.
31. 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E. 2d 555 [1954]
Also, Steven v. F id e lity  Casualty Co. of New York. 27 Cal Rep. 
172, 337 2'd 11962) 284.------------1-----
32. N.J. 358, 161 2d 69 [I960],
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express or implied. The issues in that case covered the whole scope 
of the doctrine of unconscionability but the immediate concern is 
what the court had to say about d isclosure . Justice Francis narrowed 
the controversy in th is  connection to two essential considerations: 
were the purchasers su ff ic ie n t ly  informed of the nature of the contract 
before entering into the contract? Secondly, granted that the terms 
contained in the form su ff ic ie n t ly  disclosed the nature of the d is ­
cla imer, Justice Francis asked, "...can  i t  be said that an ordinary
layman would rea lise  what he was re linqu ish ing in return fo r what 
(33)he was being granted?"' ' These questions which in the present case 
were answered negatively ra ise an important question - the nature o f 
d isclosure. How is  disclosure to be made? From the discussion of 
standard form contracts in the previous chapter i t  is  evident that 
i f  there is  one place where a manufacturer or salesperson can insert 
a term which he does not want the purchaser to read, i t  is  in the form, 
buried with in  the fin e  p rin t. Therefore.for disclosure to be 
e ffec tive  a lte rna tive  methods must be envisaged. This point is 
a fo r t io r i apt in Cameroon where most consumers are not lite ra te . 
Justice Francis 's reasoning in Henningsen gives much consideration 
to the status of the parties Involved 1n the transaction. The 
purchaser's level of education, h is  acquaintance with the type of 
contract 1n question are c le a r ly  relevant factors. The nature of 
the disclosure a manufacturer would be required to make to a garage 
owner should surely not be the same as that to be made to an ordinary 
purchaser who has l i t t l e  or no knowledge of the market. This is  3
33. Henningsen v. Bloomfield M o to rs ,lo c .c it. at p.92.
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part icu la r ly  so where the term concerns an a lte ra tion  of risk  not
normally expected by purchaser as in Henningsen.
Recently, English. courts have followed in the same vein with
Lord Denning spearheading th is approach. In Jacques v. Lloyd George 
(351S Partners Ltd., the p la in t if f  placed his in te re st in a coffee 
house up for sale with an estate agent. The contract signed by 
the p la in t if f  contained the following term: "(3) Should you be 
instrumental in introducing a person w illin g  to sign a document 
capable of becoming a contract to purchase at a p r ice , which at 
any stage of the negotiations has been agreed by me, I agree to 
pay you a commission of £200 or 1\% . . . "  The agent did introduce 
a w illin g  purchaser and an agreement of sale was entered into but 
i t  subsequently f e l l  through because of an intervening factor fo r 
which neither party was to be blamed. The agent nevertheless claimed 
his commission. In deciding the case against the agent, Lord Denning 
said: "The common understanding of mankind is  that commission Is only 
payable by the vendoc when the. property is  s o ld .. .  I f the agent seeks 
to depart from the ordinary and well understood term, then he must 
make i t  perfectly  p la in  to h is c lie n t . He must bring It home to 
him such as to make sure that he agrees to i t .  When his representation 
produces a printed form and puts It before the c l ie n t  to sign, he 
should explain Its e ffect to him, making i t  c lear that i t  goes beyond 345
34. Such a lte ra tion  of risk  Is one which is  'prima fa c ie 'u n fa ir which 
means that the Issue of disclosure is  not e n t ire ly  saverable from 
substantive unconsclonabillty.
35. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 625.
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the usual understanding In these matters. In the absence of such
explanation, a c lie n t  Is e n tit le d  to assume that the form contains
nothing unreasonable or oppressive. I f  he does not read I t  and
the form Is found afterwards to contain a term which is  wholly
unreasonable and to ta lly  uncertain as th is  is ,  then the estate
(371
agent cannot enforce 1t against the Innocent vendor".' ' Lord 
Denning appears to be suggesting that the mere Inserting of a 
term In the form 1 s not enough and oral d isclosure has to be made.
The same re su lt was arrived a t 1n American Home Improvement Ino. v. 
M a c l v e r where a financing contract did not d isclose the rate 
o f Interest to be paid by the defendant. The decision was however 
not arrived at so le ly  on the grounds of procedural unconsclonabllity.
The problem of procedural unconsclonablUty has also been the 
main Issue In some recent cases which although apparently decided 
on the grounds of a general doctrine of Inequality of bargaining 
power, are on a close reading of the fac ts , arguments and decisions 
Indeed an espousal o f the doctrine of d isc losu re . In the f i r s t  of 
that lin e  of cases* Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, a bank obtained security 
from a father who was quite advanced 1 n age and had been the ir long­
standing customer, to secure the Indebtedness o f his son with the bank.
37. Jaques v. Lloyd George and Partners, supra at pp. 629-630. 
3U. 105 N.h. 435, 201 A 2d 886 2vcc. Rep. Serv. 235 (1964)
39. [1974] 3 W.L.R. 001, discussed by Slayton, "The Unequal 
Bargain doctrine: Lord Denning 1n Lloyds Bank v. Bundy". 
22 McGill L .J. (1976), p.94.
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Th1s was done without d isc los ing  to the father the state of h is  son's 
a f fa ir s .  The security was Invalidated by the Court of Appeal. Sachs 
and Cairns L .J J . rested the ir decisions on established rules re lating 
to confidentia l re la tionsh ips between banker and customer and the 
bank's duty of d isc losure . Lord Denning however, while subscribing 
to the arguments above, sought to cast the Issue on the broader 
basis of inequality o f bargaining power. He said that such a con­
tra c t would be Invalidated when one party 's bargaining power was so 
g rlev lous ly  Impaired by reason of his own needs or desires or by his 
own Ignorance. Clifford Davia Management Ltd. V. W.E.A. Records 
L td .^ Q^ was an appeal against a f i r s t  Instance decision to discharge 
an Interim Injunction restra in ing  W.E.A. Records from Infring ing on 
the p la in t i f f s '  ( 1 .e. the publishers) copyright 1 n the composition of 
a group o f musicians. Lord Denning not only found that the terms of 
the contract were un fa ir , being very one sided, but he attached a 
lo t  of s ign ificance to the lack of Independent advice for the 
musicians when the contract was entered Into. He said at p .69 
that the publishers- were " s k ille d  1 n business and finance", the 
composers were "talented 1n music and song but not In business. In 
negotiation they could not hold the ir own".
Lloyde Bank v. Bundy has been followed In Canada. In Mackenzie 
(42)v. Bank o f Montreal/  '  the p la in t if f  brought an action to set aside
a mortgage on her farm lands and promises executed by her In favour 401
40. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61 (C.A.)
41. [1975] 55 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (Ontario H.C.).
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of the defendant bank to secure the indebtedness of a friend of hers. 
The bank had previously seized the p la in t if f 's  car which had been 
fraudulently chattel-mortgaged by the p la in t if f 's  friend and i t  
refused to release the car even afte r having found out who the true 
owner was. The p la in t if f  went to the bank with the sole purpose of 
getting back her car but the bank's cred it manager made her sign 
a number of forms, one of which was the mortgage 1n Issue. Stark J - • 
quoting extensively Lord Denning 1n Lloyd# Bank v. Bundy, stressed 
the fa c t that no explanations were given to her in  connection with 
the forms she signed. Hence, he concluded that the mortgage could 
not stand.
On a narrow reading of these cases, one might well say that they 
turned on undue Influence since there was, 1 n a l l  of them, some kind 
of confidentia l re lationship between the parties. This is  not however 
the case. Lord Denning maintained 1n Clifford Davie that the 
Independent duty of disclosure arose because of the Inequality of 
bargaining power. _He did not predicate such a duty on any con­
f id en t ia l re lationsh ip . I t  Is contended however that the bargaining 
power element Is merely Incidental. The heart o f the matter Is that 
the parties were not s u f f ic ie n t ly  Informed about the contracts they 
were entering Into and were thus un fa ir ly  surprised. The fact that 
the parties were of unequal bargaining power which Is a fte r a l l  to 
be expected 1n such contracts was not of great moment.
Certain ram ifications derive from these cases. I f  unequal 
bargaining power 1s not the source of th is  type of unconsclonablllty, 
neither 1 s the fact that the terms are enshrined In standard forms
- 254-
a source of the unfairness, and there is  indeed no evidence that
dickering would re su lt In fa ire r  terms. I t  may even be a means
o f achieving price d iscrim ination . The genuine reason for the
unconscionability in  such contracts is  the fa c t that the profferors
allow the other parties to enter Into the contracts without giving
them the opportunity to understand the fu l l im plications of the
terms. The contracts are usually couched 1n arcane legal language
and persons who are not used to such language are usually m isled.
This 1s p a rt icu la r ly  the case in  complex transactions such as
c red it  agreements, Insurance contracts, e tc ., where the firms do
not inform the ir customers about the nature of the r isk s  they are
undertaking. I t  1s therefore only f a ir  that the persons who supply
goods 1 n such contracts, being the knowledgeable parties should be
required to bring to the notice of those who are less knowledgeable
the relevant Information they require 1n order to make rational 
(42)
purchase d e c is io n s/  ' How possib le 1s I t  then to carry out th is
form of d isclosure considering the lite ra c y  and educational
Inadequacies o f the Cameroonian population? This end has to be
reconciled also with the socia l costs that would Inevitab ly arise
In the Implementation o f such a goal« This problem Is compounded
by other cu ltu ra l and psychological facto rs, such as the absence
of any long'term planning cha racte ris tic  o f the majority of the
consumer population, p a rt icu la r ly  the poor. 42
42. Although I t  Is assumed here that I t  1s always the buyer who 
suffers from the unconsclonablllty of the contract, I t  could 
also be the other way round; fo r Instance when small farmers 
se ll th e ir ag ricu ltu ra l produce to In s titu tion s  such as the 
Marketing Board or middlemen.
t ft* ,"»*
For d isclosure to be e ffe c t iv e  In the Cameroonian context, 
Information should be brought d ire c t ly  to the conscious attention 
of the parties p a rt icu la r ly  In the pre-contract stage. I t  is  at 
th is  stage that Information which suppliers know Is most l ik e ly  to 
Influence the purchase decis ions of buyers 1 s usually made and, 
more often than not, such Information Is given o ra lly . Pre-contract 
d isclosure therefore ought to be made o ra lly . In add it ion  to th is 
form o f d isclosure , the necessary Information should also be inserted 
In advertisements. Undoubtedly, th is  proposition Is bound to run 
into d if f ic u lt ie s  because o f the present law of evidence which 
s tipu la tes that parol evidence 1 s not to be adduced to vary written 
evidence. This ru le  therefore has to be abolished when standard 
form contracts are In Issue, so as to protect the adherent's reasonable 
re liance on the disclosed Information. To be sure, abolish ing the 
parol evidence 1s bound to make the law of evidence not on ly con­
trove rs ia l but also d i f f i c u l t  to  ascerta in . Without attempting to 
eschew th is  problem - very much a hot potato--1 t  Is submitted that 
I t  Is not an unreasonable price to pay 1 n order to achieve the 
higher objective of fairness. - This problem can also be obviated 
by the use of adm in istrative supervision of such contracts. Acquiring 
Information Is o f l i t t l e  s ign ificance 1f the Information cannot be 
used 1nchanging purchaser behaviour. I t  may thus be contended that 
because o f the educational and other socia l d is a b il it ie s  e a r lie r  
pointed out which ex is t 1n Cameroon, d isclosure would have l i t t l e  or 
no Impact on general consumer behaviour. This Is however not en tire ly  
true because there w ill be,1n any event, the presence 1n the market 
o f some buyers (or se lle rs  as the case may be) who are educated enough
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to evaluate the Information disclosed ra t io n a lly  and to put i t  
to use. The presence of such buyers therefore protects those 
who cannot make use of such Information since i t  Is not easy 
fo r firms to d istingu ish between these two groups of buyers.
Another somewhat persuasive reason for d isc los ing  Information lie s  
1 n the fac t that even I f  i t  does not in fluence buyer behaviour, 
i t  gives them an opportunity to pa rtic ipa te  ac tive ly  1n the market, 
thereby making contracts look fa ir .  This would enhance the fa ith  
people have 1 n the fairness0f  the market.
I t  has been suggested that although th is  fa irness argument 
has some weight, 1 t  should not be applied In a l l  s itua tions.
I t  1s contended that In a competitive market, 1t Is 1n the Interest 
of Individual firms to fu lly  d isclose th e ir  terms In order to 
obtain a larger share of the market since those who o ffe r better 
terms would obviously capture more customers. This argument requires 
that d isc losu re  regulation should be Imposed only 1n Imperfect 1 .e. 
o lig o p o lis t ic  or monopolistic markets.because 1n such markets It  
Is not 1 n the Interest o f any of the firm s to d isclose any of th e ir 
terms because the rest o f the firms would fo llow  su it ( l.e .  conscious 
para lle lism ) and there w il l therefore be no resu lting  advantage to *43
42a. This cla im  1s analogous to the cla im  that people have a pro­
cedural r igh t to a hearing In a contest which would be d is ­
advantageous to them Irrespective of any substantive righ t to 
be protected. This righ t Is based upon membership o f affected 
persons In the same community. See Mlchelman, "Formal and 
Assoclatlonal Alms In Procedural Due Process", 18 homes 
(1977), p. 126.
43. A. Schwartz & Louis Wilde: "Intervening In Markets on the Basis 
o f Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis", 127 
Un1v. o f Penn. L. Rev, (1979) p. 630.
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any of the firm s. Thus 1n an Imperfect market firms disclose less 
Information about th e ir products than 1s s o c ia lly  optimal.
I t  is  submitted In the f i r s t  place that In Cameroon there 1s a 
tota l absence of perfectly  competitive markets which Involve the 
use of standard form contracts ( th is  has already been discussed in 
Chapter One, on economic In s titu tion s  In Cameroon). Secondly, 
although a market may be competitive on a national scale, I t  may 
not be so 1n a pa rticu la r geographical area.
Another Une of argument 1n favour of d isclosure regulation 
derives from the so-ca lled "Coase t h e o r e m " , t h e  quintessence of 
which Is that 1 n a zero-transaction cost world, the mutual in terests 
of the parties w il l  na tu ra lly  lead to the most e f f ic ie n t  a llo ca tion  
of resources, 1.e. a Pareto optimum. However, because of high trans­
action costs ( 1 .e. search costs), l i t t l e  or no search is  carried out 
a t a l l  before contracting and»consequently, there are aberrations 1n 
bargaining processes and reasources are’ therefore In e ff ic ie n t ly  used. 
I t  follows therefore that 1£ transaction costs are reduced by means 
of d isclosure regu lation, i t .w l l l  tend to take the market towards 
a Pareto optimum. The co ro lla ry  to th is  view Is that I f  d isclosure 
costs are very high, th is  w i l l  o ffse t the benefit to consumers as It  
may re su lt In even higher p rices. The methods o f d isclosure herein 
advocated could possib ly be carried out without Incurring high costs. 
Secondly, I t  has been suggested by one commentator that the law 
could allow fo r a "cooling o ff"  period during which a consumer may be 4
44. Coase, R. "The Problem of Social Costs", 3 J. of Law and Economics, 
(1960), p . l .
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en tltled  to d isa ffirm  a contract w ithin a specified period of
(45)entering Into the contract. ' This is  of particu la r relevance 
1 n door-to-door insurance or hire-purchase sales where the parties 
do not have enough time to re f le c t on the terms before entering 
Into the contracts. In Cameroon, because o f the I l l ite ra c y  and 
lack of education that abounds, there Is bound to be a great deal 
o f focus on the personal element.^45 6 47^The insistence on conspicuous 
oral d isclosure w il l therefore aid 1n educating the population a t 
large.
( 4 7 )In F ro e tifre e h  Corporation v. Reynoso, ' the defendant, a 
Spanish speaking perso^was deluded Into entering Into a hire-purchase 
contract by the p la in t if f 's  salesman who to ld him he would be paid 
a conmission on sales to be made to h1s friends and neighbours. The 
defendant agreed to purchase a freezer a t three times the cost price. 
I t  was held Inter a lia  that the defendant was handicapped by lack of 
knowledge of the conmerclal s itua tion  and "the nature and terms of the 
contract". The court therefore refused to enforce the contract. In 
W illiams V. Walker Thomae Furniture C o . , the court put the test of
45. M.J. Trebllcock: "The Doctrine Inequality of Bargaining Power: 
Post Benthamite Economics In the House of Lords", 26 Un. of 
Toronto L .J . (1976) 359 a t 373.
46. Caplovltz In h is book, The Poor Pay More (The Free Press, 1963) 
noted that unconscionable clauses are prevalent 1n East Harlem 
where there are a plethora of firms doing business. The market 
Is apparently very competitive. This state of a ffa irs  must 
therefore a rise  from the fact that consumers are too Ill-Informed 
and uneducated to act ra t io n a lly .
47. 52 M1sc 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 268 (D1st c t  1968).
4b. 350 F 2d 445 Dc. C1v. [1965],
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fa irness thus: "Old each party to the contract, considering h is obvious 
education or lack of I t ,  have reasonable opportunity to understand the 
terms of the con tra c t...? " The Court did not enforce the contract.
The point has to be emphasized that the fa c t that there are 
procedural defects 1n the formation o f a contract does not Ipso facto 
Invalidate the contract. There must at the same time be an element 
o f substantive unfairness. The concept of procedural unfairness 
however, has the important function of Insulating the contract terms 
from being adjudged unconscionable. When notice of the contractual 
terms has been given and th e ir  Implications c le a r ly  made c lear w ith in  
the circumstances to the purchaser, the contract might be shielded from 
ju d ic ia l or adm inistrative Intervention. This point of view however 
has serious lim ita t io n s . I t  1s conditional upon the fact that there 
1 s a considerable measure o f choice In the re levant market fo r the 
buyer I f  he finds the terms o f a pa rticu la r s e lle r  unreasonable. As 
has been pointed out, th is measure of choice hardly ex ists In the 
types of contracts concerned In Cameroon. Furthermore, the a b i l i t y  to 
seek for other a lterna tives depends to a large extent on the aggrieved 
party 's  commercial soph istication: hence, because o f the socia l and 
psychological conditions that obtain 1n Cameroon ( l.e .  I l l i t e r a c y ,  
lack o f planning e tc .) , d isclosure regulation Is bound to have only a 
modest Impact'unless accompanied by consumer education and other schemes 
designed to encourage buyers (or se lle rs ) to evaluate and use disclosed 
Information.
While d isclosure regulation would not be a panacea for the 
procedural unconsclonablUty in contracts, I t  1s nevertheless based on 
sound po licy  reasons and I t  Is consistent with the new perspective
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contract has assumed, 1 .e. that of a re la tionsh ip  between the various 
partic ipants 1 n the market.
Where the buyer has no a lte rna tive  to choose from the conception 
of procedural unfairness would be la rge ly  undercut. In that case, 
an examination o f substantive unconsc1onab1 l 1 ty  1 s imperative.
B. Substantive Unconscionability
Supposing a l l the procedural requirements outlined above are 
complied w ith, 1 .e. c lea r notice and proper d isclosure of the terms 
o f the contract, would th is  fa c t preclude ar\y argument to Invalidate 
the contract on the ground of unconscionabil1 ty?
Professor Le ff has pointed out that In the absence of any pro­
cedural defect 1 n the formation of the contract outlined above, It 
Is d i f f ic u l t  to envisage any unfairness 1n the outcome.^49 50) One 
commentator^^ has suggested that a roundabout way o f dealing with 
th is problem 1s to assume that any apparent substantive unfairness 
or Inequivalence In the contract Is evidence o f some procedural 
defect. However, 1t 1s d i f f ic u l t ,  1f not Impossible to have a feel 
o f th is  apparent Inequivalence without resort to what actua lly  happens 
In the market w ithin which the contract took place.
49. L e ff, "UnconsclonablUty and the Code - The Emperor's New 
clause", 115 U. Pe*. L.R. (1967) 485.
50. Trebllcock, 26 Un1v. o f Toronto Law Journal, (1976) 359 at
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One o f the leading opponents of any attempt to formulate any
theory o f substantive unconsclonablllty 1s P o s n e r . A n  analysis
of h is views w il l make apparent the flaws 1n h1s approach. Posner
states that the use of standard form contracts by s e lle rs  can only
be attributed to two reasons: (1) To avoid the costs Involved In
negotiating and drafting separate agreements with each purchaser:
the Innocent reason; (2) A s in is te r  reason - the knowledge that the
purchaser has no choice but to accept his terms. He proceeds to say
that the s in is te r  reason 1 s Implausible because 1 t  assumes an absence
o f competition. He contends that the purchaser has a choice since he
may procure better terms from another s e lle r . In saying th is , Posner
contradicts an e a r lie r  statement o f h1s, v iz , that not a l l  Industries 
(521
are competitive' ' .  Be that as 1t may, Posner concludes that " I f  
unconsclonablllty means that a judge may n u ll i fy  a contract 1 f  he 
considers the consideration Inadequate or the terms otherwise one 
sided, the basic p r in c ip le  o f encouraglng’ market rather than surrogate 
legal transactions where-(market) transaction costs are low Is badly 
compromised. Economic analysis., at lea st, reveals no grounds other 
than fraud, Incapacity, and duress (the la s t  narrowly defined) for 
allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made In entering the 
contract. u^ \  5123
51. R. Posner: Economic Analysis o f Law. 2nd edn. ( L i t t le  Brown, 
1977), p. 6T.
52. Posner, a t p. 82.
53. Posner, supra, note 51 a t p. 87.
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In the above quotation. Posner does not even go as fa r as
requiring a duty of d isclosure as I t  has been put forward In the
previous section. He rather re lie s  on what Llewelyn characterized
as Inherently unreliab le covert too l, 1 .e. fraud, duress and 
(541in capac ity .' ' Even presuming that Posner's thesis Incorporates 
the duty o f d isclosure, 1 t  1 s submitted that that would not Insulate 
the contract from being Invalidated fo r unconsdonab lllty  for two 
reasons. The f i r s t ,  which has already been canvassed 1n re la tion  to 
d isclosure 1s that 1n the majority o f cases, the raw market data 
d isclosed cannot always be meaningfully evaluated by purchasers.
The second and more compelling reason 1s that d isclosure does not 
guarantee a reasonable choice o f terms 1n the market. To be sure, 
Posner attempts to accommodate th is  point by acknowledging that,In 
a monopoly s itua tion , purchasers are compelled to accept the 
monopolist's terms but he asserts that 1 t  Is only with respect to 
price that th is  argument is  re levant and not with regard to the 
rest o f the contractual terms. I t  Is submitted that there Is no 
ra tiona le  for h1s proposition.' Choice surely applies to contractual 
terms as well as to price. Furthermore, 1n characterizing the problem 
simply as one of monopoly power (which admittedly comes very much 
Into reckoning), Posner sh irks the heart o f the matter, 1.e. how to 
deal w ith  standard form contracts In a typ ica l market which 1 s neither 
e n t ire ly  monopolistic nor which has a wide la titude  o f choice. 54
54. Llewelyn, Book Review,52 Harvard Law Review (1939) at p. 703.
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Another l in e  of argument in connection with substantive uncon-
sc lonab lU ty  has been fostered by commentators whom Rotkin ca lls  
(551
"adheslonlsts . 1 They do not see the problems a r is in g  from
standard form contracts as merely procedural. While accepting that 
d isclosure regulation alone is  in su ff ic ie n t , the so lutions they 
proffer are fa ta l ly  flawed essen tia lly  because they focus the ir 
c r it ic ism s mainly on the fac t that standard form contracts are used.
The question o f choice 1s not looked a t from the perspective of the 
market 1n which the contract Is made. They Instead look a t I t  merely 
from the po in t o f view of Inequality o f bargaining power, l.e . because 
the purchasers does not possess enough bargaining power to a lte r the 
terms of the contract. Slawson fo r example In s ists that when i t  
cannot be shown that a purchaser c le a r ly  assented to a particu la r 
term, to be enforceable, such a term must conform to democratic 
standards. He therefore seeks to solve the problem by reference to 
assent, an approach which Is d iffe ren t from the d ls c lo su r ls t approach 
1n degree on ly because he defines assent very narrowly.^5 6  ^ His 
reference to democratic standards leaves the Issue open since he does 
not determine what these standards should be. I t  1s surely 1n order 
to a rr ive  a t  such standards that any meaningful analysis has to be 
focussed on the market.
55. Rotkin: "Standard Forms, Legal Documents 1n Search of An Appropriate 
Body o f Law". Arizona State L .J . (1977) p. 559 a t 607.
56. Slawson: “Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law 
Making Power", 84 Harv. L. Rev. (1971) p. 529.
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The same c r it ic ism s  plague Murray's analysis. 1 He turns the 
whole question o f unconsclonabllity on r isk  a llo ca tion . I f  a r isk  
Imposed by the contract on e ithe r of the parties 1 s expected, then 
a l l  1s well with the contract. I f  on the other hand 1t Is not expected, 
then the court has to revise the contract.
The flaw with th is approach Is that by confining the question 
whether a r is k  1 s expected or not w ith in  the parameters of a particu la r 
contract only, one runs the r isk  of a rr iv in g  at decisions which are 
a t complete variance with the market s itua tion .
A c la ss ic  I llu s tra t io n  of the p i t f a l ls  o f the adhesionist approach 
1s the House Of Lords decision In Macaulay V. Schroeder Publishing Co. 
L t d In that case, the p la in t if f  songwriter entered Into a contract 
with the defendants - music publishers fo r a f iv e  year term during which 
the p la in t i f f  assigned the copyright to a l l h1 s songs to the defendant 
fo r a consideration o f 50X of the net roya ltie s  received by the 
defendants whenever the songs were published. The contract contained 
a clause fo r automatic renewal fo r a further period of f ive  years 1 f 
p la in t i f f 's  share of-the roya ltie s exceeded £5000 during the f i r s t  term 
o f the agreement. The defendant could terminate or assign the contract 
without the p la in t if f s  consent simply by giving the la t te r  one month's 
notice. The House held that the contract was against public po licy , 5789
57. Murray, "UnconsclonablUty. Unconsc1onab1l1ty" 31 Un. of P it ts .
L .  R ev .  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p . l .
58. Murray's approach 1s s im ila r to that of Spanog1e:"Analys1s1ng
Unconsc1onab1l1ty problems’; 117 Un. of Pennsylvania L. Rev.
(1969), p. 931.
(57)
59. .[1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
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being in re s tra in t o f trade. This decision was however cast w ithin 
the broader grounds of unconsclonabillty. Lord O ip lock's analysis 
1s 1n no way lim ited  to ,re s tra in t o f trade and 1 n a s im ila r case,
Lord Denning sa1d^60 1 623^  that Lord D lp lock's reasoning afforded support 
fo r the Inequality of bargaining power doctrine which he, Lord Denning, 
put forward 1n iloyda  Bank v. B u n d y . In describing the Issue In 
contention, Lord Dlplock said: "What your Lordships have 1n fa c t been 
doing has been to assess the re la t ive  bargaining power o f the publisher 
and the songwriter at the time the contract was made and to decide 
whether the publisher had used h1s superior bargaining power to exact 
from the songwriter promises that were un fa ir ly  onerous.
Secondly, Lord Reid, doubting whether the doctrine of re s tra in t 
o f trade 1 s app licab le to such exclusive contracts, said " I f  con­
tractual re s tr ic t io n s  appear to be unnecessary or reasonably capable 
of enforcement In an oppressive manner, then they must be ju s t if ie d  
before they can be e n f o r c e d " . • •
Lord Dlplock went out of h1s way to estab lish  the philosophical 
underpinnings o f h1 s reasoning In a passage which Is worthy of elaborate 
quotation. He said: " I t  Is, In my view, salutary to acknowedge that 
1n refusing to enforce the provisions o f a contract whereby one party 
agrees fo r the bene fit of the other party to exp lo it or to re fra in  
from exp lo iting  h1 s own earning power, the public po licy  which the 
court Is Implementing Is not some 19th century theory about the benefit
60. C lif fo rd  Davis Management Ltd, v. W.E.A. Records L td .. [1975]
1 AER, 237
61. Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, supra a t note 39.
62. Macaulay, supra a t p. 1315.
63. jb ld  at p. 1316.
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to the general public o f freedom o f trade, but the protection of 
those whose bargaining power Is weak against being forced by those 
whose bargaining power 1 s stronger to enter Into bargains that are 
unconscionable. Under the Influence o f Bentham and o f la is s e z -fa ire  
the courts 1n the 19th century abandoned the practice of applying 
the public po licy  against unconscionable bargains to contracts 
generally, as they had formerly done to any contract considered 
usurious; but the po licy  survived 1n Its  application to penalty 
clauses and to r e l ie f  against fo r fe itu re  and also to the special 
category o f contracts In re s tra in t o f trade. I f  one looks at the 
reasoning o f 19th century judges In cases about contracts 1n re s tra in t 
o f trade one finds Up  service paid to current economic theories, but 
1 f  one looks at what they said 1n the l ig h t  of what they did, one 
finds that they struck down a bargain 1 f  they thought I t  was uncon­
scionable as between the parties to 1 t  and upheld I t  1 f  they thought 
1 t  was not.
So I would hold-that the question to be answered as regards 
a contract 1n restra in t o f trade of the kind with which th is  appeal 
Is concerned 1s 'was the bargain f a ir ? ' The test of fairness Is no 
doubt whether the re s tr ic t ion s  are both reasonably necessary for the 
protection o f the legitimate Interests o f the promisee and commensurate 
with the benefits secured to the promisor under the contract. For 
the purposes o f th is test a l l the provisions of the contract must be 
taken under consideration."^6^
64. ]b1d at p. 1316.
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I t  Is d i f f i c u l t  to fau lt Lord D lp lock's analysis. However, what 
test of fa irness d id the House o ffe r to buttress the ir decision?
Their Lordships a l l  agreed with Lord Reid's analysis on th is  point.
In holding the contract un fa ir, he re lied  on three arguments. F ir s t  
of a l l ,  he thought that the f iv e  year duration of the contract was 
too long for the p la in t if f  because he might well become popular and 
yet remain tied to the defendant fo r a period o f up to ten years.
He referred to clauses 9 and 16 of the contract which stipu lated  that 
the p la in t if f  was bound to le t  the defendant only publish h1 s works 
without a corresponding duty on the defendant to publish them. He 
said " 1 t  appears to me to be an unreasonable re s tra in t to be the 
composer fo r th is  period of years so that h1 s work w il l  be s te r il is e d  
and he can earn nothing from h is a b i l i t ie s  as a composer 1 f  the 
publisher chooses not to publish".^65)
F in a lly , he argued that although there are some established 
composers who can bargain on equal terms with publishers, the p la in t if f  
1 n th is  case was a yet unknown musician who had to submit to the 
oppressive terms o f the defendants.
Since a lo t  o f stress was la id  on the duration o f the contract,
1 t  has to be emphasized that Its reasonableness or fa irness can only 
be appraised by examining the entire  contract, Including the consider­
ation received by the composer. This Included a bona f id e  promise of 
promotion of the p la in t i f f 's  songs, special roya lty  agreements on 
foreign publications and access to foreign markets. Indeed, the fact 
that the agreement was 1n Its second term and that the songwriter had
65. Macaulay, note 59 a t 1313-1314«
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become famous Is evidence that that promise had been carried through.
By fa i l in g  to take these facts into consideration, there was no 
context w ithin which the duration of the contract could be ra tiona lly  
deemed unconscionable. The underlying assumption of the mainstay 
o f Lord Reid 's judgement, i .e .  that the defendant could i f  he so 
pleased, simply shelve the p la in t i f f 's  songs without Incurring a 
breach of contract 1 s w ithout any commercial foundation and his 
Lordship Indeed hinted that such a conclusion was perverse. His 
only reason for that assumption, and a very speculative reason at 
that, was that "He ( I .e . the publisher) might think I t  l ik e ly  to be 
more p ro fitab le  to promote work by other composers with whom he had 
agreements and unwise or too expensive to try  to publish and popularise 
the respondent's work 1n addition. And there 1s always the p o s s ib ility  
that less legitimate reasons might Influence a decision not to publish 
the respondent's (p la in t if fs )  work". Surely, 1t 1s not nearly enough 
to rest a judgement upon such a hypothetical s itua tion  which Imputes 
such conmerclal bad fa ith  on the publisher and for which above a ll 
there was no s c in t i l la  o f evidence. Indeed, there was evidence to 
show that the publisher had fu l ly  and properly carried  out h is part 
o f the bargain.
On Lord Reid's f in a l point, one may reasonably presume that It 
follows as a matter o f course that a well established and known 
musician would be 1 n a position  to exact better terms from a publisher 
than an unknown musician as the p la in t if f  then was.
I f  one looks at the market w ith in which that contract took place, 
a number o f facts come out. In the f i r s t  place, the music Industry 
is  not a t a l l  o lig o p o lis t ic  as s ta t is t ic s  show. The B illb oa rd 's
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1975-76 International Buyer's Guide l i s t s  428 U.K. music publishers 
which suggests that the Industry 1s quite competitive. The publishers 
1n question were by no means one o f the giants of the Industry since 
the company was made up o f only two shareholders - a man and his w ife. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence to suggest that there was any 
ca rte liz a t io n  1 n the Industry which prevented the songwriter from 
seeking a lte rna tive  terms elsewhere. On the contrary, from a study 
of the music Industry carried  out 1n 1 9 6 4 , "the record industry 
has been characterized by chaotic d is tr ibu tion  and Intensive competition 
which 1n many Instances re su lt 1n minimal p ro f its " . The authors 
fu rther found out In the same survey that only 23.7* o f free singles 
d is tribu ted  to U.S. radio stations were played more than once and up 
to 61.6* were never played a t a l l .  This points to the r isk s  Involved 
In the business, r isk s  which are greater s t i l l  when one signs an 
unknown musician because he might not turn out to be a success. It  
1s w ith  th is  background that one surely ought to evaluate the terms of 
the contract. In C lif fo rd  Daviee Ltd. V. U.E.A. Records L t d Lord 
Denning adopted Lord Reid's approach. While admitting that the royalty 
agreement's reached between the parties were f a ir  enough, he went on 
to hold that the contract contained some "amazing provisions" by which 
he meant the duration o f the contract (which was s im ila r to the provision 
1n Macaulay) . ' He observed that "1t may be said that there was such 
Inequality o f bargaining power that the agreement should not be enforced. 678
66. B re tte r, 1n Taubam, (ed.), The Business and Law o f Music (1965), p.8.
67. Note 60, supra.
68. A t p. 241.
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Thus, the reason fo r holding that the duration o f the contract was 
too long was because of the gross d ispa rity  in bargaining power.
The ambiguity given to the unequal power doctrine makes i t  possible 
fo r the courts to use Itwhen Indeed the decision should have been 
reached on the ground of substantive unconscionabllity. Arguments 
grounded on th is  concept are bereft o f any sound, factual analysis 
o f the market s itua tion  w ithin which the contract was concluded and 
the cases above bear th is out. The point being emphasized here 1s 
not that the contracts under consideration were fa ir ,  but rather, 
that not a shred of evidence was adduced to show that the contracts 
were un fa ir, 1n terms of what the market s itua tion  was. This was 
the re su lt  o f deciding the problem of substantive unconsclonablUty 
by confin ing ju d ic ia l scrutiny w ith in the parameters of the contract 
only. I f  courts had to sc ru tin ise  every contract 1n which bargaining 
power was unequal, a l l  but a few contracts w il l  be subject to such 
scru tiny . Furthermore, the proponents of*the unequal bargain theory 
have ye t to determine the extent to which bargaining power has to 
be unequal fo r the substantive Imbalance of the contract to be 
attribu ted  to 1 t.
.. At the r is k  of overemphasizing, 1t should be pointed out that 
whether one Is dealing with a small firm  or a large one, the standard 
form conforms ty p ic a lly  with the current Impersonality o f present 
exchange re la tionsh ips Instead o f being Inim ical to I t .  I f  oppression 
ex is ts  1n the forms, the cause must therefore be something other than 
fa ilu re  to bargain. Consequently, to eradicate unconscionable terms 
1 n standard contracts, one must square the terms, Including p rice , to 
the actual market s itua tion .
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Kessler suggested nearly forty years ago that the cause of 
unconscionable contracts lie s  1n market concentration and the 
existence of monopoly p o w e r . T h i s  view has not gone uncontested. 
Schwartz^69 70 71^ maintains that the above conclusion 1s not necessarily 
true because even monopolists wish to Increase demand and as such, 
they have to sa t is fy  consumer preferences. He contends that 1f 
buyers prefer one set of terms to another, I t  1s 1n the Interest 
o f the monopoly to supply these terms. From th is  premise, he maintains 
that 1 f  buyers buy a monopolist's products 1 t  1 s because they prefer 
the terms he Imposes. Even at face value, th is  theory hardly holds 
water. I t  1s Impossible to maintain that buyers prefer the monopolists' 
terms when 1n fact they do not have any a lte rna tive . Secondly, se lle rs , 
monopolists Included, often mistake buyer preferences. Schwartz 
however holds that even I f  se lle rs  do not get buyer preferences righ t, 
courts which do not have the necessary market data are less lik e ly  
than monopolists 1n ascertaining buyer preferences, hence, the ir 
attempts to a lte r  or .Invalidate a monopolists terms are conceptually 
doomed. This argument Is predicated upon the assumption that only 
courts can Intervene, but th is 1s not necessarily true. However, even 
1 f  th is  assumption was true, I t  should not preclude an attempt to 
Investigate whether the contract Is fa ir  or not as th is  1s a matter 
o f doing ju s tice . Schwartz further argues that Kessler's proposition 
bears very l i t t l e  relevance to the problem of substantive unconsclonablllty 
because true monopolists are a ra r ity .
69. Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract"; 43 Col. L. Rev. (1943) 629.
70. A. Schwartz: "S e lle r Unequal Bargaining Power and the Jud ic ia l 
Process", 49 Indiana L .J. (1974), p. 366 a t p. 380.
71. That 1s fa r from the case In Cameroon where monopolies dominate
such f ie ld s  as the supply o f e le c t r ic ity ,  water, marketing of 
• s M c l t o .  produce, to . t.su fo , o f k tM s  ^
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To him, o ligopo lies pose the real problem.
This Is not the place to delve Into a study of o ligopo ly  but 1t 
Is necessary to define what Is meant by o lig o p o lis t ic  market or price 
1n order to put the views canvassed Into proper perspective. The 
terms o lig o p o lis t ic  market re fers to:
(1) A type of Industry structure which may roughly be said to contain 
only a few se lle rs ;  (2) A ce rta in  kind of s e lle r  behaviour and (3) A 
ce rta in  kind of p r i c e . T h i s  d e fin it ion  does not suggest any 
operational d e fin it ion  o f o lig o p o lis t ic  p ric ing . The d is t in c t iv e  
ch a racte ris t ic  o f o lig o p o lis t ic  pric ing  1s the "assumption that the 
s e lle r  whose pric ing decision Is being Investigated considers the 
p o s s ib il it y  that h1s competitors' responses to h1s p rice  may be 
Influenced by the ir expectations about the way 1n which he would react 
to the ir responses".^72 3 74^
The conventional assumption that derives from th is  fa c t 1s that 
o lig o p o lis t ic  p ric ing m lsallocates resources, l.e .  by decreasing 
the un it output of the firm  erTgagtng In the practice. I f  th is Is 
true, 1t follows that o lig o p o lis t ic  pricing, reduces economic welfare, 
since the re su lt ing  prices are above what they ought to be. Serious 
d if f ic u lt ie s  however H e  in  the area of Identify ing o lig o p o lis t ic  
p ric ing . Professor Turner thinks that th is  requires probing into 
marginal costs o f firms and also into the problems posed by jo in t  costs. 
Such an enquiry would not only be too d i f f ic u l t  but a lso  too expensive 
fo r the courts to carry o u t . ^  Posner on the other hand holds that
72. See S t lg le r , "A Theory of O ligopoly", 72 J. of P o l it ic a l Economy, 
(1974) p. 44.
73. MarkovIts, "O lig opo lis t ic  P ric ing  Su its , the Sherman Act and 
Economic Welfare (Part 1)" 26 Stanford L. Rev. (1974) 493 a t 49b.
74. Turner, "The Defin ition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act. Conscious 
Para lle lism  and Refusals to Deal", 75 Harv. L. Rev. (1962) 655 a t 
670.
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such an enquiry may be conducted on re la t iv e ly  very inexpensive and
less d i f f i c u l t  lin e s , to which he c ite s  in te r a l ia , the practice of
price d iscrim ination , the re a lisa t io n  of abnormally high p ro fits  and
( 7 5 1the presence o f prolonged excess capac ity .' '
The stress on monopolistic and o lig o p o lis t ic  p ric ing should not 
lead to the assumption that ar\y other price otherwise arrived at is  
the competitive and fa ir  p r i c e . T h e  question then 1s, how can one 
determine what an unconscionable p rice  generally 1s? In th is  connection, 
a cursory ana lys is on how a competitive price is  arrived at 1s necessary. 
The most theoretica l model, that o f "tonnement" assumes that there is  
an energetic auctioneer ca llin g  out prices of goods in the market and 
agents responding to those p r i c e s . F o l l o w i n g  that mechanism, 
equilibrium  prices w i l l  only occur when a l l  the agents' decisions are 
compatible w ith the price at which a l l  exchanges should occur and no 
sing le agent w il l be able to determine the p rice  of the goods. Needless 
to say, no market behaves 1n that manner.' People buy even at non­
competitive prices. -Although economic models act as guidelines to 
what a competitive price should, be, human behaviour Is obviously too 
complex to.be encapsulated In. these models. As I t  has been ea r lie r  756
75. Posner, "Oligopoly and A n titru s t Laws: A suggested Approach", 21 
Stan L. f}ev. (1969), p. 1562 a t pp. 1578-82.
76. See Caplovltz, The Poor Pay More (The Free Press, 1963) p. 12.
77. K. Arrow * F. Hahn, General Competitive Ana lys is (Holden-Day,
O liver and Boyd, 1971).
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pointed out Information about a lte rna tive  prices or terms may be 
non-existent and th is  factor contributes in in tensify ing market 
imperfections.
As a component of substantive unconsdonab lllty, i t  is  evident 
therefore that price 1s much more complex than the trad it iona l approach 
o f unequal bargaining power makes out. In the case of a monopolistic or 
o lig o p o lis t ic  market, there are no a lte rna tive  prices to compare a 
particu la r contract price with and as such economic analysis into 
price has to be resorted to i f  any meaningful decisions have to be 
arrived at.
Even a simple comparison of prices where i t  can be done is  not 
sa tis facto ry  since in the f i r s t  place, 1t poses a problem about the 
geographical d e f in it io n  of a m a r k e t . S e c o n d l y  a simple comparison 
o f prices undermines the fa c t that accompanying terms are usually 
d iffe ren t, fo r example ce rta in  c red it terms may be more stringent 
than others. In th is connection, the cases I llu s t ra te  that low income 
purchasers are p a rt icu la r ly  subject to such unconscionable contracts.
In Uilliame v Ualker-Thomae Furniture Co, an Instalment sale 
contract made w ith a lady o f very lim ited means contained an "add-on-clause" 
which provided that payments made by the purchasers "sha ll be credited 
pro-rata on a l l  outstanding leases, b i l l s  and accounts due" In order *79
7tt. In Cameroon, because of the very In e ff ic ie n t transport system, 
there are acute d isp a r it ie s  o f prices of a particu la r good even 
between markets which are geographically not fa r apart.
7 9 .  360 F .  2d 445 D . C .  C 1r(l9 6 5 ).
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"to keep a balance due on every Item purchased un til the balance due 
on a l l  Items whenever purchased, was liqu ida ted". One might in tu it iv e ly  
assume that such a clause is  unreasonable and indeed, the court held 
that i t  was a "commercially unreasonable contract". Because o f the 
fru g a lity o f the courts ' exposition, i t  did not spe ll out why the 
clause was deemed unreasonable.
Professor Le ff however thought the clause was commercially 
reasonable, while Braucher in h1s commentary stated that "such clauses 
are forbidden in  any respectable re ta il Instalment sales law and should 
be held unconscionable in  any contract fo r the purpose o f consumer 
goods, not expected to produce money Income fo r the consumer
As Epstein points out, I t  is  ludicrous to think of hypothetical 
clauses that have never appeared 1n contracts 1n order to substantiate 
the s tr ik in g  down o f contractual t e r m s . H e  c ite s  an example given 
by M urray^ ) that: "The parties hereby agree that during the f i r s t  
year o f operation of th is  automobile, should the automobile be operated 
on any Tuesday afternoon by a party wearing a red neck-t1e, a l l  rights 
in the automobile w i l l  be fo rfe ited  by the owner and ownership of the 82
BO. L e ff , "Unconsc1onab1l1ty and the Code", note 25, supra.
Braucher» "The Unconscionable Contract or Term", 3l Univ. of 
P it t s .  L. Rev (1970) 337 a t 343.
B l. Epstein, "UnconsdonablUty: A C r it ic a l Reappraisal", IB J. of 
Law & Econ. (1975) p.293.
82. Murray, J .E . Murray on Contracts. (1974) 746.
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automobile w il l  revert to the s e lle r " . It is  clear that no such clause can 
find  it s  way Into a contract. Hence in  determining what terms should 
be held unconscionable,'discussion has to be related to spec ific  
contracts 1n Cameroon already examined. Suffice  1t to say now 
that clauses which are designed to protect the se lle r  absolutely 1n 
any event and which s h if t  the en tire  financ ia l r is k  on the buyer In 
order to secure maximum p ro fits  fo r the s e lle r  should be held to be 
unconscionable.^83 84^
Thus, even with respect to contractual terms other than price,
(84)the market has to be examined. In Henningeen v. Bloomfield blotore, ' 
the court found that there was l i t t l e  or no warranty competition large ly  
because o f the concentration o f the motor Industry as I t  existed 1n the 
United SCates. As Kornhauser cogently put 1t, "the existence of 
oppressive terms In the form or the charging of exorbitant p rice may 
re f le c t  not the Imperfections over terms between buyer and se lle r  but 
the Imperfections of the market mechanism. Economic agents have been 
supplied with Inadequate or incorrect Information; rational responses 
1n th is  environment; whether Intended to maximize p ro fits  or to optimize 
u t i l i t y  w ith in  a budget constra in t, do not lead to optimal resu lts .
Even in  the presence of bargaining or the absence of unfair surprise 
and advantage.the market would not supply the righ t goods at the Ideal 
(competitive) price to a l l  consumers because the malfunctions do not l ie  
In the two-person in teractions but 1n the more complex movements of the 
market as a whole"^85^
83. The s e lle r  has the p o s s ib il it y  o f spreading such r isk s  through Insurance.
84. Note 22, supra.
85. Kornhauser, L.A . "Unconsc1onab1l1ty 1n Standard Forms", 64 C a lif .
L.R. (1976), 1151 a t 1179.
An en t ire ly  new dimension could be added to the p rin c ip le  of 
unconsclonabillty.^8^  Unconscionabillty may have a tortious element.
An example 1s the practice by some door-to-door salesmen of peddling 
expensive household items, especia lly  on hire-purchase to purchasers 
whom they know can 111 afford them. At the back of the minds of such 
salesmen Is the fac t that a fte r the payment o f the down-payment and a 
few Instalments repossession of the goods can be had fo r subsequent 
non-payment. Surely, such conduct should constitu te a c iv i l  wrong.
I t  1s analogous to a fraud based on a contract.
Conclusion
The p r in c ip le  o f unconsc1onab1Hty therefore broadly serves at 
lea st three functions:
(1) To restore to a party what the other has unjustly  obtained at 
h1s expense, p a rt ic u la r ly  when an unconscionable price has been paid 
fo r 1n a contract. The price may then be reduced as appropriate.
(2) To give a party what the other has promised him. This applies 
where a party has been deluded Into entering In a contract on the 
ora l representations o f 'th e  other party and without adequate d isc losu re  
o f the contract terms.
(3) F in a lly , to p roh ib it or deter the future Inclusion In contracts
o f unconscionable terms or prices. This Is the aspect o f unconsclonablllty 
which takes a to rtious dimension. I t  1s not nearly enough for the law 
to Invalidate unconscionable contracts 1f they can be repeated. The 
most appropriate remedy In th is  case would be an Injunction against the
d6. See D.B. King, "The Tort o f Unconsclonablllty: A New Tort for 
New Times", 23 St. Louis Un1v. L .J . (1979) 92.
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unconscionabllIty sought to be restrained (whether with respect to 
price or term; an example o f th is  1s price contro l le g is la t io n ) .
As 1t has been abundantly pointed out and as the cases examined 
show, courts have decided the issue on the ground of unequal bargaining 
power in  Heu of engaging 1n economic analysis. What the above 
ana lys is demonstrates is  the need fo r regulation o f business practices.
I f  to estab lish  the unconsclonabillty o f a p a rt ic u la r clause the 
l it ig a t io n  model 1s used.ie, enforcement only via the courts, there 
w il l  have to be a t lea st one law su it  1n order to  create a precedent 
1n every aspect o f unconsc1onab1Hty. Businessmen may 1f they wish, 
l i t ig a te  the Issue to the h i l t  because they have the wherewithal to 
do so, while purchasers cannot. Consequently, very few cases Indeed 
w il l be brought. Even 1f an Issue 1s lit ig a te d  upon, the decision has 
a bearing on the conduct of other se lle rs  1f and only when other 
purchasers who have bought goods or services on s im ila r terms are 
w il l in g  to l i t ig a te  a lso , a very un like ly  event Indeed. Furthermore, as 
L e ffv ' points ou t,“l it ig a t io n  merely adjusts a pa rticu la r contract 
while the target,as has been emphasized,. 1s the market. He therefore 
advocates -leg is la tion  that w il l give an adm in istrative body powers to 
supervise contracts. Only through th is  channel can purchasers be 
adequately protected against unconscionable contracts ( th is  encompasses 
not merely unconscionable terms or prices but a lso  sales techniques.
The recently enacted le g is la t io n  o f four European countries In th is 
connection, recently enacted w il l  be looked a t 1n the next Chapter. The 
la s t  chapter w ill consider the elaboration of le g is la t io n  dealing with 
th is  problem In Cameroon.___________
87. L e ff, "Unconsclonabillty and the Crowd: Consumers and the Coitmon
Law Tradition": 31 Unlv. o f Pittsburgh L. Rev. (1970), p. 349.
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CHAPTER SIX
A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF RECENT LEGISLATION DEALING 
WITH STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
I t  has already been seen that although the courts 1n England and 
France delineated the problems concomitant with the use o f standardized 
contracts, they never quite developed a consistent theory 1n dealing 
with these contracts. Since the seventies, most ju r isd ic t io n s  
Increasingly realised that the only so lution to th is  problem had to 
come through le g is la t io n . An ana lys is o f the problem o f unconsclonablllty, 
undertaken 1n the la s t chapter shows that th is  problem Is Indeed complex 
and Parliament was therefore the appropriate Instrument o f change.
This chapter w il l review the d iffe ren t le g is la t iv e  approaches In 
th is connection by four European ju r isd ic t io n s . As the previous 
chapters have shown, English and French le g is la t io n  is  o f immediate 
concern; the German and Swedish le g is la t io n  is  also examined because 
i t  reveals interesting ways o f.dea ling  with the problem o f unconscionable 
standardized contracts.
Section I: Recent Leg islation 1n the United Kingdom
English law has focused on exclusion clauses as the central Issue 
In standardized co n tra c ts .^  The problem of d isc losu re , I t s e lf  related 
to the problem o f exclusion clauses,has a lso been dwelt upon by the *3
1. See Levlson v. Patent Steam Carnet Cleanlna Co. Ltd. T19771
3 A .r.ft. 496. ----------------------------
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courts. Because o f the hesitancy o f the courts in dealing with 
exclusion clauses, i t  was Inevitab le that Parliament should act.
Before d iscussing the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, 1t is  
necessary to look a t ce rta in  other pieces of le g is la t io n  enacted 
before the Unfair Contract Terms Act, which dea lt with various 
aspects o f  standardized contracts.
A. Background Leg is la t ion : Because consumers have been the main 
victims o f  standardized contracts, most le g is la t io n  has been designed 
to deal w ith  consumer contracts. In 1973 and 1974, two Acts were 
passed to deal with consumer contracts. The f i r s t ,  The F a ir Trading 
Act, 1972t set out to deal w ith ce rta in  undesirable "consumer trade 
p rac tice s" , 1.e. procedural unconsc1onab1Hty 1n re la tion  to consumer 
con tracts.
The most important aspect o f th is  Act 1s the creation o f two 
adm in istrative bodies which have been given the task o f regulating 
business practices 1n connection with consumers. The f i r s t  1s the 
O ffice  of Fa ir Trading1^  which-1s headed by the D irector General of 
Fa ir Trading. S. 2(1)(a) o f the F a ir  Trading.Act gives the D irector 
General the duty to keep under-review commercial practices that may 
adversely a ffe c t  the economic Interests o f consumers. Instances of 
such p ractices a re  enumerated In S.17(2). They must be practices which 
are l ik e ly  to have any o f the follow ing e f fe c t s :^  3
2. Curiously, the O ffice o f Fa ir Trading 1s not mentioned In the Act. 
I t  Is presumed that the D irector General must have a s ta ff  and 
o f f ic e  to perforin h1s functions.
3* Smith & Swain: Protecting The Consumer. (Martin Robertson, Oxford,
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i i)  misleading consumers as to th e ir rights and ob ligations under 
relevant consumer transactions, or withholding Information about 
such r ig h ts , or an adequate record o f them; or
(b) otherwise misleading or confusing consumers with respect to any 
matter; or
(c) subjecting consumers to undue pressure to enter Into a transaction;
or
(d) causing the terms and conditions of a transaction to be so adverse 
to the consumer as to be Inequitable.
S.13 defines a 'consumer trade p rac tice1 very broadly and 1t may 
re la te  to p rice , conditions and warranties; promotion o f goods 
(advertis ing e tc .) , methods of salesmanship; methods o f securing payment 
and even the packing and la b e llin g  o f goods.
As has e a r lie r  been mentioned, there 1s a great deal of stress la id  
on procedural unfairness. The D irector General may, on discovering 
any such p rac tice , re fe r to the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee, 
created by S.3 of the-Fa1r Trading .Act. •
The Committee Is an Independent body. Its functions are advisory 
only; thus,, the Secretary of State fo r Prices and Consumer Protection 
may give e ffe c t to it s  recommendations, but he 1s not obliged to do so. 
The committee consists o f between ten and fifte en  members appointed by 
the Secretary o f State and they Investigate any reference made to them 
by the D irector General of Fa ir Trading. I f  the Committee finds that 
any consumer trade practice ac tua lly  adversely a ffects  the economic 
Interest o f the consumer, I t  may recommend the p roh ib ition  of such a
practice or may endorse any proposals made by the D irector General.' ' 
This recommendation 1s then transmitted to the Secretary of State who 
may then make a statutory order putting the recommendations In force.
One order was made In 1976: The Consumer Transactions (Restrictions 
on Statements) Order 1976 No. 1813. This order was the upshot of 
references made to the Advisory Conuilttee 1n 1974, which covered the 
practices o f some shops o f Informing the consumer by the use of 
displayed notices or other types of exemption clauses that no money 
would be refunded, or otherwise misleading the consumer. This order 
was deemed necessary because although such clauses are void under 
statutes such as the Supply o f Goods (Implied Terms) Act (and now, 
the Unfair Contract Terms A ct), and a lso under the Consumer Credit 
Act (1974), the mere fa c t that they are Inserted In notices or 
documents may, 1n p rac tica l terms, lead consumers to re fra in  from 
pursuing th e ir  legal r ig h ts . I t  has now become unlawful to make 
such statements.
IS)
The Coneumer Credit Aot 1974' '  Is another s tr ik in g  example of a 
le g is la t iv e  attempt to deal w ith  some of the.In justices resu lting  
from the use of standardized contracts. S.8 of the Act lim its  the 
app lica tion  of the statute to:
(1) "A personal c re d it  agreement . . .  between an Individual ("the debtor") 
and any other person ("the cred ito r") by which the cred ito r provides 
the debtor with c red it of any amount". 45
4. Fa ir Trading Act, S.21.
5. This Act Implemented most o f the recommendations o f the Crowther 
Comnlttee on Consumer C red it which began Its  work In 1968 and 
published Its  Report In March 1971 (Cmnd4596, HMSO, London).
(4)
(2) "A consumer c re d it  agreement Is a personal cred it agreement by 
which the c red ito r provides the debtor with cred it not exceeding 
£5,000. ‘ v*. ^
The Act also covers consumer h ire agreements as defined by S.15,
l . e . ,  those capable o f subsisting fo r more than three months and which 
do not require the h ire r to make payments exceeding £5,000.
The Act contains several provisions requiring the d isc losu re  of 
information p rio r to the signing of the c red it agreement. S .55(l) 
provides a regulation-making power specifying Information that has to 
be d isclosed. Ss.60-64 go as fa r as g iving the regulation-making 
power to prescribe the form and content of the documents that must 
be used, even the s ize  of the p r in t may be prescribed!
S.67 also gives the debtor to the c red it  contract a coo lin g -o ff 
period of f iv e  days a fte r receiving the statutory second copy o f the 
agreement. During th is  period, he may withdraw from the transaction.
This can however be done when two conditions are fu lf i l le d :  that the 
negotiations p r io r to the contracts contained oral representations 
made by the c red ito r, and secondly that the agreement was concluded 
1n a place other than the business premises o f the c red ito r.
Ss. 137-140 o f the Consumer C red it Act contain provisions protecting 
consumers against extortionate bargains. A c red it agreement Is ex orb ltant 
I f ,  according to S .138(1), 17:
(a) "requires the debtor or a re la t ive  o f h is  to make payments (whether 
uncond itiona lly , or on ce rta in  contingencies) which are grossly 
exorbitant, or
(b) "otherwise grossly contravenes the ordinary p rin c ip les o f fa ir  
dealing".
In determining th is , the court considers a number o f facto rs, among 
which are: the prevailing Interest rates (a t the time the c red it was 
given), the age, experience, business capacity and state of health of 
the debtor, the financia l pressures on the debtor, whether a colourable 
cash price was quoted for any goods or services Included In the c red it 
bargain, the degree of r is k  accepted by the cred ito r, h is re la tionsh ip  
with the d eb to r.^
A further Important aspect o f the Consumer Cred it Act is  the 
protection of defaulting debtor. Such protection 1s enshrined 1n the 
Hire-Purchase Act 1965, Part III of which contains provisions re s tr ic t in g  
the owner's r ig h t to re-possess goods when one-th1rd o f the hire-purchase 
Instalments have been p a ld .^  In such a case only a court can order 
re-possession. Should the owner contravene th is  provision, S.34(2) of 
the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 stipu lates tha t the h ire r or h1s guarantor 
becomes en tit led  to a l l  the sums of money already paid under the contract.
This protection has been extended by the Consumer Cred it Act. S .87(l) 
o f the Act requiring the cred ito r to serve a defau lt notice of seven days 
1f he 1s contemplating termination o f the agreement. S.88 makes th is  
notice compulsory. This of course means that the defau ltor Is given 
time to make the repayments due. S .92(l) re ite ra tes the position taken 
by the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 by stating that: 67
6. See S.138 of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974.
7. S. 33 of the Hire-Purchase Act, 1965.
"Except under an order o f the court, the cred ito r or owner shall 
not be en tit led  to enter any premises to take possession of goods 
subject to a regulated hire-purchase agreement, regulated conditional 
sale agreement or regulated consumer h ire  agreement".
This provision means that In the absence o f a court order, the 
cred ito r cannot a t any time, repossess the goods against the w il l  of 
the debtor. With respect to the sale o f goods, Ss. 12, 13 and 14 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893^b  ^ have been the cornerstone of contractual 
protection of consumers. However, S.55 o f the same Act wh ittled down 
the e ffec t of those provisions by making 1t possib le fo r those 
provisions to be excluded. The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973 amended Ss. 12, 13 and 14 o f the Sale of Goods Act 1893. S.4 o f 
the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 a lso  re s tr ic ted  the 
p o s s ib ility  o f excluding Implied terms under S.55 o f the Sale of 
Goods Act. These provisions have now been re-enacted 1n the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.
B. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
This Act Is by a long way the most Important piece o f le g is la t io n  
yet to deal with the problem o f standardized contracts. In 1977, Lord 
Denning who has spearheaded the movement to protect weaker parties In 
contracts, described 1t as “a g ra tify ing  piece o f Law R e f o r m . T h e  
Act does not however address I t s e lf  to the general problem of 8
7b. See Sale o f Goods Act, 1981.
8. Levlson v. Patent Steam Cleaning Co. [1978] 1 Q.B. 69 at 79.
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unconsclonablUty 1n contracts, confining I t s e lf  la rge ly  to one 
aspect o f unconsclonabWty: the problem of exclusion clauses.
Hence the ex ist ing  law 1n connection with other aspects of contract 
remains untouched. However, as one commentator says, because the 
Act gives very wide powers to judges to regulate standard form con­
tra c ts , 1t 1s possible that they might adapt th e ir manner of looking 
a t other aspects of such contracts to the way the Act deals with 
exclusion c la u se s .^
The Act does not cover every contract with exclusion clauses. It  
applies only to contracts excluding or lim it in g  business l ia b i l i t y  
which 1s defined 1n S .l(3 ) as ob liga tions and duties a ris ing :
(a) "from things done or to be done by a person 1n the course of
a business (whether h is own business or anothers); or
(b) "from the occupation of premises used fo r business purposes
of the occupier".
Secondly, Schedule 1 of the Act excludes contracts re la ting  to 
Insurance, land, patents, trade marks, copyrights, companies, secu rit ie s , 
marine salvage or storage, charterparties o f ships or hovercraft, carriage 
o f goods by ship or hovercraft. Furthermore ce rta in  provisions of the 
Act apply only when one o f the parties contracts as a consumer. S.12(l) 
states that a person Is a consumer If
(a) "he neither makes the contract In the course o f a business nor 
holds himself out as doing so; and 910
9. Atlyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract. 3rd edn. (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford,1981).
10. Private transactions are thus excluded. This appears to be redundant 
since private contracts hardly ever contain such exclusion or lim ita tion  
clauses ar\yway.
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(b) the other party rakes the contract in the course of business; and
(c) " . . .  the goods passing under or 1n pursuance of the contract are
of a type o rd in a r ily  supplied fo r p rivate use or consumption"
This la s t  provision Is bound to be problematic. Certain goods, such 
as video recorders and cassettes,are mostly sold to non-private buyers. 
Does th is  fa c t mean that any person buying such a good 1s outside the 
purview o f some of the provisions o f the Act? Conversely, i f  a shop­
keeper for example, buys a* ordinary consumer goods such as a gas f ir e  
fo r example fo r h is shop, 1t seems that from the above d e f in it io n  he 
cannot get the protection o f some o f the statutory p ro v is io n s '11^
Goods may be bought pa rtly  fo r business and partly  fo r p rivate use.
S .12(3) however states that I t  Is fo r those claim ing that a party does 
not deal as consumer to show that he does not".
The e ffec ts  o f the provisions of the Act are two-fold. Some pro­
v is ions render certa in  exclusion clauses en t ire ly  in e ffe c t iv e ; others 
subject certa in  exclusion clauses to the requirement o f reasonableness.
(a) in e ffe ctive  Provisions * *•
L ia b i l i t y  fo r negligence: S .2 (l) o f the.Act states that "A person 
cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given to persons 
generally or to pa rt icu la r persons exclude o r re s t r ic t  h1s l ia b i l i t y  
fo r death or personal Injury resu lting  from negligence". This Is the 
most sweeping reform to be made by the Act. The app lica tion  o f th is 
sub-section 1s not re s tr ic ted  1n any way. I t  Is useful to note that 
by S . l ( l ) ,  "negligence" covers not merely negligence 1n the performance
11. Lawson, Exclusion Clauses (Oyez Publish ing, London, 1978),
o f a contractual duty, but also the to r t  o f negligence generally and 
the common duty o f care Imposed by the Occupier's L ia b il i t y  Act 1957.
Even before the Act, It'was never very easy excluding such l ia b i l i t y .  ' 
The courts required such clauses to be s p e c if ic a lly  drawn to the 
attention of those entering into the contract. Now, no such devices 
are any longer necessary since such clauses are declared void by 
statute.
Secondly, manufacturers' and re ta i le r s ' "guarantees" have also 
come under the regulation o f the Act. S .5 (l) states that: "In the 
case o f goods of a type o rd in a r ily  supplied fo r private use or con­
sumption, where loss or damage:
(a) arises from the goods proving defective while 1n consumer use; and
(b) resu lts  from the negligence of a person concerned 1n the manufacture 
or d is tr ib u tio n  o f the goods,
l i a b i l i t y  fo r the loss or damage cannot be excluded or restr ic ted  by 
reference to any contract term or notice contained In or operating by 
reference to a guarantee o f the goods."'
(2) For these purposes:
(a) goods.are to be regarded as "1n consumer use" when a person Is 
using them, or has them 1n h is possession fo r use, otherwise than 
exclus ive ly  fo r the purposes o f a business; and
(b) anything in w rit ing  Is a guarantee I f  1t contains or purports to 
contain some promise or assurance (however worded or presented) that 
defects w il l be made good by complete or pa rtia l replacement, or by 
repa ir, monetary compensation or otherwise. 12
(121
12. See Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 W.L.R. 585.
Hence, guarantees can only add to common law r ig h ts  of the consumer. 
They can never l im it  those righ ts; any clause In a guarantee purporting 
to do so w il l be declared void.
Sections 6 and 7 also render void any clauses seeking to exclude 
any terms implied by law. S6(l) states as follows:
" L ia b i l it y  fo r breach a ris in g  from
(a) section 12 o f the Sale o f Goods Act 1893 (S e lle r 's  implied under­
takings as to t i t le ,  e tc .);
(b) section 8 o f the Supply of Goods Act (Implied Terms) Act 1973 
(the corresponding section re la tion  to hire-purchase), cannot be 
excluded or re str ic ted  by reference to any contract term“ .
(2) "As against a person dealing as a consumer, l i a b i l i t y  for breach 
of the ob ligations a r is in g  from
(a) section 13, 14 or 15 of the 1893 Act ( s e lle r 's  undertakings as to 
conformity o f goods with description or sample, or as to th e ir qua lity  
of fitn ess  fo r a pa rticu la r purpose);
(b) Section 9, 10 or 11 of the 1973 Act (corresponding things In 
re la tion  to hire-purchase);
cannot be Excluded or re str ic ted  by reference to any contract term".
In th is  case, the In va lid ity  o f such an exclusion w ill be declared 
Irrespective of whether I t  1s a private sale. This protection Is however 
only given to a person dealing as a consumer. Section 7(2) on Its part 
s tipu la tes that "As against a person dealing as a consumer, l i a b i l i t y  
In respect o f the goods' correspondence with descrip tion or sample, 
or th e ir qua lity  or fitness for any particu la r purpose, cannot be 
excluded or re s tr ic ted  by reference to any such term". This subsection 
Is unequivocal. I t  replaces Ss. 1-3 of the Supply o f Goods (Implied
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Terms) Act 1973. Schedule 4 of the 1977 Act repeals S.55(3) o f the 
Sale o f Goods Act and S.12(2) o f the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) 
Act.
There has been c r it ic ism  of the above-mentioned provisions of the
Act. Professor B. Coote for example, 1n s im ila r fashion to h is e a r lie r
(13)c r it ic ism  of the ju d ic ia l approach to exclusion c lauses,' ' contends 
that the underlying assumption o f the Act 1s that exclusion or 
lim ita t io n  clauses are merely defences and that they do not 1n fac t 
determine the preferring party 's l i a b i l i t y  1n the f i r s t  place. He 
contends that th is  1s wrong, c it in g  Lord Devlin who sa id , 1n Hedley 
Byrne v. H e lle r^  that: "A man cannot be said vo lun ta rily  to be 
undertaking a re spon s ib ility  1f a t  the very moment when he Is said 
to be accepting I t  he declares tha t 1n fa c t he 1s not". With respect, 
I t  Is submitted that Professor Coote does not adequately appreciate 
the need to Impose minimum ob liga tions 1n contractual re la tions 
espec ia lly  between businesses and consumers. In the above cases 
therefore, the leg is la tor, has qu ite  r ig h t ly  therefore deemed I t  
Improper for such exclusion clauses to have any e ffe c t as against a 
person contracting as a consumer.
(b) Provisions subject to the requirement of reasonableness.
S .2(2) states that "In the case of other loss or damage, a person 
cannot so exclude or re s tr ic t  h1s l ia b i l i t y  fo r negligence except In so 
fa r as the term or notice s a t is f ie s  the requirement o f reasonableness". 134
13. Coote, Exclusion Clauses (Sweet and Maxwell, 1964).
14. [1964] A.C. 465 a t 538. See also B. Coote, "Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977", 41 M.L.R. (1978), 312 a t 314.
This sub-section 1s complementary to S .2 ( l) where the damage 
resu lts  In personal Injury or death. The concept o f "reasonableness" 
is  central to the whole Act. S.3 of the Act states that:
(1) This section  applies as between contracting parties where one of 
them deals as a consumer or on the o ther's  w ritten standard terms of 
business.
(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any 
contract term -
(a) when 1n breach of contract, exclude or r e s t r ic t  any l ia b i l i t y  
1n respect o f  the breach, or
(b) claim to be en tit led  -
(I) to render a contractual performance substan tia lly  d iffe ren t from 
that which was reasonably expected o f him, or
(II) 1n respect o f the whole or any part of h is contractual ob liga tion , 
to render no performance at a l l ,
except 1n so fa r as (In any of the cases mentioned above In th is  sub­
section) the contract term s a t is f ie s  the requirement o f reasonableness".
Section 2(2) has a very broad sphere of app lica tion . Not only 
does I t  a f fe c t  physical damage to goods, but also economic loss as In 
Hedley Bryrna v. Hello' A P a rtn e re S ^  This SUb-sect1on does not 
however create new grounds for actions In negligence. I t  merely makes 
1t more d i f f i c u l t  fo r l i a b i l i t y  to be excluded. 15
15. [1964] A.C. 465; See Lawson, Exclusion Clauses (Oyez Publishing 
Ltd, London, 1978), p. 85. He supposes that car parks, dry cleaners 
and launderers are the main targets o f th is  section.
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This sub-section 1s complementary to S. 2(1) where the damage 
resu lts  In personal Injury or death. The concept o f "reasonableness"
Is central to the whole Act. S.3 o f the Act states that:
(1) This section applies as between contracting parties where one of 
them deals as a consumer or on the o ther's  w ritten standard terms of 
business.
(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any 
contract term -
(a) when In breach of contract, exclude or r e s t r ic t  any l i a b i l i t y  
In respect o f the breach, or
(b) cla im  to be en tit led  -
(I) to render a contractual performance substan tia lly  d iffe ren t from 
that which was reasonably expected o f him, or
(II) In respect o f the whole or any part of h1s contractual ob liga tion , 
to render no performance a t a l l ,
except 1n so fa r  as (1n any of the cases mentioned above In th is  sub­
section) the contract term s a t is f ie s  the requirement o f reasonableness".
Section 2(2) has a very broad sphere of app lica tion . Not only 
does I t  a ffe c t physical damage to goods, but also economic loss as In 
Hadley Bryma v. H e llo ' a Partners. th is  sub-section does not 
however create new grounds fo r actions 1n negligence. I t  merely makes 
1t more d i f f i c u l t  fo r l i a b i l i t y  to be excluded. 15
15. [1964] A.C. 465; See Lawson, Exclusion Clauses (Oyez Publishing 
Ltd, London, 1978), p. 85. He supposes that car parks, dry cleaners 
and launderers are the main targets o f th is  section.
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Section 3, l ik e  S.2, 1s not confined to contracts to which one 
party contracts as a consumer. I t  su ffice s that where the party 1s 
not a consumer, he contracts on the terms o f a standard contract.
Hence even commercial contracts are w ith in the purview o f these 
sections. Almost any type of clause designed to exclude or l im it  
l i a b i l i t y  or one of the party 's  ob ligations can therefore be challenged. 
To th is  extent, Professor Atlyah 1s r ig h t 1n asserting that the doctrine 
of breach of fundamental term or breach of fundamental ob ligation  has 
become unnecessary/16 17^ The target o f S“.3(2)(b) 1s the practice , 
p a rt icu la r ly  o f tour operators fo r example, who, while agreeing to 
undertake a ce rta in  ob liga tion , reserve at the same time the r igh t 
to substitu te that ob ligation  with one en t ire ly  d i f f e r e n t / 1^ I t  
must be stressed that the Act requires performance to be what 1s 
expected by a reasonable man. I t  1s an objective standard. Any 
In s t itu t ion  which according to S . l l( 2 )  Is charged with the determination 
of whether an exclusion clause 1s reasonable or not has been given 
guidelines fo r  such determination 1n Schedule 2 of the Act. The 
matters to be taken Into consideration are:
(a) the strength o f the bargaining positions of the parties re la t ive  
to each other; taking Into account (among other things) a lte rna tive  
means by which the customer's requirements could have been met;
16. Atlyah, Introduction to the Law o f Contracts, 3rd Edn, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1981 p. 152.
17. Contrary to Prof. Coote's thes is , exclusion clauses can also take 
the form of a s tipu la tion  that one party does not have to perform 
certa in  ob ligations which are part o f what he has agreed to.
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(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, 
or 1n accepting 1t had an opportunity o f entering Into a s im ila r con­
tra c t with other persons, but without having to accept a s im ila r term.
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known o f
the existence and extent o f the term (having regard, among other things, 
to any custom o f the trade and any previous course of dealing between 
the parties);
(d) where the term excludes or re s tr ic ts  any relevant l ia b i l i t y  i f  
some condition 1s not complied With, whether, I t  was reasonable a t  the 
time of the contract to expect that condition would be practicab le;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the 
special order of the customer".
S . l l  also adds to these guidelines. S . l l ( l )  states that regard 
must be had to the "circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to 
have been, known to or 1n contemplation of the parties when the contract 
was made". Sub-section 4 requires that where l ia b i l i t y  Is lim ite d  to 
a pa rticu la r sum of money, 1n order to determine Its reasonableness, 
regard must be had to the resources the party proffering the clause 
could expect to have In the event that the l ia b i l i t y  arises; and also 
whether that party could cover himself by I n s u r a n c e . S . l l ( l )  f in a lly  
places the onus o f proving reasonableness on the party re lying on the 
exclusion clause. Clauses excluding l ia b i l i t y  fo r misrepresentation are 18
18. This section Is designed to redeem the situation  created by 
Harbutt's P la s t ic in e  v. Wayne Tank Pump L td . [1970] 1 A11 E.R.
461 where what was a perfectly  reasonable exclusion clause 
between two businesses was struck down.
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now subject to S.8 o f the Act.^19  ^ They must be reasonable. So also 
should clauses requ iring  a consumer to Indemnify another person whether 
party to a contract or not.^2^
The e ffe c t o f a breach o f contract on exclusion clauses has been
unqua llfied lystated in  S .9 ( l): '-Where fo r re lia n ce  upon 1t a contract
term has to s a t is fy  the requirement o f reasonableness, I t  may be
found to do so and given e ffe c t accordlngly notwithstanding that the
contract has been terminated by breach or by a party e lecting to trea t
i t  as repudiated". This ensures that the "doctrine o f fundamental
breach does not Invalidate a clause which has passed the reasonableness
test, as fo r instance In Harbutt'e Plaetioine"
Since the Unfa ir Contract Terms Act, a new Act, the Sale of Goods
Act 1979, has been passed. This new Act does not repeal any parts o f 
(21)
the 1977 A c t . ' 1 There appears however to be a certa in  Inconsistency 
between S.6(2) o f the 1977 Act and S .14(2) o f  the Sale o f Goods Act,
1979. The la t te r  states that: "where the s e l le r  s e lls  goods 1n the 
courseof business, there 1s an Implied cond ition  that the goods supplied 
under the contract are of merchantable q u a lity , except that there 1s 
no such condition:
(a) as regards defects sp e c if ic a lly  drawn to the buyer's attention 
before the contract 1s made; or 1920
19. This replaces S.3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967.
20. S.4 of the Act. Such s ituations hardly a rise  however.
21. B la ir ,  Sales of Goods Act 1979 (London, Butterworths 1980) no. 79, 
p. 27.
22. Harbutt's P la s t ic in e  v. Wayne Tank t  Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447.
(b) I f  the buyer examines the goods before the contract 1s made, as 
regards defects which tha t examination ought to reveal.
S.6(2) I t  1s re ca lle d , ca tego rica lly  states that as against a 
consumer Ss.13, 14 or 15 of the Sale of Goods Act cannot be excluded.
I t  seems therefore that on the basis o f S.6(2) o f the 1977 Act a 
court may even refuse to hear evidence that defects were sp e c if ic a lly  
brought to the knowledge of a consumer In order to va lidate the exclusion 
clause because such a clause 1s simply void.
An Important feature of English le g is la t io n  on standard form 
contracts wh1ch,as w i l l  be seen, remarkably d istingu ishes 1t from the 
French le g is la t io n  or even the Swedish le g is la t io n , 1s that 1t has not 
a ltered redress and enforcement procedures, re ly ing  as 1t has always 
done on the courts. Adm in istrative control which has been outlined by 
the Fa ir Trading Act 1973, 1s e ssen tia lly  confined to procedural un fa ir­
ness and the protection 1s given exclus ive ly  to consumers.
SECTION II : Recent French Leg is la tion
As was seen 1n Chapter Three, the French courts have managed to 
deal with .some of the In justices of standard form contracts even without 
any le g is la t io n . However, they were always faced with the d if f ic u lt y  
o f providing a coherent theory enabling them to s tr ik e  down or modify 
contracts which appeared to them to be unconscionable. Several attempts 
were made, notably, attempts to use the doctrines of 'le s io n ' and 'abuse 
o f r ig h t ' as a basis fo r  the formulation o f a general theory.
A r t ic le  1674 of the French C iv il  Code enables the vendor who has 
sold Ms land fo r less than seven-twelfths o f Its value, to rescind 
the contract. This provis ion  has however been confined to real property
'Lesion ' thereforeand only applies under re s tr ic ted  circum stances.^  
fa ile d  as a basis for a general theory. The theory of abuse o f rights 
was a lso used as a basis 1n an attempt to formulate a theory for 
Intervention 1n unfa ir contracts. This theory was b u ilt  around 
A r t ic le  1382. However th is  was against the p rin c ip le  “qui d1t 
contractue l, d1t juste" o f A r t ic le  1134 o f the C iv il Code. The theory 
was therefore only used to Intervene 1n contracts whenever the p rin c ip le  
of freedom of contract ran counter to some other basic p r in c ip le . Hence, 
I t  was used e ssen tia lly  1n contracts 1n re s tra in t o f trade. Abuse 
of r igh ts  also fa ile d  to provide a theory to enable the courts to 
s t r ik e  down or modify unconscionable contracts.
Before the 1978 reforms, the French leg is la tu re  had passed a 
number of laws, dealing with the various aspects of standard form con­
t ra c ts . One such law, Law No. 75-597 o f 9th Ju ly 1975 on fo rfe itu re  
and penalty clauses has already been elaborately d is cu ssed .^  The law 
o f the 22nd December 1972^ modified by’ the law of 27th December 
1973 (Lo1 R oye r)^  regulated-'premium s a le s '. The la t te r  law, ' lo1 
Royer', also dea lt with problems of procedural unfairness before and 
a f te r  the .signing o f a contract. The law o f 22nd December 1972 also 
regulated door-to-door sales. Most of th is  le g is la t io n  1s designed to 
p ro tect consumers (who are the primary targets of standard contracts) 
from unconscionable aspects o f the la t te r .  1234
1. Mazeaud, Leports de D ro it C i v i l . Tome 2 (Paris 1973, 5th Edn. 
by de Jug la rt) pp. 175-178.
2. See Section 3 of Chapter Three.
3. J.C .P . 1972, 111, 39950;
4. J.C.P. 1974, 111, 41167. This law also protects small businesses 
from the larger ones.
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In 1978, two laws were passed: Lau No. 7 8 - 2 2  o f  1 0 th  January, 1 9 7 8 , ^  
dealing with the d isclosure o f Information to, and the protection o f 
consumers 1n certa in  c red it contracts. The second 1n Lau No. 7 8 -2 3  o f  
1 0 th  January,  1 978  dealing with the sale of goods or services to 
consumers. ^  -
The feature which sets these two pieces of le g is la t io n  apart from 
what had h itherto been done 1s the fa c t that there -1s e x p lic it  recognition 
o f the exp lo ita tion  by the stronger o i  the weaker party to standard 
c red it or sa le  contracts, and an overt desire to restore a certa in  
equilibrium  between the partie s . By so doing, the French leg is la tu re  
flouted the bed-rock o f contract theory In French law: the 'autonomy 
of the w i l l '  and the binding force o f contracts le g a lly  made. This 
prompted M. Foyer a deputy, to pro test against what he ca lled  the 
"ravage of C iv i l  la w " .^
Both laws protect consumers before and a fte r they enter Into any 
contract. Hence, Intervention can now be made a p r io r i,  not necessarily  
a poste rio ri ( l.e .  a fte r a breach) as the case was before 1978.
Provisions re lated to procedural unconsclonablUty: the problem 
of d isclosure of Information, being central to the whole Idea of 
consumer protection, 1s dea lt with by both laws. Both laws deal with 
th is  problem In two guises. In the f i r s t  place, the duty to d isclose 567
5. J.O. 11 jan le r 1978, p. 299;Rnceuil Dalloz S lrrey  1978 Leg.
P. 84.
6. J.O. 11 Janvier 1978, 301 Receull Dalloz S lrrey  1978, Leg. p. 87.
7. G. B e r lio z , "D ro it de la  Consommation, et D ro it des Contracts"
J.C .P . 1979, Doctrine 2954 at no. 4.
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is  owed to the general pub lic . Disclosure ru les o f th is  order are 
aimed at the p u b lic ity  and advertisements made by manufacturers and 
re ta ile r s ,  banks etc; ru les which seek to ensure the accuracy of 
statements made to the general pub lic . This aspect of disclosure 
has come under the law since 190b.^
A r t ic le  22 o f Law No. 78-23 strengthens previous leg is la t io n  In 
th is  connection by creating the means by which the accuracy of such 
statements can be tested. A r t ic le  4 o f Law no. 78-22 regulates 
advertisements o f c red it  transactions. Ih1s Is designed to control 
the a c t iv it ie s  o f cred it-brokers who are henceforth lim ited In the 
nature and extent of ba its they can throw around to entice consumers.
Those who do not observe th is  ru le  may be fined between 2000 F and 5000 F. 
A r t ic le s  39-43 (Chapter V of the Law), also deal with such disclosure 
1n re la tion  to the sale of goods or services. A r t ic le  40 states 
that any person 1n breach o f these provisions might be fined up to 
50 per cent of the costs of the advertisement.
Besides these ru le s , provisions requiring d isclosure o f a 
d iffe ren t order - to a pa rticu la r contracting party are found In both 
laws. While the former type o f d isclosure, l.e .  to the general public 
might be said to be negative (In the sense that a party 1s required 
not to engage In ce rta in  p ractices), d isclosure o f th is  order 1s 
pos itive  because I t  requires that party to do ce rta in  things, to 
provide d e fin ite  Information. One party - the b u s ln e ss - ls  required to 
d isc lose a l l  that Is necessary to enable the other party to understand 
the f u l l  Implications o f the contract he 1s about the enter Into: 8
8. Loi du 1er août 1905. See also Loi Royer, note 4, op. c l t .
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information on the goods or service i t s e l f  and also on the terms of 
the contract. This Is a patent affirm ation by the French leg is la tu re  
that the adage "Let the buyer beware", fo r so long a fundamental part 
o f contract theory has become 111-suited fo r present-day adhesion 
contracts. A r t ic le  7 of law no. 78-23 provldes'that the q u a lit ie s , 
composition, quantity, descrip tion and even it s  uses and Inherent 
r is k s  and dangers must be d is c lo s e d .^
Disclosure extends to the terms of the contract. In th is , 
law no. 78-22 goes very far;- Not only does 1t require f u l l  d e ta ils  
o f the contract to be given; a r t ic le s  6 and 7 go even fu rther to 
prescribe the form which any c re d it  contract w il l have to assume.
At the pre-contractual stage, any person requiring a loan must make 
a w ritten o ffe r In the form prescribed by decree no. 78-509 of 24th 
March 1978 which goes as fa r as prescrib ing the type o f characters 
with which the document should be printed. This o ffe r remains open 
for fifteen  days although 1n p ractice , the lender might accept 1t 
Immediately, thus bridging th is  period.
In addition to these safeguards, the borrower benefits from a 
seven-day cool1ng-off period, during which he may withdraw his 
o ffe r. However, u n til the expiry of that period, ne ither party to 
the contract can enforce I t . 9
9. As In English law, such d isclosure was only required In Insurance 
contracts or contracts fo r the sale of Immovables (See A r t ic le  7 
of Law no. 261-11 of 3rd January 1967 on the sale o f Immovables). 
The business community opposed the extension o f th is  requirement 
to other contracts because 1t would require them to divulge trade 
secrets. Luc B lh l, 1n "La lo l no 73-23 du 10 janv. 1978 sur la  
protection et 1'Information du consommateur"; J .C .P . 1978, Doctrine 
2909, thinks however that such protection 1s only desirab le 1n con­
tracts where the goals Involve high technology, rather than where 
the contract concerns consumer goods.
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A r t ic le  35 of law no. 78-23 gives power to the 'Conseil d 'E ta t ' 
to regulate or forb id  clauses in contracts between professional and 
non-professional persons or consumers in  accordance with the advice 
given to 1t by a commission created for the purpose o f po lic ing  such 
contracts, to r id  them of the ir unconscionable aspects. In pursuance 
o f th is power, a decree was passed on the 24th o f March, 1978, a r t ic le  
1 of which Invalidates clauses, in  adhésion contracts which do not 
figure on the contractual document signed by the other party, such 
as clauses printed on 'rece ip ts, t ic k e ts . S im ila r ly , clauses Incor­
porated by reference are void.
The law does not however define who a consumer or a non-professional 
is .  Law no. 78-22 1n Its  a r t ic le  3, excludes from the ambit of the 
present law c re d it  contracts which are made 1n solemn form, those 
whose object 1s to finance professional a c t iv it ie s ,  those made with 
Incorporated bodies (as borrower), those for which the loan period does 
not exceed three months and those designed to finance the purchase of 
immovables. Furthermore the sum Involved must not exceed one hundred 
thousand Francs. The lender must be a person or In s titu tion  which 
hab itua lly  gives c red it. Hence, a contract made with a department 
store which hab itua lly  gives c re d it  to Its customers 1s w ith in the 
purview of th is  law.
A r t ic le  35 of law no. 78-23 mentions non-professionals and 
consumers. I t  1s d i f f ic u l t  to see the relevance of th is  d is t in c t io n .
An example o f th is d is t in c tio n  Is that of a publisher who Is a 
professional, a w rite r, who Is a non-professional and the reader who
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is  a consumer. Does th is  therefore mean that persons such as a r t is t s ,  
musicians, w r ite rs  fa l l  w ith in  the protection o f the new law.
Although the parliamentary debates p r io r to the passing of th is  law 
do not d isc lose  such an in tention, without such an Interpretation of 
S.35, i t  1s d i f f i c u l t  to see any raison d 'etre  fo r the d is t in c t io n .
I f  a "consumer" 1s defined as the " fin a l user o f the goods 
or s e r v i c e " , t h i s  w il l  unduly re s t r ic t  the scope o f the new 
laws. The v e il of incorporation fo r example, should not preclude 
a small company v ir tu a lly  owned-by one person from the protection of 
the le g is la t io n  If such a company enters Into an unconscionable con­
tract, whether fo r  the purchase of a good or fo r c re d it , s im ila r to 
that entered in to  by a c o n s u m e r . B e r l i o z  thinks therefore that 
the c r ite r io n  fo r  the a p p lic a b ility  o f  the new laws ought to be 
whether the party  had the p o s s ib il ity  o f negotiating the terms of 
the contract. I f  he did not, he should be en tit led  to the protection 
o f the new le g is la t io n . This view 1s p lausib le 1n the l ig h t  o f the 
fact that some professional persons such as small re ta ile rs  and small 
scale farmers might be no better placed than consumers whenever 
they contract fo r  business purposes. 102
10. Luc B1hl, "La Loi 110 78-23 du 10 Janvier 1978 sur la  protection 
e t l'In form ation  du consommateur", J.C .P. 1978 Doctrine 2909
no. 20.
11. Fourgeoux, Droit de la  Consommation, (1978) p.c. 4.
12. G. B e r lio z  "D ro it de la  consommation et D ro it de, contrats", 
J.C.P. 1979, Doctrine 2954 no. 9.
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Substantive Prov is ions:
Law no. 78-22 linked a financing contract to the contract of 
sale for which the c red it was needed. Before 1978 the contract o f
sa le was Independent of the financing contract. Hence, 1f a finance
«
company refused to lend to the borrower, the contract of sa le (fo r 
which finance was needed) nevertheless went through, 1n the absence 
o f a clause s t ipu la tin g  otherwise. A lte rn a tive ly , the financing or 
c red it contract may go through without the delivery o f the goods for 
which the c red it  was .required.
A r t ic le  9 of the new law states that where the o ffe r 1n a c red it 
contract mentions the purpose o f the loan, the ob ligation  o f the 
borrower would not conmence un til the goods or service mentioned has 
been delivered or performed. In the case o f a continuing performance, 
when the performance begins; and a lso , the ob ligations of the borrower 
cease or are Interrupted when performance ceases or 1s Interrupted. 
Paragraph 2 of a r t ic le  9 states that on a breach of the primary or 
main contract by the s e lle r , the c red it contract automatically ceases. 
Other measures to protect the c red it  consumer have been provided 
besides th is  Important Innovation. Penalty and liqu idated damages 
clauses have again come under regulation. In c re d it  and hire-purchase 
agreements such clauses are designed to cover two even tua lit ie s; f i r s t  
of a l l ,  cases where the borrower seeks to repay the whole loan before 
Its fu l l term. This might deprive the lender of the sums he would 
have earned as Interests. Usually, there 1s a clause 1n c re d it  contracts 
that the fu l l Interest fo r the fu ll term w il l  be paid. Decree no. 78-375 
o f March 17th 1978 1n Its a r t ic le  19 states that 1n such a case, the
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in te re s t payable sha ll not exceed 40 per cent o f the sum repaid before 
the end of the term o f the loan.
More often than not, the cases turn on penalties or liqu idated 
damages where the borrower f a i ls  to repay the loan on time. A rt ic le s  
20 and 21 o f Law no. 78-22 cover such cases. The borrower may breach 
the contract in  one or more o f several ways: non-payment of instalments, 
parting with goods subject to hire-purchase, or breaching any other 
condition o f the contract. A r t ic le  20 provides that on SUCh an 
occurrence, the lender may immediately require repayment o f the entire 
sum len t, plus Interest already due and demand liquidated damages which 
have been regulated by a r t ic le  2 of decree no. 78-373 o f 17th March
1978. The lender may Impose on the party 1n defau lt by way o f damages, 
8 per cent of the sum due on the date o f the breach. A lte rna tive ly , 
the lender may not require inmediate repayment o f the whole sum, but 
merely liqu idated damages equivalent to 8 per cent of the unpaid 
Instalments. This does not o f course preclude him from requiring 
payment of the normal sums due plus "delay In terests". The court 
may however Increase or decrease the liqu idated damages provided for 
above, on the basis o f the new a r t ic le  1152 o f the C iv il Code.
A r t ic le  21 o f the above mentioned decree provides spec ific  
ce ilin g s  fo r liqu idated damages In the case o f hire-purchase con­
tracts . These ce ilin g s  take Into consideration the d ifference between 
the unpaid Instalments, and the residual value o f the goods on the 
one hand, and the purchase value of the goods (as determined by an 
expert) on the other hand. Any lender who Imposes liquidated damages
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over and above these legal l im its  Is l ia b le  to be fined between 2000 F 
and 20,000 F.^13 14^
Law no. 78-23 of 10th January 1978 achieved a land-mark as fa r  
as French law goes generally, 1n opting fo r what nearly amounts to a 
tota l exclusion of ju d ic ia l control o f adhesion‘contracts. Adm inistrative, 
rather than ju d ic ia l con tro l, has been provided for.
A r t ic le  36 creates a commission fo r unconscionable clauses In 
contracts between professional-people (businesses) and consumers or 
non-professional persons. The comm1ss1ou w il l  be a f f i l ia te d  to the 
M in istry  of Consumer A ffa ir s . The conmlssion Is composed of f ifte en  
members amongst whom must be a judge (from the ju d ic ia l bench) who 
1s to be the Chairman o f the Commission; two other judges (from the 
ju d ic ia l or adm inistrative bench) or members o f the 'Conseil d 'E ta t ',  
three representatives from the adm inistration; three legal advisers 
on the law of contract, three representatives from the consumer 
association; three representatives from the trade association.
A r t ic le  37 determines the function o f th is  conmlsslon as fo llow s:
I t  sha ll examine the model forms of standard contracts to find out 
whether they contain any unconscionable clauses. The commission may 
do so a t the Instigation of the M in istry of Consumer A ffa irs  or by a 
consumer or trade association. I t  may also act on Its own v o lit io n .
I t  may make public Its  recommendations (without s p e c if ic a lly  mentioning 
ar\y names). The coirmlsslon also produces a yearly report In which any
13. See A r t ic le  26 of Law no. 78-22 of 1978.
14. The In it ia l b i l l  provided for ju d ic ia l control: See Project de 1o1,
Ass. Nat. 3154, 1977-78; also J.D. De'b Ass.Nat. 8 dec. 1977.
See also G. B e r lo lz , "D ro it de la  Consommation et D ro it de.
Contrats", supra, note 12 at n.23.
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suggestions fo r le g is la t iv e  or adm inistrative reforms are put forward.
I f  the cortmisslon discovers any unconscionable clause 1n a 
standard contract, 1t may then consult with the "Conseil d 'E ta t" which 
may then issue a decree banning or regulating such a clause. A r t ic le  
35 gives four c r ite r ia  fo r determining whether a pa rticu la r clause is  
unconscionable or not:
(I) 1t must f i r s t  of a l l  be Inserted 1n a con tract between a pro­
fessional person and a non-professional person or a consumer;
(II) 1t must be imposed by the professional person on the non-pro­
fessional person or consumer;
( II I)  i t  must be an abuse of the p ro fessiona l's economic superio rity ;
(1v) the clause must confer on the professional person an excessive 
advantage over the other person.
The f i r s t  decree from the 'Conseil d 'E ta t ' to apply the new 
law 1s Decree no. 78-464 o f 24th March 1 9 7 8 . Thi s decree prohibited 
the Inclusion o f two types o f clauses In standard form contracts between 
professionals and consumers: those clauses whose object or e ffe c t 1s 
to give the professional a r ig h t to u n ila te ra lly  modify the characte ris tics  
of the goods or services to be delivered; those whose e ffe c t Is to exclude 
or l im it  the l i a b i l i t y  o f a professional person towards the non-pro­
fessional or consumer In the event of a breach by the former. Other 
types of clauses regulated by th is decree Include guarantee clauses - 
requiring the professional to Insert a guarantee clause c le a r ly  Indicating 
the guarantees he 1s leg a lly  compelled to g ive, the consumer. Some 15
15. D. 1978, 228.
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other recommendations have been made by the conmisslon but they 
have not yet (un til 1981) been translated Into d e c re e s .^
I t  is  useful to note that A r t ic le  35 provides that clauses which 
could be considered unconscionable Include clauses re la ting  to the . 
mode of f ix in g  and payment o f the price; the qua lity  of goods; the 
resc iss icnor renewal o f the contract; guarantees, the passing of 
r is k s , the extent of l i a b i l i t y  assumed by the s e lle r  and clauses 
re la ting  to the mode of performance.
The nature of these proh ib itions have preoccupied some scholars . ^ ^  
The broad characterisation of the clause as conferring "excessive 
advantage" on the pro ffe ro r appears vague. Nowhere 1n law no. 78-23 
is  "excessive advantage" defined. Excessive 1n re la tion  to what? 
Secondly, 1s the onus o f proving a l l  four c r ite r ia  fo r  the existence 
of InconsclonablUty on the non-professional or consumer? Because 
these Issues are to be decided by the commission which 1s composed of 
experts, maybe the French le g is la to r did not find I t  useful to determine 
such matters of d e ta il.
I f  the above c r it ic ism s  can be ea s ily  overcome, the position 1s 
d iffe ren t when one considers the problem of sanctions In law no. 78-23. 
The law stipu la tes that any clause which has been adjudged unconscionable 
Is void. In certain cases (c red it contracts), a f in e  may be Imposed. 
Those are however exceptional cases. Merely declaring the clauses void,
I t  Is submitted, w ill not deter businesses from Inserting such clauses 16*
16. Ph ilippe Mal'mvaud, "La protection des consommateurs", D.1981, 
Chronlque v111.
17. B1 h i , note 10, o p .c lt . nos. 22-24.
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1nto th e ir  standard forms and th is  practice w il l  inev itab ly  Influence 
the buyers in point o f fa c t. Merely declaring such clauses void 1s 
therefore not nearly enough I f  businesses are to be dissuaded from 
such practices.^ 18^
What • becomes o f the ju d ic ia ry  In re la tion  to disputes a ris ing  
from such contracts? Section V of Book 3 o f the C iv il  Code (a r t ic le s  
1156-1164) give the courts the power to Interpret contracts. The new 
le g is la t io n  has not detracted from th is  standpoint. Judges may s t i l l  
declare such contracts, voldy They do noi however have the power to 
declare any type of clause void, which has not been declared void by 
the regulatory body.
This state o f a f fa ir s  has been c r it ic is e d ,  espec ia lly  because 
the regulatory body 1s viewed as being part o f the government. Hence 
the extent to which unconscionable contracts w il l be regulated might 
depend on what view the government takes and th is obviously hinges 
on the p o lit ic a l and Ideological complexion of the government In 
power. Surely, a s o c ia l is t  government Is bound to assume a more 
pro tective a ttitude towards consumers than a conservative government 
would. I t  Is submitted that there 1s a case fo r removing the regulatory 
body from the control o f the government.
18. B lh l,  note 10 no. 24; Thanh Bourgeals ; 0. 1979, Chronlque III 
no. 24.
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SECTION III : The German Law on Standard Contract Terms 
A Background
The German C iv il Code o f 1900 did not mention standard form
contracts, the problem not having been recognised then. I t  did
not take very long however fo r 1t to emerge. In 1921 the German
Supreme Court declared certa in  clauses -in a standard form contract
to be against good morals because the-profferer o f the clauses took
advantage o f a monopoly s itu a t io n .^  Legal scholars followed su it
In examining the problems posed by standard form contracts. In an
a r t ic le  published In 1933, Professor Grossman-Doerth pointed out
that entrepreneursdld create new sets o f contractual ru les by means
(21of th e ir standard contract forms.' ' Professor Raiser also noted
that the general rules on the law of contract applicable then could
not adequately deal w ith the emerging problems. He ca lled  upon the
(31
leg is la tu re  to Intervene.' '
Unlike English and French law which I n i t ia l ly  looked at the 
problem from the point o f view o f consent, 1.e. whether or not the 
adhering party had given h1s consent to the terms, Inserted 1n the 
contractual document, the German Supreme Court f e l t  that by the fa c t 123
1. RG 26 Oct. 1921, RGZ 103, c ited In von Bre lnste ln: "Le d ro it  
allemand r e la t l f  aux Conditions contractuelles generales", [1978] 
Gaz. du Pa la is , 110.
2. Cited In von Marschall: "The German Law on Standard Contract Terms" 
(I979)4ar1t1me and Commercial Law Q ua lity , 278 a t 279.
3. Cited In von Bre lnste ln , note 1 supra, a t p . l l l .
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of entering Into the contract, such a party had thereby "submitted"
himself to it s  terms. Conscious acquiescence was therefore not
(4)
required. Having taken th is  pos ition , the German Supreme Court 
however proceeded on a s t r ic t  Interpretation o f standard contract 
terms and,of course, there was the overrid ing condition that no 
clause which was contrary to 'good morals' could stand.
I t  soon became evident however that th is  stance by the German 
Supreme Court did l i t t l e  by way o f protecting weaker parties against 
unconscionable standard terms, e spec ia lly  1n view o f the fact that 
the stringent condition the courts required to declare a clause 
against 'good morals' meant that the In justice re su lt ing  from a 
clause had to be Indeed g laring fo r the courts to hold that 1t 
Infringed a r t ic le  138 of the C iv il  Code.
A fter the second world war, the Supreme Court sh ifted from 
dealing with the problem on the basis of a r t ic le  138 of the C iv il
(5)
Code (good morals) to a r t ic le  242 - the requirement o f good fa ith . ' ' 
Because the requirement of good fa ith  1s less s t r ic t  than the require­
ment of good morals, the German courts did therefore acquire a wider 
la titude  In con tro lling  standard contracts.
In a 1955 c a s e /4 56) the German Supreme Court held that although
the v a lid ity  of standard form contracts did not depend on the conscious
consent of the adhering party, such a party being presumed to have
4. Dawson: "Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version", 89 Harvard 
Law Review (1976) p. 1041 at p. 1105.
5. Dawson, op. c l t . note 4 at p. 10$i.
6. Judgement of March 8, 1955, BGH, 17 BGHZ 1, c ited  In Dawson, p. 1108.
-310-
"submitted" himself to the contractual provisions, nevertheless, he 
must be presumed to have submitted himself only such terms as he 
could " f a ir ly  and ju s t ly  reckon". The Court further held that 1f 
the language o f the contractual document did not permit a f a i r  and 
ju s t  Interpretation by the cou rt, any unfa ir provisions would be 
unenforceable. The case 1n point was brought by a shipper who sought 
to recover possession o f goods he hadshlpped, against a c a rr ie r .
Under the term o f the standard contract, a lien  fo r the fre ig h t was 
created 1n favour o f the c a rr ie r  against“ the consignee o f the goods, 
not against the shipper. The court conceded that a lien  could be 
created 1n assets owned by another party 1f the lieno r believed 1n 
good fa ith  that they were owned by his debtor. I t  concluded however 
that 1n a standard contract, prepared for general use by a ca rr ie r , 
neither consignor nor consignee had reason to foresee such an extension 
o f the ir own r isk s . I t  therefore held that the clause d id  not apply.
A 1964 decision Introduced another lin e  of reasoning the 
Im plications of which went much deeper than any previous decis ion.
The case Involved a contract fo r services 1n which a broker undertook 
to find a w ill in g  lender of money. A clause 1n h is standard contract 
form provided that h1s commission was earned I f  and when he provided 
a w ill in g  lender. That clause constituted a departure from a C iv il 
Code provision which stipu la ted  that commission Is earned only when 
the event occurred, 1.e. the actual loan Is given. That provision Is 7
7. Judgement o f November 4 1964, B611 [1965-1] NJW 246.
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is  nevertheless 'fa cu lta tive ' as opposed to mandatory. Contractual 
parties may provide otherwise. The Supreme Court held that because 
the C iv il Code provision was a le g is la t iv e  judgement, any derogation 
from i t  although possib le, had to be fu l ly  understood, by the other 
party to the contract. The court found that th is  was not so in the 
instant case.
Between 1955 and 1974 standard contracts become one of the 
most widely discussed themes by German ju r is ts .  It became obvious 
that the problem had assumed such dimensions by the early seventies 
(given the sharp r ise  in consumer c re d it)  that Professor Raiser's 
early suggestion that leg is la tion  was required had to be fo llo w ed .^  
Questions were raised however as to what nature the leg is la tion  
should take. Should spec ific  rules be created or was i t  su ff ic ie n t 
to simply modify and add to the ex is t in g  C iv il Code provision?
In 1972, a work-shop attached to  the German M in istry of 
Justice was given the task of looking through the whole question 
of standard form contracts and th e ir studies culminated 1n law 
reform proposals which were eventually passed unanimously by 
parliament on the 24th of June 1976.
B: The Act Concerning the Regulation of the Law of Standard Contract 
Terms
The new la w ^  is divided into f-ive parts. The f i r s t  part 
comprises eleven a rt ic le s  which constitu te the core of the substantive 89
8. Other Western European countries were also considering taking 
special leg is la t ion  in th is connection.
9. Translation by Nina Moore G lis te n , (1978) 26 American Journal 
of Comparative Law, p. 568.
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provisions. The second part consists of only one a r t ic le ,  a r t ic le  12 
which mentions the rules of private in ternational law in th is  
connection. The th ird  part deals with procedures fo r the enforcement 
of the Act while the fourth and f i f t h  parts define the sphere of 
application of the new Act. Because i t  would require too much time 
and space to look a t a l l the provis ions, discussion w il l be lim ited 
to the essentia l provisions of the law.
Part one o f the Act covers three aspects of the law of standard 
contract terms: the problem o f.d e f in it io n , the question of incorporation 
of terms and f in a l ly ,  the problem of the in terpretation of standard 
terms.
A rt ic le  1 states as follows: "(1) Standard contract terms are 
a l l those contractual provisions drawn up fo r a large number of 
contracts which one contracting party (the proponent) presents to 
the other contracting party fo r h is assent. It  makes no difference 
whether the s tipu la tion s  are contained in a separate instrument or 
included in the contract I t s e lf ,  what th e ir scope may be, what type 
of w riting is  used, or what the form of the contract may be.
(2) Standard contract terms are not Involved when and insofar as 
the contractual conditions are ind iv id u a lly  negotiated between the 
parties".
Three d istingu ish ing  c r ite r ia  can be d is t i l le d  from the very 
broad d e fin it ion  given above: such a term must be drawn up in 
advance; i t  must not be drawn up so le ly  with respect to a particu la r 
transaction but rather to be applied to a number of transactions. 
F in a lly , i t  must be imposed by one party - the proponent-on the 
other.
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With the exception of a few a r t ic le s ,  the law is  not confined
to consumer dealings; rather, i t  is  applicable whenever a standard
contract is  used.^^  The above de fin it ion  is  indeed broad since i t
encompasses a wide gamut of terms: terms written on the contractual
document proper, i .e .  terms appearing above the signature; terms
which appear at the back of any contractual document, to which
reference is  usua lly  made on the front page; terms-inserted in
documents evidencing a contract such as receipts or t ic k e ts ; clauses
which are simply incorporated by reference.
Paragraph 2 of a r t ic le  1, excluding from the sphere of application
of the Act any term in d iv id u a lly  negotiated is  however bound to be
problematic as one commentator has already pointed out.^11  ^ It is
not c lea r whether a term would be deemed to have been in d iv idu a lly
negotiated merely by d in t o f the fact that the proponent of the
term is  ready to change the term, irrespective of whether the term
is changed or not, or whether an actual change has to come about.
In a Supreme Court decision on th is  point which was taken before
the coming to force of the Act, i t  was held that the mere readiness
to change the term is  su ff ic ie n t to transform a standard term into
(121
one in d iv id u a lly  negotiated.' ' Such a view surely w il l  enhance 
the p o s s ib il it ie s  of unscrupulous businessmen evading the new law 
and might also lead to time wasting in haggling over terms, the very 
thing standard contracts are designed to check. 102
10. This can be compared with the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 
and contrasted with the French and some Swedish le g is la t io n  which 
are confined to consumer contracts.
11. Otto Sandrock, "The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West Germany",
[1978] vol 21 American Journal of Comparative Law at p.557.
12. 30 NJW 624-626 [1977] c ited in Sandrock, supra, p.557.
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Having defined a standard contract term, the Act goes on to 
deal with the problem of incorporation of terms into contracts. The 
Act does not depart very much from the position-taken by the Supreme 
Court in th is  regard. A r t ic le  2 states: "(D  Standard contract terms 
become a component part of the contract only i^ the proponent upon 
the making
(1) expressly brings them to the attention of the other party or, 
i f  th is  would be unduly d i f f ic u lt  under the circumstances, he does 
so by a c lear v is ib le  notice posted at tjie place of making of the 
contract, and
(2) i f  the other party has had a reasonable chance to obtain knowledge 
of th e ir content,
and i f  the other contracting party agrees to th e ir app lica tion".
"(2) The contracting parties may agree in advance to the application 
to a spec ific  type of legal transaction of spec ific  standard contract 
terms, upon compliance with the requirements mentioned in paragraph 1 
above".
The above rules are simply a rendering of the ju d ic ia l view into 
le g is la t iv e  form. As in English law, the German courts required 
notice to be given to the other party by the proponent of contract 
terms. It is  noteworthy that A rt ic le  2 does not address i t s e l f  to 
the question of the time the notice is  to be given; an important 
enough question. It  is  also remarkable that in addition to the 
requirement of notice, the new rules lay  down that the other party 
has to agree to the application of the term. A r t ic le  24, paragraph 
1 however states that the rules enshrined 1n a r t ic le  2 cannot be 
invoked by a merchant for his own protection. The a r t ic le  is
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exc lu s ive ly  fo r the protection of consumers. How that provision can 
be implemented in the innumerable d a lly  consumer transactions appears 
inconceivable except i t  is  acknowledged that such consent is  to be 
implied. In that event, the provision appears otiose . The a r t ic le  
is  nonetheless important and welcome in certain*consumer contracts 
of re la t ive  importance such as the sale of cars, re frigera to rs etc, 
and in important service contracts.
The protection afforded-to consumers by a r t ic le  2 goes only 
some way. A consumer may be given notiqp of a contractual term and 
may even understand and accept i t  in sp ite o f the fact that i t  is  
unconscionable because he e ither does not f u l ly  appreciate its  
im plications or because he has no a lte rna tive  but to accept the 
term. A r t ic le  3 however affords some r e l ie f .  I t  states as follows: 
"S tipu lations in standard contract terms which, according to the 
circumstances, p a rt ic u la r ly  according to the external appearance of 
the contract, are so unusual that the contracting parties of the 
proponent need not an tic ipa te  them, do not become an integral part 
of the contract". Professor von Marschall^123  ^ in order to i l lu s t ra te  
th is  a r t ic le ,  gives an example of a contract entered in to fo r the 
re ta il sale of a re fr ig e ra to r in Bonn with a clause that the buyer 
agrees to accept de live ry  in Hamburg. Such a clause is  so unusual 
that 1t is  i£sp facto Inva lid , irre spective  of notice or consent.
Having determined when contractual terms are deemed incorporated 
in a contract, a r t ic le s  4 and 5 of the Act provide fo r th e ir in te r­
pretation. A r t ic le  4 s tipu la tes that in d iv id u a lly  agreed upon terms
12a, Von Marschall, note ? supra, at p.282.
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take precedence over standard terms. Because the "parole evidence 
ru le is  unknown to German law, o ra lly  negotiated terms would there­
fore a lso  take precedence over w ritten standard terms. A r t ic le  5 
which states that in the case of any doubt a clause is  to be 
construed against i t s  proponent merely restates*the ju d ic ia l p rin c ip le  
of construction also known in English law - the 'ton tra  proferentem" 
ru le . A r t ic le  6 is  intended to modify the provis ion  of a r t ic le  139 
of the German C iv il Code which prescribes that where part of a 
contract is  declared vo id , the .whole.contract becomes void also 
i f  i t  cannot be assumed that the parties would nevertheless have 
entered into the contract without the inva lidated part. A rt ic le  
6 provides therefore that unless performance a fte r  modification of 
the contract would subject one of the parties to undue hardship 
part o f a contract may be invalidated while the re s t of the contract 
stands.
A rt ic le s  9 through 11 constitu te the core o f the new le g is la t io n  
as they contain provisions which regulate the content of standard 
contract terms. A r t ic le  9 states: "(1) S tipu la tions in standard 
contract terms are in va lid  i f  the contracting partner prejudices 
unreasonably the command of good fa ith . (2) In case of doubt, an 
unreasonable prejudice is  presumed i f  a s t ip u la t io n  (1) cannot be 
reconciled with the fundamental idea underlying the legal rule 
from which i t  dev iates, or ^ ^
"(2) so lim its  essentia l righ ts or duties Inherent in the nature of 
the contract that attainment of the purpose of the contract is  
jeopardized". The above provision is  s im ila r to the requirement 
of reasonableness in the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
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It reformulates the provisions enshrined in A r t ic le  138 and 242 of 
the German C iv il Code which command good morals and good fa ith  in 
contracts. Both the presumptions of paragraph 2 of a r t ic le  9 
are derived from German case law. The f i r s t  presumption denies 
contracting parties the r igh t to deviate fundamentally from any 
d ispo s it iv e  le g is la t iv e  ru le . Any term which stipu la te s otherwise 
w i l l  be deemed to impose an unreasonable prejudice on one party.
The second presumption is  comparable .to the English law doctrine 
of fundamental ob ligation . I t  assumes that every contract 'type ' 
has inherent rights and duties. Any clause, the aim of which is  
to d ivest a contract of a l l  such righ ts and duties w i l l  be presumed 
to be unreasonably p re jud ic ia l to one of the pa rtie s .
In addition to these general provisions of a r t ic le  9, a r t ic le s  
10 and 11 proscribe about fo r ty  types of clauses. These clauses 
are among those which are recurrent in standard forms and which have 
generally been invalidated by the German courts. The clauses lis te d  
in a r t ic le  10 are not in va lid  Per se but must be evaluated w ith in 
the context of the whole contract and in accordance with c r ite r ia  
defined by the law in ascerta in ing whether or not they are uncon­
scionable. They include clauses concerning tim e -lim its  fo r 
acceptance and performance; r ig h ts  of withdrawal, provisions fo r 
m odification, settlements o f contracts and choice o f law.
The clauses enumerated 1n a r t ic le  11 on the other hand are
**• '*s
void per se. They Include terms imposing short-term price increases; 
the righ t to refuse performance; proh ib ition  of se t-o ffs ; deductions 
of lump-sum as indemnity; lim ita t io n  of l i a b i l i t y  fo r gross negligence; 
withholding correction of a defect; lim ita t io n  of the righ t to repair 
a good with hidden defects; lim ita t io n  of the period of warranty below 
the statutory period.
A r t ic le  24 lim its  the app lica tion  of a r t ic le s  10 and 11 to 
consumer contracts. They may however apply when the weaker party 
is  a small businessman such as a small shopkeeper or farmer when 
such party does not q ua lify  as a merchant under the German Commercial 
Code.
Since as already pointed out, the German courts had already 
evolved most of the ru les which have been enacted in the new 
le g is la t io n ;  the question may be posed as to what novel contribution 
the Act has brought to deal with standard form contracts. F ir s t  of 
a l l ,  because of the inadequate p u b lic ity  attached to ju d ic ia l decisions, 
e spec ia lly  with respect to those of the f i r s t  instance courts where 
such decis ions abound, th e ir e ffe c t has been rather meagre, lim ited 
to theparties involved and to members of the profession. By giving 
these decis ions le g is la t iv e  form the wider p u b lic ity  le g is la t io n  
ca rries w i l l  enable them to reach the consciousness of a greater 
part of the consumer population whose protection is  p a rt icu la r ly  
sought.
Secondly, the new law has introduced new enforcement procedure,
contained in the th ird  part o f the Act. The German leg is la to rs
(141
opted fo r  ju d ic ia l instead of adm in istrative co n tro l.1 A rt ic le  
13 s tip u la te s  as follows:
"(1) One who applies or recommends the app lica tion  to legal trans­
actions o f s t ipu la tion s  in standard contract terms which are in va lid  
under a r t ic le  9 through 11 of th is  Act may have a claim for discontinuance
or re trac tion  brought against him".
Marymethods of enforcement were discussed, including adm inistrative 
enforcement. The German le g is la to rs  did not however desire to be seen 
to intervene vigorously in the 'market'; rather, th e ir Intention was 
to set things r ig h t for the consumer so that he may enter Into con­
tra c ts  no longer from the very weak position from which he had 
previously contracted.
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"(2) Claims fo r discontinuance and fo r re traction  may v a lid ly  be 
brought only
"(1) by associations with legal capacity whose statutory duty is  to 
protect the in te rests  of the consumer by giving information and 
advice. I f these associations have as members other associations 
active in th is  sphere, or at least seventy-five natural persons;
"(2) by associations with legal capacity to advance commercial 
in terests or (3) by chambers a f industry and commerce or chambers 
of a rtisans". _ , ■
The above provisions were partly  drawn from the 1971 Swedish 
le g is la t io n  which created a consumer ombudsman to intervene in 
favour of consumers. Furthermore, a r t ic le  20 requires the Federal 
A n titru s t O ffice  to reg iste r complaints made to the courts and 
also to record the judgements of the courts in th is  connection.
The e ffe c t of any judgement against a merchant is  not lim ited to 
the consumer who brought the action, but extends to the benefit a l l  
other consumers who dealt with the merchant on s im ila r terms. A 
form of "c lass action" h itherto unknown to German law was thereby 
introduced.
Section IV : Standard Contract Laws in Sweden *1
A: Background:
The widespread movement across North America and Western Europe 
to control unconscionable standard terms of contract which began in 
the late s ix t ie s  into the seventies has had a forcefu l impact in the
Scandinavian coun tries genera l ly  and in Sweden In p a r t ic u la r .^
1. The discussion of standard form contracts began earnestly in Sweden 
in 1960 - Jorgensen, 10 Scandinavian Studies in Law ( 1966) pp.9711.
Leg is la tion  on the law of contracts began in Sweden in 1905 
with the passing of the Sale of Goods Act, 1905(2) and the Contracts 
A c t ,^  1915. The influence of the p rin c ip le  o f freedom o f contract 
on these pieces of le g is la t io n  is  evidenced by the fact that the 
f i r s t  a r t ic le  in both acts stipu lated that a l l  \he ru les o f the Acts 
were 'fa cu lta t iv e ' as opposed to being mandatory. I t  therefore meant 
that the extremely lim ited protective measures the Acts contained 
which were e ssen tia lly  with respect to matters such as m isrepresentation,
deceit and duress could in'any-event be-frustrated by the use of
(41standard terms.'
As fa r as ju d ic ia l practice was concerned, Sedish courts were 
much more timorous than th e ir other c iv i l  law counterparts such as 
the French and German courts in setting aside un fa ir contract terms 
outright although some covert tools such as s t r ic t  construction were 
often used.
In ce rta in  areas, special leg is la t ion  was enacted. Unfortunately, 
these statutes demanded a very high degree of unfairness to be present 
before protection could be given. An example is  the Conditional Sales 
Act, 1915 and the Insurance Contract Act 1927. Section 2 of the 
former contains an important provision in connection with h ire 
purchase contracts. I t  stated that: " I f  the buyer is  in arrears with 
one or more instalments or any other sum due under the contract, the 
s e lle r  sha ll not be en tit led  to reclaim the goods on that account
or demand payment fo r any instalment not yet due, or enforce
2. S .F .S . 1905;'38----------------
3. S.F.S. 1915; 218
4. Sheldon, "Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts: The Swedish 
Experiment in Adm inistrative Control". The American Journal of 
Comparative Law. vo l. 22 [1974] p,19.
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any other penalty provided fo r in the co n tra c t..." ' '
Generally, Swedish ju d ic ia l practice was characterized by a 
lack of in terest in the problems posed by standardized contracts.
The problem of incorporation of terms into contracts was considered 
by the courts but th e ir a ttitude  was remarkedly less stringent than 
that o f English Courts, to say nothing about the French Courts. In 
Swedish case law , the terms must be part and parcel of each ind iv idua l 
contract, although there is  a p o s s ib il it y  of a clause being incorporated 
on the strength of i t s  widespread usage in a particu la r industry. With 
that exception, Swedish court required notice to be given of any term. 
This requirement was however not s t r ic t  inasmuch as notice could be 
given through catalogues, brochures, c ir c u la rs , notices and d isp la ys , 
among other means.^ It has even been argued that terms should be 
deemed incorporated into contracts on the basis of usual course 
of conduct not merely as between businessmen but also in consumer 
contracts. The argument is  that because most consumers are aware 
that businessmen deal mainly on the basis of standardized contracts, 
and given that i t  is  re la t iv e ly  easy fo r consumers to acquaint 
themselves with standard terms, such terms ought to apply irre spective  
of n o t ic e .^  Viewed in re la tion  to other ju d ic ia l approaches such 
as the French or German, i t  is  manifest therefore that the Swedish 
ju d ic ia l stance was not nearly enough to protect consumers. 567
( 5 )
5. English translation  from UNIDROIT, Un ifica tion  of Laws Yearbook 
1961 [1962].
6. U lf Berntiz, "Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts", [1973] 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, p.22.
7. Landòi lo Sc. Studiai In Law [1966] p, 130.
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A1though none of the pre-1970 Swedish le g is la t io n  on contracts 
gave any gu idelines with regard to the construction of contract 
terms, the Swedish courts did evolve ce rta in  canons of construction, 
prominent among which was the contra proferentem ru le known in 
Swedish legal lite ra tu re  as the 'obscurity  r u le '^  The test of 
reasonableness a lso has a considerable ro le  to play in the in te r ­
pretation o f contracts. The court app lies the above ru les of 
in terpretation  in order to ensure that the contract is  f a ir .
The upshot of the approach of the "Swedish courts was to impose 
vague and uncertain*standards, the only advantage of which ( i f  i t  could 
properly be ca lled  an advantage), was to in s t i l l  caution in certa in  
firms as to what terms they should in se rt in  th e ir  standard contract 
forms. Viewed from a perspective of consumer protection i t  was 
obvious that the pre-1970 Swedish le g is la t iv e  and ju d ic ia l approach 
to standard contract terms was a fa ilu re . This fa c t did not go 
unnoticed by the business community who, conscious of the need to 
maintain the public good w il l they had, set up business practice 
councils. In 1957, the Swedish Council on business practices was 
formed. The Public Complaints Board is  an issue of th is  counc il.
The la t te r  was established by the State Consumer Council, a consumer 
protection agency fo r the purpose of reso lv ing disputes between
consumers and merchants concerning the q u a lit ie s  of goods and
'**• ■>,' (9)
services. It  began it s  a c t iv it ie s  on January 1st, 1968. ' The
IT UTf Be rn itz , op .cit.note (6) p.30. He c ite s  a case of 1950,
N.J.A 86, where the court ruled that the consequences of obscurity 
in an order form used by a car dealer should f a l l  on the drafting 
party. Another decision- 1957 NJA 426, held that an exemption 
clause did not apply where damage done to a car parked in the 
defendant's garage was due to the garage watchman who, in the 
course of h is employment, used the car 1n question fo r a purpose 
inconsistent with the contract.
9. See generally Eisenstein:"Publ1c Complaints Board in Sweden" in 
Access to J u s t ice eds. M. Cappe lle tti and M. Weisner v o l. 11,
Book 2 (S ijh o ff 1979), pp. 493-593.
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Board, which is  supported by the Swedish government was designed to 
be an a lte rna tive  to the regular courts in consumer disputes. Because 
it s  procedure is  exceedingly informal, i t  has the advantage of being 
less time consuming than the regular courts. What is  more, it s  
services are provided g ra tu it iou s ly . The procedure at the meeting 
is  en tire ly  w ritten ; parties must present th e ir  claims and defences 
by w ritten pleadings and they do not appear before .the board.
The Board consists of f iv e  d iv is io n s , each headed by a 
Chairman who must be a judge and several^members representing consumers 
and trade unions, industry and commerce. The main drawback of the 
Board is  that i t  does not possess the status of a court and therefore 
it s  decisions are on ly recommendations compliance with which is  s t r ic t ly  
v o l u n t a r y . I n s p i t e  of th is  drawback, the Public Complaints 
Board remains a v it a l in s t itu t io n  as the data i t  has compiled over 
the years constitu te  a strong ind ica tion  of the problem areas thus 
providing an important basis fo r the ongoing development of consumer 
protection p o lic ie s  in Sweden.
B. Post-1970 Leg is la tion
As the problem of standard contracts and consumer protection 
became more and more of a p o lit ic a l issue, the Swedish government 
had to act. The f i r s t  concrete re su lt of th is  action was the 
passing of the: 10
10. Sheldon, supra, note 4, p.22. There are however certa in  con­
sequences W iion-compl lance with the boards recommendations 
and these include placing the merchant's name on the National 
Swedish Board fo r Consumer P o lic ie s  (NSBCP) 'b la c k - l is t '  . The 
b la c k - l is t ,  compiled approximately twice a year, contains names 
and addresses of merchants who have not complied with the PCB's 
recommendations. These are published in the NSBCPs period ical 
ca lled "Advice and Results".
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This Act, subsequently revised in 1975,was not designed to 
deal d ire c t ly  with standardized contracts. I t  did not purport to 
redress the imbalance inherent in most standard contracts. Its 
main thrust was to protect the consumer pub lic from misleading 
advertis ing practices by merchants. This ob jective has however 
produced important e ffects  on one aspect of the problem of standard 
con tracts, i .e .  the problem of procedural unconscionability. The 
upshot of the Act has been to impose s t r ic t  d isclosure rules on 
merchants. A rt ic le -2  of the revised Act p roh ib its marketing practices 
which adversely a ffe c t consumers or other businessmen. A rt ic le  3, 
which was not in the o r ig in a l 1970 version of the Act .requires 
businessmen to supply consumers with information which is  important 
in  connection with any contract they are about to enter. The a r t ic le  
states that: "Any tradesman who, in the marketing of any goods, 
services or other commodity, omits to de live r information of pa rticu la r 
s ign ificance  to consumers, may be enjoined by the market court to give 
such information. An injunction may also be issued to an employee 
o f a tradesman and to any other person acting on behalf of a trades­
man"^^. Such information Includes among others the terms of the 
contract; the mode of payment of the contract p rice; the nature of 
the warranties given; where required, the person responsible for 
serv ic ing  commitments. Further special d isclosure rules have been 
enacted in the 1977 Conwmo.r Credit Aat. A rt ic le  5 of th is Act 
provides that the 'e ffe c tiv e  in terest ra te ', I .e . ,  the sum total
11. Translation by U lf Bern itz: "The Swedish Marketing Practices
Act in Law and the Weaker Party vo l. 1 - The Swedish Experience" 
Ed. Alan Neal, (Abingaon»1981), p.120.
Marketing Practices Act, 1970 (SFS 1970:40)
—' l>*
of a l l  in te re s ts , surcharges and other c red it costs, has to be 
expressly made known to the consumer as well as included in the 
marketing of the scheme. This teffective in te rest rate ' has to be 
expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed. A rt ic le  6 of the 
law provides that such information must be given to the indiv idual 
consumer before the transaction .is  completed.
A r t ic le  2 of the Marketing Act i s  designed to deal with the 
problem of misrepresentation by imposing a requirement of t ru th fu l­
ness. What is  remarkable about th is  a r t ic le  is  the fact that i t  
places the burden of proving the truthfulness of any statement on 
the s e lle r .  This obviously enhances procedural fa irness in standard 
contracts.
In 1971, as a complement to the Market Practices Acts the
(12)
Act to  P ro h ib it  Improper Contract Terma was passed.' 1 This Act
has been described as the "most important weapon in Sweden for
(13)conbatting un fa ir contract terms"' ' .  The most important part 
of the Act is  i t s  section 1 which states that: " I f  an entrepreneur, 
when o ffe ring  a commodity or a service to a consumer fo r personal 
use, applies a term which, in regard to the payment and other 
circumstances, is  to be considered as improper towards the consumer, 
the Market Court may, i f  the pub lic Interest so requires, issue an 
in junction proh ib iting the entrepreneur from using that term or a 
term substan tia lly  the same in s im ila r cases in the future. The 123
12. SFS 1971; 112, hereinafter ca lled  the "Contract Terms Act".
13. Hellner, "Unfair Contract Terms", in Law and the Weaker Party , 
supra, note 11, p. 89.
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in junction  sha ll be issued under penalty of a f in e  unless, fo r
special reasons th is  is  unncessary". The 1971 Act lim ited the
scope of th is  section to contracts involving movables and services
only. This provision was extended in 1977 and i t  now applies also
to contracts invo lving other objects such as inmovables. The Act
is  confined to contractual re lationsh ips between entrepreneurs and
(14) , *
consumers, but i t  is  not lim ited to standard form contracts It 
may apply to any other type o f contract provided that the circum­
stances are important enough td invoke the pub lic in terest. In 
p rac tice , however, pnly widely used standard contracts are bound 
to have th is  e ffe c t. Like the Market Practices A ct, the Contract 
Terms Act cannot be invoked by an indiv idual consumer to obtain 
redress against an entrepreneur. Its goal is  the co lle c t iv e  pro­
tection  of consumers. The procedures fo r the enforcement of these 
acts have no room for ind iv idual v ind ication of r igh ts  by consumers.
While these Acts cannot by any means be considered revolutionary 
in terms of th e ir  e ffo rts  to protect consumers from unconscionable 
standard terms, th e ir mode of enforcement is  ce rta in ly  rad ica lly  
d iffe ren t from the trad it iona l methods of enforcing s im ila r le g is la tion  
in other countries. The Market Court A ct, 1970 (SFS 1970:417) which 
is  linked to and was passed concurrently with the Market Practices 
Act created two in s titu t ion s : the Market Court and the Consumer 
Ombudsman (hereinafter ca lled  the K0).' The e ffe c t iv e  control of 14
14. In Swedish Law, an entrepreneur is  defined very broadly as any 
"natural or legal person who pro fessionally  ca rries an a c t iv ity  
of an economic nature while a consumer 1s one who acquires goods 
or services for f in a l consumption: Sheldon, supra, note 4 at 
p.34.
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standard contract terms turns on both these in s t itu t io n s .
The Market Court is  a specia l court created to supervise the
operation of both the Market Practices Act and the Act P roh ib iting
Improper Contract Terms. I t  is  composed of nine members consisting
of a Chairman who must be a h igh ly  qua lif ied  judge; a Vice-Chairman,
also a judge; a sp e c ia lis t  in consumer a ffa irs  (in  p rac tice , an
Economics professor). The other s ix  members represent,in  equal
numbers, national associations of consumers and employers on the
one hand and associations of entrepreneurs on the other. It
possesses the power*to subpoena parties and witnesses on pain of a
fine . The Market Court is  a court of f i r s t  and f in a l instance,
from which there can be no appeal. The obvious reason for th is
was the desire to prevent the prolongation of d isputes. A case
may nevertheless be reconsidered i f  "changed circumstances or
(15)
other special reasons provide cause".' '
The only property authorised p la in t if f  in the Market Court 
is  the Consumer Ombudsman (KO ). The only exception to  th is  ru le 
is  given in S.5 of the Contract Terms Act which provides that an 
association of consumers, employees or entrepreneurs may bring an 
application fo r an injunction before the Market Court where the KO 
decides against bringing one. This is  a safeguard against any 
possible arb itra riness by the KO 1n refusing to bring an action.
The KO, who must be a lawyer, used to be independent o f the Consumer 
Board, but in 1976, both in s titu t io n s  were merged with the KO being 15
15. Sheldon, supra, note 4 a t p. 43.
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at the head. The KO acts on complaints from the pub lic or other 
sources. In th is  connection, the records of the Public Complaints 
Board are very important to him. With the exception of complaints 
re la ting  to the Market Practices Act, of which the KO receives 
about f iv e  thousand a n n u a l l y , h e  does not receive very many 
complaints with respect to breaches of the Contract Terms Act.
Hence, he acts more on his own in it ia t iv e .  The KO has a t r ip a r t it e  
ro le : as investiga to r, negotiator and prosecutor. He proceeds by 
examining standard contract'fortns which are w ith in the ambit o f the 
Contract Terms A c t.. Where he find s any improper term, unless the 
matter is  o f some weight but not very important, he may issue "a 
cease and desist order". I f  complied w ith , the order has the force 
of an in junction issued by the Market Court. I f  on the other hand 
the business refuses to comply with the order, the KO then in stiga tes 
proceedings against i t  in the Market Court. I f  the la t te r  finds 
that the term in question v io la tes  the Contract Terms Act or the 
Market Practices Act, i t  issues an i njunction restra in ing  the business 
from any further use of that clause. S.5 provides fo r the p o s s ib il it y  
of issu ing an interim in junction. Just as in any other case where an 
interim  injunction is  sought, there must be a strong p robab ility  
that the court would u ltim ate ly find  in favour of the p la in t if f .
Because the Contract Terms Act does not s p e c if ic a lly  state the
c r ite r ia  fo r holding a term improper,^ lo t  is  le f t  to the d iscre tion
of the KO as far as the In it ia l control o f un fa ir contract terms is
concerned. However the b i l l  presented to the Swedish Parliament
16. B e rn itr , Swedish Marketing Practices Act, in Law and the 
Weaker Party, note 11, supra, at p.109.
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stated that: "A contract term may be considered improper to consumers 
i f ,  in deviating from non-mandatory law, i t  gives entrepreneurs an 
advantage or deprives consumers of a r igh t and thereby causes such 
one-sided re la tion s  in the parties" righ ts  and ob ligations under 
the contract that a reasonable balance between the parties no 
longer e x is ts " .* 17  ^ The KO therefore has to take into account a l l 
the pre-1970 mandatory le g is la t io n  such as the Contracts Act 1915 
and the Sale o f Goods Act, 1905, as well as the post-1970 le g is la t io n . 
Since the Act does not s p e c if ic a lly  require a pa rt icu la r degree of 
impropriety o r unfairness, i t  therefore gives a very wide la titude  
to the KO in determining whether a standard contract term is  uncon­
scionable or not. Thus, not only must he take such matters as 
warranties, exclusion clauses in to account, but a lso the price of 
the goods.
In 1971, the M in istry  of Justice  issued a l i s t  of certain 
contract terms which are so one-sided that they are considered 
improper without reservation. Among these are the follow ing:
(a) Terms by which a purchaser is  u n ila te ra lly  bound to an order 
without a cance lla tion  r igh t while the se lle r  reserves for himself 
an unlim ited approval period;
(b) Terms containing the clause "t'n ex isting  condition" fo r the 
sale of factory-new goods.
(c) Warranties which give the purchaser no r ig h t to rescind a 
purchase because of defects in goods;
(d) "Force majeure" terms giving the s e lle r  the righ t to postpone
in d e f in ite ly  the fu l l  performance of his ob ligations.
17. Sheldon, note 4. supra.at p.35: The b i l l  was la te r amended.
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(e) Terms enabling the s e lle r  to u n ila te ra lly  Increase the contract 
price because o f circumstances w ith in  or outside h is control
The other ro le  o f the K0 which is  equally important to consumers,
*f not more than the bringing o f actions in  the Market Court 1n the long 
term, is  that o f negotiating with entrepreneurs on behalf o f consumers 
in  order that standard contracts should be f a ir .  I t  has been pointed 
out that some enterprises welcome such negotiations because I t  often 
happens that they might be using unfa ir contract terms not out o f a 
p os it ive  desire to take undue advantage of consumers, but rather, 
out of Ignorance o r* tra d it1 o n /* 19  ^ Although the Swedish leg is la to rs  
had Intended th is  ro le  fo r the KO, the Act I t s e lf  does not give 
expression to th is  in tent. In 1973,however, the KO was given the 
power to fine  firms which refused to co-operate with him in  connection 
with any Information he requires. Such refusals are now punishable 
by a f in e  of up to f iv e  thousand Swedish Kronors (about five  hundred 
pounds). The KO has several major successes 1n th is  area, leading to 
a number of negotiated settlements. In 1972 for example, the KO 
reached an agreement with travel organisations on general terms for 
charter and group tr ip s  which brought about Improved deals for consumers.
The Market Court Imposes a contingent fine  of up to one hundred 
thousand Swedish Kronors when i t  issues an Injunction. I f  the 
in junction  1s not complied w ith, the fine  may be enforced by 
regular court. The regular court, in  enforcing the fin e , makes a
1«. Sheldon, supra■ at p.38.
19. Sheldon, supra. at p.41.
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determination as to the le g a lity  o f the in junction, l . e .  whether the 
Market Court acted w ith in I ts  proper ju r is d ic t io n . This procedure 
constitu tes a check on any possib le a rb itra riness o f the Market Court 
which 1s p a rt ic u la r ly  welcome In view of the fac t that I t  1s a court 
of f i r s t  and f in a l Instance. This procedure 1s unfortunately hardly 
ever Invoked since manufacturers or traders are unw illing to run the 
r is k  of paying a heavy fine  merely with the aim o f having a formal 
review o f the Market Courts decis ion.
Evaluation of the Swedish Leg is la t io n :*
Within the f i r s t  two years o f the coming Into force o f the 
Contract Terms Act, the KO dea lt with fo rty-fou r reported cases 
concerning Infringements o f the Act.^20  ^ Th irty  of those cases were 
resolved through negotiated settlements. Four were terminated by 
the use of cease and des is t orders given by the KO, while four were 
decided by the Market Court. Infringements against the mandatory 
provisions o f the Home Sales Act 1971 figured prominently among the 
reported cases. The main provision o f the Act Is that where 1n the 
sa le of personal property, the buyer receives the o ffe r In any place 
other than the s e l le r 's  or h is  agent's permanent place o f business, 
the purchaser must be given a one week coo ling -o ff period w ith in  
which he may withdraw h1s acceptance or his o ffe r as the case may be.
Another area where the KO has frequently Intervened has been In 
connection with the Sale o f Goods Act 1905. Although the provisions 
of the Act are not mandatory, the KO has taken the view that any 
contractual term which m ateria lly  reduces the purchaser's r igh ts  under 
that Act is  an Improper term under the Contract Terms Act.
20. Sheldon, supra, note 4 pp. 44-45.
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The KOs use o f cease and des ist orders 1s also worth commenting 
upon. Although the Act requires the KO to Issue such orders only w ith 
respect to unimportant matters, the KO has been using them 1n cases 
which can hardly be said to be unimportant. Th$y have been used In 
respect o f widely used contracts. In Sheldon's words, "What has 
happened 1s that the KO has been sa tis f ie d  to estab lish  the I n it ia l  
standards of h is own, and the Court has become not a source of 
precedent but an occasional source of leg itim ation  of the KOs 
d e c i s i o n s " . T h l s  puts the KO in  the d riv ing  seat as It  were, as 
far as the enforcement of the le g is la t io n  afore-mentioned is  concerned, 
Indeed, during the period 1971-1975, the Market Court heard only 141 
cases while the KO dealt with 17,549 cases.^21 2 23^ H1s only handicap 
Is that he Is not empowered to bring priva te  proceedings 1n the regular 
courts o f law. He has submitted a recommendation to the M in istry  o f 
Justice that he be permitted to bring 'parens patriae ' su its  on behalf 
of consumers In the regular c o u r t s .^  A t the moment, a l l he can do 
Is to re fer a consumer to the Public Complaints Branch where the 
consumer can obtain redress against an entrepreneur.
Since 1971, the Swedish Parliament has passed more le g is la t io n  
which has had profound consequences on standard form contracts. The 
Consumer Sales Act 1973 stipu lates "minimum rules" for the v a l id it y  o f 
a consumer sales contract. The Act addresses I ts e lf  to the problem 
of defects 1n goods and exclusion clauses. S.7 of the Act defines a
21. Sheldon, p. 55.
22. Ese lnste ln, o p .c lt . note 9 a t p. 508.
23. U lf  Bern ltz, note 11 op. c l t . a t p. 111.
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" fau lt"  In goods to include In addition to actua l technical defects 
in  the product, any misleading statement regarding the nature, 
qua lity  and use o f the goods, provided that such a statement can be 
assumed to have Influenced the purchaser.
The Act states what rights and remedies are ava ilab le  to a 
consumer when he purchases a defective a r t ic le .  I t  s tipu la tes that 
the r igh t to have the goods repaired Is the primary r ig h t for the 
consumer. I f  that is  not possib le, then the consumer has the r ig h t 
to re jec t the good and get back' the price pa id . I t  does not however 
give the buyer a mandatory r ig h t to damages. On the contrary, S.6 
gives the s e lle r  the r ig h t to exclude l i a b i l i t y  fo r damages.
As a re su lt o f the very lim ited remedies provided by th is  Act, 
the KO sought an amendment of the Contract Terms Act 1971, 1n order 
that both he and the Market Court should not be lim ited also to those 
remedies. This amendment was Introduced In 1973. Hence although a 
term may be proper w ith in the Consumer Sales A ct, the Market Court may 
nevertheless hold 1t Improper under the Contract Terms Act. A contractual 
clause which v io la tes the Consumer Sales Act 1s Im p lic it ly  therefore 
Improper per se under the Contract Terms A ct.
Although co lle c t iv e  protection of consumers had become e ffe c tive  
because of the a c t iv it ie s  of the KO and the Market Court, the ta le  
was d iffe ren t 1n connection with Individual consumers. The Market 
Practices Act and the Contract Terms Act could not be Invoked by them.
The Consumer Sales Act contained very lim ited remedies. F in a lly  the 
ju d ic ia l approach already examined was c le a r ly  Inadequate. The need 
was therefore f e lt  to empower the regular courts to have the so rt of
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broad powers given to the Market Court under the Contract Terms Act.
This need was f u lf i l le d  by an amendment to the Contracts Act 1915.
The new a r t ic le  36 (SFS 1976:185) gives the regular courts the power 
to set aside or modify an improper contract term, having regard to 
the contents of the contract, the circumstances o f the formation o f 
the contract and other subsequent events and circumstances. Paragraph 
2 o f the new a r t ic le  36 states that special regard Is to be had to 
the need for the protection o f  the weaker party in  the contractual 
re la tion sh ip . The scope of the a r t ic le  Is not confined to consumer 
transactions; farmers, small shop-keepers, a rtisans among others may 
be equally protected. This amendment, coupled with the Small Claims 
Act o f 1974 which established a special streamlined procedure fo r the 
adjudication of re la t iv e ly  small claims 1n the regular courts, made 
I t  easier for the Swedish consumer to obtain redress against 
entrepreneurs who Insert unconscionable terms In th e ir  standard 
contracts.
The po licy  behind the Swedish post-1970 approach to the phenomenon 
o f standard form contracts 1s two-fold: I t  does not only seek to 
negative unconsclonablllty in  standard contracts, 1t also attempts 
to achieve, pa rt icu la r ly  through the o ff ic e  of the KO, more acceptable 
contract terms, thus encouraging more harmonious contractual re la tionsh ips.
Section V : CONCLUSION
The d issa tis fa ction  w ith  the trad it iona l ju d ic ia l means of 
dealing with the problems o f standardized contracts has been pervasive
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throughout North America and Western Eu rope.^
From a comparative law perspective, there I s a  lo t  in common 
among the le g is la t io n  o f the four legal systems ju s t  examined. This 
connion ground is  noticeable as fa r as substantive provisions go. The 
case Is d iffe re n t however, w ith respect to the procedural methods of 
enforcement where each system has Its own procedure.
As fa r as substantive provisions go, a l l  the various systems 
have sought in varying degrees to protect consumers pa rt icu la r ly  
against procedural and substantive unconscionab ility . The German 
le g is la t io n 's  target covers standard contract terms generally, while 
that o f France is  confined to consumer transactions. The English 
le g is la t io n  is  designed to control un fa ir contracts. In practice 
however the contracts which 1n a l l  p robab ility  w il l  be controlled 
are consumer contracts as they are those which are most l ik e ly  to be 
standardized and un fa ir. Most systems have more or less used the 
tra d it io n a l le g is la t iv e  method o f imposing minimum general standards 
fo r con tract terms coupled with mandatory provisions which have 
b la ck - lis te d  terms considered unconscionable per ee. The German 
le g is la t io n  u t i l is e s  th is  method very thoroughly. In addition to 
the general provision of a r t ic le  9, a r t ic le s  10 and 11 give an 
exhaustive l i s t  of about fo rty  ty p ic a lly  unconscionable clauses.
Of a l l  the le g is la t io n  looked a t, the English Unfair Contract 
Terms A c t is  the narrowest 1n scope as i t  is  almost en tire ly  concerned 
with the problem of exclusion clauses. This can be contrasted with the 1
1. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code o f the United States, 
sta tes that an unconscionable contract or clause may be modified 
or cancelled.
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Swedish le g is la t io n  which seeks to regulate every aspect o f  standard 
contracts.
In nearly every country, special le g is la t io n  has been enacted to 
deal with the problem of procedural unconsclonability: the Fa ir Trading 
Act 1973 o f England (th is  Act however deals more with a n titru s t issues 
than w ith issues of procedural unconscionab illty ). The Law no. 78-22 
o f the 10th o f January 1978 o f France,and the Marketing Act, 1970 of 
Sweden.
The enforcement procedures o f the B lffe re n t legal systems d if fe r  
co n s id e ra b ly .^  The English Unfa ir Contract Terms Act opted for the 
trad it io n a l "abstract contro l" l . e . ,  enforcement by the ordinary 
l i t ig a t io n  process. However, the Fa ir Trading Act, 1973, which 
created the O ffice  o f the D irector of Fa ir Trading has complemented 
th is  abstract control with a 'voluntary control s y s te m '.^  The 
D irector uses h is  o f f ic e  to negotiate codes o f practice with trade 
associations fo r the regulation o f standard form contracts, (most 
codes o f p ractice have however, been w ith respect to re s tr ic t iv e  trade 
p rac tice s). The codes of p ractices only apply to members o f the trade 
association  promoting them and even then, only to those members who 
agree to be bound by the standards they set.
The German mode o f enforcement Is an Improvement o f the 'abstract' 
ju d ic ia l enforcement coupled w ith Ideas drawn from the Swedish 
le g is la t io n ,^  A r t ic le  13 of the Standard Terms Act 1976 provides that 234
2. Hond1us:"Unfa1r Contract Terms: New Control Systems"(1978) 26 Am.J. 
o f Comp. Law, 526.
3. The f i r s t  country to adopt a voluntary control system was Israe l.
S.2 of the Standard Contract Law of 1964 made I t  possible fo r anyone 
to submit standard contract terms to the Board of R estr ic t ive  Trade 
Practices fo r approval. This system Is however generally acknowledged 
as a fa ilu re : Hondlus, supra, p. 532.
4. Sandrock: ‘'Germany's Standard Terms Act 1976V 1978, 26 Am. J . of 
ComP. Law. p.555.
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"clalms fo r discontinuance and re traction '1 of clauses which have been 
declared Inva lid  under a r t ic le s  9 to 11 may be brought by a lim ited 
number o f In s t itu t io n s . They Include consumer associations, trade 
unions, chambers of industry, commerce and artisans, as well as by 
any association  with a statutory duty to advance commercial Interests. 
Hence co lle c t iv e  protection of consumers Is also provided for.
At the extreme opposite spectrum o f these enforcement procedures
may be located the French model which has denied the regular courts
any p r io r it y  In enforcement'. I t  provides fo r a "one layer control 
(51system". 1 A r t lc lg  36 of Law no. 78-22 creates a commission for 
abusive clauses whose task 1s to recommend the proh ib ition of any 
unfa ir contract term to the Council o f State which may then Issue 
a decree pron lb ltlng  the said clause. No regular court may pronounce 
a clause Invalid  which has not been Invalidated by a decree from the 
Council o f State.
The Swedish control system Is multi-faceted and presents very 
Interesting procedures. I t  provides prim arily  for adm inistrative 
enforcement. The KO Is In charge of th is  adm inistrative contro l. At 
a second layer o f contro l, there Is a special court which possesses 
the necessary expertise In consumer a ffa irs  which as I t  were, supervises 
the adm in istrative control o f the ICO. The KO does not possess actual 
decision making powers and must submit disputes to the Market Court. 
These contro ls are supplemented by the regular courts which have wide 5
5. Hondlus, supra, p. 542.
-336-
powers under the revised a r t ic le  36 o f the Contracts Act. A l l  these 
methods make fo r a very e ffe c tive  control mechanism of standard form 
contracts and deal quite adequately with the problem o f access to 
courts often faced by consumers. In add ition, the Public Complaints 
Board with Its  inexpensive, sw ift procedures provides a considerable 
leverage in  the defence of weaker parties In standard con tracts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
A TENTATIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS 
IN CAMEROON
In Chapter Four, a fte r an examination of Cajneroonian cases on 
standardized contracts, the conclusion arrived  at was that the Cameroonian - 
ju d ic ia l a ttitude towards such contract?, l ik e  tha t.o f many other African 
states, is  characterized by an inadequate analysis o f the problem and 
that i t  was impossible to discern any c le a r  p rin c ip le  upon which the 
courts acted. There was very l i t t l e  in c lin a t io n  on the part o f the courts 
to hold such contracts in va lid  for unreasonableness. Nor did they fo llow  
the methods u t i lis e d  by th e ir progenitors - English and French courts - 
in in va lida ting  unreasonable exclusion clauses, as examined in Chapter 
Three. This chapter therefore sets out to do two th ings. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  
i t  seeks to exp lica te  the reason for th is  monumental fa ilu re  by the 
Cameroonian courts; secondly, i t  seeks to demonstrate that the courts 
are in any event 111-suitedto deal with the problem o f unconscionability 
in standardized contracts as demonstrated in the chapter on unconscionability. 
It concludes that what is  required is  le g is la t io n  to tackle th is  problem 
and that adm in istrative, rather than ju d ic ia l in s t itu t io n s , should have 
the primary task of enforcing such le g is la t io n .
Section I: Reasons for the fa ilu re  of the Courts:
A: Inadequacy of Leg is la tion :
It is  impossible to put one's finger on one s ing le  cause of the 
fa ilu re  of the courts in handling the problems of standardized contracts.
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The most obvious, however, turns on the laws Cameroon inherited from 
it s  co lon ia l powers. English law o f contract, l ik e  the law o f ob ligations 
in France was b u ilt  around the c la ss ic a l concept o f freedom o f co n tra c t.^ ) 
I t  has already been seen that th is  c la ss ic a l paradigm o f contract could 
not ea s ily  accommodate standardized contract,«e ither in England«or in 
France; hence the increased tendency to provide su itab le  le g is la t io n  in 
these countries.
In the part o f Cameroon which used to be under B r it is h  co lon ia l ru le , 
the law of contract app licab le , as e a r lie r  mentioned, was and s t i l l  is  
lim ited to the common law, doctrines o f equity and statutes of general 
application which were in force in England before 1900. In francophonic 
Cameroon, the French C iv i l  Code governed the law o f contracts. Even 
a fte r acceding to independence, Cameroon, l ik e  many other African States 
made no e ffo rts  to modify the law o f contract in order to accommodate local 
factors. Seidman points out that save for constitu tiona l p rovis ions, the 
courts in anglophonic A frica  were s t i l l  empowered to defer to English 
precedents.^) The same is  true o f the French speaking African States, a 
few amongst whom have only recently begun to introduce the ir own C iv il Codes/3) 123
1. See Chapter One generally.
2. See Seidman, R .B.: The State, Law and Development. (London 1978), p.37.
3. See Lampue,l P. : "L 'In fluence du d ro it français et du d ro it .contumier 
surles lo is  c iv i le s  a fr ica in es ,"  in "Dynamiques et f in a lité s  des Droits 
A fr ic a in s " (Paris 1980) ed. Conac G. p. 14.
Senegal enacted a Code of C iv il  and Commercial Obligations in 1976, 
drawn nearly e n t ire ly  from the law applicable in France. See Tossi, J .P . ,  
Le d ro it des Obligations au Senega l, (L .D .G .J., P a ris , 1981). The C iv il  
Code of Ivory Coast enacteTTn“T970 does not deal with the law of 
contract. The most recent code Is that of the Seychelles. The la t te r  
is  interesting inasmuch as i t  deals expressly with standardized contracts. 
See Chloros, A.G. : "Cod ification in a Mixed Ju r is d ic t ion" European 
Studies in Law, V o l. 3. |North Mol land Publishing Company, 1977).
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Cons i dering the fac t that the law o f contract is  o f cardinal 
importance in  the economic development o f any country, i t  is  not easy 
to explain the nearly complete inattention  paid by the Cameroonian 
le g is la tu re  to th is  area o f the law. To be sure, ce rta in  standardized 
contracts which are of conspicuous importance, v iz . ,  employment and 
insurance contracts have been provided fo r.
There are three basic reasons that explain the fa ilu re  of the 
Cameroonian leg is la tu re  to pass any laws dealing with contracts. The 
f i r s t  and undoubtedly .the most important reason lie s  in the fact already 
alluded to, that the‘ independent state o f Cameroon inherited a complex 
and fragmented legal system from it s  erstw hile co lon ia l powers. It was 
therefore not constructive to provide any unitary le g is la t io n  on c iv i l  
matters fo r the whole country while the legal system and the c iv i l  
procedure applicable by the courts d iffe red  from one region to another.
The app lication of such le g is la t io n  could hardly have been uniform. It 
is  only as recently as 1972, as mentioned in Chapter One, that a uniform 
lega l system was established for the en tire  country. Up un til now, 
d if fe re n t systems of c iv i l  procedure are applicable in the country.
While the above d if f ic u lt ie s  made i t  Impossible fo r the then Federal 
Leg is la t ive  Assembly to pass le g is la t io n  covering the whole country, the 
leg is la tu re s  o f the federated states could not act independently because 
a r t ic le  6 of the Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Cameroon reserved 
to the federal leg is la tu re  the power to le g is la te  on c iv i l  and conmerclal 
m a tte rs .^  Hence, in sp ite  of the fac t the leg is la tu res  of the federated 4
4. See Kontchou-Kouomeghi, A.: "Ideologic et In stitu tion s Po litiques: 
L'Impate de l'ld ee  de l'U n ite ' Nationale Sur Les Institu tions 
Publiques de l 'E ta t  Camerounais" in Dynamiques et f in a lite s  des dro its 
A frica ins , note (3), supra, at p. 451.
states were eager to meet the increasing need for le g is la t io n  in th is 
area, they were precluded from doing so by the constitu tion .
F in a lly , because of the p o lit ic a l disorders that existed in Cameroon 
at the time o f independence and even a f t e r / 5) the Cameroonian leg is la tu re , 
conscious of the need to estab lish  law and order, concerned i t s e l f  more 
with crim inal le g is la t io n , than with c iv i l  law le g is la t io n , an attitude 
which i t  has yet to discard.
Even i f  the above problems are taken into consideration, i t  may
/ . * ' ■
nevertheless be said with a reasonable degree of certa in ty  that Cameroon 
is  among the most backward African countries in terms of the introduction 
of innovative le g is la t io n  on the law o f contract. ^  The in su ffic iency  
of contract law le g is la t io n  does not however explain why the courts have 
been re luctant to appreciate the economic Import o f standardized contracts 
and in dealing with them accordingly. They have not followed in the 
footsteps of the French and English courts which, as seen in Chapter Three, 
in sp ite  of the lack o f sp e c if ic  le g is la t io n  dealing with standardized 
contracts, d id , nonetheless, via ju d ic ia l Interpretation, give considerable 
protection to the weaker parties to standardized contracts.
I t  was made c le a r in Section I o f Chapter Four that one of the 
obstacles in the way o f a thorough appreciation of standardized contracts 
in Cameroon is  that fact that in sp ite  of the fact that these contracts 
are often most unconscionable, there 1s a dearth of l it ig a t io n  involving 
such contracts. This lack o f l it ig a t io n  reduces the v is ib i l i t y  o f the
I ___________ .
1
5. See Joseph, R.A.: Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social O rig ins 
o f the U.P.C. Rebellion.*~7Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1977.)
6. Cameroonian leg is la t io n  dealing with price control w il l be examined 
in Section II.
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problems involved in  standardized contracts, and hence, from the point of 
view o f the courts, the ir acuteness. Two factors explain th is . F ir s t  of 
a l l most Cameroonians are ignorant about the law and the ir rights in 
connection with such contracts, and secondly, there is  the problem of 
"access" to the courts.
B: The Problem o f 'Rights Consciousness1 .
That most people who enter into standardized contracts are unaware 
of th e ir  righ ts and ignorant of the law is  not a problem peculiar to 
Cameroon. A researcher on consumer protection in Nigeria finds that "fo r 
most people the real problems about consumer protection are ignorance and 
a lack o f fa ith  in  the machinery for e ffecting  p r o t e c t io n .O b v io u s ly ,  
i l l i t e r a c y  counts fo r a great deal fo r th is ignorance. I t  is  not, however, 
the sole reason, fo r th is ignorance is  also a feature of the ju r isd ic t io n s  
of the developed countries where i l l i t e r a c y  is  very much less common. 
Professor Furmston p o in ts^  out that an unusual feature of the cases 
dealing with the hire-purchase of defective motor vehicles such as Karaalee 
(Harrow) Ltd. v. U a l l ie ,^  is  the fac t that i t  is  the finance company, 
which usually breaks the contract that appears as the p la in t if f ,  rather 
than the defendant. He re lates th is to the fact that most hire-purchsers 
are ob liv ious of th e ir  contractual r igh ts. Lord Windlesham pointed out in  
in the House o f Lords^10  ^ that: "A rough and ready understanding of the law,
7. Kwesi Essien, "Consumer Protection in Nigeria: The Case For Reform", 
Unpublished Paper presented at the Annual Law Teachers Conference,
Ahmadu Be llo Univ., Zaria, 1981, p.8.
8. Furmston, M.P. "Ignorance of the Law" Legal Studies (1981), pp.37-38.
9. [19561 2 A l l .  E.R. 866.
10. HL 15 May 1974.
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a feel for i t  i f  you l ik e ,  is  a mark o f the democratic system it s e lf .
There is  not much point having rights unless people are aware of what they 
are and know how to act on them."
Observations in Cameroon point to an abysmal.lack of re a liza tion  or 
imagination on the part o f the Cameroonian public about what the law might 
do fo r them. This a ttitude is  unfortunately not confined to the lay pub lic , 
but extends to a ce rta in  degree to Cameroonian lawyers. How else can the 
fact that doctrines such as "fundamental breach" have ra re ly  been pleaded 
by advocates in cases dealing with exclusion clauses in the part of 
Cameroon subject to the common law? The recent stri<fes made in the North 
American continent and in Western Europe towards the protection of consumers 
has been achieved through the creation of Consumer Associations in those 
parts o f the world. These associations have heightened the awareness of 
the unconscionable aspects of standardized contracts, among other things, 
thus forcing the courts and the leg is latures, as i t  were, in to  taking 
cognizance o f the problems that e x is t . The non-existence o f Consumer 
Associations in  Cameroon (and indeed in most of A fr ica ) means that the 
courts can hardly be pressurized into con tro lling  standardized contracts. 
This leaves the stronger parties to such contracts with a free hand to 
impose whatever contractual terms they please, with the knowledge that the ir 
co-contractors w il l ra re ly  resort to the courts and that even i f  they d id , 
the odds are against any e ffec tive  censure of th e ir  standardized contract 
terms by the courts. Proposals for the solution o f th is problem w ill be 
dealt with in Section II o f th is  chapter.
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C: The Problem of 'Access to Ju s t ic e1
The discussion of standardized contractshas fo r a long time been 
lim ited to the question of the protection o f the substantive righ ts of 
the contracting parties. In recent years however, there has been a 
remarkable s h if t  of emphasis and i t  is  now realised that there are indeed 
two facets to the problem: the problem of protection and the problems 
involved in vindicating the righ ts  to be protected. The rea liza tion  that 
"the enforcement or procedural protection is  merely another side of the 
content of th is r i g h t , h a s  led to the” b irth  of the "access-to-justice 
movement.
The French and English legal systems on which that of Cameroon has 
been patterned were designed to cater fo r a la is se z -fa ire  economy and are 
i l l- s u it e d  to deal with the in tractab le  socia l and economic problems 
eminent in Cameroon. Hence, the Cameroonian legal system which, s im ila r ly  
to those of i t s  progenitors, re lie s  heavily  on s k ille d  lawyers is  too 
expensive for the average Cameroonian consumer, fanner or small businessman, 
p a rt icu la r ly  in view of the fa c t  that the issues at stake do not normally 
involve considerable sums of money. The legal system in i t s e l f  therefore 
thwarts the desire on the part o f many to resort to l it ig a t io n .  Although 
there is  provision for legal a id  in Cameroon, i t  has been seen that i t  1s 
severely lim ited in s c o p e . T o  the extent that the disputes assigned
to the courts for resolution are between disputants of inadequate or unequal
-
11. R. Claude."Comparative Rights Research: Some Intersections Between Law 
and Social Sciences',1 in Compara tive  Human Rights, (Baltimore, 1976),
p. 382 at 395.
12. See M. Cappelletti and B. Garth: "The World-wide Movement To Make Rights 
Effective - A General Report," in M. C appe lle tti, Access To Ju stice. 
(S ijth o ff, 1978), Vol. 1. Bk 1. A lso, R. Nader -"Consumerism and Legal 
Services: The Merging of Movements"- 11 Law andSociety Rev. (1976) p.242.
13. See Chapter 1.
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means, the present ju d ic ia l system may not provide a f a ir  forum.
This conclusion, reached with respect to a developed country, the United 
States o f America, is  even more apt in re la tion  to Cameroon where 
contracting parties are economically much more disparate.
The legal system in Cameroon also functions 'a p o s te r io r i'.  It 
requires the aggrieved contracting party to in stiga te  proceedings against 
the other party. This presupposes that.such a party is  capable o f iden tify ing  
when h is in terests have been injured and that he has a legal remedy. This 
is  sure ly beyond the ken o f the average Cameroonian l it ig a n t .  The f i r s t  
ba rrie r to "access" is* therefore educational as has f i r s t  been pointed out. 
Although le g is la t iv e  p a llia t iv e s  can be brought to bear on th is problem, i t  
cannot be wholly solved by le g is la t iv e  f ia t .  The truth of the matter is  
that in Cameroon i t  cannot be solved except through massive societa l 
changes which in ev itab ly  involve time and considerable financia l outlay.
Hence, any eventual le g is la t io n  on standardized contracts must assume the 
existence of th is  problem rather than assume that i t  can be solved, and 
must seek to accommodate i t .
This problem is  exacerbated by the geographical d if f ic u lt ie s  in 
reaching the courts. In Cameroon, the courts are situated in the head 
towns o f each adm inistrative d iv is io n . This poses considerable d i f f ic u lt ie s  
to would be lit ig a n ts  resid ing in  the rural areas who may have to travel 
for distances of up to a hundred kilometres and more in order to get to the 
courts. Furthermore, because o f the recent explosion in l it ig a t io n  14
14. E. Johnson, "Thinking About Access, A Prelim inary Typology of
Possib le S trateg ies", inAccess To Justice , op. c i t . . note 12.
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genera 1ly  in Cameroon, l it ig a n ts  have to wait sometimes fo r years before 
obtaining judgment.^  ^ This is  again to the disadvantage pa rt icu la r ly  
o f those who are economically not w e ll-o f f ,  resid ing fo r the most part in 
rura l areas.
In addition to the educational, geographical and financia l ba rr ie rs , 
there is  also a psychological b a rr ie r to access to ju s tic e  in Cameroon.
The o f f ic ia l languages used in the Cameroonian courts are French and 
English, languages spoken only the educated m inority o f Cameroonians. In 
addition to th is ,  the procedures of the courts, with a l l  the ir paraphernalia, 
are absolutely a lien  to most Cameroonian l it ig a n ts .  Indeed, to the peasant 
from the v illa g e , the court is  nothing but a group o f faceless bureaucrats 
conspiring to deny him ju s tice ; h is p lig h t not being fa r removed from that 
o f Joseph K. in Kafka's "The T r ia l" . An il lu s t ra t io n  o f the sense of 
fru stra tion  f e lt  by lit ig a n ts  from the rural areas in pa rticu la r is  evidenced 
by the case o f Doh David a/ Lamy G rcy .^ ^  The p la in t i f f ,  a peasant, 
brought an action in the Batouri Court o f F ir s t  Instance (in  the French 
speaking part o f the country) against the defendant, a businessman, on a 
contractual matter. A fte r judgment was given against him, he applied for 
leave to appeal, but his app lication was not granted. He thereupon wrote 
to the Yaounde Court of Appeal in the follow ing terms
15. See A lex is Pipande Mouelle- "Communication du Cameroun - Actes de la 
Conférence des M inistères de la Justice des Pays de Droit d'Expression 
Française", September 1980, Penant, numéro sp è c ia l, p.87. An indication 
of th is explosion is  revealed by the follow ing s ta t is t ic s : -  In the 
Douala High Court, 401 cases on c iv i l  and commercial matters were 
decided in  1962-63. In 1971-72, barely nine years la te r , the same 
court heard more than 3494 of such disputes. This increase in the use 
of the courts has not however been matched by a s im ila r increase in the 
personnel of the courts.
16. A ffa ire  No. 96/72, 1972, Cour d ' Appel de Yaoundé. (Unreported.)
-348-
"The Court o f Batouri, having very poorly decided my case against 
Lamy Grey, I wanted, and s t i l l  want to appeal to you. However, since 
Idepositedmy app lica tion , the Registrar has refused to reg iste r my 
appeal fo r reasons he knows best.
Confronted with th is  s itua tio n , I am powerless and have only one 
option, that is ,  to get ip touch with you .d ire ctly , and to ask you what 
1 should do in the face of th is  socia l in ju s t ice , which gives preference 
to friendsh ip and bottles of whiskey, and takes advantage o f the ignorance 
and old-age of com pla inants....".
Needless to say, the Yaounde Court o f Appeal held that the above le tte r  
disclosed no grounck for appeal. The above is  nevertheless il lu s t ra t iv e  
of the fee ling  and attitude most Cameroonians have towards the courts. 
Although th is  a ttitude springs pa rtly  from ignorance, i t  is  submitted 
however that the formalism of the procedures o f the Cameroonian courts, 
inherited from those of th e ir erstwhile co lon ia l powers plays a major ro le 
in generating such attitudes. Unable to get any remedy from the courts 
for claims which they deem well-founded, many lit ig a n ts  can think of no 
other explanation than that court o f f ic ia ls  are corrupt and biased in 
favour o f the r ich  and powerful. However groundless these feelings may be, 
the confidence that the public ought to have in the courts, which is  
fundamental i f  they are to e ffe c t iv e ly  serve as dispute resolution 
in s titu t ion s  is  consequently undermined.
The upshot o f the state of a f fa irs  outlined above is  that the courts 
in Cameroon serve the ends of the riche r and stronger parties in so far 
as standardized contracts are concerned, rather than those of consumers.
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farmers and small businessmen who need the protection of the courts more.
The stronger parties appear more as p la in t if f s  in debt co lle c t io n  cases 
and to enforce th e ir  contracts generally. This trend is  again, not 
pecu lia r to Cameroon. Gal anter reached s im ila r conclusions w ith respect 
to consumer transactions in the United State of America.^17) The stronger 
parties enjoy in s t itu t io n a l f a c i l i t ie s  which consumers and weaker contracting 
parties generally do not. They enjoy the use of s k ille d  and even specia lised 
lawyers; they have the wherewithal with which to sustain legal actions, 
however long they may take. Furthermore, they do so with the comfort that 
i f  they succeed, costs would be awarded to them. Indeed, because they 
know that there are strong d is incentives against weaker parties in s titu t in g  
legal actions, they not infrequently resort to "se lf-he lp ". This was seen 
in the practice of the Cameroon Development Bank whereby they give themselves 
the r ig h t (in  th e ir  standardized contract form) of impounding th e ir  debtors' 
chatte ls without even obtaining a court order to that e ffec t (discussed in 
Chapter Four).
Some w rite rs have suggested that because of the p lu ra lis t  nature of 
most African so c ie t ie s , what is  required is  a legal system with a p lu ra lis t  
nature, with a va rie ty  of courts capable of serving the d iffe ren t segments 
of the population appropriately.^18  ^ I t  is  however contended that while 
th is might be a possib le so lution with respect to other branches of the 
law (by the way such courts already e x is t in the form of customary courts),
17. Gal anter, M., "Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Lim its o f Legal Change," J. o f Law and Society, (1974), p .131.
18. Bush, R.A., "Trad itional and Popular Forms of Dispute Processing 
and Their Modern V ita lit y "  in Cappe lle tti and Garth, note (12), 
supra, at p.263.
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such as land law, fam ily law and labour law, i t  is  inappropriate in dealing 
with standardized contracts w h ich .it has been said time without number, are 
a sp in -o ff o f the modern economy. Whatever improvements might be brought 
to bear on the legal system, such as the introduction o f small claims 
courts and class actions, such improvements w il l  merely be p a llia t iv e s , not 
going to the root of the problem and having only, a s l ig h t  impact. I t  is  
submitted that the exclusive use of the.courts is  i t s e l f  an impediment to 
the e ffec tive  control of standardized contracts for reasons to be discussed 
next.
D: Institu tiona l D if f ic u lt ie s  Faced by the Courts.
In the la s t chapter, i t  was seen that the trend in  North America and 
in Western Europe has been to resort to le g is la t io n  in connection with 
standardized contracts. Furthermore, re liance is  Increasingly being 
placed more on adm inistrative, rather than on ju d ic ia l, in s titu t io n s  as far 
as the enforcement of such leg is la tion  is  concerned. The view w il l be put 
forward here that th is  ought to be a fo r t io r i the case in  Cameroon for 
reasons to be discussed la te r. I t  is  worthwhile however to mention the 
position taken by a few of the c r it ic s  o f these recent developments.
S.M. Waddams feels that in the Anglo-American law ju r is d ic t io n s , they are 
the outcome o f "an attitude to the ju d ic ia l function that is  rap id ly 
becoming o u t d a t e d " H e  contends that over the la s t twenty years, 
ju d ic ia l a ttitude to law reform has changed dramatically. He c ite s  
Viscount Simmond's castigation of Lord Denning's attempt to enable a th ird
19. S.M. Waddams: "Leg islation and Contract Law." Un iversity o f Western
Ontario Law Rev. Vol. 17, (1978-79), p. 185.
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party to benefit from a contract to which he was not a party in Midlands 
S ilico n e s  v. Scruttons L t d  ^ as an "undiscerning zeal fo r some abstract 
kind of ju s tice " and a lso  as "well-meaning sloppiness o f thought", to show 
how less than twenty years ago, the ju d ic ia ry  was loath to decide po licy  
issues. He however went on to c ite  Lord W ilberforce in M iliangos v. George 
Frank (T e x t ile s ) L t d who said " I t  is  e n t ire ly  w ith in th is House's duty 
in the course of adm inistering ju s t ic e , .to  give the law a new d irection  in 
pa rticu la r where, on p r in c ip le  and in  reason, i t  appears r igh t to do so.
I cannot accept the suggestion that because a rule is  long established, only 
le g is la t io n  can change i t  - that may be so when the ru le  is  so deeply 
entrenched that i t  has infected the whole legal system, or the choice o f 
a new rule involves more far-reaching research than the courts can carry 
out."
That Professor Waddams is  r igh t in th is  connection is  beyond any doubt. 
Indeed as the chapters on the ju d ic ia l treatment of standardized contracts 
and on unconscionability ind icate, common law and even c iv i l  law approaches 
to standardized contracts are strewn with instances where the courts have 
tried  to reform the law. Indeed Professor Waddams contention even appears 
to be rather t r i t e . L o r d  W ilberforce makes two pertinent points above. 201
20. [1962] A.C. House o f  Lords, p.446.
21. [1976] A.C. p. 443 a t pp. 469-70.
22. Professor Waddams is  not alone in commenting deprecatingly on the new 
trend in contract le g is la t io n . Prof. Reiter (see Re ite r,1 Unconscion­
a b il it y :  Is there a choice? A Reply to Prof. Hasson." Vo l. 4, 
Canadian Busines Law Journal, p. 403), points out the d if f ic u lt ie s  
involved in perceiving a ll the possib le problem areas in order to 
leg is la te  appropriate solutions to them in advance. See also:
G. Be rlo iz , "D ro it de la Consommation et Droit des Contrats,"
J.C. P. (1979), Doctrine, 2949.
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F ir s t  of a l l ,  he states that ju d ic ia l control is  unsuitable i f  the rule 
to be changed is  so deeply entrenched that i t  a ffects the whole system.
At the r is k  of belabouring the po in t, i t  must be stressed that the law 
o f contract has an important impact on d is tr ib u t iv e  ju stice ,^ 2"^  
p a r t ic u la r ly  the law re la ting  to standardized contracts. Should th is  be 
le f t  to the courts? Professor G r if f it h  has very ably pointed out that 
the notion that the courts are an embodiment o f the shared m orality o f the 
community is  "nonsense a t the very top o f a high ladder".^23 4 25^ I t  is  
obvious (p a rticu la r ly  in  Cameroon) that the business community's in terest 
is  in the m aintainancqof the status quo while i t  is  in the in terests of 
the weaker parties to standardized contracts to have such contracts 
regulated. Hence any intervention to redress the balance which is  in 
Cameroon heavily t i l t e d  in favour of the business-community, must in the 
f in a l analysis be rooted in some conception o f ju s t ic e . In North America 
and Western Europe, the lib e ra l theory o f ju s t ic e , advocating welfare-state 
cap ita lism ,has been the main influence on the recent reforms, however 
i n a r t i c u l a t e l y . T h e  question then is ,  are the courts the best 
in s t itu t io n s  to make th is  choice o f such cardinal importance? I t  is  put 
forward that the choice must be le f t  to the leg is la tu re .
23. A.T. Kronman, "Contract Law and D is tr ibu tive  Ju stice ", 89 Yale Law 
Review, (1980) 472-479.
24. G r if f ith  ,"The P o lit ic a l Constitution" 42 Modern Law Rev. (1979) at p . l l .
25. J. Rawls. A Theory of Ju s t ice (Oxford Univ. Press, 1972), is  an example 
of th is theory! Others such as Hayek and Nozick hold otherwise, i.e . 
that any intervention is  wrong because i t  required interference in 
peoples' liv e s . See: Hayek, The Constitution o f L ibe rty . (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1960) Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1974).
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This problem has an added s ign ificance in  Cameroon which i t  has been 
time and again made c le a r, has a p lu ra lis t  legal system. French law,
English law and Customary law (including Islamic law) co -ex ist together.
Side by side with th is p lu ra lis t  legal structure, there is  a h ighly 
centra lised  state machinery, the guiding p rin c ip le  of which is  the 
maintenance of the unity o f the S ta te d 26) This decentralised nature 
of the Cameroonian courts has engendered suspicions on the part o f the 
government that the courts have not been working in the in terests of the 
government. Hence, there has'been a gradual w h itt lin g  down of the 
influence of the ju d ic ia ry , while on the other hand, the pervasiveness 
of the executive has been in ten s if ie d . Most enactments from the leg is la tu re  
in Cameroon are designed fo r adm inistrative rather than ju d ic ia l enforcement. 
Indeed, th is negative a ttitude of the government towards the jud ic ia ry  is  
re flected  in it s  po licy  towards the personnel of the courts.
While immediately a fte r independence, the jud ic ia ry  was h ighly e l i t i s t ,  
a ttrac ting  only the best lawyers, because o f the reduced importance of the 
courts, and the fac t that judges have been incorporated into the main­
stream of the c iv i l  serv ice , the ju d ic ia ry  no longer a ttrac ts  the best 
lawyers. On the contrary, i t  has become the refuge of the less able lawyers.
The above points have two important consequences. F ir s t  of a l l ,  the 
predominance o f the 'adm in istration ' over the ju d ic ia ry , encouragedby the 
government has been in terna lized  to a large extent by the loca l population, 
p a rt icu la r ly  in the rural areas. Hence, i t  is  not uncomnon to find  people 
in those areas resorting to agents of the adm inistration such as D is t r ic t  
O ffice rs (Prefects) with contractual or tortious disputes, rather than to
26. See Kontchou: "Idéologie et In s t i tu t io n s  Po l i t iq ues "  in Dynamiques
et F i n a l i t és des D ro its Af r i c a in s ,  Par is 1980, ed. Gerard Onac, p. 442.
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the courts. The former are perceived to be more e ffec tive  (access to them 
is  ea s ie r, both geographically and f in a n c ia lly ) . Secondly, because the 
qua lity  o f the judges, p a rt ic u la r ly  o f the f i r s t  instance courts, is  not 
as high as i t  ought to be, they have not generally proven themselves to 
be equal to the task o f properly analysing the issues involved in 
standardized contracts. As the chapter on "unconscionability" shows, 
even h igh ly q u a lif ie d  judges have hot generally delivered satisfacto ry 
judgments in connection with such c o n t r a c t s . T h i s  leads to the th ird  
major c r it ic ism  of the co u rts 'in  dealing with standardized contracts.
Assuming away the problems of a c c e s s ib il ity  and legitimacy, courts 
s t i l l  do not come across as the best forum for dealing with standardized 
contracts. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  Lord W ilberforce in  Miliangoa v. George Frank 
(Textiles) L t d said the courts are unsuitable to deal with cases which 
involve more fa r reaching research than the courts can carry out. To make any 
proper determination on whether a standardized contract is  procedurally or 
substantively unconscionable, considerable economic analysis needs to 
be ca rried  out. In view of what has been said about the Cameroonian 
ju d ic ia ry  above, they c le a r ly  lack any fact gathering apparatus and they 
also lack the expertise to analyse economic facts adequately. The impact 
of monopoly or o ligopo ly power on standardized contracts has to be 
reckoned w ith. According to one commentator, the courts can at best look 
at the problem in terms o f unequal bargaining power, a method which "w ill
27. See for example, the House of Lords decision in Macaulay v. Shroeder 
Pub lishing Co., Ltd . , /1974 ; 1 W.L.R. 130 and the cr it ic ism s of that 
decision 1n Chapter Three.
See Note (21), supra.2 8 .
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rap id ly  degenerate in it s  applications into the crassest forms of ad 
hocery".*29) in the United States, i t  has been pointed out, "fifteen  
years o f l it ig a t io n ,  and learned commentary have fa ile d  to produce a 
set o f acceptable working rules for the application o f the unconscionability 
concept".
I t  has furthermore been seen that any discussion o f substantive 
unconscionability must be related to the determination of price. Because 
th is  requires expertise in economics and accountancy, a detailed knowledge 
o f the sort o f market w.ithin which the contract takes place, the courts are 
therefore manifestly t i l -suited for the determination o f such matters.
Another factor that imposes severe constraints on the courts in the 
handling of l it ig a t io n  a ris ing  from standardized contracts concerns the 
remedies open to the court to award. Le ff set th is problem out very 
ap tly  when he said: "One cannot think of a more expensive and frustrating  
course than to seek to regulate goods or 'contract q u a lity ' through 
repeated law su its  against inventive 'wrongdoers''.'^^ Courts have a very 
lim ited  number of remedies open to them. If a clause is  found by the court 
to be unconscionable, more often than not, the court's only option is  to 
have i t  struck from the contract without more. However, banning an offensive 
clause w i l l  not help buyers who assent to i t .^ ^  Indeed, the fact that
29. Trebilcock, "The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power." Post- 
Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords" (1976) 36 U.T.L.J. 359 at 385. 3012
30. Belobaba: "The Resolution of Common Law Contract Doctrinal Problems 
Through Leg is la tive  and Administrative Intervention" in Reiter and Swan: 
S tudies in Contract Law. (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) p.424 at 446.
31. Leff:"Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law 
T rad ition "(1970) 31 University of Pittsburg Law Rev. p. 349 at 356.
32. Schwartz."Seller Unequal bargaining Power and the Jud ic ia l Process" (1974) 
49 Indiana L .J . 391.
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there is  no halfway house between banning a clause completely and le tt in g  
i t  stand might prompt the court to choose the former option in sp ite o f the 
fact that i t  may re su lt in considerable unfairness to the stronger party.
An instance of th is  s ituation  is  Macaulay v. Shroeder Publish ing Co. Ltd 
The only other option open to the court would have been to uphold the 
disputed clause in it s  entire ty  which would have been un fa ir on the weaker 
party on the other hand.
The fa ilu re  o f the courts to provide more appropriate remedies stems 
from two premises. The, f i r s t  is  the age-old adage that courts do not make 
bargains for the parties.- Secondly and probably more importantly, the 
courts do not possess su ff ic ie n t knowledge about the market context of a 
contract to enable them to fashion su itab le  remedies. Where the unconscionable 
aspect o f a contract concerns d isclosure of terms, the courts are not in a 
position  to enforce any disclosure ru les they may deem necessary.
Because the courts proceed on a case-by-case approach, th e ir effectiveness 
is  indeed s t if le d .  Institu tions which are prim arily  reactive such as courts, 
requiring m obilisation by c it izen s  tend to deal with sp ec if ic  instances 
rather than general patterns, thus having l i t t l e  preventive capacity.
I t  is  for th is  reason that the French leg is la to rs  decided to remove 
consumer issues from the ambit o f ju d ic ia l control and to transfer i t  to 
an adm inistrative body. S im ila r ly , the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman, (with 
the Market Court) an adm inistrative agent, is  p rim arily  responsible for 
consumer protection. In Cameroon, in  view o f the fact that only an 
in fin ite ss im a l number of cases on unconscionable standardized contracts do
33. /1974; 1 W.L.R. 1308.
34. Black, D.J. "The M odllizatlon o f Law", (1973) 2 J. of Legal Studies,
125.
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reach the courts, the influence of the courts is  therefore neg lig ib le .
Professor Dawson, w riting  in 1947(35) 36aptly  sunmarised the problem 
in the follow ing terms: " I t  is  evident that the courts have neither the 
equipment nor the materials fo r resolving the basic co n flic ts  of modern 
society or the d is tr ib u tio n  o f the socia l product and the lim its  to be 
set to the use, or misuse, o f economic power. The issues involved in 
these co n flic ts  must be reserved., for the most part, fo r decisions by other 
means. The lim ited  range of ju d ic ia l action makes i t  no less important, 
however, that the issues raised in private l it ig a t io n  be co rrectly  
id en tified  and placed in proper perspective." Although he went on to 
assume that the courts are concerned about "excessive and un justified  
gains that are d ire c t ly  traceable to d isp a r ity  in bargaining power" he 
nevertheless concluded that: "This assumption does not involve any 
expectation that the methods o f private le g is la t io n  w il l be used to over­
haul the immense range of transactions invo lv ing the sale or exchange of 
goods and services 1n a competitive society. The factors that lead to 
ju d ic ia l abstention are themselves basic; but i t  is  time that they be 
examined.
Section II: Strategy for Reform:
Before sp e c if ic  proposals fo r law reform in connection with standardized 
contracts are dea lt w ith, one prelim inary point ought to be made. The 
c r it ic ism  has a l l  too often been made of law reform in African countries
\
35. Dawson," Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective."(1947) 45 Michigan
L. Rev. 253 a t 289.
36. Dawson, note (35) supra, p. 290.
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that reforms have often had consequences which have been at variance 
with the in terests o f the countries concerned. Law reform, Jolowicz wrote, 
requires examination o f the law as i t  operates in  socie ty, not examination 
of the law 's in ternal log ic  or theoretica l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e  
"d e s ira b ility  o f any law, ex isting  or proposed, is  to be judged in terms 
of i t s  consequences". " I t  requires empirical investigation o f the causal 
re lationsh ip  between laws and the ir soc ia l e f fe c ts , or proposed laws and 
the ir possible socia l e f f e c t s " . T h i s  cannot be achieved unless a law 
reform commission works, on the line s o f a de fin ite  theory. It  is  th is 
lack of a theory that'characterizes the lack o f consistency o f purpose that 
is  transparent in law reforms carried out by most African countries. The 
question then is ,  what theory should be adopted in Cameroon? I t  was argued 
in Chapter Two that in  th is  connection, there has been a s h if t  from Bentham's 
u t i l i t a r ia n  theory which held sway in Western European countries in the la te r 
part o f the nineteenth century to the view which prevails at the moment that 
weaker parties ought to be protected, 1.e. a lib e ra l theory of law reform.
In Cameroon, lik e  in most o f A fr ica , two objectives stand out. The f i r s t  is  
the need to achieve economic development, an objective which has been 
emphasized by Robert Seidman.^®^ In h is  book, "The State, Law and 
Development", he convincingly shows that c o lo n ia lis t  powers used contract 
law to fa c i l i t a te  the exp lo ita tion  o f the c o l o n i e s . H e  argues that the 
independent African states should use the law in the furtherance of economic 
development.
37. Jolow icz, J.A. "Fact Based C la ss if ica t io n  o f Law" 1n Jolowicz, J .A ., (ed), 
The D ivision and C la ss if ica t io n  of Law, p. 3.
38. Woodman, G., "A Basis for a Theory for Law Reform", Univ. of Ghana Law 
Rev. 1975, p. 5.
39. Seidman, R.B., The State, Law and Development (London, 1978).
40. Seidman, supra, Chapter 5.
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To th is  objective of economic development, should be added the 
concern fo r socia l ( i.e .  d is tr ib u tiv e )  ju s t ic e . I t  is  a t r i t e  observation 
that economic d isp a r it ie s  amongst ind iv idua ls are greater in A fr ica , than 
in the more developed Western countries. Because contract law is  p a rticu la r ly  
well su ited in implementing d is tr ib u t iv e  ju stice ,-be ing  concerned as i t  is  
with regulating exchange re lationships,^41  ^ law reformers in  Cameroon 
should consider th is  as an end in view in the elaboration o f any proposals 
on standardized contracts. • •
In the la s t chapter, th e 'le g is la t iv e  approaches o f four European 
countries to th is prob.lern was outlined. While one must necessarily  be 
mindful of the fact that "legal transplants p ra c t ic a lly  never work",^4^  
the methods used by these European countries provide invaluable ideas in 
the elaboration of s im ila r le g is la t io n  in Cameroon. Where appropriate, 
reference w il l also be made to the approaches by other A frican countries 
in th is connection. In view o f what has been said about the inadequacies 
of the courts in the f i r s t  section o f th is  chapter, one prelim inary remark 
must be made about the approach the Cameroonian law reformers should take.
Some of the foreign le g is la t io n  examined above, in pa rt icu la r the English 
Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 and the 1976 German law on general 
conditions of contract assume that the courts w il l continue to act pretty 
much as they have always done. Because of the demonstrated inadequacy of 
the Cameroonian courts, any new le g is la t io n  should necessarily  be sp e c if ic , 
deta iled and well drafted, designed to be in I t s e lf  a primary source of 
law, so as to be capable of being administered by an adm inistrative agency.
41 . See generally, Kronan, "Contract Law and D is tr ib u tive  Ju stice", 89 Yale
Law Journal, (1980).
42. See Seidman R .B., note (39) supra, at p. 34.
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The constitu tion  o f a law reform commission is  also a matter o f 
considerable importance. In Chapter One, the point was made that the 
Federal Law Reform Commissions established to prepare a Code of C iv il  
and Commercial Obiigationsin 1964 was constituted oddly enough, o f judges, 
advocates, trad it io n a l ch iefs and even re lig ious leaders, to the to ta l 
exclusion o f academics.- It is  submitted .that while the above mentioned 
members should be part of the law reform commission, pride of place should 
be given to academics both in law and in  other related d isc ip lin e s  such as 
economics and marketing. Only a combination of such persons can adequately 
examine the complex problem of unconscionability in standardized contracts.
Having disposed o f these prelim inary issues, i t  is  necessary to 
id en tify  the major problem areas to be dealt with. The f i r s t  obviously 
is  the problem o f i l l i t e r a c y  and the related problem of the general lack 
o f consciousness o f the rights o f the contracting parties. Secondly, 
certa in  types of contracts must be given special treatment in view o f the 
special problems they pose. These are cred it and hire-purchase contracts 
and also contracts fo r the sale o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce. These contracts 
do not only pose pa rticu la r problems, but they are of fundamental importance 
because they have a considerable impact on economic development. With 
regard to the rest o f standardized contracts, the problem of procedural 
unconscionability should be dealt with separately from that o f substantive 
unconscionability. F in a lly , the very important problem of enforcement w il l 
be looked at.
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A: The Problem of I l l it e r a c y  and Awareness o f Contractual R ights:
There are e ssen tia lly  two problems involved where an i l l i t e r a t e  
person is  a party to a contract. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  i f  i t  is  a w ritten contract 
(as standardized contracts often are), the contract may contain terms, such 
as exclusion , lim ita t io n  or penalty clauses,which the i l l i t e r a t e  party is  
ignorant about. Secondly, the v a lid ity  of ce rta in  contracts (as s tipu la ted  
by S.4 of the Statute o f Frauds 1677) may depend upon whether they are 
w ritten or not. In the French-speaking part o f  Cameroon, the problem was 
not addressed before independence". Because French law was app licab le only 
to the educated m in o r ity -  those who were given the status o f " c it iz e n " ;  
the problem was not acute. On accession to independence, the dual status 
of "c it iz e n "  and "indigene" was abolished, and French law was applicable to 
a l l persons, depending o f course on the nature o f  the transaction. In spite 
of the seriousness of th is problem in A fr ica , few countries have attempted 
to deal with i t .  Nigeria has an I l l ite ra te s  Protection Act,^43  ^ the p ith 
and marrow of which is  section 3 which provides:- "Any person who sha ll 
w rite any le t te r  or document at the request, on behalf, or in  the name of 
any i l l i t e r a t e  person sha ll also w rite on such le t te r  or other document his 
own name as the w rite r thereof and h is address; and h is so doing sha ll be 
equivalent to a statement - (a) that he was instructed to w rite such 
le t te r  or document by the person fo r whom i t  purports to have been w ritten 
and that the le t te r  or document fu l ly  and co rre c t ly  represents his 
in structions; and (b) i f  the le t te r  purports to be signed with the
43. The d iffe ren t Nigerian states have d iffe re n t I l l i t e r a te  Protection 
Laws, although they provide substan tia lly  the same provisions: 
I l l i t e r a te s  Protection Act (Lagos), cap. 83; I l l i t e r a te s  Protection 
Law (former E .R .), cap 64; I l l ite ra te s  Protection Law (former N.R.), 
cap. 51 ; I l l i t e r a te s  Protection Law (former W.R.), cap 47.
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signature or mark o f the i l l i t e r a t e  person, that p r io r to i t s  being 
so signed i t  was read over and explained to the i l l i t e r a t e  person, and 
that the signature or mark was made by such person."^44)
With regard to standardized contracts, i t  is.obvious that th is  
provision is  very lim ited . It  does, not cover unsigned standardized 
contracts although as pointed out .in Chapter Four, the Nigerian Courts have 
given some protection to i l l i t e r a t e  parties where exclusion clauses have 
not been explained to them. However, the courts have faced considerable 
uncerta in ties, p a rt ic u la r ly  with respect to the d e fin it ion  o f an I ll ite ra te .^ 45) 
In Cameroon, because there are two o f f ic ia l  languages, th is  is  ce rta in ly  a 
problem. A contracting party may be l it e ra te  in English, and not in French.
That was the case in Olabi Fayez V. Cie. Tnduetrielle d 'Automobile du 
Cccrip.roun. 4^5) There is  ce rta in ly  a case fo r enabling such a party to 
benefit from le g is la t io n  designed to protect i l l i t e r a t e s .  A lte rn a tiv e ly , 
there must be a provision requiring a l l  standardized contract forms to 
couch a l l  important contract terms in both French and English.
Although the in te re s t in  protecting i l l i t e r a t e s  is  very strong, i t  
must nevertheless be balanced with other equally important in te re s ts , such
(46b)
as the maintenance of ce rta in ty  in commercial transactions. One commentator 
on th is  problem holds the view that there should be a "presumption of 
equitable fraud" on the l i t e r a te  parties "to w ritten con tracts." This 
presumption would be rebuttable by evidence showing that the l ite ra te  party 
explained the terms o f the contract to the I l l i t e r a t e  party . . . " .  While
4 4 .  I l l i t e r a te s  Protection Law (former E.R.) cap. 64, S.3.
4 5 .  Nwogugu, E .I. "An Examination of the Position of I l l i t e r a te s  in 
Nigerian Law" Vol. 12, Journal o f African Law (1968-69), p. 33.
46. Su it No. HCSW/4/73, High Court, Buea (unreported).
4 6 b .  S . K .  Date-Bah " I l l i t e r a t e  Parties and Written Contracts", 3  Peview 
of Ghana Law (1971), p. 181
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one might understand the motive fo r holding such a view, i t  is  suggested 
that i t  is  too strong. I t  is  suggested that there must be a le g is la t iv e  
duty, based on public po licy  on lite ra te  parties to explain the terms of 
the contract to the i l l i t e r a t e  party. Moreover, th is  ¿uty sha ll be 
lim ited  to important contracts only. I t  is  common knowledge that most 
people (including i l l i t e r a t e s )  are conversant enough with day-to-day 
transactions, p a rt icu la r ly  when subject-matters o f such contracts are 
re la t iv e ly  unimportant. However, the case is  d iffe ren t in more complex 
transactions such as the sale of motor-vehicles, p a rt ic u la r ly  when these 
involve hire-purchase‘or cred it-sa les terms, or c red it  contracts. I t  is  
w ith respect to such contracts (the above examples are by no means 
exhaustive) that there must be a duty to explain the contractual terms 
to an i l l i t e r a t e  person. In th is  connection, there must a lso be a 
presumption that the dominant party to the contract, who proffers w ritten 
contract terms has knowledge o f the meaning and scope of the terms he 
p ro ffe rs. This w i l l  prevent such dominant parties from pleading th e ir  own 
i l l i t e r a c y  i f  they happen to be i l l i t e r a t e s  as is  often the case. The 
le g is la t iv e  provisions should also incorporate the requirement on a l l  
w rite rs  of documents to explain the documents to the i l l i t e r a t e  persons 
fo r whom they w rite , i .e .  a provision s im ila r to the above Nigerian 
provis ion. Fa ilu re to comply with the above should render the contract 
voidable.
Turning now to the question of awareness of r ig h ts , i t  is  obvious that 
th is  problem is  even more d if f ic u lt  to leg is la te  fo r because i t  hinges on the 
problem of the education of the public, an issue which cannot be dealt 
w ith so le ly  by leg is la t io n . The idea put forward by Professor Furmston,
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of introducing legal education to a l l  segments o f the soc ie ty , p a rt ic u la r ly  
to schools, is  too much to hope fo r in  the Cameroonian context fo r the 
simple reason that the material and human resources necessary to carry out 
such education is  absent. There is ,  however, a case (also put forward by 
Professor Furmston) fo r using the media: radio afld d a il ie s ,  in imbuing 
the pub lic a t large with th e ir  contractual r ig h ts , whether as consumers 
or as fanners and small businessmen. This so lution ha's also been put forward
in connection with consumer protection in  N igeria. (48)
A second and even more e ffe c tive  remeSy lie s  in  the creation o f 
in s itu t io n s  on the lin e s  of ¿onsumer associations,whose task i t  w i l l  be 
o f informing and advising the public on th e ir  contractual r ig h ts , as fa r 
as standardized contracts are concerned. While such in s t itu t io n s  can 
function properly in  urban areas, they w i l l  not be feasib le  in rura l areas 
where communities are small and dispersed. In those areas, co-operatives 
which already e x is t fo r the marketing o f cash crops could be used as 
centres fo r the dissemination o f such information. With respect to farmers, 
p a rt icu la r emphasis must be placed on informing them on the so rt o f terms 
they should expect in  contracts fo r the sale of ag r icu ltu ra l produce.
B: Leg is la tion  Appropriate to Special Contracts:
( i)  Credit Contracts:-
I t  is  ce rta in ly  not possible 1n a thesis o f th is nature to delve 
into the de ta ils  o f c red it and hire-purchase. Attention w i l l  be paid
47. Furmston, M.P., "Ignorance of the Law" Legal Studies, (1981), p.49.
48. See Kwessi Essein, Note (7), supra, at p. 21.
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essentia l ly  to the unconscionable aspects o f  these contracts, already 
examined in Chapter Four. C red it, i t  has been pointed out, is  of 
fundamental importance in  economic development.^^ The leg is la tu re  
must therefore ensure that c red it contracts are f a ir  to the weaker parties. 
Although the bulk o f c red it comes from banking in s t itu t io n s , an important 
part o f i t  is  provided by money-lenders. The contracts o f the la t te r , o ften ' 
very shady, must be regulated. The f i r s t  step in th is  d irection  would be 
to require them to be w ritten , specifying the in te re s t charged on other 
terms. The problem with such, coatracts (from my observations in Cameroon), 
is  that because these contracts are more often than not i l le g a l ,  both 
parties always contrive to avoid the courts. I t  is  debatable whether by 
de-crim ina lis ing  such contracts, the contracting parties w il l more read ily  
bring them to lig h t .
With regard to contracts by banking in s t itu t io n s , three particu la r 
types o f clauses were seen to be unconscionable. The f i r s t ,  used by the 
Cameroon Development Bank re lates to the d is t ra in t  o f debtors. By giving 
themselves a contractual r ig h t to impound the debtors goods without 
resorting to the courts, the banks could e a s ily  hold th e ir debtors to 
ransom. Such a term is  l ia b le  to abuse by the banks and i t  must not be 
allowed to stand in any c red it contract.
Secondly, most banks, as a few of the cases in Chapter Four revealed, 
have exceedingly stringent guarantee clauses, often in e ffe c t assim ilating 
the surety to a co-debtor, holding him p rim arily  responsible for the 
repayment of the debt.^49 50  ^ In the words of a Fonader. o f f ic ia l ,  "habituellement,
49. See generally, Rogers M. and A llo t t ,  A.N. "Introduction and Report of 
Proceedings: International Conference on Banking Law and Development 
in A frica  " J.A .L. (1975).
50. See for example, A f fa ire Eboumbou Moudom, Trib . de Gde. Instance,
Younde (198) unreported.
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les c lie n ts  trouvent nos garanties excessives."^51 5234) This makes many
Cameroonians wary o f standing as sureties to c red it con tracts, making i t
exceedingly d i f f i c u l t  fo r the less w e ll-o f f to obtain c re d it  (p a rticu la r ly
farmers and small businessmen). Guarantee clauses should be reasonable,
«
holding the surety only secondarily l ia b le  fo r the repayment o f the debt.
In order to deter banks from using unconscionable practices as was the 
case in  A lb e rt Ngafor v. Cameroon Bank L t d where the bank w itt in g ly  
detained the p la in t i f f 's  deed long a fte r he had repaid h is loan; or as 
in the case of Mofor Alexander v. Cameroon Bank Ltd. & O t h e r s , where 
the bank blocked the p la in t i f f 's  account even a fte r the loan fo r which he 
stood as surety had been repaid, provision should be made fo r  the payment 
of pun itive damages by the cu lp r its  o f such practices.
F in a lly , the contractual term, provided by the standard contract forms 
of most banks, g iving them the righ t to withdraw from a c re d it  c o n t r a c t^  
is  unconscionable inasmuch as i t  often puts the other party in a quandary 
and should not be allowed to stand.
Because c red it  contracts are very important, there must be procedural 
guarantees to ensure that the borrowers c le a r ly  understand the im plications 
of the terms of the contract. In th is connection a ru le , on the lines o f 
a r t ic le s  6 and 7 of the French law No. 78-22 of January 10th 1978 may be 
a d o p t e d . I t  may be reca lled  that those a r t ic le s  provide that a person
51. Ze' Ondoua, J.B. "System de Garantie du Cre'dit du Fonader (unpublished 
paper), Yaounde' 1981.
52. Su it No. HCB/3/79 of January 16, 1981, Bamenda High Court (unreported).
53. Su it No. HCB/15/80, A p ril 22, 1981, High Court, Bamenda (unreported].
54. A ffa ire  Pharmaci e Nnam c/ BICIC, Jugement No. 33 du 10 Septembre 1974, 
Yaounde' (unreported]"!
See Note (9), of Chapter 5, Section II.55.
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requ irlng a loan must make a pre lim inary o ffe r  ( in  a prescribed 
form). The o ffe r remains open fo r f if te e n  days; and a lso  that even 
a fte r acceptance by the lending in s t itu t io n , the borrower benefits 
from a seven-day cooling o ff period, during which he may withdraw 
h is o f fe r . Until the expiry of that period, neither party to the 
contract can enforce I t .  This provis ion would bene fit such parties 
who would otherwise h a s t ily  enter Into c re d it  contracts only to 
regret afterwards."
F in a lly , there should.be p ro v is ion .to  l im it  the penalty payable 
by the borrower In the event of a breach, fo r instance, in  the non­
payment of the loan. I t  may be reca lled  that Fonader exacts f ifte en  
per cent o f the to ta l sum len t. I t  1s submitted that th is  is  an 
exorbitant penalty. A r t ic le  2 of the French decree No. 78-373 o f  
17th March, 1978 l im its  i t  to e ight per-cent o f the unpaid loan.
This Is ce rta in ly  more reasonable. Although there Is d e f in ite ly  
a strong Interest In ensuring that loans are repaid, th is  should not 
be by holding the borrower 11n terrorem1. 1
(11) Hire-Purchase Contracts
Provisions applying to hire-purchase contracts should a lso apply 
to a l l  other types of c red it sa les. The p rin c ipa l unconscionable 
aspect here as the Cameroonian cases show turns on the p ractice of 
'snatch-backs'. The absence of any le g is la t io n  dealing with th is 
p ractice  means that the h ire r can se ize the good subject to the h ire - 
purchase contract (1n rest cases, the good Is a motor veh ic le ), 
Irrespective of the amount of the contract p rice that remains due.^56^
56. See for example, Mbah Mathias v. Joseph Tata, note 31, chapter Four.
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Many African countries have already enacted le g is la t io n  to deal with 
th is  s itua tion  and th e ir  examples are worth looking at. The 1965 
Nigerian Hire-Purchase Act, which came into force 1n October 1968 
applies to a l l  hire-purchase and c red it sale transactions invo lv ing 
goods whose to ta l price does not exceed N- 2,000 and also to a l l  
hire-purchase contracts invo lv ing motor vehicles regardless o f th e ir 
p r ic e . ' 1 Section 9 o f the Act provides that where 1n the case o f 
motor veh icles, the h ire r has paid up to_ th ree-fifths o f the h ire 
purchase p rice , or one h a lf  o f the price 1n the case o f other cha tte ls, 
the se lle r  can on ly dispossess the h ire r o f the goods under a judgement 
o f a court. Section 15 of the Kenyan Hire-Purchase Act a lso provides 
that where the h ire r has paid two-th1rds of the hire-purchase p rice , 
the owner can only recover the goods subject to the contract by 
court order. Margaret Rogers points out that two-th1rds of the h ire - 
purchase price w i l l  in most cases approximate to the fu l l  market 
value of the goods, allowing fo r d e p r e c ia t io n . T h e r e  1s therefore 
a case fo r providing that the amount above which the h ire r cannot 
automatically se ize the goods should be reduced 1n Cameroon to one-third 
of the tota l hire-purchase p rice . Although th is  might not please 
owners, 1t is  u n like ly  that they w il l refuse to deal on hire-purchase 
terms because most of th e ir sales (especia lly  with regard to the sale 
of motor veh icles and other expensive goods) are carried out by the use 
of hire-purchase contracts. A refusal to deal on hire-purchase terms
57. Section 1.
58. Rogers, M., "A Note on Hire-Purchase and Chattels Mortgage 1n 
Kenya", V o l. 19, J .A .L . (1975), p. 154 at 157.
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would mean a d ra s t ic  reduction of th e ir  sa les which they would 
ce rta in ly  not welcome.
Andrew H1cks^59  ^ pointed out that In N igeria , 1n order to 
circumvent the provis ion against automatic se izure, many motor 
vehicle dealers have used h ire  agreements Instead o f hire-purchase 
or c re d it  sales agreements. There 1s therefore a great deal o f 
weight to h1s proposal that statutory'standard contract forms should 
be used by se lle rs  1n order to fo re s ta ll the p o s s ib il it y  of circum­
venting the le g is la t iv e  provisions. Again, as with c red it contracts, 
there should be provis ion to deal with procedural unconsclonablllty.
In p a rt icu la r , the hire-purchase contract must contain terms c le a r ly  
s t ip u la t in g  the in te re s t payable, the net p rice  of the goods, and the 
tota l hire-purchase p rice  payable on the goods. A s im ila r provision 
Is enshrined in  a r t ic le  5 of the Sutedieh Coneumer Credit Act, 1977.
The provis ion o f a cool1ng-off period s im ila r  to that suggested In 
respect o f c re d it  contracts should a lso be considered, p a rt icu la r ly  
when the hire-purchase or c red it sale contract Involves a considerable 
sum. In add ition to these, provisions app licab le generally to sale of 
goods contracts generally (to be discussed la te r) sha ll also be 
applicable to contracts o f hire-purchase.
(111) Contracts fo r the sale of ag ricu ltu ra l products
The point has been made that ignorant farmers are often subject to 
unconscionable contracts by unscrupulous licensed buying agents. There 
Is a case In th is connection for providing that such contracts must be 
In w ritten  form, s t ip u la t in g  c le a r ly  the prices to be paid fo r d iffe ren t
59. H icks, A., "A Review of Some Aspects o f Nigerian Law of Consumer 
Cred it" (1975) 19 N .L.J. 41.
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grades of the produce; the method of grading the produce; and also 
the methods of weighing. Practices such as that o f Pamol (Cameroun),
S .A ., consisting in  reducing the weight o f produce for whatever 
reason^60) should not only be declared not binding on the farmers, 
but should also be declared i l le g a l .  Indeed, in view o f the 
fundamental importance o f these contracts on the live lihood  o f the 
bulk o f Cameroonians, there are strong reasons in favour of holding 
parties breaching such ru les c r im in a lly  responsible. Although 
making these contracts formal might be tTiought to be otiose in  view 
of the fa c t that most farmers are I l l i t e r a t e ,  th is  would however 
convey to the farmers the Importance of these contracts, thereby 
making them more a le r t  to ar\y overreaching by the buyer o f the 
produce.
I t  is  however conceded that with regard to these contracts, 
what 1s required above anything else 1s an e ffe c t ive  enforcement pro­
cedure to ensure that persons carrying out unconscionable practices 
are duly apprehended.
C: Leg is la tion  on Standardized Contracts Generally
Provisions under th is  heading deal with a wide gamut of standardized 
contracts such as contracts fo r the carriage of goods, the supply of 
water and e le c t r ic ity ,  service contracts, and sale of goods contracts.
60. See Chapter Four, sub-section C.
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( 1) Procedural Unconscionabilitv: The Important aspect here turns 
on the question o f non-disclosure or Inadequate d isclosure o f contractual 
terms, in p a rt icu la r , exclusion clauses.
In Braaeerieedu Cameroun v. Mokake Elali, I t  was seen that
the stronger party to the contract, the appellant brewers, w ilfu l ly  
eschewed delineating c le a r ly  the terms on which they were contracting. 
That enabled them to u n ila te ra lly  terminate the ir agreement with the 
respondent without incurring any l i a b i l i t y .  There is  therefore a 
great deal to be said. 1n favour o f re in fo rc ing  the importance of 
"form", p a rt icu la r ly  In important contracts ( th is  should apply where 
the contract Involves a sum which Is above f i f t y  thousand CFA francs 
(approximately one hundred pounds). Such standardized contracts must 
be In w rit in g , spe lling  out th e ir precise terms, and should be couched 
In ordinary language, rather than 1n arcane legal language.
There should be a general duty to d isclose a l l  relevant Information 
Involved In a contract, espec ia lly  exclusion terms, and the onus should 
be on the person re ly ing  on the contract (the dominant party to the 
contract) to prove that he had done a l l  that was necessary In d is ­
c losing  the contract terms. This 1s a feature of the le g is la t io n  o f the 
four European countries looked a t 1n the la s t  chapter.
The provision enshrined In Section 17(2) of the B r it is h  Fa ir 
Trading Act proscrib ing any practice l ik e ly  to mislead consumers Is 
also Interesting 1n th is  regard. A s im ila r  provision Is la id  down In 
the 1975 revised version o f the Suedieh Market Praotioee Aat, 1970$
61. C iv . Appeal No CASWP/14/79, 1980. Court o f Appeal, Buca 
(unreported).
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(a r t ic le  2). This re fers generally to advertisements and p u b lic ity  
given p r io r to the conclusion o f the contract. Such p u b lic ity  should 
be held to form an Integral part of the contract. This measure 1s 
designed to pro tect the naive and g u llib le  1n p a rt ic u la r who are often 
induced into entering Into contracts by flamboyant statements made by 
astute salesmen determined to press the ir goods o r services on them. 
This 1s o f p a rt icu la r importance in cgntracts fo r  the sale o f used 
cars where unknowledgeable buyers are led by salesmen in to buying 
worthless cars.
Important terms, such as exclusion clauses, which are not 
adequately brought to the notice of purchasers o f goods or services 
should not be Incorporated Into the contract. Standardized contract 
forms must also spe ll out the nature of guarantees given (In the 
case o f sale of goods), the mode of payment, the party responsible 
for serv ic ing  coirmitments, etc.
F in a lly , where the other contracting party 1s a consumer, or a 
weaker contracting party 1n comparison with the party putting forward 
the contract terms, the consumer or weaker party should benefit from 
a cool1ng-off period. This provision should however be lim ited  to 
Important contracts such as the sale of motor veh icles or other 
expensive Items. This provision has very many inconvenienceswhlch 
make I t  unsuitable to be applicable to some contracts. Not only 1s 
I t  time wasting, but 1t nay prove to be d i f f i c u l t  to apply 1n ce rta in  
contracts; for example, 1n service contracts, where the service has 
already been supplied. Even In contracts fo r the sale o f goods, there
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might be problems where the goods have already been used. Should the 
supplier o f a service or the s e l le r  be compensated? I f  so, then the 
e ffe c t o f the coo ling -o ff period w il l  be considerably diminished. If, 
on the other hand, no compensation 1s provided fo r, then one party w il l 
be un justly  enriched. However, d i f f ic u l t  these problems may be, they 
are not Intractab le. Nevertheless, th is provision should be lim ited 
to important contracts only.
I t  Is noteworthy that th is  provision is  ensirined In A r t ic le  1583 
(3), ru le 4 of the C ivil Code o f the Seychelles. The ru le provides 
that where a sale is  1n standard form "the contract shall only have 
binding e ffe c t 48 hours a fte r the document has been signed by the buyer. 
Until that time has elapsed the buyer is  e n tit le d  to avoid the contract".
I t  is  submitted however that 1n the case o f Cameroon, th is  period 
should be extended to a minimum of four days, considering the 
d if f ic u lt ie s  1n conmunlcatlon that e x is t 1n that country. The above 
provis ions, designed to protect weaker parties from procedural unconsclon- 
a b il lt y  in standardized contracts can be couched 1n a lim ited number of 
provis ions, thus avoiding a s u r fe it  of le g is la t iv e  proposals.
(11) Substantive Unconsdonabllity
In the chapter analysing the problem o f unconsclonablUty In 
contracts, the conclusion was reached that th is  problem Is much more 
complex than I t  Is commonly thought to be, consisting as 1t were, not 
only of the problem o f unconscionable contract terms, but also of 
unconscionable prices. Certain African legal scholars have also 62
62. See Chloros, A.G. Cod ifica tion  In a Mixed Ju risd ic t ion  (North 
Holland P-b. Co. 1977^
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begun to look at the problem from th is  perspective. Hence here, 
an attempt w i l l  be made to provide fo r the problem o f unfair 
contract terms and also to look at price control le g is la t io n .
In con tro lling  un fa ir contract terms, blanket provisions 
proh ib iting  un fa ir contract clauses, a method used 1n the English 
Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, are not appropriate 1n Cameroon, 
because they assume that they w i l l  b e -p r in c ip a lly  enforced by 
the courts. This approach has been used by the Papua New Guinea 
leg is la tu re . Section 7(1) o f the Fatrneee o f  Transactions Aat o f  
Papua New Guinea permits a court to re-open any contract which Is 
not genuinely mutual or which Is otherwise un fa ir to one o f the 
p a r t i e s . S i m i l a r l y ,  A r t ic le  1118 o f the C iv il  and Commercial 
Code o f the Seychelles provides: " I f  a contract reveals that the 
promise of one party Is, In fa c t, out o f a l l  proportion to the 
promise of the other, the party who has a grievance may demand Its  
resc iss ion ; provided that the circumstances reveal that some un fa ir 
advantage has been taken by one of the contracting parties. The loss 
to the party en tit led  to the action fo r les ion  shall only be taken 
Into account 1f I t  continues when the action 1s brought." The use­
fulness of such provision resides In the fa c t that I t  sets out a 
po licy  which enforcement In s titu tion s  w il l  have to abide by. I t  
Is however too general to be capable of being administered by an 
adm in istrative agency. 63
63. See Sprlvastava: "The Law Reform Commission: Farmers of 
Transactions B i l l " ,  Vo l. 15, The Malanaslan Law Journal 
(1977), p. 139.
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In the Cameroonian context, 1t seems preferable therefore to 
adopt a combination o f the German and French approaches to the problem. 
Under Section 10 and 11 o f the German law on Standard Contract Terms 
(1976) the use o f sp e c if ic  clauses Is prohib ited. Clauses appearing 
under S.10 o f that law are not unconscionable 'per se' but the ir 
v a lid it y  must be determined w ith in the context of the whole contract. 
Penalty and fo rfe itu re  clauses f a l l  under that section . Clauses 
under Section 11 are however unconscionable 'per se' and are absolutely 
proscribed. In Cameroon, clauses excluding l i a b i l i t y  fo r personal 
in ju ry  should f a l l  under such a provision. Also should be prohib ited, 
clauses g iv ing  one party the r ig h t to modify the contract price 
u n ila te ra lly .  Exclusion and lim ita t io n  clauses should be v a lid , only 
I f  they are not unconscionable. Any clause which purports to exclude 
a l l  warranties and guarantees 1n sale o f goods, should be prohib ited. 
This sha ll apply even to the sale of used cars.
In addition to the proscrip tion  of harsh clauses, there must 
be a provis ion requiring clauses defin ing the r igh ts  o f buyers. Such 
clauses should Include the warranties and guarantees given In sale o f 
goods contracts; clauses Indicating t im e-lim its fo r performance 1n 
service contracts In p a rt icu la r , clauses specifying maximum Interest 
rates payable In c re d it  and hire-purchase contracts. Spec ific  ce ilin g s  
fo r liqu ida ted  damages should also be Imposed. Needless to say, the 
above provisions are by no means exclusive. Furthermore the French 
provision requiring an adm in istrative body to review from time to time 
new standardized contract terms, and to p roh ib it these which f a l l  foul 
of the accepted standards of fa irness should be considered.
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Prlce Control Leg islation
Price control le g is la t io n  1n Cameroon provides an I llu s tra t io n  
of the desire to control unconscionablUty In contracts. This 1s 
a l l the more necessary because,as pointed out e a r lie r ,  the short 
supply of most goods and services puts the suppliers 1n a very strong 
pos ition , v is -a -v is  consumers In p a rt icu la r, a pos ition  which they 
are wont to e xp lo it to the ir advantage.
The existence of ju s t  a few firms 1n ce rta in  markets [for 
exanple, 1n the motor-vehicle business, SCOA and SHO (A fr icau to ] dominate 
the market). The Cameroonian le g is la tu re , l ik e  those o f other A frican 
countries has therefore, from very ea rly  years, sought to control 
predatory p ric ing , espec ia lly  as 1t can have detrimental e ffects on 
the economy.
Price control began In Cameroon, with the Law No. 63/LF/27, 
o f the 19th o f June 19b3,^64  ^ which established a regime of price 
contro l. In 1968, the then Federal Assembly passed a law (Law No. 
68/LF/22 of Noventer 18th 1968), delegating to the Federal Government 
the r ig h t to pass le g is la t io n  on prices. The d e ta ils  o f the numerous 
enactments w i l l  not be delved Into as the ir ana lys is would Involve 
points which are too technical to be capable o f being dea lt with here. 
This section w il l confine I t s e lf  to those aspects o f the enactments 
that a ffe c t standardized contracts.
64. This law, and other laws and regulations 1n th is  connection are 
found In: Handy V.E and Noubeyon E. "Nouveau Receull des Importants 
Textes sur la Regle'mentlon des P r lx , des Polds e t mesuresl 
(Yaounde, 1980).
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On a procedural le v e l, an Important M in is te ria l Order was 
passed 1n August 1971 (Arête' No. 782/MINFI/DCE/P) dealing w ith the 
p u b lic ity  o f prices In a l l consumer contracts. A r t ic le  1 o f the 
Order provides that any advertlsentent of consumer goods or services 
must mention the tota l price a consumer w il l e ffe c t iv e ly  have to pay. 
A r t ic le  2 states that any p u b lic ity  making mention of a reduction 
of the p rice  o f a good or service must state In percentage terms 
the value o f such reduction. A r t ic le  5 provides s im ila r requirements 
with respect to bargain sa les, 'clearance-sales and auction sa les. 
A r t ic le  21 of a 1964 M in is te r ia l Order on price control requires 
hotel and restaurant keepers, entrepreneurs o f transport services 
and supp liers o f other services to d isp lay th e ir rates and charges 
in places open to the general pub lic . Various a r t ic le s  In Law No. 
79/11 of June 30th 1979 also contain guarantees against procedural 
unconsclonablHty. A r t ic le  43 p roh ib its  any actions, Iso lated or 
concerted, by Individuals or firm s, designed to re s t r ic t  the supply 
of goods or serv ices, or to Increase the ir p rices. Section II of 
the law provides that a l l  sales must be evidenced by a re ce ip t, 
Ind icating the price a t which the goods or services are sold. Section 
IV o f the same law deals with hire-purchase and c red it  sale trans­
actions. A r t ic le  46 provides that 1n such sa les, the s e lle r  must 
de live r to the buyer, a signed copy of the terms of the sa le . A 
dup lica te  copy of such terms must a lso be kept by the s e lle r  fo r at 
lea st three years a fte r the conclusion of the contract.
These provisions are Indeed Important and they go a long 
way towards meeting some of the proposals put forward 1n the la s t  
section. They are not nearly enough however. They should be extended
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to take account of the proposals re la t in g  to d isclosure already put 
forward.
The substantive provisions on p rice  control in Cameroon 
consis t e s se n t ia lly  in placing goods under three d iffe ren t categories, 
and in  a ttr ib u t in g  to each category a p a rt ic u la r  method of determining 
p rices. These categories are (a) essentia l goods (such as foodstuffs 
and other necessaries), (b) heavy and.bulky goods (bu ild ing materials 
fo r example), and (c) luxury goods (jewelry fo r Instance). D iffe rent 
p ro f it  margins are allowed to the s e lle rs  o f these goods. The base­
lin e  fo r the determination o f the p ro f it  margins 1s the gross cost 
of the goods 1n question; In the case o f imported goods, th e ir cost, 
insurance, f re ig h t  and other warehouse and transport charges, and 
in the case o f home-product goods, the manufacturers'or producers' 
p rices. Furthermore d iffe ren t p ro f it  margins apply depending on 
whether the s e l le r  1s a wholesaler or re ta ile r .
In add ition  to these general p rov is ions, spec ific  le g is la t io n  
has been enacted to deal with pa rt icu la r businesses. M in is te ria l 
Order No. 14/MINEP/DPPM, of March 4th 1977 regulates the sales of 
pharmaceutical products. Another Order, No. 006/MINDIC/DC/82 deals 
with a c t iv i t ie s  re lated to the automobile Industry. A r t ic le  4 of 
th is  order provides that the maximum charge per hour fo r the repair 
of vehicles Is one tnousand CFA francs, l .e .  about £2 per hour.
65. Deta ils are spe lt out In Decree No 69/DF/409 of October 2nd 
1969.
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Another order passed 1n 1971, Order No. 96/MINFI/DCE/P2 deals with 
the sales of spare parts fo r veh icles.
Law No. 79/11 o f 30th June 1979 deals with the sanctions 
applicable to any party who 1s 1n breach o f the above provisions.
There are two types o f sanctions provided for: ju d ic ia l and 
adm inistrative. Any Infringement of the provisions designed to 
deal with procedural unfairness 1s punishable by a fine o f between 
5,000 and 50,000 CFA-francs ( l.e .  between approximately £10 and £100 ). 
Besides, any person breaching those provisions may be c r im ina lly  
lia b le  and may be given a prison sentence of between f iv e  and fifte e n  
days. In the case of a breach of any of the substantive provis ions, 
a tine of at lea st 10,000 CFA francs Is levied (approximately £20).
In the case o f pers is ten t offenders, the fin e  1s doubled and they 
may face a prison sentence of up to two years. The court also has 
powers to close the defau lting party 's  business premises.
There are a lso  adm inistrative sanctions which, more often 
than not, are the app licab le  sanctions. Where an enforcement 
o ff ic e r  establishes that a party is  In breach of the above provis ions, 
he f i l l s  1n a report (1n standard form) to th is e ffe c t, which the 
defau lter signs, and exacts a compromise fin e . The fin e  varies with 
the amount o f the p rice  I l l i c i t l y  charged. In the case of a pers istent 
offender, the enforcement authority may close the offender's business 
fo r three months (renewable once) even without recourse to the courts. 
This appears to be rather d rastic  from the point of view of se lle rs
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and natura lly  enough I t  has led to considerable l i t ig a t io n J 66*
The enforcement o f the p rice  control le g is la t io n  1s dealt 
w ith by agents o f the P rice  Control Department (attached to the 
M in is try  of Econoniy and P lanning), who must take an oath 1n the 
Court of F ir s t  Instance before exercising th e ir  duties. The price 
co n tro lle rs  are fo r the most part graduates from the Faculty o f Law 
and Economics o f the Un iversity  o f Yaounde. Theyact e ith e r on the ir 
own In it ia t iv e  or on complaints by consumers.
/  '  -  a M
The enforcement o f p rice control le g is la t io n  has been quite 
e f fe c t iv e , p a rt ic u la r ly  In the urban areas. In one c it y  alone,
Yaounde, over 450 m illio n  CFA francs were paid In as fines In 1980.
The highest f in e  paid by a s ing le  firm  on a given occasion was 
1,101,000 CFA f r a n c s . M o r e  importantly, the vigorous adm inistrative 
enforcement has succeeded 1n I n s t i l l in g  an awareness among the business 
community and consumers that the state machinery w il l protect the la t te r  
against predatory p r ic in g , something the courts could never achieve.
The major lacuna o f the le g is la t io n  1s that 1t does not 1n 
any way provide fo r compensation to those who have paid unconscionable 
p rices for goods or serv ices. Be that as I t  may, I t  1s contended that 
1t 1s a step In the r ig h t d ire c t ion . A ll that 1s required Is fo r 1t to 
be Incorporated 1n more comprehensive le g is la t io n , dealing with the wide 
ambit o f unconscionable terms, practices and prices outlined In th is 
chapter.
66. In Tengo Stan is las v. The Prov incia l Chief of Service, Price Control, 
B a m e n d a . SuTt No. HCB/37/H, 1979, Bamenda High Court; the High 
Court refused to quash an order taken by a price control o ff ic e r
to close a shop.
67. Interview with Mr. Nsom Eba, P rice Control Department, Yaounde,
July 24th 1981.
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D. Enforcement
I t  Is t r i t e  to remark that however well conceived and 
drafted le g is la t io n  may be, i t s  impact u ltim ate ly hinges on the 
effectiveness o f i t s  enforcement!. This is  p a rt icu la r ly  so w ith 
regard to the strategy outlined above. I t  has been exhaustively 
argued that because o f the complexity o f the Issues Involved, and 
also because of the Intractab le problems of access to courts, the 
la t te r  are not su itab le  fo r the enforcement of the above proposals.
This point o f view 1s, Increasingly gaining ground even in the 
developed countries.* I t  has been seen that France and Sweden have 
moved in th is  d ire ction . Although i t  is  not proposed that the 
ju r is d ic t io n  of the courts should be en tire ly  ousted 1n th is  
connection, 1t is  submitted however that they should be relegated 
to the second place, while primary re sp on s ib ility  fo r enforcement 
should be attributed to an adm inistrative agency.
The Infrastructure of such an agency already ex ists  in the 
Department of P rice Contro l, attached to the M in istry  o f Econorny and 
Planning. This Department 1s already very decentra lized, with 
o ff ic e s  in  each head town of a l l  the adm inistrative decisions In 
the country. Its personnel are well trained and quite e ffe c tive  1n 
price control already. They have been dealing with businessmen, 
farmers and consumers fo r the past twenty years which has given them 
invaluable experience which has never been acquired by court o f f ic ia ls .  
Because o f the legal tra in ing  most o f them have acquired they are 
very conversant with contractual documents. The control o f standardized 
contract terms w il l  simply be added to the ir task of con tro lling  prices.
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The procedure la id  down in Ordinance No. 72/18 of 17th October 1972, 
should a lso  govern the enforcement o f the proposed le g is la t io n . I t  
empowers the co n tro llin g  agents to c a ll on a l l  types of businesses 
and to demand any relevant Information. Ind iv idua ls may also lay th e ir 
complaints to the agents who must act on such complaints. A ll that is  
required is  a reinforcement o f the ex is t in g  enforcement machinery which 
already has a wealth o f knowledge 1n th is  connection and also a sound 
fac t-f ind ing  machinery.
Another important In s t itu t io n  which could be copied In
Cameroon Is that o f ‘ thé Consumer Ombudsman, an o ff ic e  created by
the Swedish Market Court Act, 1970. Date-Bah has also suggested
that such an o ff ic e  should be created In Ghana In connection with
the control o f unconscionable c o n t r a c t s . T h e r e  has been a lo t
of controversy whether the o f f ic e  of an ombudsman 1s desirable In
most A frican  states. I t  Is contended that because most of them are
one-party states (as Indeed Cameroon 1 s), the Ombudsman w il l simply
be a servant of that party, thereby reducing h is e ffec tiveness.^ 9^
I t  1s not however necessary to go Into the merits o f th is  claim
1n as much as the nature and functions o f the type of Ombudsman being proposed 
are d iffe ren t from those
whose function 1s to act as an adm in istra tive watch-dog, the "grievance 
man", checking the high-handedness o f bureaucratic Institu tions.^ 7^
68. Date-Bah, S.K. "Leg is la tive  Control o f Freedom of Contract"
Damets and Woodman, (eds.) Essays 1n Ghanaian Law, (Fac. o f Law, 
Un iversity o f Ghana, 1976) p. 131.
69. Prof. M lttlebee ler, E.V. Correspondence -"The Ombudsman In Africa"
9 J .A .L . (1965) p. 134.
70. H i l l ,  L.B. The ModeJ_Ojrt>udsman (Princeton Unlv. Press, 1976)p.3.
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I t  may be reca lled  that the Swedish Consumer Ombudsman's duty Is 
e ssen tia lly  to receive and investigate complaints w ith  respect to 
breaches o f the Swedish Contract Terms Act. He does not necessarily 
come into c o n f l ic t  with the government except 1n so fa r  as the business 
concerned is  state owned. His functions are therefore fa r removed 
from those o f the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the J.O . I t  Is with 
respect to the la t te r  In s t itu t io n  that the debate about whether an 
Ombudsman can function e ffe c t iv e ly  1n A frica  has taken place. To 
be sure, a Consumer Ombudsman 1n CameroonwouId Inevitab ly  have to 
take on state owned‘corporations, fo r example, the sta te  owned National 
Railway Company or the E le c t r ic it y  Board. However, because he deals 
with purely technical m atters,ie ihe protection o f users o f services 
these companies provide, rather than with Issues with are overtly  
p o l i t ic a l ,  1t 1s hoped that the fact that he Is appointed by the 
government would not seriously  a ffe c t h1s effectiveness.
The Consumer Ombudsman should oversee the app lica tion  of 
le g is la t io n  designed to protect weaker parties to standardized con­
trac ts , and a lso  to propose amendments to such le g is la t io n  whenever 
desirab le . As In Sweden, he should be given powers to Issue Injunctions 
against businessmen who use contract terms which are prohibited by 
le g is la t io n .
Another o f h is functions should be to co-ordinate programmes 
designed to educate the pub lic , p a rt icu la r ly  those 1n rural areas, 
about the ir contractual r igh ts .
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Thls in s t itu t io n  does not yet e x is t  in  ar\y A frican  state.
The Tanzanian Permanent Commission o f Enquiry fo r example 1s akin 
to the Swedish J.O ., rather than the Consumer Ombudsman. I t  1s 
therefore an o ff ic e  which could be Institu ted  In other A frican countries. 
Both types o f Ombudsmen however are necessary because trad it ion a l forms 
o f control against unconscionable practices o f government and the 
business community have fa ile d .
F in a lly , the consumer could act as an advocate fo r weaker 
partie s  requring sp ec if ic  redress from tfie courts. This function 
should however be s t r ic t ly  lim ited  to only very deserving cases 
(preferably where the p la in t if f s  are peasants, too poor and ignorant 
to hold the ir own in any event).
Because the thrust o f the le g is la t iv e  proposals given above 
is  to protect weaker partie s , rather than to compensate them, the 
courts should continue to adjudicate on cases stemming from standardized 
contracts where sp ec if ic  redress Is sought. Hence, there Is s t i l l  room 
fo r  enforcement of the proposed le g is la t io n  by the courts.
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Conclusion
I t  is  hoped that th is  thesis has shown how much out of touch the 
law of contracts as practised in Cameroon is  with economic and soc ia l 
conditions that prevail in the country. Given the importance of the 
law of con tracts, both as an instrument fo r the Idealization of soc ia l 
ju s tic e  and a lso as an instrument fo r the furtherance of economic 
development, th is  fac t ought to generate serious concern and attempts 
must be made to correct th is  s itua tio n .
The fa ilu re  of the Cameroonian courts must be acknowledged in 
order that a lte rna tive  dispute reso lution in s titu t io n s  be created.
In th is  fa i lu re ,  the courts of the French law and the common law 
trad it io n s  stand on the same footing. As was seen in Chapter Four, 
the fa c t that they fo llow  d iffe ren t approaches to standardized contracts 
has not however resulted in substan tia lly  d iffe ren t re su lts .
This thesis has attempted to explain that fa ilu re . Since 
continuous deference to English and French law concepts has not brought 
about the desirab le changes in th is  area of the law (the same can be 
said of many other areas), the time has therefore come fo r Cameroonian 
law reformers to undertake a lo t  of fresh thinking in connection with 
standardized contracts. In th is  respect, proposals which may guide 
the Cameroonian law reformers have been stated here. These proposals 
have been drawn from the current analysis of the notion of "unconscion- 
a b il it y "  and also from modern pieces of le g is la t io n  dealing with 
standardized contracts by other countries, bearing in mind always, the 
p a rt icu la r circumstances of Cameroon.
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e t .s .
Gaz. Pal. 
J.C.P./Sem. Jur. 
J.O.
L.G.D.J.
L .  Q.R.
M. L.R.
N. /no.
P.U.F.
Rev. trim , dt.^clv. 
Rev. trim . dt. com. 
S.A.
Somm.
B u lle t in  C iv il 
Cassation chambre c iv i l  
^.Cassation chambre commercial 
Chronique 
Code c iv i l
Cambridge Law Journal 
Cambridge Un iversity  Press 
Dalloz
Dalloz périodique 
Dalloz socia l 
e'dition 
et suivant(es)
Gazette du Pa la is
Semaine ju rid ique (Ju risc lasseu r périodique) 
Journal o f f ic ie l
L ib ra ir ie  generale de d ro it et de jurisprudence 
• Law Quarterly Review 
Modqrn Law Review
«
numero
Presse un ive rs ita ire s  de France 
Révue tr im e s tr ie lle  de d ro it c iv i l  
Revue tr im e s tr ie lle  de d ro it commerial 
Société Anonyme 
Sommaires.
